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THE

HISTORY OF ROME.

PHILADELPHIA :
CAREY, LEA & BLANCHARD.
1837.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

IN a field where the labors of eminent foreign historians have rendered originality a difficult feat and a doubtful merit, it behoves a writer not affecting novelty to name his principal sources and authorities. This has been done, in case of occasional reference, at the foot of the pages. The authors from whom more important points have been abstracted are, in the First Book, Niebuhr, in his third (untranslated) volume; Wachsmuth;* and Heeren, in his chapters on Carthage.† But the largest contributions have been drawn, throughout the volume, from the great work of Professor Schlosser of Heidelberg;‡ and the views of manners and literature will be recognised by the German student as (it is hoped useful) selections from that author. A neglected book, the *Scienza Nuova* of Vico,§ has deserved acknowledgment long before the date of this notice, as throwing a strong original light on the early portions of Roman history, and the primitive relation between patricians and plebeians.

* Die altere Geschichte des Romischen Staates, &c. Halle, 1819.

† Ideen, &c.

‡ Universalhistorische Uebersicht der Geschichte der alten Welt und ihrer Cultur. Von F. C. Schlosser, &c. &c. Frankfurt am Main, 1828—30. A work altogether unknown to the English, and hitherto only known to the French reader through the medium of a wretched translation. If such a work had appeared in France or in this country, it would instantly have employed half the translating and critical pens of Germany.

§ An abridged translation of this work has been published in Paris by M. Michelet with an excellent prefatory "Discours sur le Systeme et la Vie de Vico."

[This work was published in London, in two Vols. as a part of Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopaedia.—*American Publishers.*]

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HISTORY OF ROME.

BOOK I.

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE END OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

CHAPTER I.

ETRUSCAN, LATIN, AND SAMNITE LEAGUES BEFORE THE ROMAN ERA.

AN opening dissertation on each of the native tribes and foreign settlements which, in ages without authentic record, formed the population of Italy, would be perhaps an introduction too ambitious for the limited design of the present history. It may suffice to make introductory mention of three extensive national leagues, not only as forming the most powerful, and, before the Roman era, the most flourishing and civilised states, but as affording traces of these features by which the Roman character was principally distinguished in the days of its unexhausted vigor.*

Of these three federal unions in Italy previous to the Empire of Rome, and whose several constituent parts became at length embodied with it, the Etruscan league has the first claim to attention. This again was divided into three several branches; the northern and most ancient extending between the Alps and the Appennines, over the regions afterwards known as Cisalpine Gaul, the second being situate in Etruria Proper, the third in Campania.

It may safely be inferred from Etruscan relics extant, that a civilized people, with a language, religion, and government of its own, elevated Etruria Proper at least to a state more flourishing than it ever enjoyed afterwards under the Roman domination. Niebuhr, indeed,

* The *Tuscans* are alluded to by Persius (Sat. iii. 28.) as forming a parent stock of the Roman people; which Dionysius confirms, so far as regards the formation of their language. Florus, besides, expressly says, that the combination of the best institutions and bravest hearts from amongst the Etruscans, Latins, and Sabines, composed the strength of the Roman body politic. "Quippe quum populus Romanus, Etruscos, Latinos, Sabinosque miscuerit, et unum ex omnibus sanguinem ducat, corpus fecit ex membris, et ex omnibus unus est." Flor. lib. iii. cap. 18.

has shown, that the social system of this people was not of the most happy description. It formed an aristocratic hierarchy, in which a patrician caste, who alone had access to the will of the gods, (manifested by signs of which they monopolised the interpretation,) ruled over a multitude of serfs, like the *Penestæ* of Thessaly*, or of peasants as submissive as serfs in obedience to the divine will. But Niebuhr sometimes seems to forget that our sources of intelligence do not reach back to the brightest days of Etrurian prosperity, but embrace only a period when the bonds of union had been slackened, morals depraved, and religion shorn of its influence. At the time when Rome begins by degrees to make a figure in history, the whole Etruscan league had lost its energies. Luxury had followed in the train of wealth and commerce, and piracy itself had become a regular branch of trade. Intercourse with Greece had induced a change in the modes of thinking and living, while the old established hierarchy did not admit of modifications corresponding with the state of the times. Owing to these circumstances, the way may be said to have been clear for the extension of the Roman power in Etruria, even before Rome herself had become sufficiently powerful to aim at reducing the towns of the Latin and Tuscan leagues under her empire.

The Etruscan institutions seem to have stood in close connection with the number of their twelve principal deities, to whom, in earlier times, human sacrifices were offered. We find the number twelve recurring every where. Twelve towns always composed a federal state; twelve nobles constituted* the priesthood of the *Antheriates*; and even many Roman regulations again present the mystical number twelve. Of the northern and southern Etruscan leagues, we have few trustworthy memorials; but with regard to that in Proper or Royal Etruria†, we know with certainty that it consisted of twelve towns, each constituting a state of itself; that general assemblies were held in the neighborhood of Volsinii, in the temple of the goddess *Voltumna*; and that, in critical emergencies, a king, or rather a regent, spiritual and temporal, was elected for a certain time as head of the whole confederation. This regent, like the Roman kings, presided at all sacrifices and other public offices of the region; watched over

* οἱ δυνατωτάτοι τοὺς τεύεστας ἐπαγομένοι Dionysius, ix 5.

† The *Etruscan league* is described as follows in Beauforts's *Republique Romaine*, vol. i. p. 67:—

"On sait que ces peuples, reunis par une confederation generale, etaient presque toujours divises par des interets particuliers, et que l'esprit de faction met-tait la desunion au point d'en venir á des actes d'hostilite les uns contre les autres.

"C'etait une ligue ou alliance defensive, dont tous les membres etaient independans et pouvaient faire des alliances particulieres, pourvu qu'elles ne fussent pas contraires aux conditions de la confederation generale. Chaque ville ou canton envoyait ses deputes aux etats de la nation, et c'etait la qu'on deliberait sur les interets des corps de la nation, et que se prenaient les resolutions. Quoique la pluralite des suffrages y fut suivie, il parrait que lorsque le corps de la nation s'engageait dans une guerre que quelque canton particulier n'approuvait pas, ce canton pouvait rester dans la neutralite sans etre oblige de fournir de contingent malgre lui."

the maintenance of ancient manners and usages; had cognisance of all minor judicial transactions, and the right to call assemblies of the patricians, and regulate public affairs with their concurrence. On him devolved also the executive part of the ordinances made by the patrician senate, as well as the command of the army in war-time. It was from these kings, or *lucumos*, or whatever other title belonged to them, that the Romans derived* the purple robe, the golden crown, the curule chair, the eagle sceptre, the fasces and the axe of the lictors—all which insignia were transmitted from the royal to the republican authorities.

The second people which flourished before the Roman era in Italy, and whose ancient vigor went to establish that of the ascendant state, were the Latins. As all that is recorded of the Arcadian immigration of Hercules and Cacus, of Æneas and the Trojans, belongs to the province of mythology and poetry, and not of regular history, it may be sufficient to notice generally the flourishing state of the Latin region before the Roman era. Latium would seem to have at no time been more populous, at no time to have offered an aspect of opulence more widely diffused, than at the period which precedes authentic history. Thirty Latin municipalities existed in a country which is now in the most deplorable condition; three and twenty populous places are said to have been situated where the atmosphere is now poisoned many a league by the Pontine marshes.† Under the Roman empire, the prosperity of Latium exhibited only the vast and unwieldly wealth of a few families, side by side with the squalor of a corrupt and dissolute populace, and the wretchedness of innumerable slaves.

A confederation of small states existed in Latium, similar to that which has been already described in Etruria. The larger towns, so far as their supposed traces may be relied on, were always placed on heights, crowned by a citadel, and gradually extended their domains around the central eminence. The mode of building, the massive and gigantic scale of the walls, exhibit the same architecture already remarked among Etruscans. Ruins like these also unequivocally indicate similar, if not so powerful, hierarchial establishments. Under the sway of such establishments only could enormous works of this kind have

* Livy says (lib. i. c. 8.) that Romulus adopted the lictors from the Etruscans: --“unde sella curulis, unde toga prætexta sumpta est, numerum quoque ipsum ductum placet, et ita habuisse Etruscos, quod ex duodecim populis communiter creato rege, singulos singuli populi lictores dederint.”

† The *Pontine Marshes*, during the dominion of the Latins, are thus contrasted, by Micali, with their state at the present day:—“Per opera d'una diligente industria la maremma Pontina, soggetto di curioso esame per naturalisti, ed i politici osservatori delle rivoluzioni umani, vede vasi ridotta nello stato di un florido ed ubertoso territorio, cui si alzavano ventitre grosse terre mentre di nostri giorni dopo tanti secoli et tanti sforzi, non ha potuto mutare finora lo squalido aspetto d'una malsana palude.”—*Micali*, vol. i. p. 161.

Against this account must be cited the authority of Niebuhr, who states (vol. iii. p. 353.) that it is physically impossible the Pontine marshes ever can have gone through any other transition than merely from a reservoir of water to a morass. The legends of towns having there existed and perished, he treats as purely fabulous.

been practicable. It will be seen, in the course of our history, that the Latin constitution bore considerable resemblance to the Tuscan. The bond of union between the several states was equally loose, and the deficiency of concert in their measures equally ruinous. Many monuments extant seem to indicate the celebration of certain sacrificial and festal rites in common, by the Latins, Tuscans, and Samnites.*

A national league extended over the whole range of the Apennines, probably consisting chiefly of tribes having a common origin. Of this league the Samnites formed the vital core and centre. Even after its dissolution, the primitive Samnite character was preserved throughout the whole Roman history, in the habits of the Vestini, Marsi, Peligni, Marrucini, and Frentani. The Sabines, also, sprang from the same race, and continued to maintain the good old usages in the highest vigor, even after kindred tribes had split into bands of robbers.

The national religion, like that of the Latins, was closely connected with the labors of agricultural and pastoral life. Of the national and religious festivals, those held in Cures were renowned above all the others. The Samnite, like the Etruscan, institutions were based on aristocracy and religious ceremonial. But aristocracy among the Samnites was not begirt with slaves and vassals: worship was ruled by written prescriptions, not by the caprice of patrician collegest, veiling in oral tradition their mysterious art and science. Inhabiting a hilly country, they scattered themselves through numerous villages, instead of being crowded together in towns. The few towns which existed lay in the most inaccessible fastnesses of a region every where rugged in its character. The whole mountainous tract of the Matese, situate in the highest range of the Apennines, and covered with snow during part of the year, was then turned into arable or pasture by the labors of a hardy and contented race, and peopled to an extent almost incredible.

The Samnite aristocracy was unlike that of the Tuscans and Latins, as the Samnite population knew no luxury. Domestic slavery either was wholly unknown, or at least rare; every one performed his own labor, and all were closely united by reciprocal necessities. Political and religious institutions, in many points, coincided with those of the Latins and Etruscans, and perfectly served the purposes to which they were afterwards turned by the Romans; who readily adopted, in their civil and religious arrangements, the best parts of those of the three primitive nations of Italy.

According to Strabo and Stobæus, marriages among the Samnites

* The worship of the *Dea Feronia*, described by Dyonysius (l. iii. c. 32.) conceals the existence of rites in common between these primitive nations. "There is a mode of worship (*ἱερος*) common to the Sabines, and Latins, which is held in high veneration. The deity which they worship in common is called *Dea Feronia*. This is translated by those who attempt to render it into Greek *Θεὸς Ἀνθηφόρος*, by others, *Φιλοστήφανος*, by others again, *Περσεφόνη*."

† "Ibi ex vetere libro linteolecto sacrificatum, sacerdote Ovio Pactio quodam homine magno natu, qui se id sacrum petere affirmabat ex vetusta Samnitiū religione."—*Liv. Ann.* l. x. c. 38.

were contracted under the eye of the authorities. The youths were assembled at certain epochs for that purpose, and subjected to examination by public censors. The most deserving were privileged to make a selection amongst the virgins, and others were provided with wives under suitable regulations. The highest and lowest cultivated the soil with their own hands, and the institution of an agricultural priesthood (*fratres aruales*) was borrowed by the Romans from the Samnites. This fraternity was not wholly engrossed with formal rites, but engaged in the scientific practice of agriculture.* Virgil, in a well-known verse, derives vine-cultivation in Italy from the service performed to the deity of the Sabines.†

The Samnite league, in this respect, resembles that of the Latins and Tuscans, that the several tribes might each contract separate alliances. But the bond which held them together was never so feeble as in the other leagues, and the members of their confederation, even singly, were capable of formidable resistance to an external enemy. The Sabines at an early period severed themselves from the league, and entered into close union with Rome. Their uncorrupted morals, firmness, piety, and rectitude, gained power and reputation for the infant state amongst those around it; and the Sabine virtue furnished the Roman poets with the richest theme for eulogy of their forefathers.

* The forms observed by the *fratres aruales* were discovered engraved on marble tablets, in 1778, in clearing out the foundations of the sacristy of St. Peter's, in Rome.

† ——— paterque Sabinus
Vitisator, curvamque ferens sub imagine falcem.

CHAPTER II.

ROME UNDER THE KINGS.

THE origin of the city of Rome, and its earliest institutions must entirely be assigned to the province of legend. The succeeding era of kingly government is also wholly legendary, and even among the oldest monuments extant of the Latin language, it is difficult to regard any as referable to this period. But if we would trace chronologically, and view connectedly, the growth of the original institutions, and of the power of Rome, from the primitive times, we must accept, notwithstanding their apocryphal character, the recorded names, the leading events and dates of successive dynasties.

The new town, whoever may have founded it, appears from the legend of Romulus and Remus, as belonging neither to the Samnite, nor the Latin, nor the Etrurian league, while it not only lies contiguous to the three confederations, but also stands in connection with all three. In Alba Longa, one of the capital cities of the ancient Latium, Romulus and Remus were born, and on one of the seven hills by the Tiber, they preluded with Etruscan auguries * the building of a new town †, which a few years after its foundation, acquired increased importance, or rather rose to independent existence, by the rape of the Sabine virgins ‡; and soon afterwards, by the reception of a considerable number of Sabines, as comrades and co-burghers. This tradition tallies exactly with the geographical situation. In those times the Sabines and Samnites were pressing down upon Latium and the Campanian plains. North of the Tiber was Tuscan land. Thus, without ascribing to legends more historical weight than they deserve, a glance at the map renders it easily conceivable how a mixed town population should form itself in this corner of Latium.

The Latin and Tuscan regulations, described in a former chapter, recur to view in the first annals of Rome. A patrician senate, a priesthood held exclusively by the nobles, guided and governed all public affairs. An elective chief stood at their head, the *lucumo* or dicta-

* The number of *twelve* vultures seen by Romulus is Etruscan, as also is the yoking of a cow and an ox together, the circuit of the city with a plough, the lifting of the plough (*porta*), the *pomarium*, and, finally, the *mundus*. (See Appendix.)

† The *Building of Rome*, according to Dionysius, Varro, and Plutarch, took place on the 24th or 23d year after the first Olympiad, which again is assumed as the year 776 B. C. The foundation of the city, on this calculation, falls on 754th or 753d year B. C.; which last era is that assigned by Varro, and commonly received by the authorities followed in this history.

‡ Niebuhr finds the origin of the poetic tale of the rape of the Sabines in the absence of the *connubium*, or right of intermarriage, between the Rhamnes, or genuine Romans, and their Sabine neighbors, whom he accommodates with a settlement on the Quirinal and Capitoline hills.

tor of the former nations, designated as king by the Roman legend. These forms, indeed, even if tradition had not avouched them, conjecture might have ascribed with high probability to the earliest ages, as in the primitive nations, already referred to, a sacred aristocracy existed, combining the priestly functions with those of secular sovereignty.

As the foundation of the new town, according to the legend, was executed by two Latins, Romulus and Remus; and as its scanty population was swelled by Sabine reinforcements, the first monarch could turn his arms against none but the Etruscans. The wars with Veii, which did not end till several centuries afterwards, by the destruction of that town, began under Romulus. Yet no important additions to his own city appear to have been made, either by him, or by his immediate successor. Rome is, however, described as having gathered strength internally under Romulus, as well as under Numa,—under the first by wars, and by the reception of the vigorous Sabines,—under the latter by laws and institutions borrowed from that people, and in particular by the establishment of a worship well adapted to the agricultural life of the patricians and their clients.

The tradition of Romulus having opened a sanctuary for fugitives of every description, and of Numa having established guilds or companies of trading burghers, may have been founded on the circumstance that, besides the patricians and their clients, a class of simple citizens, in the modern sense of the word, began to show itself at a very early period, but remained during a long time without obtaining any share whatever in the public administration. Such are the first traces of the free plebian order in Rome.

After a senatorial interregnum, the patrician assembly chose Tullus Hostilius, whose grandfather had migrated from a Latin town to Rome, where he had married a Sabine lady of the highest rank. Though in this manner Tullus was closely connected with the Sabines, it is precisely with the Sabines that we find him in perpetual warfare. Yet, notwithstanding the eternal feuds of the Roman with the Sabines, Rome had all the characteristics of an Etrusco-Sabine stronghold, reinforced by Latin immigrants, and by these raised to importance.

The current narrative of the wars of Tullus Hostilius with Alba Longa, by tradition the parent state of Rome, is, in all its details, a mythical epos. Yet we must take as an historical fact (in order to understand what follows), the incorporation of one of the thirty Latin towns with Rome, and the removal of its inhabitants of the Cælian hill. From this moment, the Romans, without properly belonging to the Latin league, advanced claims to priority of rank amongst the neighboring towns,—claims which gave occasion to the wars which are recorded to have occupied the succeeding monarch during the whole course of his reign.

The reign of Ancus Martius was distinguished by the conquest of Fidenæ, an Etruscan town, although supported in its struggle with Rome, first by Alba Longa, which had severed itself from the Latin league, and afterwards by Veii. A truce was closed with Veii and the Volscians; for it was contrary to Etrus-

u. c.
39
to
80.

u. c.
81
to
114.


u. c.
114
to
137.

can usage to make a regular peace, though they would willingly agree to a truce of a hundred years. Under this government it is further recorded that a footing was gained on the right bank of Tiber. The Janiculum was built upon, and a harbor made at Ostia.* Works for preparing sea-salt were also placed on the coast. Fortresses were built on Etruscan ground. Rome received an increase of her plebian population from Latium, and Ancus assigned the Latins, whom he brought to Rome, as captives of war, a site for their habitations in the wood which covered the Aventine; and admitted them to the rights of Roman citizens. The Aventine continued to be the plebian quarter of the city, and was not included in the Pomœrium, the circuit consecrated by patrician auspices. A temple at the fount of the Fœrentia had hitherto been the point of union for all the Latins. A temple on the Aventine was thenceforth destined to be so. It is here that solemn rites were held for the object of investing Rome with the character of capital and centre of the Latin league; though to what deity they were held is not easy to say, since the Roman religious services were excessively indefinite, and altogether dependent on political expediency.

u. c. The Etruscan character appears in all the undertakings of the
137 next king, Tarquinius Priscus; his father, according to the le-
to gend, having migrated from Corinth into Etruria.† The exist-
176. ence of a dominant patrician order, like those already described amongst the Etruscans, Latins, and Sabines, must be continually kept in mind throughout the first ages of Rome. It cannot, indeed, be affirmed that these patricians, who, however, stood at the head of all religious rites and ordinances, had a character exactly sacerdotal. The two principal Roman historians differ essentially from each other, with regard to other particulars in the life of this monarch, but all they relate of his architectural works bears the Etruscan stamp of grandeur and solidity. The sewers, which in later times, were viewed with astonishment, as a work of giants,‡ for draining the fo-

* The state of this harbor in later times, and the navigation of the Tiber, are described with great particularity, though with some apparent exaggerations, by Dionysius, l. iii. c. 44.

† The importance of the genealogy of the Tarquins to the version commonly received of the expulsion of the kings, claims insertion for it here, as follows:—
Demaratus.



‡ Dionysius (l. iii. p. 67.) adduces Caius Aquilius as his authority, for stating a circumstance, from which may be inferred the enormous outlay made by Tarquinius on his various architectural works. Caius Aquilius reports, that when on one occasion the necessary repairs of the cloacæ had been for some time neglected, the censors entered into contracts for cleansing and repairing them, for

rum* and other parts of the town; the walls which he constructed of squared stones, the *substructions* of the Capitol, and the levelling of a site for the erection of an immense temple on the summit of the Capitoline rock †, (then called the Tarpeian), recall the massive Etruscan piles to remembrance. The games, too, which were held in the circus, are styled Etruscan by Niebuhr, who also shows how totally the popular diversions of the drama, racing, and wrestling differed in Rome and Greece in their nature and tendency, and how this difference naturally resulted from the whole re-organization of society.

The murder of the elder Tarquinius, and the narrative of the early life of his successor. Servius Tullius, who appears to have belonged neither to the royal nor to a patrician family, ‡ cannot in any degree be relied upon as history. Thus much, however, seems established, that he was raised to the throne by his merit, and by the will of his predecessor; that he maintained himself at first by force, and afterwards by the love of the people, and promoted during his reign Latin and Grecian customs, in the same way as Tarquinius had Etruscan. From this epoch we find Grecian principles of religion and of policy more and more prevalent, even though every particular fact of this and the succeeding times continue veiled in legendary obscurity. Most of the acts exclusively ascribed by later tradition to Servius are so important to the knowledge of the Roman constitution, that we cannot avoid treating of them in this place, though it seems next to impossible to separate what belongs to these early times from what is manifestly of later date. In order to the better understanding of the organic changes introduced by Servius, we must take a rapid review of the original constitution, such as early traditions, adopted by the commonly received authorities, describe it to have existed up to the era of those changes.

The earliest constitution of Rome is set down as the work of Romulus, by those records of antiquity which constitute our sole authorities. Yet rarely does a constitution spring from the brain of an individual, independently of already existing regulations. It is true that

1000 talents. Thence, Dionysius concludes, may be inferred the expense of their first construction. He adds, that Roman greatness may be specially traced in three things—in the highways built of solid stone, the aqueducts, and the cloacæ.

* The *Forum Romanum*, so long the sight of markets, public assemblies, as well as public spectacles, and solemnities, was originally a marshy plot of ground, between the Capitoline and Palatine hills. Tarquinius Priscus, according to Dionysius and Livy, first apportioned lots of building ground about the forum to private persons, erected covered passages, and set up booths for artizans and tradespeople.

† Livy relates (i. 38.), that during war with the Sabines, king Tarquinius had vowed a temple to Jupiter, and that, on the conclusion of that war, he proceeded, to clear a foundation for it on the Capitol, by levelling a space, of which the extent was enough to give an idea of the grandeur of the contemplated work. This site retained the name of *rupes Tarpeia* to a late period, and is now known by that of *la Rocca*.

‡ Livy (l. i. c. 39.) relates that Ocrisia, wife of the first citizen of Corniculum was, after the conquest of that town, brought to Rome, where, *ab reginâ Romana prohibitam servitio*, she bore Servius.

we should overlook the most rapid strides of the human mind, if we denied the noble prerogative of a spirit superior to the crowd; which anticipates the slow movement of multitudes, and forms a new creation out of such elements as the age affords. Thus, features of the earliest constitution of Rome are to be found in several of the primitive states of Italy. But the new spirit which shows itself from the very outset in Roman story, gives warrant enough that the infant city did not continue swaddled in the old forms of traditional observance.

According to Niebuhr, Rome's earliest citizens solely consisted of patricians and their clients.

The patrician houses in later times were fond of tracing their origin to the fabulous age of Trojan and Greek heroism. Even the rude tradition does not affirm that Rome was founded by a mere undistinguished multitude. And though her earliest citizens may not be deemed to have constituted a regular colony, formed according to ancient Etruscan or Latin usage, yet it may safely be assumed, that such nobles as were found amongst them, ranked in the new commonwealth as such, without requiring elevation to that dignity by the founder of Rome. The patrician creations attributed to the kings, and the additions which they are said to have made in the numbers of the senate, wear the aspect of measures adopted to curb the domineering spirit of an order which they found already existing. While, then, the first establishment of the order of patricians must be disputed to the legendary founder of Rome, it is, nevertheless, as clear as any fact of that obscure period, that the following kings from time to time made additions to their numbers, whether individually or by batches; that consequently a close oligarchical system had no existence, and that the patricians could not pretend to preserve the purity of their blood. Hence it happened, that in later times not all the patrician families pretended to trace their pedigree to Æneas or Ulysses. Royal creation sufficed to confer the privileges of birth. That even plain plebeians were raised to patrician rank, is evidenced by the *patres minorum gentium*, so designated by the old nobles, while that designation did not import the non-possession of any privilege.* The patricians, as they could not bar plebian entrance into their order, apparently refused them admission at least into their families. It is, however, doubtful, whether the *connubia* were rigidly refused by them during the period of the monarchy; and plebeian disqualification in that point up to the time of the *Twelve Tables*, appears on the whole rather to have to been customary, than matter of express regulation or positive institution.

The relation of clientship formed between the patricians and their dependants appears to have been less of a political than of a private nature. One of its most ordinary incidents was the allotment of land by the patron to the client. It seems, however, that clientship could subsist independent of such allotment, as free plebians possessing land

* The *patres minorum gentium* are thus described by Livy:—"Plerique oriundi ex Albanis et Sabinis non genere et sanguine, sed per cooptationem patres," &c. iv. 4.

of their own, would sometimes enter that state, and property in land might be acquired by clients from other sources. Instances of the first kind may be easily accounted for by the advantages of powerful protection offered in the condition of clientship, which might well outweigh the blessing of precarious independence. Thus, freemen in the middle ages consigned their persons to servitude, and their possessions to dependance, by the fiction of a *feudum oblatum*.

As Niebuhr describes the Roman population to have at first only consisted of patricians and their clients, he supposes that a free *plebs* was only formed by degrees, and that its first organization was owing to the elder Tarquin and Servius Tullius. There are not, however, wanting grounds for inferring the earlier existence of a commonalty not included under the condition of clientship. It appears extremely probable that immigrants from the neighboring towns, who had emancipated themselves from the bonds of hereditary clientship, were not called upon to bind themselves anew on coming to Rome. It may even be supposed that clients coming in with their patrons changed their condition, and became at once free citizens along with their lords, in like manner as the negro slave acquires immediate freedom by setting his foot on European soil.

According to Dionysius,* Romulus first divided the whole people into three tribes, † each tribe into ten curiæ, each cury into ten decuries. At the head of each of the three divisions stood tribunes, curions, and decurions. Out of each cury he chose ten knights, altogether three hundred in number, entitled *celeres*. Livy relates, that after the war with Tatius, thirty curies were established, and at the same time three knightly centuries, entitled Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres. According to Plutarch, the able-bodied were first classed in military divisions, of which each contained 3000 foot and 30 horse, and was called a legion. All the rest came under the denomination of people (*δημος*).

The names above given, in all probability, indicate three original divisions of race in Rome. The first were the Ramnes, the Latin comrades of Romulus, to whom were afterwards joined the Titienses (Sabines), and Luceres (Etruscans).

Different arrangements of the same body of citizens are requisite for different purposes. The purpose of the curiæ was religious—they formed centres of union and of common sacrificial rites. The tribes came into action in time of warfare, independently of the curiæ, and were founded on national distinctions. Dionysius, for the sake of connecting the several divisions, has mixed things up together which have no proper affinity. The division by curies has nothing to do with war. Dionysius takes the curions for military commanders, and

* ii. 7.

† Varro calls the *tribes* the primary division of the domain of Rome. "Ager Romanus primum divisus in partes tres, unde *tribus* appellatae." Varro's etymologies are amusing, like most which are found in the writers of antiquity: e. g. "*Turma turma* est, *E* in *U* abiit, quod terdeni equites ex tribus tribubus fiebat. . . . *Milites*, quod trium *millium* prima legio fiebat, ac singulæ tribus millia singula mittebant."

therefore thinks that Romulus selected the bravest for that function. But there is no authority for believing them any thing else than priests, or for supposing that the tribes had curies for subdivisions in the armies. On the other hand, Dionysius's decurions belong not to the curies, but to the army. The tribunes, like the tribes, have war for their only distinction. It is easy to see why the tribes, elsewhere subordinate to the curies, in war appear as an independent portion of the people. In all antiquity, armies, in which various nations or races served, were originally arrayed in divisions corresponding with those varieties. Thus, in Rome, the Latin, Etruscan, and Sabine races fought in separate bands, till Servius introduced common arms and array for all three, and thus remodelled the military as well as civil organization.

The patrician order, which alone had a recognized share in the powers of government, according to immemorial custom, constituted the senate. The original number of members is unanimously given by the ancients at 100. The several accounts of the augmentations of the senate diverge very widely from each other. Dionysius states the second hundred, or, according to other accounts, fifty, as elected through the curies, after Tatius's accession. Livy only mentions 100 after the death of Romulus; yet he speaks of the participation of the Sabine senators in the government, and his hasty style of writing seems to explain the contradiction. Tullus Hostilius took only a small number of the Albans into the senate; and this, it would seem, rather as a complement than an augmentation.

The stated powers of the senate, or the patricians, in so far as they only gave members to that body during the times of the monarchy, cannot be laid down with precision. What is told of the last Tarquinius, that he never asked advice of the senate, may be equally true, if true at all, of Romulus and Tullus Hostilius. Neither Romulus, nor any of the succeeding kings, appear to have been controlled by the patrician caste in their course of policy, or devoted to its interests so completely, as that executive generally must, which a stable aristocracy sets at its head as its mere organ. The power of the senate, however, could not fail to be felt on all occasions, when that of the monarchical branch suffered interruption. After the death of Romulus, therefore, it showed no disposition to allow the new accession of a troublesome supremacy. The *interregnum* was an attempt to vest the lapsed executive functions in the members of the body of patricians. But, however willing might be the aristocrats to lose their head, the people cherished other inclinations. Accordingly, the former did not succeed in making their monarch one of their own body, and keeping him in allegiance to themselves. The royal dignity at Rome was doubly remote from this consummation. Hereditary right began to show itself in the sons of Ancus; while the elective right which the people seems to have exercised in the case of Servius, and, according to Livy,* so early as the elder Tarquin, was almost equally dangerous to the senate.

* i. 35.

The king stands at the head of the earliest magistrates of Rome. We have seen that his power was not merely executive, nor confined within the limits conjured round it by Dionysius, who figured to himself the royal power as resembling that of the consuls. He was commander-in-chief, superintendent of worship, and supreme judge. The right of taxation seems to deserve mention as especially belonging to the sovereign. Even after the kingly era, the people laid no claim to it, but it continued in the uncontested possession of the senate. The *interreges* were very subordinate instruments of the senate. When it is said that the *interreges* chose the king, this can only be understood to refer to the conduct of the election by them, according to Livy's usual mode of speaking of the presiding magistrate.

Next to the king's, the highest rank was held by the tribune of the *celeres*, the prototype of the subsequent *magister equitum*. This office is mentioned only twice during the royal era, under Romulus and the younger Tarquin. Under the latter, Brutus is recorded to have possessed the power of assembling the people.*

The patricians were, at first, possessed exclusively of the public *sacra*. However, they can neither be supposed to have been a priestly caste, in the Oriental sense of the word, nor to have first been invested with priestly functions by Romulus. These functions were an ancestral right of the nobles, who, in the primitive times of Italy, were at once priests and warriors. The king, however, retained the choice of the officiating persons. We are here speaking, not of family forms of worship, which do not belong to a survey of the constitution, but of public rites. These were performed in the *curiæ*, under the superintendence of thirty *curions*.

A state religion was soon found to be necessary, and could emanate alone from the king, the first among the priests. Numa became the creator of a worship common to all citizens, and of a more exalted nature than the service of each individual *cury*. One common *cury* would not alone suffice him; he endowed the temple of Vesta with the character of a sanctuary—a temple consecrated by himself to an ancient Latin worship. Moreover, he built a significantly formed temple to the Etruscan Janus, and dedicated the *Salians* to the service of the Sabine Quirinus; who, as afterwards the *vestals*, was considered as the guardian of a mysterious *palladium*, the *Ancilia*. Thus each of the three national races was honored by the establishment of its own peculiar worship, and the temple of *Fides Publica* was reared as a basis of mutual confidence.

The most momentous influence on the state was exerted by *augers* and *fecials*. The former sprang from the primitive times of the Latins and Etruscans. The latter were first introduced in Rome by Numa, to proclaim war and conclude peace and alliances,—a kind of antique prototype of the *truga Dei*. In a peace closed by the *fecial* right no hostages were given.†

The office of *haruspices* in Rome was, at all times, exercised by Etruscans, more peculiarly than by Romans. Notwithstanding the

* Liv. i. 59.

† Liv. ix. 5.

instructions which the Roman youth received in their mysteries, they never became properly acquainted with them; and on important occasions, Etruscans were brought to Rome, or ambassadors despatched to Etruria. At the time of the siege of Veii, Rome had no haruspices of her own. The emperor Claudius, an amateur of Etruscan art, restored their college, which in his times had gone to decay. The grand Etruscan mystery was the interpretation of lightnings, which like every other branch of aruspical science, could only be attained to in the schools of the priests. So late as the siege of Rome by the Goths, A. D. 408, Etruscan art was put in requisition to conjure thunder-bolts down upon the enemy.*

The first reception of foreign worship in Rome drew after it the principle which was long afterwards acted upon, of uniting with neighboring states in common ceremonial rites, with the Latins, for example, in the service of Diana and of Jupiter Latiaris, with the Sabines in that of Feronia. The religious forms of foreign nations were also imported into Rome; for example, the service of the Veian Juno, and the Mater Matuta of Satricum. They were anxious to avoid omitting any deity. Accordingly, as the Athenians built an altar to the unknown Godhead, all the divine powers, who it was apprehended might have been missed, were named *Novilenses*, "hereafter to be recognised." We shall presently find mention made of these in the self-devoting formula of Decius. Thence it appears, that though the patrician worship suffered no direct invasion, it could not but subside into insignificance amidst the accessions from all quarters, especially from Greece. Tarquin the elder assumed to be the founder of the highest national godhead for Rome and Latium, by beginning the temple of Jupiter on the capitol. Thenceforward every state-transaction was linked with the service of Jupiter. Jupiter's temple became the holy of holies, the point of union for all parts of the state. Many a rite which had formerly been recognised as public sunk before it into the obscure and private service of a particular *gens*.

Livy and Dionysius disagree about the commencement of the reign of Servius Tullius. According to the former, he commenced his reign under the auspices of the senate, without election by the people; according to the latter, through the people, against the will of the senate. In the sequel, the patricians alone are exhibited by Livy as the enemies of the people: while the rich, as a body, together with the patricians are presented in that light by Dionysius. In both points Dionysius appears to be right. That Servius was a friend of the people, and that the patricians hated and plotted against him, appears from a passage of Festus.† Indeed it might be indirectly gathered, from the statement of Livy‡ that he chose his habitation on the Esquiline, for that was the plebian quarter.§ The government of Servius Tullius was, from beginning to end, a sort of revolution. The or-

* Zosim, v. 41.

† Patricius vicus Romæ dictus eo quod ibi patricii habitaverunt jubente Servio Tullio, ut si quid molientur adversus ipsum, ex locis superioribus opprimerentur.

‡ Liv. l. i. c. 44.

§ Dion. l. iv. c. 13.

ganic changes ascribed to him can hardly be conceived of, as projected under any but republican institutions. At all events, they seem to have paved the way for the republic.

Servius prepared his constitutional innovations by a division of lands and of building ground for habitations to the poor. His constitution, however, had no resemblance to a pure democracy. Property was adopted as the standard for apportioning the public contributions and franchises. To facilitate the intended general census, it was necessary to divide the mass of the people for a convenient survey, as the *curies* by that time only included the smaller part of the population. For this purpose, the city was divided into four tribes; the whole domain belonging to it into six-and-twenty. Next was performed a general valuation of property. The whole number of able-bodied citizens was then divided into six classes. On the valuation of the property of the class depended the tribute, the military accoutrements, and the place assigned in order of battle. The highest description of citizens were embodied into the cavalry.

Each class was divided into centuries, which again were sub-divided as *seniores* and *juniores*. The division by centuries, probably, was calculated, so that an equal amount of property should be possessed by the members of each collectively. In voting in the *comitia*, not the number of heads, but of centuries counted. On the other hand, the position of the military forces seems entirely to have been fixed by the numbers in each class, told by the head. The knights, or citizens entitled by birth or wealth to serve on horseback, gave their votes apart in eighteen centuries. Of these the six first were reserved exclusively to patricians, while the remaining twelve were open to the wealthiest men of plebeian birth. In the enrolment of plebeian knights, as in all the rest of his institutions, it may be affirmed that Servius regarded wealth as of primary importance.

When it is considered that out of a hundred and eighty-nine (or ninety-three) centuries, the first class alone contained eighty, to which must be added the eighteen centuries of knights, and that the last class had either only one voice or none at all, it is easy to see that Servius, if in effect he made this arrangement, substituted an aristocracy of wealth for the former patrician preponderance in the *curiæ*.^{*} As, in these times, the property of land was, for the most part, in the hands of the patricians, they, of course, retained preponderance in the new aristocracy likewise. But this was accidental, and soon ceased to be the case. For the rest, the *curiæ*, even in the time of the republic, retained all the rights which stood in connection with religion, and with the performance of particular formalities. The authorities which were elected in the assemblies of the centuries received the military command through the sanction of the *curiæ*, or, in other words, the *curiæ* had in appearance the right of confirming the previous elections. Adoptions, testaments, priestly functions, and sacrifices remained, even in later times, under their superintendence. The

^{*} Glarcanus (Liv. Drakenborch, p. 172.) gives the following tabular view of the arrangement of Servius:—

comitia centuriata, instituted by Servius, continued in possession of supreme power, till the people, or rather its tribunes, systematically began to undermine the aristocracy and patrician order; and, therefore, set the mode of voting according to tribes, and by the head, in the place of that of voting according to centuries.

The warlike undertakings of Servius were principally directed against the Etruscans. He is said to have carried on war for twenty years with the citizens of Veii. Cære, Tarquinii, and, lastly, with the collective force of the Etruscans; till all allowed the pre-eminence of Rome and her king. By the erection of a temple on the Aventine hill, he had drawn to Rome the sacrificial meeting of the Latins, which had formerly only been held in the grove of Ferentina, in the territory of Alba Longa.

The horrible tale of the last Tarquin's accession to the throne might be regarded as incredible, were it not that Italian history in the middle ages affords us many similar examples. The narrative in question is as follows:—The two daughters of Servius were married to the two sons of the elder Tarquin. The one murdered her husband, Aruns, and her sister, with the aid of the other son of Tarquin, Lucius, and paved the way to the throne for herself and her new husband by the murder of her father. If this history be true, Tarquin the Proud arrived at the head of the government by similar means to those employed by the petty tyrants of Italy for possessing themselves of sovereignty in their native town. We cannot, therefore, be surprised if he maintained himself on the throne

v. c.
220
to
244.

Class.	Property.	Centuries.	Knights.	Arms, Offensive and Defensive.
I.	Asses of brass 100,000	80, divided, as in all the classes, into <i>seniores</i> and <i>juniores</i> .	18 centuries. Livy adds the two centuries <i>fabrorum</i> to the first, Dionysius to the second class.	Offensive; <i>Hasta</i> et <i>Gladius</i> . Defensive; <i>Galea</i> , <i>Clypeus</i> , <i>Ocreæ</i> , <i>Lorica</i> .
II.	75,000	20	—	Offensive; <i>Hasta</i> et <i>Gladius</i> . Defensive; <i>Galea</i> , <i>Scutum</i> , <i>Ocreæ</i> .
III.	50,000	20	—	Offensive; <i>Hasta</i> et <i>Gladius</i> .
IV.	25,000	20	<i>Tibicinium duo centuriæ</i> , according to Livy <i>tres</i> .	Defensive; <i>Galea</i> <i>Scutum</i> .
V.	11,000	30	—	Offensive; <i>Funda</i> et <i>lapides missiles</i> .
VI.	—	Capite censurum.	—	Defensive; <i>None</i> .

by similar means, that is to say, by terror and by brute force. Servius Tullius had given up many royal prerogatives: and later writers even suppose that he cherished the intention of introducing the consular government. Tarquinius proceeded in an opposite direction. He aimed at over-reaching the allies of Rome, at employing the people in forced labors, and despoiling the senate of all consideration in the state, by letting its numbers dwindle away gradually. This was the more easy, as the senators were nominated by the kings, as at a later period by the censors. (Still later, indeed, certain public officers gave claims to a perpetual place in the senate, yet, even then, the censors retained the right of naming the other members.) Tarquin, moreover, formed for himself a body guard and privy council; neither sought the concurrence of senate nor people; consulted only his friends and cabinet councillors; made himself difficult of access, and encouraged informers and eaves-droppers. Turnus Herdonius, the most influential man in Aricia, who had offered successful resistance to Tarquinius, when he attempted to transform into a species of supremacy the influence which Rome had long exercised over the Latin states, was put out of the way by violence, and an alliance formed with Octavius Manutius, who ruled in a similar manner at Tusculum as Tarquin did at Rome. The practice now commenced, which was continued till a later period, for the king, as afterwards for the consul, to proclaim, by a yearly solemnity on the Alban hill, that Rome laid claim to the first rank amongst the Latin towns, not as a privilege acquired by force, but as hereditary, and consecrated by divine awe and worship.

From this time forth the king appears as a conqueror, and quite in the approved manner of conquering kings, as a builder of enormous piles, and a founder of new cities. Suessa Pomætia, and the rich country of the Volscians, were first occupied; vast spoils were made, numerous captives, and an immense mass of treasure, fell to the share of the monarch. The next attack was made against the Latin town of Gabii, which refused to acknowledge the title by which Rome affected the eminence of capital of the whole Latin league. Tarquin vainly attempted to reduce the town by force; and his son Sextus acted the part of a double betrayer, in order to procure success for his father. Among the colonies which Tarquin is said to have founded are Signia, Circeii, Cora. It is related by the Roman annalists, Fabius Pictor and Piso, that the king collected enormous spoils in his wars, and on some occasions brought an army together, of which the number was reckoned at 70,000 men. All these incidents cannot have been of literal occurrence. Yet, combined with other circumstances, they indicate a power which was much more extensive and considerable than the Romans, who wrote the history of the first times of the republic, knew or chose to acknowledge as having preceded them. The building of those temples, of which the first foundations had been laid under Tarquinius Priscus, was doubtless carried on under Servius Tullius; but their completion is ascribed to the last Tarquin, who is said to have kept the people at forced labors, and to have spent the amount of his military spoils upon these objects. It is

certain that the buildings of the elder, as well as the younger Tarquin, were entirely in Etruscan style; that workmen out of Etruria were employed upon them; that the Capitoline temple was a triple one, and consecrated to the Etruscan worship, which at this time had spread itself over all Italy.*

It is evident that the military despotism which Tarquin had endeavored to erect was not only obnoxious to the senate, whom he deprived of their influence, and to the people, of whose compulsory service he made use in his wars and his works, but even to a large part of the royal family itself; and this, for the obvious reason, that in a military despotism, with the exception of a single man, and of those whom he happens to choose for his instruments, all others are and must be utterly insignificant. That the expulsion of the king and his sons was the work of an aristocratical party is manifest from the early constitution of the Roman republic. It is equally certain, however, that the Roman patricians, like the English barons, were obliged to enlist the people in their interests, and concede to it rights, which must, sooner or later, lead to a new description of government. Livy, moreover, expressly states,† that the change of the constitution at the outset was nothing else than the transformation of monarchical into patrician administration—of hereditary into elective government. Those members of the royal family, by whom the king was expelled, would seem to have gained the patricians and the plebeians for their new regulations, much as the men who overset the old regime in France attached the mass of the people to the revolution, by dividing amongst them, namely, the possessions of the exiled party.

The legend represents the collateral branches as principal actors in the expulsion of the main branch of the royal family. Brutus was the nephew of the despotic Tarquin, and at the same time the first officer of the realm, having the command of the cavalry, and the right to assemble the people. Collatinus, who in concert with Brutus conducted the conspiracy against the king, and excited the people to revolt, was a descendant of the younger branch of the royal house, and Spurius Lucretius, like Valerius, who was distinguished by the title of Publicola, belonged to Collatinus's family, and to that of his wife. That Brutus, to avoid suspicion, counterfeited idiocy; that he brought an oracle from Delphi, and applied it to the furtherance of his project for the liberation of Rome, does not interweave so well

* The story goes that Tarquin, on the capture of Suessa Pomætia, appropriated a treasure, of 400 talents of silver and gold, from the booty, with which money he set about the building of a magnificent temple. Liv. i. 53.

The building was, however, laid out on so grand a scale, that the spoil from Pomætia, which should have defrayed the expense of the entire work proved hardly sufficient even to lay the foundation. (Liv. i. 55.) The king, eager to see his temple completed, caused architects and surveyors to be brought out of Etruria; and put in requisition for that purpose, not the public treasures only, but the labors of the people, who, on their part, did not grudge their assistance to raise the gods a temple with their own hands. Liv. i. 56.

† L. ii. c. 1. Libertatis autem originem inde magis quia annum imperium consulare factum est, quam quod diminutum quicquam sit a regia potestate numeres.

with the main texture of the story as does the brutality of Sextus Tarquin towards the chaste Lucretia, the wife of Collatinus Tarquinius. No one who is acquainted with the history of the petty lords of Italy in the middle ages, and who knows the force of passion and the excess of wanton arrogance exhibited by an Ezelin and a Cæsar Borgia, will consider it incredible that Tarquin should have hurried from his father's camp at Ardea, expressly to dishonor the nuptial couch of a near relative. The Roman historians lavish an abundance of rhetorical ornament on the voluntary death of Lucretia, her last moments, and the scenes immediately subsequent in Rome.

In later times, the 24th of February was celebrated by the Romans as the anniversary of the expulsion of kings. The history of Rome as a kingdom closes with the reign of the Tarquins. The place of the monarchical form was taken by a strict aristocracy, modified only by the existence of assemblies voting by centuries. According to the ordinary reckoning, the kingdom had existed 244 years.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC.

BRUTUS and Collatinus, according to the received tradition,* were chosen consuls for the first year of the new republic, in a popular assembly held by centuries, which continued to be the custom from that epoch. They retained the royal insignia with the royal power, which being divided between two, who were only invested with it for one year, could no longer endanger the state, while it gave greater vigor to the executive department than it possessed in any other republic of those times. Brutus, who in fact had been the head of the conspiracy against the royal government, found according to the tradition, a part of the most respectable burghers, and even his own colleague, Collatinus, more inclined towards the monarchical constitution than towards republican forms. He detected a conspiracy in which the sons of the first families, including his own were implicated, and of which the object was to recall the royal family from exile. He sacrificed his sons to his country, and pronounced sentence of death on them in person. Moreover, according to Livy's account, Brutus compelled his colleague, Collatinus, to resign the consulship, in a manner which looks very like a manœuvre for the promotion of Valerius, who procured the concession of new rights to the people through the senate, which was now restored to the number of 300.

The stories of the flight of Tarquin's party to Tarquinii; of the aid which they received from thence and from Veii; of the battle and single combat † at the wood Arsia: of the panic terror by which the troops were dispersed after the battle; of the expelled monarch's arrival at Clusium, and reception at the court of Porsenna; of the latter's expedition to Rome; of Mucius Scævola, Clælia, Horatius Cocles, &c. &c. are hardly more admissible into the page of sober history than the narrative of the Messenian war, or that of the deeds of Codrus.

* The treaty of peace which the Romans are said to have closed with the Carthaginians in the first years of freedom,—which Polybius affirms himself to have seen, and the very words of which he has handed down to us,—stands in utter contradiction with the whole history of the first consuls, and every thing connected with it. The only alternative, therefore, is to derive an altogether new history from the treaty, or to follow the hitherto received tradition. We have preferred the latter course; since, though the early annals of the republic are as little adapted as those of the kings to afford a firm historical footing, they may very well aid in explaining the first steps of Roman aggrandisement.

† The single combat is described very theatrically. Brutus and Aruns Tarquinius, each a worthy antagonist of the other, must of course be brought together; and that the *deus ex machina* may not be wanting, the voice of the wood god scatters hosts which the day before, had fought courageously. Dion. l. v. c. 15, 16.

The story goes, that the city of Rome was invested by Porsenna, and compelled to accept the conditions which he thought fit to impose. He, however, was magnanimous enough not to force back on the Romans the expelled king, in whose cause he is said to have undertaken the whole expedition! This looks very consistent with the natural course of human action. But we are now in a field where strict historical method is inapplicable. According to Dionysius, an unfortunate war with Aricia deprived Porsenna of all the advantages previously gained by him over Rome, while the city received an important reinforcement of able bodied men, by the settlement on Roman soil of Attus Clausus, a Sabine patrician, with 5000 fighting men of his clients. He was afterwards, as a Roman patrician, called Appius Claudius, and his whole family always continued notable, or notorious for aristocratic pride.

The Latins are recorded to have next marched upon Rome, in the cause of the exiled family, under Mamilius, the Ruler of Tusculum. Their object appears less to have been to restore the Roman king, whose flight was now directed towards Tusculum, than to contest with Rome the foremost rank and influence in the Latin league. The battle which was fought at Regillus,* between the Romans and Latins, decided the contest. Tarquin is said, after this period, to have been last of all abandoned by the Latins, and to have died at Cumæ. v. c.
258.

In the Latin towns, a dictator was a functionary of nearly the same description as an *æsymnete* among the Greeks.† We find this dignity also established in Rome soon after the expulsion of the kings. Even if the dictator was not appointed, according to the commonly received account, on occasion of the disputes between the plebians and the patricians, his commanding position, at all events, was employed to drive to the field such plebians as refused to serve in the army.‡ The main grievances of the people did not directly point to the constitution, but to the laws and their administration, especially in cases of debt. By the existing law, the person of the poorer citizen, who in war-time was compelled to neglect his business, and maintain himself besides at his own cost, was abandoned to the mercy of his creditor; who having first by usurious interest exhausted the poor debtor's means, laid claim at last to his person § as security for the principal. The chance-spectacle of a former captain set to work like a slave in chains occasioned a revolt at so early a period as that which

* Il lago Regillo, situato secondo Livio nell' agro Toscolano dee essere lo stesso che oggi chiamasi laghetto alle radici di monte Falcone presso la colonna.—*Micali, Italia, &c.* iii. 70.

† Vid. Beaufort, *Rep. Romaine*, vol. iii. c. 10. *du Dictateur et du general de la cavalerie.*

‡ The choice of a dictator at first rested with the senate. The consuls, afterwards *one* consul, nominated him in the dead of night, and the consular lictors were instantly transferred to him. It was necessary, at first, that he should be a man of consular rank; in later times this limitation ceased, as well as that of election by the senate.

§ Wachsmuth, p. 276, 277.

preceded the battle at the lake Regillus. The plebians refused to be enrolled, and the first conciliatory expedient was the extension of the term for calling in debts. The people now expected some mitigation of the existing laws; but the persecution of debtors was recommenced with all its former rigor, immediately on the close of the Latin war: and, when the popular discontent broke forth, endeavors were made, by incessant wars, to occupy and divert the minds of the multitude. During these wars, and after the close of each campaign with the Volscians, with the Sabines, and Auruncans, the disturbances became more and more serious. The government, the lictors, knights, and patricians, met with resistance; and it was necessary twice to name a dictator to restore order. The first of these officers, Appius Claudius, embittered the people by proud defiance; the second, Manius Valerius, sought to appease them by fair promises, which he found himself unable to keep, as the rich would concede nothing. A formal schism ensued between the orders of the state. The dictator resigned his office; the consuls took the command of the army; the plebians left the patricians to return to Rome by themselves, and encamped under the guidance of their leader, Sicinius, three miles from the town, on a hill, which since that time was known by the new name of *Mons Sacer*. Here they seemed prepared to found a city for themselves, with laws and regulations of its own.

In the position which they occupied, it is not at all improbable that they really began to organize some sort of constitution, though it were only of a tumultuary or military description, like the peasantry in Bauernkriegen of Germany in the sixteenth century, or the ana-baptists in Munster and Thuringia; excepting that they were not utterly rude like the former, nor fanatical and abandoned like the latter. In their ranks were men of the greatest wealth, even nobles, though not Roman ones, nor did they lack the presence of landed proprietors. The seceders, as the story goes, were induced to cool reflection by the rational addresses of the moderate patricians, and by the celebrated fable of "*The belly and limbs*" of Menenius Agrippa, who was sent as their delegate to the plebians. A formal pacification was at length concluded. It is not known what was settled with regard to the debts,—the main point;—but it is certain that the people obtained a much more important share in the administration of public affairs than had hitherto been allowed them.

This was achieved through the agency of the tribunate,—an authority entirely new in its form as in its essence,—a representation of the people, invested with its majesty, armed with its collective force against any individual magistrate, and striking with a sentence of outlawry whoever dared violate it. At first, two tribunes were appointed, Junius Paterculus (Brutus), and Sicinius, the chiefs of the secession. Soon afterwards, three others were added, and the people thought they had gained an advantage in proportion to the increased number, while the patricians profited in effect, by the splitting of the authority.

The tribunate, looking only to the spirit of its institution, was established to protect the people from patrician attacks generally, and

from magisterial tyranny especially in cases of debt. It was established as a last resort for every individual against threatened ill treatment, and, the patricians alleged, was limited to immediate personal protection. The intercession of the tribunes, therefore, had nothing of free spontaneous agency, but was primarily a check upon the agency of others. They could prohibit, but they could not enjoin without special occasion. Strictly speaking, therefore, they had no administrative function, though, in so far as they had charge of the safety of every individual, and, by consequence, of the people in the aggregate, they assuredly deserved the name of a magistracy; and even the patricians soon found their account in extending this protective authority over their own body, and thus converting the tribunate into a general or national, though still called a plebian, office, in regard to the birth of those who held it.

But the principle of the institution could not long confine its range, which inevitably extended itself with the growing power and claims of the people. It was soon perceived that when one side strikes, while the other is only allowed to parry the struggle is waged on very unequal terms. This suggested the idea of anticipating patrician attacks, by crippling the power of the order which was capable of them. Thus, patrician prerogatives, even when unaccompanied by actual encroachments on the plebeians, soon came to be regarded as entrenching on their political rights. Out of these pretensions sprang the principle that the plebs composed the people, properly so called, and of right possessed supreme judicial and legislative authority. So soon as this idea was once recognized, the tribunes might bring forward what they pleased in the name of the people, and the patricians appeared merely in the light of possessors of public property, from whom successive portions of that property might and should be recovered. The plebs put forward their claim of property; the patricians rested on that of possession: the former party felt themselves strong in the justice of their cause, and acquired additional strength with every right which they recovered; the latter defended themselves by the arts of chicanery and religious delusion. The issue of the struggle could not be doubtful.

According to the Roman maxim of government, that the prevention of good measures should be preferred to the admission of evil, and that those who held co-ordinate authority had the right of opposing a veto to each other's proceedings, a tribune, by his single intercession, could, at once, check the activity of the rest. The decision of a majority of the tribunes could only be admitted as valid, when a previous understanding had existed that it should be so, a precaution which was taken against the right of intercession, by which any one of their body might have reduced the rest to inaction.

Along with the tribunes, plebeian ædiles were instituted, inferior in rank, but who do not appear to have been subservient, though subsidiary to the former in function. Their duties, which had, probably, no very definite limits, soon became manifold. As the tribunes on a large scale acquired and secured to the people justice, liberty, and the powers of legislation; so the ædiles afforded them succor in necessity,

aid against all injuries of a minor description, tranquillity and security, by means of police regulations. In after times, the regulation of the price of grain, the surveyorship of public works, the care of the temples, aqueducts, baths, and other similar duties, which had formerly been in the province of the consuls, devolved on the ædiles.

The whole subsequent history of Rome turns upon this grand innovation in her government. Ever since the expulsion of the kings, the legislative power, the supreme legal jurisdiction, and the election of public officers, had vested ostensibly in the people; but the exercise of their rights was extremely cramped and limited, as the people gave their votes only by *curiæ* and by centuries. In the first, patrician influence preponderated. In the second, wealth appears to have had the majority, and in general all the centuries blindly followed the vote given by the *prærogativa*, or century called by lot to vote first. Neither of these assemblies could be held without the senate. A magistrate of senatorial rank presided in both. Both were under the authority of the augurs, who interpreted or invented signs at discretion. Things were altered after the succession: the popular assemblies had been held without auspices on the Mons Sacer; and without auspices those assemblies continued to be held, which were especially called to debate the affairs of the plebeians. These assemblies voted by the head, and the tribunes were invested with the formidable attribute of convoking them, as well as taking cognisance of the rights of the plebeians in the meetings of the senate.* The number of the first tribunes was limited to two; but a few years after there seem to have been five of them, and the number was raised to ten at a later period.† The first step had now been made towards the annihilation of the strict aristocratical privileges. The senate, however, still retained the prerogative of war and peace, decreed levies of troops, determined as to the necessity of naming a dictator, imposed taxes, allotted and administered the public domain, gave or withheld the spoils of war from the army. It retained, even in later times the superintendence of religion and religious ceremonial, the distribution of offices in the provinces and commands in the army, the care and appropriation of the public treasures, the administration of justice over all Italy, the conduct of all foreign affairs, the reception and appointment of ambassadors, the investment of allies with royal dignity. Moreover, it fixed the times for holding popular assemblies, and pre-arranged the matters there to be treated of. Lastly, the senate held itself licensed to confer unlimited powers on consuls, prætors, and tribunes, by virtue of the tremendous formula, which consigned to their charge the safety of the republic on occasions of particular emergency.

The whole subsequent history, it has already been said, turns on the strife between the privileged orders and the plebeians, who, since the

* Niebuhr, i. 415. Wachsmuth, p. 285.

† According to Livy, a formal treaty was made, "in has conditiones, ut plebi sui magistratus essent sacrosancti, quibus auxilii latio adversus consules esset neve cui patrum capere eum magistratum liceret. Ita tribuni plebel creati duo, C. Licinius, N. L. Albinus: hi tres collegas sibi creaverunt; in his Sicinium fuisse."

nomination of the tribunes, had started up at once into a formidable political power, and, three years after that nomination, seized the highest judicial functions. This took place when a young patrician, Caius Marcius, surnamed Coriolanus, for his bravery at Corioli, endeavored to take advantage of the necessities of the people to tear from them their hardly extorted franchises.

U. C.
261
to
263.

Dionysius,* Livy,† and Plutarch,‡ unite in narrating that the interruption of agriculture during the secession was very soon succeeded by a dreadful famine. Ambassadors were sent to purchase corn of the Volscians, as well as into Etruria, Cumæ, and Sicily. The Volscians, and Aristodemus, the tyrant of Cumæ, gave the Roman envoys an unfriendly reception; corn was not to be had in sufficient quantities from Etruria. At length arrived the supplies bespoken from Sicily, with an equal quantity as a present from one of the Sicilian tyrants. It would seem that the ædiles, had not, as yet, the superintendence of stores and prices, for the senate regarded the distribution of the newly acquired stock as coming entirely within its proper financial province. A certain party, of whom Coriolanus was at the head, proposed that the corn should be portioned out, to the people on no other condition than the abdication on their part of the rights so lately conceded to them. The tribunes, who were present at the debate, took note of the words of the young patrician champion, and as he went out of the curiæ, called him publicly to account for them. Tumult ensued, Coriolanus struck the ædiles, who would have laid hands on him; and the young patricians rallying round him, prepared to repel force by force. The tribunes interfered to restrain the summary justice of the multitude, and cited Coriolanus before the tribunal of the people. At this tribunal they themselves were to preside, the votes to be taken by head, independently of all influence or guidance of the patricians. This was probably more than the latter intended to concede, when they recognised the judicial authority of the assembled people. They must now have given up all hope of saving Coriolanus, as they could not even assist at the trial without incurring deeper loss than even that of Coriolanus himself. Any individual sacrifice seemed of less destructive consequence than collective abasement of the order beneath the authority of the tribunes. Accordingly, though with their clients they made their appearance on the day of trial, it was only to work upon the people by threats or supplications, without taking any part in the proceedings. The tribunes charged Coriolanus with having uttered traitorous words, with having outraged the persons of the ædiles, and with having proposed to rob the people of their consecrated authorities. The penalty annexed by them to these offences was banishment. Coriolanus quitted Rome without appearing before the tribunal, and took refuge at Antium with the Volscians. According to the legend, he reappears at the head of a Volscian army, in the character of an enemy to his country, marches on Rome, and forbears the vengeance already in his grasp, at the prayer of his mother, wife, and children, after he had spurned from

*VII, 1.

† II. 34.

‡ Coriol. 12.

his feet the suppliant priests and magistrates of his country. He draws off the Volscians from their prey, and the fates devote him to death, by their hands, with strict poetical justice.

The history of Coriolanus, whether it be true or not, must be acknowledged of the highest importance in estimating the Roman character. This narrative of a struggle between two parties, equally firm, vigorous and patriotic, each in its way, demanding or defending what they each deemed their rights, was delivered from mouth to mouth, from generation to generation, and became a lesson of fathers to their children and grand children. The patricians might already perceive what were their future prospects from the issue of this struggle, in which they vainly opposed force to force.

CHAPTER IV.

POLITICAL POWERS ACQUIRED BY THE PLEBEIANS.

WHILE war with the Volscians, Hernici, and Veientes supplied the Romans with military exercise, new disputes arose in the interior; first, on the right of the people to a share in conquered lands; and secondly, on the right of legislation which the plebeians, assembled by tribes, began on certain points to claim exclusively. The *Agrarian law*, the object of the first of these demands, has been investigated so thoroughly by Niebuhr, that the following simple statement can add little of value or novelty to the view which he has given of the subject.

The division of a demesne into three parts, one for the gods, one for the state, and a third for the citizens, was, in ancient times, no uncommon measure. In Rome it was of immemorial usage, and is ascribed, like other things of the kind, to Romulus. In the earliest divisions of land, one portion appears to have been obtained in absolute property by the patricians, nor does there seem to have been any prohibition against the enlargement of this portion by purchase. The usufruct of another part of the public domain was held by the king and patricians, jointly or severally, and usufructuary became, in fact, permanent possession, on the payment of a trifling quit-rent, or, rather, tithe. This tenure was greatly more advantageous than the ordinary modes of farming land, and it was matter of complaint that these prescriptive occupants dispensed themselves even from paying the dues annexed to their tenure. The occasion of every extension of Roman territory was seized by the patrician gentes to swell their acquisitions, while allotments of conquered lands to plebeians, in full property, were rarely and were grudgingly made. On the expulsion of Tarquin, indeed, his domain was divided among the people; but the subsequent losses of territory under the republic dispossessed many of their allotments. Fresh conquests were not speedily made, but the patricians first attempted to meet the public distress by establishing colonies. This was, however, not so much an allocation of territories conquered and secured as of strips of frontier, thrown for defence on the colonists to whom they were allotted, and consequently was viewed as no relief by the plebeians who, while they were mocked with these illusory advantages, saw in the hands of patricians the more secure and inland public domains. The people were thus tricked out of the profits of their toilsome campaigns. The tribunes, however, were not the first to signalise the abuse. A patrician and a consul took the lead in bringing it under discussion.

Spurius Cassius had been thrice consul. He had already, at an early period, proposed to return to the people the purchase money of the grain which had been imported from Sicily during a scarcity. ^{u. c.} He now proposed to divide a part of the public landed estates.* 267. It would be difficult to form any decision with regard to the character of Cassius from the records of his transaction which have come down to us. What is certain, however, is, that his motion occasioned dangerous disorders, not only during his consulship, but to the end of the republic, during the whole of which period these disturbances form one of the main features of Roman history. The senate, embittered against a consul who seemed to betray so scandalously the interests of his order, exerted itself to ruin him with the people, succeeded in throwing suspicion on the motives of the proposal, and even affected willingness, and absolutely passed a decree, to give the people a share in the conquered territory. The people distrusted the consul, whose ambition was notorious, and abandoned him to the vengeance of his order.

After the fate of Cassius,† no one dreamed of putting the senate's decree, with regard to the public lands, into execution, until the tribunes at length began to take up the matter in good earnest. They did not, however, it seems, immediately bring the patrician authorities who were to blame for this neglect, before the popular tribunals. It was not till the termination of the war with Veii and the Sabines, that the tribune Genucius advanced the proposition that all the consuls since Sp. Cassius must be made answerable to the people for the subsequent oblivion of the promised division of lands. However, he did not persist in going so far back, but contented himself with bringing to trial Furius and Manlius, the consuls of the foregoing year (280 u. c.,) who had terminated the war with the Veians, and closed a forty years' truce. The patricians took all possible pains to save their most esteemed and deserving colleagues from the slur of a public trial. They even had recourse to the most humiliating supplications; unless, indeed, Livy, as usual, has transferred to the earliest times what was wont to occur in his own days‡ on similar occasions. Nothing would do! The people were assembled, the trial came on, when, at this critical moment, the death of the defender of popular rights was announced,§ and the comitia rose again as a matter of course.

This incident, however, only made matters worse, as the affair must

* Wachsmuth, 324.

† Sp. Cassius is said to have been sentenced by his own father, according to the ancient family law, *cognita domi causa*. On the other hand, Livy states, "Invenio apud quosdam, idque propius fidem est, a quæstoribus K. Fabio et L. Valerio diem dictam perduellionis, damnatumque populi judicio, dirutas publice ædes."

‡ Furius et Manlius sordidati circumeunt non plebem magis quam juniores patrum—hi non publica, sed in privato seducta a plurium conscientia consilia habuere, nec auctor quamvis audaci facinori deerat.

§ Igitur die judicii cum plebs in foro erecta expectatione staret, mirari primo, quod non descenderet tribunus, tandem qui obversati vestibulo tribuni fuerant, nuntiant domi mortuum esse.

inevitably, sooner or later, again come under discussion. Publius Volero, a plebeian captain (*qui ordines duxerat*), on being shortly after summoned to serve in the ranks as a common soldier, refused, and, when compulsion was attempted, appealed to the people, and was instantly taken under their protection. The senate was induced to yield by the more prudent of the patricians, and Volero was chosen by the people for their tribune of the following year. During his tribuneship he made the proposal to withdraw the election of tribunes of the people from the influence of wealth, and from that of the nobles, with their pretended science of sacred rites and usages. The tribunes, like the regular authorities, had been formerly elected in the assemblies of the centuries, which could only be convoked in pursuance of a decree of the senate, and in which rank and riches had the preponderance. These assemblies were presided over by some person in authority, and stood in need of the auspices and auguries, which entirely depended on the senate. They must, moreover, be confirmed by the assemblies of the *curiæ*, which were wholly patrician, or, at least, stood wholly under patrician influence.

Publius Volero proposed that the defenders of the people should be chosen in the assemblies of tribes, where votes were decided by numbers; where no auspices and no confirmation by the *curiæ* were required; where, lastly, a tribune presided.* The question was momentous: it was the first step to all the subsequent changes introduced in the aristocratic parts of the constitution. In the first year Volero could not carry through his project. He was, however, again elected for the following year; which would not have happened, had not the rich plebeians of the first class for once felt an identity of interests with the multitude. The consuls of the following year were of different dispositions. Appius, at the head of the haughty nobility, would have used force; but Quinctius led his colleague away, and conceded what could not be refused much longer. Four generations passed, however, before the consul Publilius procured the delegation to assemblies of the tribes, and, by consequence, to votes by the head, of the power of making valid laws on all subjects proposed to them. Meanwhile the confirmation of the decrees of the centurial assemblies by the *curiæ* became a mere form, as did the curial meetings themselves, the thirty lictors only being brought together to *represent* the *curiæ*. It was rare for aught of early institution to sink into entire disuse in Rome. If the substance vanished, the shadow was retained, and the *curiæ* kept the privilege of confirming long after the right of electing the consuls had shifted to the centuries. All political changes made by the Romans were directed to some proximate and definite object, and nothing was wholly done away with, unless inconsistent with that object.

The plebeians having in this manner possessed themselves of some of the most important political privileges, next sought to remove the last restrictions on their rights, which had existed from the earliest times, and had hitherto retarded the developement of that Roman state, to which was reserved the empire of the world.

* Beaufort.

In order to obliterate in Rome the last traces of the Etruscan system of castes and priestly government, the plebeians must be made to participate in the knowledge of those legal mysteries, which had hitherto been communicated only to the patrician families by means of oral tradition and of ceremonial archives, while they were purposely kept inaccessible to the body of the people. The exorbitant power of the consuls, as supreme judges must disappear:* the prohibition of marriage between patricians and plebeians must be taken off. To this end a new legislation was requisite, and the tribune, Terrentillus Arsa, v. c. made the first advances to it, taking advantage of the absence of 292. both consuls. The affair was, however, delayed by the city prefect, through the intervention of the other tribunes, till the return of the consuls, whose presence put a stop to it for the moment. In v. c. the following year, however, the whole college of tribunes re- 293. newed the rogation, which was strenuously resisted by the noble Cincinnatus, the very model of a Roman of the old stock, as well as by his son Cæso Quintius. Legal and illegal means were resorted to; recourse was had to the Sibylline books; warnings against disturbance were promulgated on divine authority; a war was begun against the Æqui and Volsci. All in vain. Quintus was brought to trial; the entreaties of his father, those of the patricians and his own were unavailing, and he thought it more advisable to forfeit his recognisances, and save himself by flight, than to await his sentence. Cincinnatus was impoverished, being obliged to indemnify those who had stood as sureties for his son; yet the nobility still resisted the repeatedly re-elected tribunes. The latter, however, carried the augmentation of their number to ten; and at length the nomination of a commission, with extraordinary legislative powers.† Every other power, even that of the tribunes, thereupon ceased, and unlimited authority, till the establishment of new laws, was delegated to ten men, to be elected, according to the proposal of the tribunes, as well as from among plebeians as patricians; but who were chosen, after some discussion, exclusively from the latter class.

It is evident, that an union of the several classes of Romans, which had hitherto stood apart from each other, in some measure, as castes, was the real scope and end of the new legislation. The remains of that legislation are, however, so insignificant, and their interpretation so difficult, that even Niebuhr confesses they would give us little instruction in civil or criminal jurisprudence. It may be enough, therefore, to mention, that the distinction between clients, as vassals, or hirelings

* According to Livy, Terentillus Arsa particularly directed his attacks against the consuls:—"Quippe duos pro uno acceptos immoderata infinita protestate; qui soluti atque effrenati ipsi omnes metus legum omniaque supplicia verterent in plebem. Quæ ne æterna illis licentia sit, legem se promulgaturum, ut quinque viri crentur legibus de imperio consulari scribendis."

† Livy, who in this is followed by Niebuhr, says, that each decemvir held the presidency for twelve days, had twelve lictors for his suite, and exercised judicial supremacy:—"Placet creari decemviros sine provocatione, et ne quis eo anno alius magistratus esset. Admicerenturnd plebeii controversia aliquamdiu fuit, postremo concessum patribus modo, ne lex Icilia de Aventino aliæque sacratæ leges abrogarentur."

of the patricians, and the rest of the plebeians, thenceforth vanished, that patronage became a mere protection and defence of humble dependents by the rich and the powerful; and that the centuries, not as yet the tribes, recognised as alone having penal jurisdiction over burghers.

In the first year of their office, these decemvirs behaved so admirably, that their administration gave general satisfaction; and they brought their legislative duties nearly to a close; but declared that a sixth of the requisite laws was still wanting (or two of the twelve tables on which the laws were afterwards engraved;)* and by consequence, that a further prolongation of this extraordinary regimen was necessary. The patrician, Appius Claudius, who took the leading part in the whole affair, was nominated president at the election of the new decemvirs. He acted in concert with the plebeians, by receiving votes for plebeian candidates, and for himself, likewise, though it had been declared contrary to law that any functionary should be re-elected immediately after holding office. By dint of intrigue, Appius was, however, re-elected, and along with him nine others, half of whom were patricians, half plebeians.

This new commission soon showed itself very different from the first. Each of the decemvirs had twelve lictors; and the latter bore in their bundle of staves the formidable axe, the sign of judgment on life and death, which the consuls, since the time of Valerius Publicola, had been obliged to lay down during residence in the city. It was now in vain to think of appeal from one ruler to another, though that appeal alone had rendered tolerable the want of tribunes during the first year of the new government. Even in this year the sway of the decemvirs had already become tyrannical; and in the beginning of the next, not a word more was said of the resignation of their office. The second year's decemviral government was entirely without legal foundation; yet the senate, which they found themselves obliged to convoke on occasion of an inroad of the Æqui and Sabines, acknowledged their authority. The circumstances under which that body was convoked were the following. The decemvirs had received an application for aid from Tusculum; and, as they durst not presume so far on their own authority as to levy an army, they were obliged to call the senate together. On its meeting, the first question raised was the right by which it had been convoked: for in strictness the decemvirs were but private persons, and as such could have no right to convoke the senate or to collect its votes. However, only two of its number insisted on the point of form, and the decemvirs kept possession of their dignity. Accordingly, they sent out an army, which was every where defeated, and procured the murder of Siccus, the only man who had vindicated the honor of the Roman arms by deeds of personal valor, which the chronicles have strained to the verge of the fabulous.

Hardly was this murder accomplished, when Appius Claudius perpetrated a still more scandalous deed in the town than that which had

* *Duas adhuc deesse tabulas*, is the singular phrase of Livy, as if the requisite number of tables could have been settled so precisely beforehand. Had the mystical Etruscan number any weight in the calculation?

been committed by his colleagues at the head of the army. The daughter of Virginus, a brave officer, the betrothed of Icilius, who had before acquired high esteem as tribune of the people, was claimed by a dependant of Appius, as daughter of his female slave; and Appius himself sat in the judgment-seat to decide upon the question raised with regard to the birth of an innocent virgin, whom he had marked out for the victim of his lust. He refused to await longer than a single day the arrival of her father from the army, pronounced sentence against him on his unexpected appearance, and the father stabbed his daughter in the sight of the assembled people, rather than be witness of her dishonor. Father and bridegroom then invoked the vengeance of the people. Within the city the senate took the part of the decemvirs: but Virginus and Icilius found an audience in the army, which left its encampment, marched upon Rome, and Virginus first occupied the Aventine with one division of troops, where he was speedily joined by Icilius with another. The people would hear none but the two men who in the senate had opposed the illegal power of the decemvirs. Every other embassy from the town was received with scorn, and each division of troops, that of Virginus and Icilius, elected ten tribunes, who formed a deliberative council. The first rank and the conduct of affairs was entrusted to two of these tribunes, and the whole multitude marched, under the leading of their new chiefs, from their position on the Aventine to the Mons Sacer.

At first the patricians, in spite of threats, persevered in their previous disposition, and the decemvirs did not abdicate their office. But Valerius and Horatius refused to mediate between senate and people, so long as that iniquitous power should continue to exist. It was not till the people prepared for a formal secession from the town, that the patricians did at last give way. The decemvirs were obliged to retire; and the people, under the auspices of the pontifex maximus, chose ten tribunes, who were recognised by the senate as rightful defenders of the people. On the motion of these tribunes, the old constitution was restored, with the express provision, which Horatius and Valerius, the two friends of the people, who were afterwards chosen for consuls, caused to be passed into a law, that not only should an appeal lie to the senate from all decrees of the consuls, but that the decision of the people should have more weight than that of both the senate and the consuls.* Appius, who had caused Virginia's murder, died by his own hand; the plebeian Appius, who, with the aid of the senate, had screened Appius, was capitally convicted; the other decemvirs were forced to quit the town. Whether the laws of the second and third year of the decemviral government had by that time been promulgated, cannot be ascertained with certainty, since it is no where stated at what time were set up the two last tables of the twelve which contain-

* "L. Valerius et Horatius, (says Livy) omnium primum, cum velut in controverso jure esset, tenerentur patres plebiscitis, legem centuriatis comitiis tulere, ut quod tributum plebs jussisset, populum teneret." The antithesis of *plebs* and *populus* here must not be overlooked.

ed the old legislation of Rome. However, the impassable distinctions of rank were overthrown. A law of Canuleius, in the 309th year of the city, removed the prohibition of marriage between plebeians and patricians; and, after a long struggle, all the regular seats of authority were at length rendered accessible to the plebeians. The provisional function of interrex alone continued till the latest times a prerogative of the patricians.

CHAPTER V.

ADVANCE OF ROME TO SUPREME POWER OVER ITALY.

THE rapid aggrandisement of Rome, and immense increase of her internal strength, resulted from the foregoing innovations. Nothing but war could procure for the families which occupied the places of honor any respite from the tribunes and from the multitude, kept by the tribunes in a state of constant excitement. Nothing but moderation, valor, fortitude, justice, and prudence could now secure persons in their station who had formerly owed every thing to birth alone. It was this which gave such dignity to the characters of those times, such activity and vigilance to the military leaders. The plebeians were excited in no less degree by the change. They were constrained to double exertions in the public service, in order to supplant the present possessors of public offices; they were constrained to practice industry and frugality, in order to become their rivals in wealth; they were constrained to exhibit promptitude in supporting public burdens, in order not to stand behind them in patriotism. Perfect union prevailed amongst all classes against the foreign enemy; and to the latter the vigor awakened by intestine strife was always dangerous. But so soon as war with external enemies ceased, intestine commotions were sure to re-commence, which kept all the burghers awake at least, and allowed none to sink down on the pillow of effeminacy or luxury.

About this time a system of strict moral superintendence was introduced into the Roman state, according to Sabine usage, and in connection with military discipline, taxation, and administration. A review of the civic force, of the most eminent as of the poorest burghers; inscription in the roll of citizens, and in the lists of contributions; and the letting of the demense lands, were annually conducted by two censors, who, moreover, made strict inquiry into the outward manner of life and reputation of every individual citizen. These censors must themselves be men of tried and blameless character, and for a long period they watched over the maintenance of the ancient discipline, with no less success than was found during three centuries in Geneva; only that in the latter town, the duties of religion and morality, as well as those of domestic life, were drawn within the competence of a spiritual tribunal; while in Rome the censors exercised a merely civil jurisdiction. The election of censors took place every five years. Three men were elected who had held the consular dignity, who remained in office eighteen months, and performed its functions usefully, so long as superintendence of that description was compatible with the multiplied relations of the state.

When this ceased to be the case, the people began to regard the superintendence of morals as a secondary part of the office, and the censors themselves only employed it to gratify animosities, and to wreak their personal spite upon individuals.

We must content ourselves with indicating the steps by which Rome attained to the highest point of external domination, in the same manner, that is to say, only in its leading features, as we have already described the internal formation of her civil constitution—a constitution which, like the English, was bought at the price of blood and of earnest struggles, not got up by extempore complete in all its parts, but developed by degrees, like every thing great which nature herself produces.

The Sabines, a parent stem of Rome, had been, since the three hundred and sixth year of the city, wholly incorporated into the Roman state—their hills and vales became Roman possessions. The Volsci and Æqui were in part received into the alliance which was granted to the Latins, and their land was in part granted to Roman or Latin colonists. In this manner Fidenæ became Roman property;

U. C. while Lavici, Bolæ, and Anxur were divided between Romans
329 and Latins. In these arrangements the advantage was always
to on the side of the Romans, who, though citizens of a single
340. town, maintained an equal footing to the whole league at the head of which they stood. Their domain extended as far as the sea and the lake Fucinus, and all the Latins appeared content with these unequal terms of alliance. Southwards and westwards their territory was rounded off by the sea; northwards, in Etruria Proper, the farther progress was hindered by the Capenites, Falisci, and Veientes. At an earlier period, Rome had maintained a respectable rank, even among the Etruscan towns. This rank, however, was afterwards lost by the town—the remembrance of their Tuscan origin had vanished, and Veii, with its enormous walls, behind which its inhabitants were perfectly safe against every attack which could be made without machinery for a siege, and without paid and standing armies, lay like a barrier in the neighborhood of Rome, and resisted the extension of her domains north of the Tiber. Perpetual wars between Veii, a declining primitive state, and the growing Roman commonwealth, were inevitable. Unfortunately for Veii, the total overthrow of the two other principal parts of the Etruscan league took place just at the time when Rome, by degrees, partly modelled herself, and was partly modelled by circumstances, completely into a military aristocracy; and at the moment when the Romans threatened the Veians with destruction, even the towns of Etruria Proper refused to aid them against the common enemy. With regard to the two other members of the great Etruscan union, the Campanian branch had sunk under the Samnites, who also began to press on the Greek population of Campania. The Lombard branch had long been crushed by the Gallic expeditions. While the Romans at length threatened the destruction of Veii, the same barbarians also invaded Tuscany Proper, or at least threatened it every day with invasion.

Shortly before the last war with Veii, Rome had taken a measure

which necessarily rendered her military force the most imposing in the whole west. The regulation must, however, have existed in the time of the kings, as the royal troops, or at least their guards, were undoubtedly paid from the public treasury. After this model, the civic force, which had formerly marched at its own expense, was, thenceforward, taken into the pay of the state.* This, however, regarded only the infantry: the cavalry, which was not very strong in numbers, and which was levied from that class which was the first in point of property, did not begin to receive regular pay till long afterwards.

The occasion of the last war with Veii was not so much the aggression of its citizens on the Roman soil, as the insulting manner in which they had dismissed the Roman delegates who were sent to demand satisfaction. “*Veiens bellum*,” says Livy,† “*motum ob superbum responsum Veientis senatus, qui legatis repetentibus res ni, facesserent propere urbe finibusque daturus, quod Lars Tolumnius dedisset, responderi jussit*.” The explanation of this insolent allusion is, that the Fidenates, on the suggestion of Tolumnius, had slain the Roman ambassadors. In retaliation for this outrage, Cornelius Cossus slew Tolumnius, and brought to Rome the second *spolia opima*. Unequal to a conflict in the open field with the Romans, the men of Veii esconced themselves behind their gigantic walls, and there withstood a seige for years. The seige of Veii has been handled in the Roman chronicles just as the Messenian wars in those of the Greeks. Its duration during ten successive winters and summers; the part which Camilus plays in it as dictator; the turning off the waters of the Alban lake by the enormous work of a canal (emissarium,) hewn in solid stone; ‡ the sudden apparition of the Romans from a subterranean passage in the temple of Juno at Veii, belong to the embellishments of this narrative, which it were vain to attempt to reduce to any historical form and consistency. These incidents have all been received as true historical details, and filled the later Romans with enthusiasm for their national history. While on the one hand, therefore, we dare not represent them as authentic, on the other we shall as little presume to subject them to the method of historical criticism applicable on other occasions.

The conquest of Veii not only increased the population of Rome as its inhabitants were compelled to leave their abodes and migrate, thither,—it not only enriched the Romans with the spoils of an ancient and wealthy town, but it also extended the Roman dominion over one of the most fertile districts of Italy. The lands of the burghers of Veii were partly divided, partly farmed out. Etruria was now ren-

* Livy relates (l. iv. c. 59.) that after the seige of Anxur (Terracina.) the plebeian soldiers were gratified with regular pay by the senate. “*Oppidum vetere fortuna opulentum tres exercitus diripuerunt. eaque primum benignitas imperatorum plebem patribus conciliavit. Additum deinde omnium maxime tempestivo principum in multitudinem munere, ut ante mentionem ullam plebis tribunorumve decerneret senatus, ut stipendium miles de publico acciperet, quum ante id tempus de suo quisque functus eo munere esset.*”

† L. i. v. c. 58.

‡ Ricci, *Memorie Storiche della Città di Alba Longa*.

dered accessible; the bulwark which had arrested the march of the Romans was removed; and sooner or later Latium, like Etruria, was marked out for conquest.

Even the Gauls were involuntary accessaries to this subjection of all Italy under Roman domination, though they menaced, in the outset, Rome itself with destruction. We have already related how the Gauls forced their way into Italy; how, by degrees, and constantly reinforced by new immigrations, they approached the Apennines, and at last extended their ravages even into Etruria, on the other side of these mountains. Four expeditions are said to have been made by the Gauls at an earlier period, the fifth had been conducted into Etruria by the guardian of the regent (Lucumo) of Clusium, whom the latter had robbed of his wife. According to another account, the Gauls made their appearance somewhat later in Italy, and directed their attack at once on the Etrurians within the Apennines.

Whatever occasion, however, may have led them over the Apennines, they besieged Clusium (Chiusi) at a time when Roman ambassadors were resident there, either accidentally, or on account of the Gauls. These ambassadors, of the powerful and numerous Fabian gens, were sent to make representations to the Gauls in the name of the Romans; and when they could not obtain a hearing, joined the ranks of the combatants. One of them had slain a Gaulish leader, whereupon the Gauls demanded the surrender of an ambassador, who had been guilty of so gross an offence against the laws of nations. Not only did the Romans refuse to comply with this demand, but likewise, when the Gallic army set out from Clusium towards Rome, elected three Fabii as military tribunes of the year. As the conqueror of Veii was at that time living in Ardea, the military tribunes led the army into the field.

The motive of Camillus's retirement from Rome, at this juncture, is said to have been his resentment of the treatment which he had met with from the people and their tribunes. Before the conquest Veii, he had promised the people the whole of the spoils, but afterwards had sily contrived to diminish their share by a tenth. He had also applied a great part of the Veian spoil to his own use,—a practice to which the people were not yet accustomed. The tribunes took advantage of this circumstance to get him condemned by the people to a considerable fine. Indignant at this, he would not allow his clients and men to pay it though they offered to do so. According to Livy, he left the town "*precatus a diis immortalibus, si innoxio sibi ea injuria fieret, primo quoque tempore desiderium sive civitati ingrata facerent.*"

U. C. 364. The Romans took position, with 25,000 or 30,000 men, on the river Allia, against 70,000 Gauls, and suffered such a defeat that the remainder of the army did not even find its way back to Rome. It would appear from the rapid and easy conquest of Rome which ensued on this disaster, that the citizens deprived of their effective force betook themselves in part to the neighboring places, in part to the Capitol. Many Romans and Etruscans had collected themselves together within the massive and deserted walls of Veii, with the Ro-

man Cædicius at their head. Another band, under Camillus, defended itself in Ardea, in conjunction with the burghers of that town. Eighty old men, who had filled the highest offices sacred and civil, devoted themselves as victims to the subterranean powers, and awaited, in their robes and on their curule chairs in the forum, the sword of the unsparing invader. In Rome the Gauls burned the houses, but vainly besieged the Capitol, which they therefore kept blockaded, and spread their ravages over all Latium. Cædicius from Veii, and Camillus at the head of the men of Ardea, obtained important advantages over isolated Gallic detachments; and the Veneti pressed hard on the Gallic settlements across the Apennines. In the mean time the besiegers of the Capital endeavored to come to an understanding with the Romans with regard to the sum of money which they demanded for their departure; while the small and scattered bands of Romans in Latium or at Veii addressed themselves for aid to Camillus.

Hitherto the narrative has been probable in all its parts; but from henceforwards it rather resembles an epic poem, framed for the glorification of its hero, than a true and even probable story. According to the tradition, the Romans elected Cædicius for their leader: but when he declared that he, a man of inferior rank, could never be their rightful leader, they applied to Camillus, who, however, refused to exercise the functions of dictator without the sanction of a decree from the senate. Pontius Cominius undertook the dangerous duty of ascending the besieged Tarpeian rock, and bringing back a decree from such of the senators as were within the Capitol. He swam across the Tiber, climbed the rock at its steepest side, and returned in safety to the army. The senate decreed it lawful to elect a dictator in an assembly of the curiæ, and to delegate the military command on this occasion, not to a person nominated by a consul, but to one who should be elected by the people. Camillus was accordingly elected; but before he had time to proceed to the liberation of his native town, the Gauls had tried a surprisal of the citadel from the same side on which they had discovered that Cominius had climbed the rock. On this occasion the vigilance and firmness of M. Manlius saved the Romans from surprisal, just as the enemy had scaled their walls. If Roman heroism and destiny did indeed conspire so singularly to rescue a town destined to be mistress of the world, the last scene in this drama is not so incredible as it has sometimes been said to be. Polybius, indeed, contradicts the ordinary narrative; but his testimony has not the same weight with regard to a dark period which we grant him with regard to times nearer to his own. According to the narrative of Livy, the gold which the Gauls exacted as the price of their departure was being actually weighed out. A dispute took place, occasioned by the Gauls employing false weights—their leader wantonly threw his heavy sword and shoulder-belt into the balance. In the nick of time appears Camillus, drives out the Gauls, and cuts off their retreat.

Whatever the real facts may have been with regard to this liberation of Rome, she now advanced with giant steps to sovereign power over Italy. It was first debated whether the town should be rebuilt on its

old site. Many would have preferred taking possession of the deserted Veii; but the patricians, and especially Camillus, withstood this, and their patriotic views were backed by the popular superstition. The town having been hastily and irregularly rebuilt, petty wars were renewed by the Etruscan states, the Volsci and Hernici. The termination of all such contests was in favor of the Romans, who maintained superiority in the field. Under Camillus, Cincinnatus, and others, a number of skilful officers were formed, and improvements were made in arms and martial discipline, though intestine broils broke out with renewed violence.

The attempt of M. Manlius, who had previously saved the Capitol, to make himself master of Rome, is a very remarkable episode in her history. Whether the charge were true or false is hard now to determine but it is certain, that he who was its object was thrown from the Tarpeian rock, and thus met a more rigorous doom from the Roman aristocracy than Miltiades from the democracy of Athens.*

It were superfluous to investigate the motive which may have induced Licinius Stolo to broach anew the long-decided themes of dispute betwixt the nobility and the plebeians. He was a highly distinguished person, connected by marriage with a patrician family; † possessed all the requisite qualifications for the consulship; and moreover, as his tribuneship proved, stood so firm in popular favor, that he certainly would have succeeded as a candidate for the higher-office. Such a man must have felt with unusual bitterness the exclusion of the plebeians from the highest political functions. Elected tri-^{v. c.} bune with Lucius Sextius, he immortalized his name by a nine 378 years' struggle for the rights of his order, in which he won at last the most brilliant victory.

The currently received tale ascribes the introduction of the Licinian rogations to a petty caprice of female vanity. M. Fabius Ambustus, who was consular tribune, v. c. 374, had two daughters, one of whom married Servius Sulpicius, consular tribune in 378, the other a plebeian, C. Licinius Stolo. The story goes, that this younger bride of the Fabian house, being once upon a visit to her sister, showed alarm at the noise made by the lictors announcing, by striking their rods on the threshold, the arrival of their master from the forum, and was ridiculed by her sister for an instance of plebeian ignorance, which betrayed the humble station into which she had lowered herself by marriage. The plebeian lady, stung by the affront, extorted a vow from her husband, and even from her father, that they would never rest till her house also were graced with similar ceremonies. The silence of Dionysius on this absurd legend, and the absence of the smallest trace of it even in Plutarch, who seldom resists the temptation of preserving relics of that sort, might well be deemed sufficient to discredit the whole story. Its absurdity, moreover, appears from the simple con-

* Vid. Niebuhr.

† One of the daughters of Fabius Ambustus was married to C. Licinius Stolo, the other to Servius Sulpicius, one of the military tribunes, who were then from time to time appointed instead of consuls.

sideration that the ambitious lady in question could not well have been *surprised* at formalities with which she must have been perfectly well acquainted in the house of her father, who had himself been consular tribune four years previously. Besides, since the capture of the city, the consular office had been in abeyance, and its restoration could hardly have been dreamed of by a thoughtless woman, although it was now once more about to become the object of manly ambition.

The first Licinian rogation provided that military tribunes should again be superseded by consuls, equally appointed from among the patricians and plebeians, and of whom one must invariably be chosen from the latter order. It will be found, from the subsequent course of Roman history, that infinite good, unalloyed by evil, resulted from this law. The Decii, who gave themselves up as sacrifices for the weal of the Roman people, were plebeians. Plebeian leaders first repulsed, and finally conquered Pyrrhus. A plebeian reduced the Gauls of Italy, stemmed the conquests of Hannibal. A plebeian from the peasant huts of Arpinum extirpated the Cimbri and Teutones. A plebeian consul saved Rome from the highborn comrades of Catiline. The Catos, the Gracchi, and Brutus, were plebeians.

The second rogation consisted of the Licinian agrarian law. The following is the substance of its most important provisions.

“The common land, *ager publicus* of the Roman people, shall be strictly ascertained and defined in its boundaries. Such portions of it shall be reclaimed by the state as may have been usurped by private persons. Those of which the property is uncertain shall be sold, that the law may decide between private claimants.

“No one shall possess for ploughing or planting more than 500 *jugera* of common land, nor turn out to graze on the common pasture more than 100 head of large, or 500 of small cattle. All who act in contravention of this law shall be sued on a fine, by the *ædiles*, before the people; so, also, all who extend their pasture lands illegally.

“The occupiers of portions of the *ager publicus*, shall pay to the state the tenth bushel of agricultural produce, the fifth of the produce of plantations and vineyards, and a certain yearly sum per head for the grading both of the large and small cattle kept on the common pasture.

“The censors shall, once in every *lustrum*, let on lease to the highest bidder, the annual dues reserved to the Roman people from the *ager publicus*. The revenue farmers shall give security for the performance of their contracts. In case of unforeseen losses, the senate may remit the sums due from them. The proceeds shall be applied to the pay of the troops.

“The revenue farmers shall agree with the occupiers as to what part of the produce of their possessions they are entitled to demand in behalf of the state. Cattle are not to be turned out on the common land without being previously marked, and paying grazing

money. Cattle withdrawn from the legal dues are forfeited to the state.

"The occupiers of public land are bound to employ free laborers in a certain fixed proportion to the extent of their occupation."

Thus far the provisions of the proposed enactment were general and permanent in their nature. The following clause had more immediate reference to existing circumstances.

"Such portions of the public land, over and above 500 jugers, as are in the present possession of individuals, shall be divided amongst all the plebeians, in lots of seven jugers, as property. Triumvirs shall be appointed for the execution of this law, which shall be sworn to by both orders as an eternal covenant."*

Happy the state, says Niebuhr, where by force of a Licinian law the restoration of a race of free agriculturists, were it only for a century, was possible!

III. The third Licinian rogation enacted, that the amount of interests hitherto paid on all outstanding debts, should be deducted from the principal, the residue to be paid by equal annual instalments, within a term of three years.

In order rightly to estimate the character of this last enactment, we must dismiss from our minds the modern ways of thinking on these subjects. We must remember, that the transactions of the money-market were hardly less odious to the nations of antiquity than to the early Christian church, or the religion of Islam. Every interference of a modern state between debtor and creditor robs not only those who can stand the loss, but many more who cannot, and perhaps despoils

* The following is a note of Niebuhr, which, in this instance, we choose to extract from No. XXII. of the Foreign Quarterly Review, rather than take it, as usual, from the original text of that author, for the sake of one or two useful additions made to it by the critic.

"Five hundred jugers, says Mr. Niebuhr, are equivalent to about 490 Magdeburg morgen, or to 70 Roman rubbj; that is about 280 English acres, the rubbio being about four of our acres. Now, as Mr. Niebuhr ascertained during his residence in Italy, a farm of 70 is considered a very handsome tillage farm in the Agro Romano at the present day, which generally brings in about 20 scudi a rubbio to the *mercanti di campagna*, as the persons who take them are called, and gives them a large return for their capital. The farms of the present day are in general immensely large; but there are smaller ones in the more fertile situations, such as the vale of Aricia, which pay from 60 to 70 scudi the rubbio; and in this way Mr. Niebuhr thinks the patricians of ancient Rome may have let to their clients small portions of the part of the domain which was in their possession. That the 500 jugers, which, be it remembered, were all arable and plantation land, formed no paltry farm, is plain, when we recollect the right attached to it of feeding cattle on the common pasture, the extreme fertility of the soil in the south, and the frugal habits of the people. To this we must add, that the law set no limits whatsoever to the acquisition of property of any kind, but only regulated the possession of the domain, the public property. Two hundred jugers would just, at this very time, be considered a very large estate in Attica where the paternal estate of Alcibiades was not quite 300 plethra or 120 jugers, that is, about 67 acres. Yet Alcibiades was immensely rich; and the very same might be the case with a Roman citizen, who, exclusive of the property which he might purchase within the limits of the Roman territory, might hold large estates in Latium, Etruria, or any where else that the public relations of the state would allow him to purchase."

the widow and orphan to ease the great proprietor. This did not take place at Rome, where the debts contracted had no resemblance to the intricate and extensive transactions known by that name in latter times. Rome was not a mercantile town, and consequently there was no borrowing on bottomry or at *respondentia* for mercantile speculations. Borrowing on mortgage for the completion of purchases, or for the payment of legacies on landed estates, was equally unknown; such estates, when the inheritance was divided, being left in joint tenancy, or partitioned amongst the several heirs. Thus the debts which came within the operation of the Licinian law formed a very small proportion of those which now make up the mass of obligations of that nature. They were such as arose wholly from the pressure of necessity in times when extravagance and commerce were equally in a manner unknown. The deduction of interests already paid had no such effect as would inevitably result from the adoption of a similar measure in our times; namely, that many a debt would be cancelled, principal and interest. There were no debts of sufficiently long standing to be wholly wiped away by this process, how high soever might then be the rate of interest.* It is a singular fact, that the tribunes who introduced this daring measure neither mitigated the rigor of the existing law of debtor and creditor, nor restored the ancient laws against usury.

For ten successive years the popular tribunes were re-elected, during which time they were obstinately resisted by eight of their colleagues, who appear to have been gained by the patricians. Both parties exhausted every expedient permitted by the Roman constitution in case of disputes between the tribunes and the ordinary authorities. Licinius and his colleagues stopped the elections of public officers; and the senate, on the other hand, restored to their old resource in civil feuds, the appointment of a dictator, and endeavored to seize the first occasion of war, in order, if possible, to elude the necessity of yielding. Camillus was appointed dictator, and began to levy troops on the day fixed for taking the votes of the people. The old man might imagine himself as powerful as Cincinnatus had been, surrounded with the terrors of a time long passed. But the tribunes opposed a passive resistance to all his commands and menaces; and as neither troops nor taxes could be levied, the senate was at length forced to yield. In the year u. c. 387, the three renowned Licinian rogations passed into law. In the following year, a plebeian consul was elected for the first time. But the patricians, in their assembly of the curiæ, refused their assent to the appointment—*se auctores futuros negabant*. This senseless act rekindled the yet smouldering flame more fiercely than ever. According to Livy, furious threats were exchanged, and a new secession of the plebs appeared eminent. But even Camillus had now become tired of this inglorious squabble. He stood forth as the mediator of peace between the contending orders, and dedicated a temple to Concord, in memory of his success as a pacificator. The throwing open of the consulate to the plebeians was directly advantageous of course only to the *elite* of that order—the men of wealth, abilities, and influence. Meanwhile the patricians endeavored to save whatever was not yet lost

* See Appendix.

and succeeded in effecting the separation of the supreme judicial functions from the consulship. Thus arose the new office of prætors. The high police was also set aside for the patricians. When, therefore, the plebeian ædiles refused to hold the games which the senate had appointed for two extraordinary festival days, patrician ædiles were chosen with the distinctions which exclusively belonged to the first rank. The office of curule ædiles, like the censorship, was thus created at first for the patricians, who also regarded the priesthood as their hereditary property. This, however, could last but a short time: the first step drew all the others after it. After the lapse of only eleven years, admission to the censorship was extorted for the plebeians. Fourteen years later a plebeian became prætor; and fourteen years after the first prætor had been elected from amongst the plebeians, they likewise obtained admission to the priesthood. From this epoch, a new nobility supplanted the patricians, whose pride, however, long survived their importance.

CHAPTER VI.

WARS WITH THE GAULS, THE SAMNITES, AND THE LATINS.

U. C. 383 to 406. IT is evident from the military annals of this period, that the passing of the Licinian laws disembarassed the republic from the oppression of those fetters by which it had been previously retained in a state of wretched impotence. Hitherto the internal struggles for freedom from this crushing constraint have been exclusively deserving of attention: but henceforwards the mission of Rome to rule the nations declares itself. All at once, the complaints of public burdens, and the resistance to levies, cease, and are succeeded by murmurs whenever soldiers are *disbanded* against their inclination. So rapid was the rise of martial spirit in the nation; so rich her treasure of warlike force and virtue, from the moment that every one could aspire to attain his fitting place and recompence.

At two successive epochs, during this period, Rome was alarmed by the near approach of the Gauls, and, according to Livy, victoriously repelled their inroads on both occasions. Livy has, moreover, preserved the legend of a single combat, in which the youthful hero, C. Manlius, vanquished and slew a giant who had stepped forward, insultingly, from the Gallic ranks, and challenged a Roman knight to the trial of single combat. The legend recites, that the Roman warrior adroitly shunned the sword-stroke of his bulky antagonist, and thrusting upwards the lower rim of his monstrous shield with his own, transfixing his bowels, as he towered above him like a rock, and falling, like the Homeric Mars, took up an extended space with his carcase.* The victor won the golden chain which had decorated the neck of the vanquished, and long with it the surname of Torquatus. Two victories, hardly won by Pæteliuſ and C. Sulpiciuſ, and authenticated by the memorials of them preserved in the triumphal Fasti, freed the republic, for this time, from the alarms of gallic invasion.

* Livy's version of the Roman legend at once reminds the English reader of the fall of the old dragon in the Faery Queen:—

“So down he fell, and forth his life did breath,
That vanisht into smoke and clowdes swift:
So down he fell, that Earth him underneath
Did groane, as feeble so great loades to lift:

So down he fell, as an huge rockie clift,
Whose false foundation waves have washt away,
With dreadful poyse is from the maine land rift,
And rolling down, great Neptune doth dismay;
So down he fell, and like an heaped mountain lay.”¹

Book i. cant. ii.

Nine years had elapsed, when Rome and Latium were visited anew by the Gauls. Terror, as before, preceded their march, and poetic fiction, as before, described their struggle with Roman valor. A gallant youth, M. Valerius Corvus, again meets an insulting foe in single combat; a raven sent from the gods alights on the helm of the Roman warrior, and at every onset flies in the face of his adversary, and attacks with beak and wings its selected prey. However apocryphal Livy's oft-repeated tale of victory, certain it is that Latium never again was reached by the Gauls, and Rome had, from this period, a long respite from their inroads. In the Gallic wars, as Polybius remarks on a later occasion, they became inured to being cut to pieces, and they issued from these wars accomplished candidates for the empire of Italy.

As, in Rome, little distinction was to be gained by civil services, and none at all by mental exertions, as the whole system was calculated for warfare and contention, we cannot be surprised that the Roman annals of this period are little else than an uninterrupted string of bulletins. The *middle age* of the Romans, as we would designate the period extending from the expulsion of the kings to the second Punic war, is, like that of the modern European nations, an age of chivalry. The single combats of heroes with Gallic giants, described in the Roman annals, bear out this comparison. In reading of a Valerius Corvus and Manlius Torquatus, every one involuntarily thinks of Arthur and Roland, as of Godfrey of Bouillon in reading of Pyrrhus, who cuts through the Mamertine giant, so that half his body falls off at each side of the saddle. Central Italy alone maintained its ancient splendor and glory, for which it was indebted to the fruitfulness of Campania, to the remains of the declining Latin industry and Tuscan commerce, and, above all, to the progressive growth of Rome as a state of soldiers, and of vigorous and industrious agriculturists. Between the years 405 and 408 since the building of the city, the Romans alone, without reckoning the Latins, could, according to Livy, bring into the field ten legions, each consisting of 4200 infantry and 300 cavalry: a force which seems quite enormous, and doubly important from the consideration that it was wholly composed of men who took the field of their own accord, for their own cause. The common soldier might start into a general at any moment; all the centurions, up to the *primipilus*, that is to say, every man, from the corporal to the major, took rank according to merit and length of service. We follow Livy's narrative in these statements (l. viii. c. 8).

Upper Italy lay already desolate. In Magna Græcia, sometimes Greeks contended against Greeks—sometimes with the Lucanians and other rude mountain tribes—sometimes with Dionysius or the Carthaginians. On the other hand, the hardy Samnites cultivated, or turned into pasture, the rugged range of the Apennines, till the Romans entered Campania. Then came desolation over these regions also. The whole interior of the country, partly rugged and mountainous, had enjoyed the happy Samnite constitution and simple modes of life, while the bands of robbers and mercenaries which issued from their fastnesses gained disgraceful notoriety by their rudeness and ra-

capacity. From the moment of the Roman expedition into Campania, hostilities with this people were incessant. This expedition was occasioned by the Samnites, who had formerly found themselves too much cramped in their mountains, and, in consequence, had migrated into Campania. They had possessed themselves of the land—had become enervated by the influence of the climate and the mode of life—and had fallen into contention with the primitive Samnite tribes.

The occasion of the war with the Samnites was similar to that which afterwards led the Romans into Sicily—namely, that their assistance was solicited by the Campanian Samnites, who had seized upon a district town and goods belonging to others, against their own countrymen, as afterwards against the Carthaginians. It was eighty years since those Samnites, as we have already above remarked, had despoiled the Osci and Etruscans of Capua and great part of Campania. Since that time, they served among the Greeks and Carthaginians as mercenary troops, degenerated, and ceased to be connected with their mountain brethren, either by political or moral ties of any kind. In the constant wars of the latter with the Samnites in Campania, the Sidicini, whose capital was Teanum, were particularly hard pressed. They addressed themselves to Capua, and Capua to Rome. The Romans, who, since the year u. c. 401, were at peace, and, indeed, in formal alliance with the Samnites, scrupled to form a new league with a people engaged in actual warfare with their allies. Hence they refused to take the Campanians into their alliance, unless the latter, *pro forma* at least, would declare themselves clients of Rome, and thereby render overtures in their favor a right, or rather a duty, of the Romans. The Campanians, without, probably, considering the consequences of such a self-surrender, submitted to the necessity of pronouncing, through their ambassador, the formula which the Romans demanded; whereupon the latter summoned, for the first time, the Samnites to exercise no further hostilities against a state which had given itself up to them.* Naturally, the Samnites did not attend to these representations, but rather felt affronted by them; and both the Roman consuls entered Campania, each at the head of an army. One of them, Valerius Corvus, took an exposed position in the neighborhood of the Lucrine lake, where the Samnites thought they could attack him to advantage. They had deceived themselves, however, and were defeated by him. The other consul, Cornelius Cossus, allowed himself to be lured into the mountain passes, and found himself surrounded all at once in a deep valley, by the hostile army which occupied the heights. Retreat alone appeared to remain open—but even this would be difficult or impossible, if the whole Samnite army, which was posted on the heights, should pursue him. In this emergency, Decius resolved to offer himself as a sacrifice. He proposed to take position on an eminence, with a small band, in order that, while the whole force of the army was directed against him, the consul might have time to draw back his forces. This was done ac-

* The solemn formula of subjection ran, according to Livy, as follows:—"Itaque populum Campanum, urbemque Capuam, agros, delubra deum, divina humanaque omnia in vestram, P. C. populi que Romani ditionem dedimus."

cordingly. Decius made a stand against the far superior forces of the enemy till nightfall, cut his way during the night through the whole hostile army, joined the consul, and induced him to hazard an instant attack on the enemy.* In this action, also, the Samnites were beaten; but the consul, as it should seem, refrained from pursuing them, and penetrating again into the mountain regions, where matters had gone so ill with him shortly before. Decius received public honors in the shape of praises and gifts, and his name shown forth in popular songs and legends, side by side with those of Scævola, Cincinnatus, Manlius, Camillius, and other ancient heroes.

Meanwhile the Samnites speedily rallied their forces, which were far from having been crushed by the foregoing actions. Both the consuls, too, combined their armies, and endeavored to make themselves for once sure of the enemy. The Samnites mistook their caution and cunning for terror, and imprudently strayed to a distance from the camp, which they had fixed near Suessula. The Romans took the camp by a sudden assault, and immediately afterwards gave such a decided defeat to the Samnite army, before it had time to form in order of battle, that the Carthaginians sent the Romans a golden crown of honor, as a token of their pleasure on the overthrow of their ancient antagonists, with whom they came in constant collision in Italy and Sicily. Valerius, already distinguished by birth among the Romans, attained still higher distinction by this victory. The patricians were rejoiced to have men amongst them, whom the people were constrained to love and reverence; the people, on the other hand, is never disposed to refuse its homage to high birth, when accompanied by merit and condescension. In republics which are not founded on trade and commerce, in which, therefore, wealth is not the only title of honor, gratitude to deserving men is more rarely lost sight of than in states where rank is solely conferred by riches.

However honorable their two recent victories to the Romans and their consul Valerius, the Samnites were still far from being wholly subdued; for in the very next year we find them in as great force as ever. Meanwhile the Romans, contrary to their custom, had left a part of their army behind in Campania; and this division consisted of persons deeply involved in debt, who anticipated feeling the full rigors of the merciless law of debtors on their return. The project, therefore, occurred to them, of appropriating Campania, or, at all events, a part of it. The plan was prematurely detected; but such numbers were already concerned in it, that it was deemed more prudent to stifle than to scrutinise the matter. An attempt was, therefore, made to remove the malecontents to a distance; but they penetrated its object, united their forces, and unexpectedly marched, 20,000 strong, against Rome, in order to extort the enactment of some decree against usury, and pardon for themselves and their friends. It was intended that Valerius, at the head of a civic force, should march against them, and he

* "Decius, dum occasio in manibus esset, perpulit consulem, ut hostes et nocturno pavore attonitos, et circa collem castellatim dissipatos, aggredierentur; credere etiam aliquos, ad se sequendum emissos, per saltum vagari."

was accordingly named dictator; but, as he dreaded a new struggle between patricians and plebeians, he preferred to smooth the contest in an amicable manner. The immediate result of this dispute was a reconciliation with the Samnites, which an impending war with the Latins probably aided in bringing about.

It seems disparaging to the Romans, that, while they imposed a contribution in money and in grain on the Samnites, they, on the other hand, abandoned the Sidicini to their destiny, whose cause had been the pretext of the whole war. The latter circumstance indirectly occasioned a war with the Latins. For the latter took part with the Sidicini just as the Romans had given them up, and leagued themselves in their favor with the Campanians against the Samnites. This was at about the same time that they declared, by a solemn embassy to the Romans, that the hitherto existing relations must cease between Rome and Latium, which must together form a free federal state. Latins must have seats in the senate—the authorities at Rome must in part be Latin—Rome must become in future merely the capital of the Latin league—and not, as hitherto, domineer exclusively over that league. This idea was unbearable to the Roman pride—the arbitrament was therefore left to arms. A Roman army marched upon Campania, where the allied Campanians and Latins stood in arms against the Samnites. And here was displayed an alternation of friendship and hostilities, connections and dis severments, which astonishes us, and the causes of which we cannot satisfactorily explain. First of all, the Romans aid the Campanians, on account of the danger with which the Sidicini threatened the Samnites. Then Romans desert the Campanians—the Latins take their part—and, last of all, a combined force of Latins and Campanians take the field against the Romans and Samnites, who march upon Capua. The Latin force might probably be a match for that of the Romans—but that of the Campanians was certainly not, and would be of little use if the Samnites, as it appears, advanced, combined with the Romans, into Campania. The Latins and Campanians lay encamped at the foot of Vesuvius,* resolved to await the decision of a battle.

The action which ensued, contributed more than any other event to establish the Roman greatness, and diffuse the dread of their name over Italy. They have therefore, extolled the two consuls who then stood at their head, as patterns of Roman fortitude and discipline, and as unsurpassed examples of devoted love of country.

While the hostile army stood in each other's presence, the consuls issued orders that, on pain of death, no man should engage in single combat in front of the ranks; provocations to which might arise all the more probably, as individuals in the Roman and Latin ranks were personally acquainted, from the campaigns which they had formerly served together. This order could be no secret to the enemy. Accordingly, a Tusculan officer confronted the son of the consul Manli-

*Niebuhr here remarks, that, according to Livy, the battle took place on the road *ad Vesperim*, and that the Romans, therefore, named it the battle *ad Vesperim*; but that we do not know whether this was the name of a place or a river.

us, who commanded a body of cavalry, and scoffed at the prudent precautions of the generals, and the no less prudent forbearance of the soldiers. The youth yielded to passion, fought the aggressor, who fell by his lance. The intoxication of victory in the youth, the consternation of the father, the inevitable sacrifice to military discipline, the sentence and execution, are incomparably described by Livy.*

From the tenth chapter, and especially from the beginning of the eleventh, in the eighth book of Livy's history, it appears with the fullest evidence, as it also may be proved from other sources, that in ancient Italy the Celtic and Phœnician custom of offering human sacrifices was not usual, however it might yield to the Grecian influence. Livy recites the following particulars of this usage:†—"It was lawful for the consul, the dictator, or the prætor, when he contemplated devoting the hostile legions to the powers of destruction, not only to offer himself up to the gods of death, but also any others whom he chose of the Roman legion. If the man who was after this fashion devoted to the infernal gods died, well and good—*probe factum videri*; if he died not, then a wooden image, seven feet high or more, was to be buried in the earth, and a beast slain as an expiatory offering. No Roman public personage was allowed to go where the image was buried. If a person in authority devoted *himself* to the infernal gods, and died not, he never again could offer a pure sacrifice for himself or the state." From this horrible custom, springing from the idea which prevailed in various countries with regard to expiatory offerings—the sacrifice of the most distinguished, best, and purest objects,—the practice of self-devotion would appear to have arisen amongst the Romans and Etruscans.

In the instance before us, both consuls received in a dream the announcement, from the spectral form of a superhuman being, that the leader on the one side, and the whole army on the other, were doomed to mother earth and the infernal gods. Both agreed, that he whose wing might waver should devote himself, and thereby the hostile army, to destruction. Even before the battle, the victims presaged evil to Decius. "It matters not," he replied to the aruspex, "if my colleague has had fortunate omens."

The wing commanded by Decius giving way in the first onset, he exclaimed, "The aid of the gods is now necessary, Valerius! Up, high priest of the Roman people; prescribe to me the formula in which I may devote myself to death for the Roman legions." The high priest enjoined him to dress in his senatorial robes, to veil his head, to raise his hand under the toga up to his chin, to place himself on a sword which was laid beneath his feet, and, these preliminaries having been fulfilled, he pronounced the formula to be repeated by the voluntary victim:—"Janus, Jupiter, father Mars, Quirinus, Bellona, Lares, Dii Novensiles, gods of our fathers, gods who rule alike over us and over our enemies, gods of the dead, to you I pray; you I beseech to bless with power and victory the Roman people, to send on their enemies dread, horror, and death. In behalf of the Roman peo-

* viii. 7.

† Lib. x. c. 5.

ple and Quirites, the army, legions, allies of the Roman people and Quirites, thus I devote the legions and allies of the enemy, with myself, to the gods of the dead and to mother earth."

From that moment, mounted on his horse, he seemed to both armies the spirit of destruction rushing down on the Latin legions. Terror went before him; and when he sank, transfixcd with arrows, the Latins recoiled. The battle was won by the Romans, and, like all actions in which Romans were engaged, was extremely bloody, as it was chiefly fought with the sword and other weapons for close fighting. The Latins lost more than three fourths of their army, but reinforced themselves immediately afterwards, and ventured a new battle. This battle, near Trifanum, between Sinuessa and Minturnæ, completed the results of the former overthrow; and the force of the Latin league, like that of the Campanians, was annihilated. The Romans, therefore, next turned to particular towns and states, which they treated in a variety of ways, according to circumstances. The war with the several states of Latium lasted two years longer; amongst these, Tibur, Præneste, Velitræ, Antium, distinguished themselves by the most persevering resistance: yet even these at length acquiesced in the new order of things.

By virtue of this new order, the old league of Latium was entirely torn asunder; the interests of the towns were divided by means of the various privileges which they obtained in relation to the Romans; general assemblies were prohibited, every citizen restricted to the landed estates within the jurisdiction of his town; a great part of the land was partly converted into Roman national property, partly assigned to Roman colonies, which were settled every here and there. Such was the course taken in the district of Antium; most rigorously, however, in that of Velitræ: the inhabitants of that town were forced to surrender their lands entirely; in Ætium, on the other hand, they were admitted amongst the colonists. Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, and Pedum received the rights of citizenship and suffrage, which Tusculum already possessed and was able to retain. In Campania the same course was taken; Capua, Cumæ, Suessula, Fundi, and Formiæ became Roman towns,—that is to say, their burghers acquired the right of Roman citizenship; a part of the land was partitioned amongst Romans,—in other words, became the leasehold estate of Roman magnates. On the other hand, the nobility of the country, because it had exhibited Roman, not Campanian, patriotism, was indemnified for its losses in land at the cost of its fellow citizens. From this time forward the force of Latium came to be called Roman, though the Latins no longer served in the body of the legions, but were annexed to them in cohorts of their own.

Thus, as Niebuhr remarks, the *jus Latinum* became a system of regulations established by the will of the Roman people over all the internal and external relations of the then vanquished Latin towns and states. The *jus Italicum* continued to be a wholly different compact, according to the circumstances under which it was made, with the towns which became subject by treaty, or, as it was termed, allied towns.

CHAPTER VII.

SAMNITE WARS.

FROM this moment the struggle was waged for empire over Italy. The Gauls, the Greeks, above all, the Samnites, might easily have prevented the Romans from becoming lords of the whole land, if they had but been united; but they were either in a state of discord, or, at all events, of isolation. The Greeks were an easy prey to the most powerful among the states which they had improvidently called upon for assistance; the Etruscans, who repeatedly revolted from the Romans, weakened as they had been by the Gauls, and enervated by luxury, were reduced to complete subjection with facility. The Grecian states of Italy regarded the Romans as their natural friends, and the Samnites and Lucanians as their hereditary enemies, but sought by preference the aid of their own countrymen, who at that time made a trade of war, and had conquered the whole East.

As both nations, Samnites and Romans, were alike warlike and alike ambitious, it was a point which the next few years must inevitably decide, which of the two should in future rule over Lower Italy. The Samnites were deficient in unity; their councils were without plan or consistency. On the other hand, the Roman senate firmly pursued the same track, and remained ever equal to itself. Even if Samnium had allies, they were such as could not be trusted; while those of Rome were obliged to follow her dictates, and to serve in the Roman ranks under Roman officers. It cannot, therefore, be wondered at that the event was in favor of the Romans. The first impulse to a new war with the Romans was given by the colony of Fregellæ, established by the Romans on a site which had formerly belonged to the Sidicini, but had afterwards been ravaged by the Samnites. This colony formed a sort of outwork of the Roman state, an advanced post, the purpose of which in general was served by the Roman military colonies. The Samnites had not impeded the formation of this colony; but when the Romans declared war upon the burghers of Palæopolis, a Greek town,* they seized the occasion of making a return in kind.

Palæopolis, a Cumæan colony, distant a few leagues from Naples, was, as the name indicates, founded at an earlier date than the latter town, which, however, gave its name to the co-burghers of both, who appear to have been united into one Neapolitan state. The ostensible cause of war between Rome and Naples was so insignificant, as to

* "Palæopolis fuit haud procul inde ubi nunc Neapolis sita est; duabus urbibus populus idem habitabat. Cumis erant oriundi."—*Liv.* viii. c. 22.

show that it was rather undertaken because the Romans aimed at exclusive rule over Campania and the western coast, and at wresting from the Samnites the alliance of a rich commercial town, than because they really felt themselves offended by the Neapolitans.* The latter themselves did not repose much confidence in the Samnites; but the Romans, while the one consul marched against Palæopolis, and before the formal outbreaking of the Samnite war (v. c. 428,) sent the other consul to the Samnite frontier, in order to observe their motions. The Palæopolitans could not defend themselves single-handed against the Romans: 4000 Samnites, and 2000 burghers of Nola who lay in their town, appeared to them more dangerous than the Romans encamped around it; and the Tarentines, who had promised them aid, delayed too long in affording it. Hence the Roman party in the town, especially the two most eminent burghers, Charilaus and Nymphius, decided rather to capitulate with the Romans, than to endure the brutal oppression of the Samnite garrison any longer. The Romans were received into the town, and Neapolis was the first Grecian state admitted into the Roman league with extraordinary privileges.†

The Samnites were such formidable enemies to Rome, that her most experienced general, Papirius Cursor, was opposed to them in the capacity of dictator; and even he considered it more prudent to extort from them a recognition of Roman superiority in the field, than to drive them to extremities. A truce was agreed on only for a year; and early in the following the war was renewed, which, with few intermissions, lasted forty years.

v. c. 428. The important town of Luceria, in the interior of Apulia, with some further part of that district, was at first allied with Rome, while the greater part of the population ranged itself against the Romans in alliance with the Samnites. A rumor, artfully spread by the Samnites themselves, that Luceria was besieged by their whole force, brought precipitately into the field two Roman armies, united under the consuls T. Veturius and Sp. Posthumius. The march of these consular armies through Campania was directed with the thoughtlessness of men blinded by destiny. In a region where almost unarmed peasants might have checked their march or cut off their communications, they marched in a column, of which the front lost sight of the rear at every turn of the route, with as little precaution as though they were far from any enemy. They had now descended through a hollow way into a narrow valley, closed in by a second

* Appian puts the following announcement to the Romans into the mouth of the great Samnite general Pontius:—"We Samnites have ever kept inviolate peace with you Romans; but ye have disturbed this amicable intercourse, inasmuch as ye have become allies of our enemies the Sidicini. Scarce, however had we again become friends, when you made an attack on our neighbors the Neapolitans. We know well that this attack upon Naples is planned merely as a first step (*παράσκειν*) to the subjugation of all Italy."

† Such is Livy's narrative. Niebuhr maintains, with show of reason, that Palæopolis suffered the usual fate of cities surprised by treachery; and that Neapolis, on the other hand, opened her gates to the Romans pursuant, not previously, to a treaty of alliance.

ridge, across which the only issue was a pass of the same narrow and difficult character as that through which they had just made their descent, and both which obtained fatal renown by the name of the Caudine passes. When the farther pass was reached by the head of the column, they found it barricaded with fragments of rock and trunks of trees, and at the same moment discovered the ridges around swarming with armed enemies. The army, thus unexpectedly entrapped, consisting of two consuls, and between 40,000 and 50,000 Romans, could neither attack the enemy, nor move backwards nor forwards.* They had, therefore, no choice but to capitulate, though, probably, not, as Livy would have it, without an effort to force their passage. The Samnites themselves appear to have been embarrassed how to employ their advantage; and of all possible lines of conduct, which could have been selected by their general, C. Pontius chose the worst. He dismissed the Roman legions and their officers on the faith of a treaty,† concluded, indeed, by the two consuls, Posthumius and Veturius Calvinus, but at which no *fecialis* or public functionary, commissioned by the Roman people for those religious ceremonies required in every treaty, could be present. The circumstance of passing under the yoke, which has been described as an impolitic humiliation inflicted on the vanquished army, was nothing more than matter of usage in all similar cases. A space was made in the palisades encompassing the Roman army, admitting one to pass through at a time, and this passage was framed into a door by a transverse bar of wood.

At Rome, on the first intelligence of the defeat and captivity of the army, a levy *en masse* was ordered to effect their release if possible—at all events to defend the walls against an expected siege by the victors. The shops were shut, for even the tradesmen and artisans were compelled to enlist, the courts of justice closed, and the terms in all transactions extended, as every one was forced to abandon his business. Such a cessation of all intercourse could not outlast the immediate crisis; but the general mourning continued, which had been voluntarily assumed. The senate had laid down their purple robes, the nobles their golden rings, the women their jewels and ornaments. No sacrifice was performed, no marriage solemnised, while Rome awaited the close of the year of mourning, or its abridgment through some fortunate change in the posture of affairs.

The pretext of informality was now put forth by the senate, in refusing its recognition to the treaty. It declared that treaty to be binding only on those persons who had pledged themselves thereto, and not on the state.‡ It decreed that all who had sworn to the observance of the terms of that treaty should be delivered up to the Samnites, as having practised a deception on them. The annals followed by Livy must clearly have been those of a senatorial family; for he ascribes to the unfortunate consul Posthumius the honor of voluntarily proposing the surrender of all those by whom the treaty had been closed and

* Liv. l. ix. c. 3.

† Ibid. c. 4.

‡ "Negarunt consules, injussu populi fœdus fieri posse, nec sine *fecialibus*, *ceremoniaque solenni*."

guaranteed, and amongst whom he himself was the first; while he imputes opposition to this surrender to the tribunes of the people, and makes them appeal to the inviolability of their persons.* Even the tribunes are finally impelled by magnanimity to offer themselves a sacrifice for their country; even they lay down their offices, and are all delivered up to the Samnites. All the Roman writers admit that the whole affair was nothing but a theatrical representation, intended in part to inspire the Roman people with new courage, in part procure admiration for the consuls and the senate. This is confirmed by the speech put into the mouth of the Samnite leader, when he refused the proffered surrender of the contracting parties.† The Romans had, however, gained their end by this disgraceful subterfuge. The courage of the army was doubly inflamed by the sting of the shame which they had suffered. But the idea of perjury still shocked the popular superstition. Posthumius met this scruple by a childish expedient. He was delivered up to the Samnites by the Roman priest of peace, *fecialis*; declared himself to have thereby become a Samnite slave, and in that capacity offered some affront to the Roman *fecialis*. All that was wanted was a form to nullify another form; and so much, at least, was gained by this expedient.

In the mean time Luceria had been taken by the Samnites: the Roman knights, who had previously been given as vassals, were guarded there. The consuls divided their forces;—one marched against Luceria; the other gave the Samnites battle in the neighborhood of the Caudine passes, and beat them. The advantages which the other consul gained before Luceria were far more important than the victory of his colleague. He not only routed the Samnites, but forced Luceria to capitulate, retook the spoils which had been taken from the Romans, revisited on the Samnites the disgrace which had been suffered by the Romans in the former year; and, if we may believe the accounts to which Livy lends a distrustful ear, Pontius himself underwent the dishonor which he had inflicted a year before on the Roman consuls. It is certain that Luceria was taken, and lost again at a later period. After its second capture, all the burghers were cut to pieces, and 2500 colonists sent thither. The war went on for twelve years, yet we do not find the Samnites overwhelmed by the successive defeats which are said to have been inflicted upon them. The Romans (v. c. 437) obtained a firm footing in Apulia, placed a garrison in Forentum, and advanced on the Lucanian territory, so that they limited the Samnites almost entirely to their own resources. We shall presently see that the Romans secured themselves in the possession of the passes, roads, posts, and best military positions on the whole line of the Apennines. But if actions had so frequently taken place as those which the Roman annalists enumerate during each year; and in each of which twenty,

* Livy puts the following peroration into the mouth of Posthumius, after a long speech:—"Quod ad tribunos attinet, consulite utrum præsens deditio earum fieri possit, an in diem differatur. Nos interim, T. Veturi, vosque cæteri, vilia hæc capita luendæ sponsonis feramus, et nostro supplicio liberemus Romana arma."—L. ix. c. 9.

† Liv. l. ix. c. 11.

often thirty, thousand men were slain, the senate, which always knew how to employ its advantages admirably, would hardly have granted the Samnites a peace which did not take a foot of land from them.

This peace secured for the Romans, whose senate pursued a single end with unvarying firmness and tranquillity, leisure to finish all that had been begun during the war. The Romans soon became masters of the whole of Central Italy, of Etruria, Umbria, and the territory which we now call the Marches. The transmutation of Italians into Romans begins with the extirpation of the remains of the Ausonian people. Then the Umbrians on the high and cold ridges whence the Tiber descends, were, more by chance than of set purpose, brought under the Roman dominion. For the Romans, as they had known how to fix themselves more and more firmly southwards, and had planted out colonies in Suessa and Pontia, in like manner pressed forwards further and further up the Tiber, and sent a military colony of 4000 men to Interamna and Casinum.

This seems to have aroused the Etruscan spirit anew. It was some time before the different towns could be brought to unite in any common undertaking against Rome. And even when their combined forces at length laid siege to Sutrium, the Arretini kept out of the general alliance. Besides, what could loose associations effect against a state which drilled its allies, like its subjects and dependants, into military unity and firmness. Fabius, who took the field against the allies, did not allow himself to be terrified by the number of assembled Etruscans; hastened over the mountains, which were then so thickly wooded, that Livy compares the Ciminian with the Hercynian forest,* and reached, by ways which no one had hitherto thought of, the territory of the Camertinian Umbrians. At first the Umbrians, or at least a part of them, aided the Romans in their descents from the heights, on the admirably cultivated Etruscan lands. They soon, however, bethought themselves better, and combined with the latter against Rome. If it be true, that in an engagement which was fought, either on the other side of the wooded Ciminian ridges in the neighborhood of Perugia, or immediately at the foot of it, above 60,000 men were taken or slain, this can only be explained by the Umbrians and Etrurians having been made enough to oppose their altogether unpractised militia to the flower of the Roman army, and its most skilled and experienced officers. The consequence might have been foreseen. The Umbrians were compelled to give themselves up before the close of the year, entirely into the hands of the Romans, or to accept a share in the *jus Latinum* on the most disadvantageous conditions—namely, by becoming *dediti*. The Etruscans, as usual, separated; Cortona, Perugia, and Arretium, obtained a thirty year's truce; and the other towns kept up the war without keeping together, or appearing simultaneously in the field. The case was the same with the other hill populations; and

* "Silva erat Ciminia magis tum invia atque horrenda, quam nuper fuere Germanici saltus, nulli ad eam diem ne mercatorum quidem adita. Eam intrare haud fere quisquam præter ducem ipsum, audebat, aliis omnibus cladis Caudinæ nondum memoria aboleverat."

here again the Roman policy shows itself in the most brilliant light. They offered the right of citizenship to the three Hernician nations,—the Alatinates, Verulani, and Ferentina,—but on their refusal to accept it, left them their own laws, in order to secure their friendship. They conferred the full rights of citizenship on the burghers of Anagnina, as well as on the Arpinates in the Samnite territory; though, with regard to the former, without the right of suffrage in the popular assemblies. The Æqui suffered severely. Fifty inhabited places of the little territory were annihilated, and Carseoli was turned into a Roman fort or colony. The Marsi lost three places,* and were forced to submit to the establishment of Sora to the southward, and of Alba to the northward, in their own territory, as military colonies.

The intestine discords of the Etruscans rendered their conquest easy to Rome. The Licinian family, which to judge by inscriptions, was extremely powerful and numerous in Etruria, bore heavily on the Etruscans with their oligarchical rule; and as the Romans took their part, new disputes were occasioned at once with the Umbrians and Etruscans. The Romans routed the Etruscans near Rusellæ, and disunited them by an armistice of two years from the Umbrians, whose passes now became of double importance, as the Gauls began to set themselves in motion anew. About this time they pressed upwards towards Spoleto into the mountains, established a new colony on the river Nar, which they called Narnia, and commanded all the passes which led from the Samnite territory to the tribes connected with them in the mountains. At length the Samnites, Etruscans, and Gauls united, rose against Rome. At an earlier period the Etruscans had employed Gallic mercenary troops, of which new swarms had come into Italy. Now the Gauls appear to have risen, *ex proprio motu*, against the Romans, who were pressing on them constantly more and more closely, and, by occupying the passes of the Apennines, were in a condition to put an end to their excursions for ever.

From this moment the most formidable war arose in the mountains, which had ever hitherto threatened the conquering city, and was waged in an inhuman and exterminating manner.† The Romans begun and ended with devastation—the inhabitants of whole towns were swept from the face of the earth. So early as the second year of this war, or, as Livy relates with greater probability, in the third, Roman bands under the command of Decius and Fabius, like those infernal columns sent by the French against their countrymen in La Vendee, scoured the Samnite territory. When, in the following year, the hope which the Samnite leaders had reposed in a connection with the Gauls and Etruscans was frustrated, the devastations recommenced on a still more horrible scale. The Apulians had in vain sought to connect themselves with the Samnites; they were routed at Maloentum, afterwards called Beneventum. Gellius Egnatius sought thereupon to effect a junction with the Umbrians and Etruscans, to strike one decisive blow: the Romans were interested in employing every means to prevent this

* Milonia, Plestina, Fresilia.

† Dion Halicar. l. xvi. c. 11, 12, 13.

junction, and the consuls of the following year found opportunity to immortalize their name. In the first year, Decius and Fabius frustrated the plans of the enemy by rapid and judicious movements, and completed the internal regulation of their armies and the fortification of their camp.* The consuls who after them assumed the direction of the army, Lucius Volumnius and Appius Claudius, won a decisive victory, while the proconsuls laid waste Samnium systematically. Egnatius, who had drawn around him the Umbrians, had already once been beaten at a distance from his country, by the junction of both consuls; but he did not despair. His countrymen devastated Campania, and the presence of a consul was necessary in order to expel the Samnites from thence. Egnatius, therefore, joined in the mountains the Etruscans reinforced by the Gauls.† The year approached a close. Old Fabius, with Decius for his colleague, were elected to face this formidable enemy, which threatened Rome from the north. The two consuls marched together against the Samnites, Gauls, Etruscans, and Umbrians, who had encamped on the other side of the Apennines, in the neighborhood of Sentinum. The wing of the Roman army led by Decius became so hard pressed, that Decius held it necessary to make a desperate effort to restore their sunken courage, as his father had done in the battle near Vesperis. Fabius in the mean time had defeated the right wing of the Samnites; the reserve came up at the proper moment, and Fabius detached aid from his wing: the superstitious feeling aroused by the self devotion had also its influence. The Gauls were at length surrounded, and the war with the Samnites in Etruria decided, since Gellius Egnatius fell in this action, surrounded by his valiant Samnite bands. The war in Etruria, indeed, like that in Samnium, was still protracted several years longer; but the most powerful towns, Volsinii, Perugia, Arretium, purchased peace for themselves as they had done once before: each paid a considerable sum as smart-money, and left the other towns and lands to their destiny. The Etruscans, indeed, at a later period, often rose against Rome; but this happened in general only in the case of particular small towns, and only rendered easier to the Romans the establishment of colonies and oppression of the country. The Samnites, on the other hand, were marked out for extermination. A people, warlike, free from time immemorial, distinguished by the simplicity of its manners and constitutions, was not to be reduced to submission. A battle near Aquilonia, in which Papirius Cursor led the Romans, was won by the latter, but still the Samnites remained a match for their enemies. After a new victory, Curius Dentatus was obliged to exercise the most shocking cruelties, to annihilate canton, after

* Liv. l. x. c. 15.

† According to Livy, the consul Appius wrote to Rome,—“*quatuor gentes conferre arma, Etruscos, Samnites, Umbros, Gallos. Jam castra bifariam facta esse, quia unus locus capere tantum multitudinem non possit.*”

canton, one place, one plantation or vineyard after another.* If it be true, as the Romans themselves relate, that the Samnite general Pontius was despatched in a shocking manner, it may well be conceived how remote was the Roman temper from the chivalrous spirit which alone can engage the sympathies for a people whose prime occupation is warfare.

* "Quando jam nullus esset hostium exercitus, qui singis collatis dimicaturus uideretur, unum super esse belli genus, urbium oppugnationes; quarum per excidia militem locupletare præda et hostem pro aris et focus dimicantem conficere possent."—*Liv.* l. x. c. 38.

CHAPTER. VIII.

WAR WITH PYRRHUS.

WHEN the Romans had so far succeeded in extirpating the Samnites, and devastating the lands which had been cultivated by them, that their dominion over Italy seemed established on a firm foundation, they began to push northwards into the Gaulish territories, southwards into those of the Bruttians; and to offer or to force their protection on the petty Grecian states of Lower Italy. This alarmed the citizens of the Greek town of Tarentum, who sought, by scattering gold, and their own jealousies, to diffuse a hostile spirit against the Romans.

Ten Roman vessels, under command of a certain Cornelius, circumnavigated the coast of Magna Græcia.* This conduct was, of course, highly suspicious to the Tarentines, as they had introduced the wildest form of democracy in their state, and well knew that the nobility of the three other Greek towns in their neighborhood had invited Roman garrisons, as well to overawe the citizens as to guard against the Lucanians and Bruttians. Thurii, which had received a Roman garrison within its walls, had no means of land communication with Rome; while the terms of a treaty, which Appian states as subsisting between the Romans and Tarentines, precluded the passage of Roman ships of war through the Sicilian straits. The faith of treaties, however was forced to yield to the expediency of supporting the Roman interest in Thurii. The commander of the Roman squadron above mentioned, either by way of bravado, or anticipating no unfriendly construction of the act, proceeded to cast anchor in the very bay of Tarentum. The theatre in that, as in the other Grecian towns, commanded a view of the sea; and the people there assembled, enraged at the near approach of a foreign armament, were easily moved by a miserable demagogue of the name of Philocaris, on whom his dissolute conduct had affixed the nickname of Thais, to sink four of the Roman ships and capture a fifth, while the rest escaped to sea. The Roman commander, with many of his company, was drowned; such of the officers and men as were made prisoners, murdered; and the rowers sold for slaves. The popular party at Tarentum now fraternised with their friends at Thurii, and aided them in the work of expelling their nobles. The people of Thurii proceeded to divide among themselves the possessions of the exiled aristocracy, but dismissed the Roman garrison without doing them any injury. The Romans were,

* The words of Appian are as follows;—"Επι καταφράκτων δέκα νεῶν ἰθεῦτο τὴν μεγάλην Ελλάδα."

as usual, glad of a pretext to reduce Tarentum, the only town in those regions still retaining considerable power and vast riches. Posthumius was accordingly sent to the Tarentines, as the bearer of excessively severe conditions. The government would not, at first, introduce the Roman envoy into the public assembly, foreseeing the event. The people raged and clamored—a wretched buffoon committed a piece of gross indecency towards Posthumius, which was greeted with loud laughter by the sovereign mob of Tarentum. The Romans, mortally outraged, gave instructions to Æmilius Barbula, who was engaged in the Samnite territory, to break off that war for the present, and march, without delay, against the Tarentines.

The Tarentines now stood in need of a general and a regular army, since their civic force was not inured to the hardships of actual warfare. The existing constitution of the Tarentines resembled that of Athens, at the time of a Cleon or Stratocles; and the state of manners was even more corrupt, because the middle class, which every where forms the main strength of a people, was beyond comparison smaller than in Athens; while, on the other hand, the members of that class of men, who are now called Lazzaroni, was even greater than it is at present in Naples. All the representations of rational persons, who conjured the people not to dream of averting one peril by bringing on themselves a greater, in the shape of a foreign protector, were useless. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, a prince who carried on war as a trade, was u. c. invited over to Italy with his army, which he could only support 465. by making warfare support itself. He was not one who needed much encouragement; yet, if Plutarch is to be credited, the Tarentines did not hesitate to allure him by the most shameless exaggerations, and therefore richly deserved to be deceived by him in return.

u. c. Pyrrhus was born about seven years after the death of Alexander the Great (Olymp. 115, 3.) of Æacides and Pthia, daughter of Menon of Pharsalus, who distinguished himself amongst the Grecian leaders in the Lamian war. We know not how long his power continued limited to his native kingdom, and whether he remained without undertaking foreign conquests until the year u. c. 465, when he received the invitation of the Tarentine embassy.

At the date of his passage into Italy, Pyrrhus was thirty-seven years old,—the most favorable age for great undertakings, while the fire of youth remains yet unextinguished, and a stirring life has ripened the fruits of experience and deliberation, the lack of which endangers earlier youth. These were times of general instability, in which one revolution followed another. Sovereign princes and nations were alike robbed of their eminence, and usurpers themselves in turn were the sport of fortune. Pyrrhus combined the advantages of education in times like these with those which are annexed to princely birth. He was alone royal amidst the upstart princes of those times, and remained, in consequence, unstained by the crimes which seem the all but unavoidable cortege of usurpation. The upstart princes of those times were environed with intriguers and flatterers. Pyrrhus had friends and cultivated the friendship of the worthiest. The

princes his contemporaries had mortal foes in their own families, betrayers in their courts and their armies. Pyrrhus's household circle was happy, and the fidelity of his Epirots stainless. He was grateful to his people, and acknowledged, unreservedly, that through them he was what he was. It was only as a general he exacted blind obedience; as a king, he forgave even unseemly freedoms.

The troops and transport ships from Tarentum all being in readiness, the king hastened his embarkation, though the stormy season was not yet over. Scarce had the fleet put out to sea, when a tempest arose from the north, by which the bulk of the fleet was scattered, driven ashore, or sunk. Pyrrhus himself saved his life with difficulty from the wreck, and arrived with an insignificant handful of soldiers at Tarentum. While such vessels as had been spared by storm were collecting at Tarentum, the king let the Tarentines alone; but no sooner had his troops been brought together, than he proceeded to exert dictatorial powers, without which, indeed, the objects aimed at by those Greeks could as little be obtained, as he himself could hope to save his honor and his army. Not the Tarentines only, but all the Grecian townsmen of those times, had long abandoned military service to mercenary troops. In the Macedonian phalanx, however, the rawest recruit might be made of use, provided he had mere strength of limb. If the Tarentine population were to be useful to Pyrrhus in any shape, he must have powers to enlist and drill them in his infantry; and, moreover, he must fill the gaps which shipwreck had made in his forces. But all this was unlooked for by the Tarentines. A free and wealthy people loves to carry on war by subsidies: so long as this can be done, and its own territory remains inviolate, the excitement of warfare seems no dearer bought than any other spectacle. When the Epirot officers made their levies without regard to any consideration but that of bodily strength, the unwarlike youth endeavored to escape out of the city, but found the gates guarded by Pyrrhus's troops. The lawless and undisciplined acts of the soldiery quartered on the citizens, gave rise to well-grounded discontents; and wherever the burghers met, they unburdened their hearts with complaints and murmurs. The Tarentines, as a Lacedæmonian colony, had at least retained the form of the *Syssitia* as an ancestral observance; these were now prohibited, with all other assemblies. The theatre was closed; and of course the popular meetings, which had been usually held there, discontinued. On the other hand, the youth were charged to practise martial exercises in the gymnasium, instead of idle athletic games. And Pyrrhus, by way of additional precautions against the outbreaking of any conspiracy during his campaign, took every method short of open violence for sending the leading citizens to Epirus.

It was not the numerical force of Pyrrhus, it was Pyrrhus himself, his tactics and character, which rendered his hostility more formidable to Rome than that of any former enemy. In the times of which we are treating, the Macedonian and Roman tactics had each attained their highest point of perfection, and were now for the first time about to be brought in hostile collision.

A point of form appeared a serious difficulty at Rome, in the midst

of more substantial embarrassments. It was thought sinful to commence hostilities without fulfilling the previous formalities of a declaration of war, amongst which, one of the most important was that of throwing a javelin on the enemy's ground. The means by which this scruple was got over, are characteristic of the Roman attachment to literal observances. An Epirot deserter was caused to buy a piece of land, which was to represent, *pro hac vice*, the kingdom of Epirus : hereupon Lævinus led the army into Lucania, in order not to await on the defensive the first attack of Pyrrhus and his allies. As the king had not yet taken the field, the Romans seized on a strong position : one division remained here as an army of observation, and to prevent the junction of the Lucanians with Pyrrhus, while the Samnites in the mean time were kept in check by the late consul, Barbula. Lævinus also found himself sufficiently strong to detach the eighth Campanian legion, under Decius Jubellius, to Rhegium, which alone, at that time, of all the Italian towns, adhered to the cause of Rome. It must also have seemed an object of importance to prevent or impede the junction of the Sicilians with Pyrrhus.

Pyrrhus seems to have looked upon the Romans at the outset as a people wholly ignorant of the art of war, and was not a little astonished to find no vestige of barbarism in their mode of encampment, arms, and evolutions. The armies met a little above Heraclea on the Siris, and the Romans threw the blame of defeat in the action on the elephants. Pyrrhus made an excellent use of his victory ; gained to his side the Samnites and Lucanians, crossed over the hills, and unexpectedly appeared in Campania. He seems, however, not to have been gifted with one prime qualification of a great leader ; he was incapable of entering into the character and nature of the countries, nations, and generals who were opposed to him ; and in this respect, we shall presently see, he was infinitely inferior to Hannibal, who was never outwitted, precisely because he never failed immediately and intuitively to know with whom he was dealing. How little could Pyrrhus have known with whom he was dealing, when he attempted to recruit his army with Roman and Latin prisoners, as if he had been tampering with Greek mercenaries. What could be more certain than the total loss of his time and labor ? Without fortified places, without a single ally on whom he could count, the impatient spirit of Pyrrhus soon indisposed him for carrying on a tedious war with the Romans, whom he learned at last to appreciate ; and as, besides, he must soon be in want of money, he endeavored, through the agency of Cineas, to bring them to terms of peace. He tempted them first with the promise of the unpurchased liberation of the numerous Roman prisoners in his hands : he demanded nothing but what the Romans could grant without prejudice to themselves ;—independence of the states in the hill country and southern corners of Italy. Cineas, too, whose eloquence Plutarch compares with that of Demosthenes, contrived to make his offers so acceptable, that the senate was shaken, and seemed disposed to peace.

This was contrary to the ruling maxim,—a maxim which rules in Rome to this day—the pride of Roman policy—*vestigia nulla retror-*

sum. For the maintenance of this policy none could be fitter than an Appius. His family, which had hitherto stood up with iron stubbornness for every point of patrician privilege, now made itself popular for the first, perhaps for the only, time. The blind and aged Appius Claudius had himself carried into the council, and in a speech attuned exactly to the temper of his countrymen, moved the senate to reject the terms of Pyrrhus.* The liberation of the prisoners, however, interested the Romans so much, that they despatched three men of consequence to Pyrrhus, the best fitted to give that monarch a high notion of the character, talents, and military experience of Roman officers. These ambassadors were, C. Fabricius his colleague Quintus Æmilius, and the conqueror of the Senonian Gauls, Publius Cornelius. It was on this occasion that Pyrrhus tried on Fabricius an experiment rarely tried in vain on the Grecian military leaders, and even on the monarchs of those times; namely, that of enlisting his private interests against those of his country. But matters had not as yet, nor, indeed, ever proceeded so far in Rome, as to give a gross temptation like this the slightest chance of success. Plutarch's account, that Pyrrhus made use of his elephants to frighten Fabricius, appears to us so unworthy of the king and of the Roman consul, that we leave the scene exclusively to those orators and painters who have thought the subject worth delineation. What is related of the astonishment of Lineas at the dignified appearance of the Roman senate, and the willingness with which the people presented itself to the levies, wears an aspect of much less improbability. When we remember the manner in which Cato, as cited by Cicero, expresses himself with regard to an Appius Claudius; how he represents him as the dignified father of a family, as prince among a numerous clientage;† we may well believe that the Roman magnates seemed an assembly of kings to a Thessalian orator hackneyed in the base usage of Greece.

War having recommenced on the conclusion of the armistice, an obstinate and protracted conflict took place near Asculum in Apulia, in which the most probable accounts award victory to Pyrrhus. Having, however, lost 15,000 men in the action, and amongst them his best officers, and his allies appearing not greatly inclined to give him active assistance,—having no hope, under the circumstances, of drawing reinforcements from Greece, while the Romans filled all vacancies in their army with the utmost ease,—he sought to give them the slip, and took opportunity of circumstances which called him into Sicily; leaving behind, with a strong garrison, at Tarentum, his officer Milo, who, from the first hour of his league with that city, had occupied its citadel. It was not surprising that a military adventurer like Pyrrhus, at the moment when embarrassed by his losses at Asculum, accepted with alacrity the proposal to seek new adventures in Sicily. Vainly did two states, at other times engrossed by mutual enmity,—the pirate state of the Mamertines in Messina, and the Carthaginians,—combine for once their efforts to prevent his passage. Having embar-

* Cicero de Senectute, cap. vi.

† Jb. cap. xi.

ked his troops at Catana, by aid of the tyrant of Tauromenium, he made good his landing at Syracuse, and was received in triumph there as throughout the island. The Carthaginians instantly raised the siege. Pyrrhus reconciled the various parties; and most of the tyrants hastened to Syracuse to tender him their allegiance. Pyrrhus now declared war upon Carthage, gathered about him a force more numerous and not less effective than that which he had brought with him from Epirus, and made himself master of all Carthaginian Sicily. The town and fort of Lilybæum alone held out against him, and the Carthaginians made the most extensive preparations for the rescue of a place which they regarded as their principal strong hold, and which they had made the depot of their stores. Pyrrhus's inconstancy, and the strange unsteadiness of his conduct, appear on this occasion in the most striking possible light. First, he storms a place with all the force at his disposal, meets with obstacles, and pursues his object only the more eagerly; but, after the lapse of two months, he abandons at once his whole plan, resolves on building a fleet and driving the Carthaginians from the seas, and on collecting a great army with which he meant to cross over to Africa. But he knew not how to unite energetic measures with prudent deliberation, and to win to his cause the generals and soldiers of the mercenary troops of Carthage in Sicily. He soon fell out with the petty chiefs who had given in their adhesion to him, and who now deserted, some to Carthage, others to the Mamertines. In short, he soon perceived that, aided only by his Epirots, he should never be able to keep his ground against the Carthaginians, the Mamertines—who alone could bring 10,000 men into the field—not to mention a multitude of adventurers who had formed themselves armies, and occupied towns in various parts of the island. He re-embarked, for Italy, on the summons of his old confederates, and once more tried his fortune against the Romans, after carrying on the war in Sicily two years and four months.

During his absence the Greek towns had succumbed beneath the Roman arms. Heraclea had capitulated; Caulonia was plundered without mercy by Roman troops; Croton was taken; Locri expelled or massacred Pyrrhus's garrison. To retaliate, on his return from Sicily, Pyrrhus sacked the town, and plundered the temple of the subterranean goddess, one of the richest in Magna Græcia. Dionysius gives the following account of this transaction:—

“The wicked and godless friends of Pyrrhus made him seek all possible resources in his pecuniary embarrassments. Evagoras, the son of Theodorus, Balacrus, the son of Nicander, Dinarchus, the son of Nicias,—people who belonged to the accursed and godless sect of Epicurus,—suggested to him an impious source of riches. They advised him to possess himself of the sacred treasures of Proserpine; for there was in this town a venerable temple, in which from of old time there lay heaped up much gold, which had never been touched, and masses of pure metal, unseen and buried under the earth. Pyrrhus, misled by the arts of the above-named flatterers into believing that necessity was valid above law, made use of the men who had prompted the plan to conduct its execution: plundered, through their

their agency, sacred treasures, loaded his vessels with the spoils of the temple, and sent them, with the rest of his acquisitions, to Tarentum. He was now, indeed, full of exultation; but a righteous providence here showed its power (*ἡ δὲ δίκαια πρόνοια τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν ἀπειδείξατο.*) On the other hand, Appian says that he scoffed at the goddess into the bargain; and said, that piety out of season was ridiculous superstition, and that getting money, where it was to be had without trouble, was true wisdom (*τὴν ἀκαίρον εὐσεβείαν εἶναι δεισιδαιμονίαν, τὸ δὲ συλλεξαι πλοῦτον ἀπορὸν εὐβουλίαν.*)

In the year after his re-appearance, the Romans appointed U. C. 974. Curius Dentatus and Lentulus consuls, the former of whom introduced the practice of considering the goods of citizens failing to present themselves when enrolled for military service. He defeated the Epirot army in the neighborhood of Beneventum, nearly at the same time as his colleague vanquished the Lucanians. Pyrrhus could not remain in Italy after the loss of a single battle: accordingly, he hastened back to Greece in quest of new adventures, abandoning Tarentum to her destiny. Two years after his departure, Milo, who, had continued to hold the citadel of Tarentum, also capitulated. He was allowed to draw off his troops without disturbance; but the Tarentines lost their fleet, fortifications, part of their works of art, and were subjected to the payment of an annual tribute. The destiny of the other Grecian towns has already been noticed. All Italy bowed beneath the Roman yoke. Most of the cities and states retained, indeed, their laws and constitutions, but in return were forced without reserve to supply their youth to the wars of Rome, and assist in making conquests without sharing either their honor or profit.

How considerable at that time was the Italian population, may be gathered from a statement in Pliny. He relates that when, five years after the capture of Tarentum, the Picinians were in like manner compelled to submit to the Romans, above 360,000 men took the oath of allegiance. The Messapians and Sallentines, too, were bent beneath the Roman yoke; and Brundisium, the point of communication with Greece, was reduced likewise.

CHAPTER IX.

FIRST PUNIC WAR.

CARTHAGE was originally one of the Phœnician colonies, founded by Tyre, on the northern coast of Africa. These settlements were mostly formed for the purposes of commerce; but many of them soon made use of their favorable situation, to vindicate their own independence, and snatch to themselves the trade which they were destined to secure to the mother-country. This was an every-day incident in the nations of antiquity, amongst whom, except in the instance of the Romans, the tie which bound the colonies to the parent state was extremely feeble. There was, besides, another circumstance in the origin of Carthage, as of many other colonies of antiquity, which completely accounts for its early independence of the mother-country. It appears to have been one of those settlements formed by the emigration or expulsion of a discontented party in the state. On such occasions, exiles from Greece commonly directed their course to the coasts of Asia Minor, or of Lower Italy; while the Phœnicians sought new habitations in Africa.

Carthage was built in the bosom of a spacious bay (the gulf of Tunis), enclosed on the eastward by the ancient *Promontorium Hermæum*, or Cape Bon, on the west by the *Promontorium Apollinis*, or Zibib. It stood on a peninsula, connected with the main land by an isthmus, about half a league in breadth. The only defence seawards was a single wall; but towards the isthmus the town was fortified from all assaults on the land side by the citadel of Byrsa, and by a triple wall ninety feet high.

Carthage, as Herder has well observed, was a city, not a nation. An isolated commercial town, on the edge of a vast and peopled continent, of necessity followed, at first, the policy suitable to its infant feebleness. The Tyrian colonists did not come as conquerors, but purchased and paid tribute for every inch of land occupied by them; and studied to preserve a good understanding with the surrounding natives. This policy was, however, pursued only while it was necessary; that is to say, only till Carthage had strength sufficient to do without it. Hostilities with the native powers followed in due course. In these contests the new comers always kept the upper hand, but, after all, only succeeded in reducing subjects under their empire who eagerly seized every opportunity to throw off the yoke.

At the time when Herodotus wrote, during the better days of Carthage, agriculture was practised by no native population of northern Africa beyond the bounds of the Carthaginian empire. All the native tribes extending from Egypt to the lesser Syrtis were, according to

that historian's express testimony, nomadic. They appear to have preserved their original habits with least mixture in the southern and western parts of the Carthaginian dominions. They did not even understand the language of their masters, and would also seem to have spoken various languages among themselves. Eastwards, along the coast, the native tribes had amalgamated more with the Carthaginians; and a mixed race had sprung up under the name of Libyphœnicians, by whom the most fertile tracts of land were occupied and cultivated.

To keep in subjection this motley population, Carthage adopted much the same expedients as those which we shall presently see were taken by Rome with the nations of Italy. Colonies of her citizens were transplanted to her subject domains, and the two-fold end was thus attained, of securing the sovereignty of the land, and of encouraging connection and intermixture with the indigenous races. The foreign colonies of Carthage were wholly designed for commercial purposes. This is indicated, indeed, by their situation, which was invariably fixed on the sea coast. On the other hand, the colonies within their own dominions were mostly agricultural and inland. These colonial establishments were employed by Carthaginian policy as the surer means of conciliating the favor of the people by drafting off the surplus population of the capital, and bettering, by apportionments of land, the situation of the poorer class of citizens. "In this manner," says Aristotle *, "the government of Carthage secures to itself the attachment of the people, by continually sending from amongst the citizens colonists to the surrounding districts, and raising them to the rank of wealthy land-owners. Such," he adds, "is the character of a mild and enlightened government, which extends its arm to the indigent, while at the same time it inures them to labor."

Notwithstanding this profound and correct policy of Carthage, or rather, perhaps, in consequence of gradual deviation from it, her empire in Africa never formed so perfect and compacted a whole, that the capital kept its dependencies in equal and entire subjection. The agricultural population only, whom the Carthaginians themselves had trained and accustomed to that mode of life, could be treated as subjects, properly so called, for the nomadic tribes were subject to Carthage only so far that they paid her tribute. The rooted hatred of these tribes for the interloping rulers, who disturbed their aboriginal and vagabond mode of life, was fomented by the oppressions of the Carthaginian government, and broke out in revolt whenever the approach of an enemy gave the signal.

The Carthaginian institutions were a work of time and of circumstances. There is nowhere mention of any express legislative basis for the rights and relative functions of the constituted powers of the state. In all probability, therefore, the constitution formed itself by degrees. Its growth was hastened by those internal disturbances, obscure traces of which are to be found in its early history, and its legitimacy rested on the title of prescription. However this may have been, all authorities unite in stating, that an aristocracy formed itself

* Polit. vi, 5.

in Carthage, which soon acquired all the stability peculiar to that form of government. The Carthaginian aristocracy seems, however, to have consisted not so much in a hereditary nobility, strictly so called, as in the customary pre-eminence of a certain number of leading families. Sometimes a single family held so leading a rank, for a length of time, that generals and supreme magistrates were chosen by preference from its members. But however great the influence and the power of such particular houses, it is, nevertheless, certain that the constitution was at no period purely aristocratic, but always contained some tincture, however moderate, of democracy. Polybius and Aristotle coincide in classing the Carthaginian among mixed constitutions, although in its general character aristocratic. They both mention the Spartan constitution as having had, in many points, the greatest resemblance to that of Carthage.

The fatal vice of the Carthaginian constitution was the influence of wealth on the appointments to high dignities, and the abuse, which stood in close connection with that influence, of heaping official pluralities on individual personages. In a commercial state, however, where the powers of government are centered in a single town, it was naturally to be expected that the houses possessing most wealth should engross the public administration. Such were the predominating elements of an aristocracy of which the centre and focus was in the Carthaginian senate; which extended its authority through the splendor of its wealth and conquest, and found its support in the popular religion, and in a strict superintendence of its own members.

Carthage was at once a land and maritime power, so far as the latter title can belong to any state of antiquity. Her sovereignty of the seas only extended to the Mediterranean, or, properly speaking, only to the western half of that sea, and, perhaps, to a small part of the ocean just beyond the Pillars of Hercules. Here were situate the islands which she had wholly or partially conquered, and the coasts which were studded with her colonies. The main object of her policy was to guard these her dependencies, and to keep, for this purpose, the route to them continually open for the transport of troops and defence from hostile incursions. This object required sustained exertion in keeping up the naval power of Carthage, as powerful rivals to that power were not wanting. In Italy they had to struggle, from the earliest times, with the Etruscans, in Syracuse and Massilia with the Greeks, and when at last they might flatter themselves with having surmounted these, Rome, the most formidable of enemies, took the field, and soon discovered that the sovereignty of the sea was the first necessary step to the humiliation of Carthage. The ordinary number of ships, or galleys of war, possessed by Carthage, at the period immediately preceding the Punic wars, appears to have been from 150 to 200. It was increased in the first Punic war, when their naval power appears to have attained its highest pitch. Their war vessels were manned partly with fighting men, partly with rowers; the war complement of a quinquereme, or first-rate, being 120 of the former, and 300 of the latter class. The great number of rowers conduced to that rapidity of manœuvre, for which the Carthaginians were distin-

guished beyond other nations.* These rowers were slaves, bought by the state expressly for that service, and who, as they stood in need of long training, must, doubtless, have formed a standing corps, maintained, at least, partly, in the time of peace. The quickness with which their fleets were manned would otherwise be inexplicable.

The whole organic structure and position of the republic led them naturally to place their main reliance on their naval power; and to that power, as Polybius expressly remarks, their land force stood in no sort of adequate proportion. The numerous wars, however, carried on by the republic, and the maintenance of their vast dependencies, forced them almost constantly to keep on foot large armies. In this point, too, the Carthaginian policy and arrangements were altogether peculiar to themselves, and strongly characteristic of a trading state, which preferred hiring others to fight for her money, to carrying on her wars herself, and knew how to make even war subservient to communication and intercourse with the most remote nations. A Carthaginian army presented an interesting spectacle to the eye of the observer of human nature, as well as to that of the soldier by profession. It was an assemblage of the most dissimilar tribes from the most distant regions: hordes of half-naked Gauls stood side by side with bands of white-robed Iberians; wild Ligurians were arrayed with far-travelled Nazamones and Lotophagi; Carthaginians and Phœnician Africans formed the centre or main army; countless troops of Numidian cavalry, levied from all the tribes of the desert, swarmed and skirmished on unsaddled steeds on the wings; Balearic slingers formed the advanced guard, and lines of colossal elephants, with their Ethiopian drivers, preceded their march, like a front of moveable fortresses. The armies were purposely drawn from the most various populations, in order, as Polybius remarks, that combination and mutiny among the soldiers might be impeded by diversity of language.

The main strength of their army for the most part consisted in light cavalry, which was provided in abundance by the nomadic tribes, which flanked their dominions. From time immemorial, as at the present day, these tribes had been renowned for the practice of horsemanship, and inured from youth to scour the field of battle on their swift horses. All these tribes, from the neighboring Massyles to the remote Maurusii, who inhabited the present Fez and Morocco on the Western Ocean, were accustomed to serve in the Carthaginian armies and receive the Carthaginian pay, and their levies extended eastward to the territory of Cyrene. The troops of this Numidian cavalry served on small unsaddled horses: their onset was tremendous through the speed of their horses, and flight had no disgrace in their eyes, and they only fled to renew the attack: they were, in short, to the Carthaginians what the Cossacks are to the Russian armies. The heavy cavalry (*equi frænati*) were formed from Carthaginian, Libyan, Spanish, and, in later times, Gallic levies. All these are continually mentioned by Polybius.

On the whole, it appears, from the destiny of Carthage as of other

* Diod. 11. Polyb. 1.

states, that mercenaries can never entirely supply the place of native troops, on account of the defect of moral impulses. The genius of a great man, assisted by long exercise, as in the instance of the second war with Rome, may give to an army so composed a short superiority. But a leader of this character is not always to be met with. War with Rome was war with *Romans*, and Carthage must in the end succumb.

It is evident from the nature of the colonial dependencies possessed by the Carthaginians beyond the limits of Africa, that, in acquiring and retaining them, they acted on a principle which must naturally suggest itself to every trading and seafaring people; namely, that they cannot have any safer and better possessions than islands. Accordingly, the foreign territorial possessions of Carthage, even in her most flourishing times, were almost entirely insular. The western half of the Mediterranean, studded with islands large and small, opened out to them a field exactly suited to their power and position. The first and most important province of Carthage was Sardinia, the largest of all the islands of which they acquired the entire mastery. The whole population of the island, with the exception of such scattered tribes as lurked amidst the fastnesses of the mountains, were reduced to subjection, and the Carthaginians built the town of Calaris (Cagliari,) which is still the capital of the island, and Sulchi, both on the south coast. The high value which the Carthaginians placed on this possession is explained by the geographical position of the island. For a people whose tenure of national existence might be said to depend on the sovereignty of the western Mediterranean, and who never obtained the entire possession of Sicily, Sardinia could not be otherwise regarded than as the principal province. It was doubtless, too, their commercial depot for southern Europe, with which they were in constant communication. The possession of Sardinia was, besides, of hardly less importance for its own sake. As a corn magazine it ranked second alone to their domain in Africa. Of the native tribes inhabiting the island even the rudest were not wholly unversed in agriculture. The prime importance to Carthage of a corn country in this situation may be conceived from the large number of the armies which she kept on foot, and from the generally low condition of agriculture in Africa, and in the western parts of Europe.

Sicily was the point at which Carthaginian and Grecian interests first came in actual collision. The Carthaginians and Greeks had planted colonies in this island, of which the latter soon eclipses the former. The colonies of Greece were free states, which soon rose through the enjoyment of independence, the astonishing fertility of the soil, and the unrestricted vent of its produce, to a high degree of power and of opulence. The colonies of Carthage, on the other hand, were planned with the close economy, and watched with the jealous vigilance, characteristic of suspicious and frugal traffickers: even her principal settlements could stand in no comparison with Agrigentum, far less with Syracuse. The entire possession of the island would have enriched her with the oil and wine trade, would have given her armies a never-failing storehouse, and her fleets the naval command

of the Mediterranean. This, however, Carthage never attained, though it was long the first and almost only object of her policy, pursued with that unvarying perseverance of which a strong aristocracy seems alone capable.

The embroiled transactions of Carthage with the Grecian states in Sicily proved the occasion of her first rupture with Rome. The town of Messina, the seat of the pirate republic of the Mamertines, stood in close alliance with Rhegium, on the Italian side of the strait, where an equally lawless military commonwealth had sprung up in the confusion of the Roman war with Pyrrhus. During that war the inhabitants of Rhegium had solicited the detachment of a Roman garrison for their protection. Accordingly, a body of Campanians was sent them from Rome, under the orders of the military tribune, Decius Jubellius. These troops, apparently with the assistance of their neighbors across the strait in Messina, expelled or massacred the citizens for whose protection they had been sent, and established their tumultuary government in Rhegium. So long as the Romans continued at war with Pyrrhus, and were occupied in the reduction of Tarentum, they overlooked this outrage of their soldiery; but no sooner was the war with Tarentum concluded, than they seized at once so good an opportunity to possess themselves of a town which would facilitate their passage to Sicily. A Roman army, under the U. C. consul Genucius, marched upon Rhegium; but the 4000 men 482. who constituted the garrison defended the place with the courage of desperation. It was taken by storm, and the greater part of the garrison were cut to pieces in the assault on the walls, or in the streets of the town. Three hundred only fell into the hands of the Romans alive, and were executed in due form as murderers. The town was then restored to its surviving emigrant citizens, who remained, of course, in absolute dependence on the Romans; and thus Rhegium, which lay exactly opposite Messina, was thenceforth in effect subject to Rome.

The fall of Rhegium had robbed the Mamertine commonwealth of Messina of the only ally which these pirates could count upon. The latter had encouraged and reinforced the predatory excursions of these military bandits on the rest of Sicily, regardless alike of the Carthaginian province as of the Greek towns; and the vengeance of the two states which divided Sicily (Carthage and Syracuse) impended with combined weight on their heads.

Their nearest, most inveterate, and most dreaded foe was Hiero of Syracuse. This celebrated personage had risen from the station of a young soldier of fortune under Pyrrhus to the royal power in Syracuse, through the regular forms of popular election, though under the pressure of military necessity. During fifty years' reign no single act of despotism was laid to his charge; and under his unostentatious regimen the Syracusans enjoyed all the advantages of freedom, which, under a republican constitution, they had lost speedily. Hiero armed the citizens, got rid of the mercenary soldiery, and organised a new army devoted to himself and the state. With this force he soon expelled the Mamertines from the towns which they had reduced to sub-

jection, and won a decisive victory over them not far from Messina. These disasters so completely exhausted their resources, that, expecting nothing short of immediate capture, and the doom of their companions at Rhegium, they had already made up their minds to sue for mercy from the victor, when the faithless intervention of a Punic naval commander, who was cruising on the coast, snatched the fruits of conquest from Syracuse, and laid the train for a war in which a province was finally lost to Carthage which had been ruled by her for a century and a half.

For centuries back the Carthaginian government had aimed at the absolute possession of all Sicily; and as the Grecian towns, in the last degree enfeebled and depopulated, were for the most part reduced to their subjection, while their own republic had arrived at the full height of its power, they believed themselves nearer than ever to the attainment of the desired object, if they could only succeed in capturing Messina.

But the Mamertines were divided in their sentiments; and the aid of Carthage, although it offered a welcome relief in the present emergency, was to many a source of suspicion and anxiety. Both parties had recourse to negotiations. The partisans of Carthage found a willing ear with the ruling body; those who sought the protection of Rome met more serious obstacles,

The policy hitherto followed by Rome, if not wholly immaculate, may yet be recorded as conscientious and honorable, when compared with that which we shall find pursued in the latter part of her history. The lust of conquest and of empire are innate in the human heart, and virtue cannot manifest its purity unmodified in the mutual transactions and collisions of powerful communities. Rome had already many acts to repent, but none as yet exactly to be ashamed of. Now, however, that state had abundant matter for shame, which had delivered its own subjects to the axe of the executioner for a deed of which it now stepped forward to rescue the accomplices from the just reward of their crime, and to receive them into its own alliance. This resolution, which was adopted against the decision of the senate, and by the vote of the assembly of the people, was no less an indelible disgrace on the Roman name, than an evidence that the constitution leaned already too much to the side of democracy, though that leaning did not occasion internal mischiefs till long afterwards.

In the mean time the Carthaginian party in Messina had taken advantage of the alarm of imminent danger, to prevail upon the Mamertines to receive a Punic garrison into the citadel. The Romans, on the other hand, thought they sought a pretext for war with Carthage, could assume no other color for their proceedings than that of affording protection against the hostility of king Hiero. The Carthaginians, however, by negotiating peace between the latter and the Mamertines, completely spoiled the pretext which had hitherto been advanced to justify Roman intervention. Still, however, both states avoided an open rupture. At length, after protracted delays, a lieutenant of the consul, Appius Claudius, made his appearance with a division of the army and a fleet of triremes at Rhegium.

The passage across into Sicily was barred by the Carthaginian fleet which lay in the strait. The unskilful seamen of Rome were unacquainted with the currents: a violent wind which arose scattered the fleet, and, without one hostile manœuvre on the part of the Carthaginians, many ships fell into their hands, and the rest retreated back to the Bruttian coast. The ships which had been taken were restored uninjured with their crews. At the same time Hanno, the Carthaginian commander at Messina, called on the Roman leader to abstain from breaking the peace, and to abandon his chimerical project. But Romans were not to be discouraged by one frustrated effort. The legate explored the strait, and the wind and current landed him on the island without hindrance on a second attempt, and probably under cloud of night. He found a friendly reception in the harbor of Messina, and soon obtained possession of the citadel by taking advantage of Hanno's vacillating and super-subtle policy. The Carthaginian commander was invited to be present in the assembly of the Mamertines, in order to treat with them and with the Romans. He showed some hesitation in complying with this summons, but at length decided to do so, that he might leave nothing untried. After long speeches on both sides, with no symptom of concession on either, a Roman soldier seized the deluded Hanno and dragged him off, while the Mamertines witnessed with acclamations this breach of all international law. Hanno had the weakness to command the evacuation of the citadel as the ransom for his person; and his cowardice and imprudence were requited at Carthage with crucifixion.

The appearance of a Roman force in Messina, and the consequence thereby given to the Mamertines in Sicily, seemed so dangerous to Hiero, that he forgot the causes of discontent which had been given him by the recent demonstrations of Hanno, and, without delay, concluded an alliance with Carthage. The combined forces of Carthage and Syracuse marched up to the town; Hiero took position on the Chalcidean heights, and the Carthaginians on a level plain called Eunai: their fleet was moored in the bay of Cape Pelorias. The Roman consul, Appius, had crossed over with comparatively small forces; but he instantly saw the danger of allowing time for the enemy to invest the town by land as well as by sea, as at sea the Romans durst not risk an engagement with the fleets of Carthage. He made overtures to treat with the Carthaginians, which were rejected; attacked king Hiero, and drove him back to his camp from all his positions. Hereupon the Syracusan, either, as Polybius thinks,* foreboding adverse results to the whole enterprise; or, according to Diodorus,† suspecting his Punic allies of treachery, drew suddenly off, and fell back to Syracuse. Appius now attacked and routed the Carthaginians singly, and spread devastation over the whole island. The two consular armies were now concentrated in Sicily, the whole inland domain of Syracuse over-run and occupied, and preparations made for the siege of Syracuse itself, when Hiero offered terms of

* οττευσαμενος τι περι των ὁλων πραγματος.

† νομιζων προδοθηναι την διασασιν ὑπο Καρχηδονιων.

peace, which, according to Polybius, the Romans were the more inclined to grant him, as the Carthaginians were masters of the sea, and were thus in condition to prevent the provisioning of the Roman armies. Hiero agreed to pay a hundred talents, and to liberate all his prisoners without ransom; and in return was guaranteed possession of Syracuse, and a considerable territory.

Successes so brilliant had never before been crowded into one campaign; but resistance so feeble had hitherto never been met by a Roman army. For in Italy every people had contended for its freedom; while the Sicilian towns, with the single exception of Syracuse, had long lost the very idea of freedom or independence. Nor did they dream of attaining these objects by means of alliance with Rome; but they courted that alliance as affording hopes of a new and less intolerable form of domination, instead of that under which the flower of their culture had been destroyed by wars, and the last extremities visited on them by the mercenaries of Carthage and Syracuse.

After this campaign, the fate of Sicily seemed to be decided, and peace to be at no great distance. The Carthaginian troops had nowhere shown themselves in the field; no check had so much as retarded the course of Roman conquest, and the senate had not yet proposed to itself the entire reduction of Sicily as the object of those conquests. The object was, indeed, irreconcilable with all hope of peace; and the attainment of it seems to have been first suggested to Roman ambition by the capture of Agrigentum in the third campaign of 484. the war.

The condition of that town once so magnificent, had long been wretched, no less through the internal pressure of tyranny than the destructive wars for the empire of the island. Hanno was compelled, by repeated signals of distress from the city, to give the Romans battle under its walls. On their part, the increasing dearth of provisions in a hostile country rendered an action no less urgent to them than to the enemy. Hanno's army had a retreat open to them. The Romans could hope to save themselves only by conquering, and they conquered accordingly. The next morning the Romans stormed the town, which was abandoned by the Carthaginian garrison. The famished burghers could not defend the wide extent of their walls, but in vain they offered to surrender, and supplicated for mercy. The Roman Soldier, after seven months' hardships, claimed a richer spoil than that which he had found in the Punic camp. The gates were forced, and the town abandoned to all the horrors of plunder and massacre. Twenty-five thousand persons were sold as slaves, and this calculation probably includes the free population only. Those who were already slaves merely changed their masters.

Under the domination of Rome, Agrigentum again rose from its ruins, and, in spite of repeated devastation, exists to the present day. Two thousand years of ruinous oppression have not exhausted the resources of nature under the sky of Sicily.

Every year Rome sent new generals into the field; for in this age of democracy a second consulship was a rare occurrence, even after a longer term than the legal one of ten years. In this multitude of

leaders, few showed themselves unworthy of the highest trust, or incapable of the greatest achievements. On the other hand, the number of the punic leaders was limited, and their talents, before the appearance of Hamilcar Barcas, in no instance rose above mediocrity. During the first and more momentous half of the present war, either no distinguished leaders formed themselves, or the government little knew how to discover them. The same unskilfulness showed itself in the whole conduct of the war. The wealthiest republic of those times was in constant financial embarrassment, and saw its troops revolt for lack of their ordinary pay. Rome, whose material resources bore no comparison with those of Carthage, while her citizens felt the pressure of taxes far more than the Carthaginians, whose treasury was chiefly filled by their subjects, nevertheless contrived to raise the requisite amount; or, in default of pay, her soldiers bore deprivations without murmuring, supported as they were at the cost of the miserable Sicilians. On one occasion the Gauls in the service of Carthage threatened desertion, unless their arrears of pay were discharged. The Punic general had recourse to a horrible expedient. He promised them the plunder of Entella, pretending that the Roman garrison which occupied that town had made him an offer to betray it. At the same time he gave the Romans notice of the meditated onset of the Gauls, who were thus enticed into the town and cut off to a man, not, however, without selling their lives dearly in a desperate conflict; so that the issue of the Punic *ruse de guerre* was regarded as doubly prosperous.

The successes of Carthage at sea were of a less inglorious nature, with a fleet of sixty ships they spread devastation along the coast of Italy, and terrified many Sicilian seaports again to acknowledge their empire. In the interior of the Island, on the other hand, where no Carthaginian force was at hand to relieve those who preserved their fidelity, all the towns yielded in succession to the Roman armies.

This turn of affairs blighted the premature hope of obtaining a peace which would include, in its terms, the entire cession of Sicily. The accessibleness of Italy to the Punic fleets rendered necessary a new line of defence. It had, by this time, become obvious that Carthage only wanted a leader, such as she found afterwards in Hannibal, to shake the Roman empire to its centre at home, and that nothing but conquests in Africa could put an end to the war. The senate, therefore, resolved to build a fleet, and to attack the Carthaginians on their own element. A Carthaginian pentera, which had been stranded on the Bruttian coast, and fell into the hands of the Romans, served as a model, after which, 130 ships were built within sixty days from the date at which the wood was felled with which they were constructed. The fleet, thus hastily built, was manned with no less expedition; the rowers having been exercised as well as they could ashore, on temporary scaffoldings raised for that purpose. The consul, C. Cornelius Scipio, sailed with part of the fleet to Messina; the remainder followed, as soon as it was fit for service, along the coast. At Messina, the consul, whose imbecile credulity procured for him the surname of Asina, was greeted by false messengers from Lipara, a

Greek town of the Cnidians, subjects of Carthage, inviting him to take possession of their islands. Off these islands the Punic commander, Bogud, awaited the success of this stratagem with twenty galleys, and showed himself to the Romans so soon as their fleet had entered the harbor. At this unexpected apparition the crews were seized with a panic fright, and fled ashore, where at least they might hope to escape from the pursuit of the victor. The consul, with all who remained on board with him, were made prisoners of war, and their capture included that of the whole squadron.

The officers of that part of the fleet which had not come into action, so soon as they learned the destiny of their consul, invited his colleague, C. Duilius, to undertake the command. The consul did not conceal from himself that the ridicule cast by the enemy on the clumsiness of the Roman galleys was well founded, and set about inventing the means of conquest with these unwieldy masses. This could only be effected by depriving the enemy of the advantage which they derived from superior swiftness.

To effect this, every ship in the Roman fleet was provided with a boarding or grappling machine (*corvus*,) which appears to have been a species of drawbridge, of thirty-six feet in length, and four in breadth, with transverse planks, forming an easy stair, and armed at one end with a strong iron spike. This boarding bridge was raised against a mast in the fore part of the vessel, so that, on letting go the rope which secured it, it fell on the deck of an enemy's vessel approaching near enough to engage in the only manner then practised, grappled it fast by means of the spike, and afforded easy access from the Roman deck to that of their antagonist. This achieved, the event could not be doubtful. The ordinary crew of an African galley, which consisted in all likelihood of just such rascals as have been found on the decks of Barbaresque rovers, could never pretend to cope with Roman soldiers.

Thus prepared, Duilius sailed, without hesitation, to meet the enemy, on learning that their fleet was laying waste the coast of Myla. The Carthaginians came to action, as to a certain triumph, with 130 ships, and without even forming in line of battle. Thirty ships, which were first attacked by the Romans, were grappled and taken by means of the boarding machines. The rest, by evolutions and manœuvres, endeavored to find a favorable position for attack; but either could not gain a sufficiently near approach, or, if they did so, were grappled by those dreaded machines, and taken or sunk. One and thirty ships, amongst which was that of the admiral, a heptera, which the Carthaginians had made prize of in a naval action with Pyrrhus, were taken, fourteen destroyed, 7,000 prisoners made, 3,000 slain. The Romans appear not to have lost a single ship. The cause of their success is pretty obvious. The Carthaginians were not prepared for the new invented manœuvre of grappling; their tactics were confined to the shock with prows of their vessels, which had hitherto been the only mode of commencing a naval action. They were consequently taken by surprise. Accordingly, in subsequent naval en-

gements, we find less notice taken of the grappling bridge and finally lose sight of it entirely.

The triumph of a first naval victory exceeded its immediate results. The successful leader was allowed, as a lasting token of honor, to be lighted home from banquets with a torch, attended by a flute player. A monument, of which, an ancient drawing is still extant, delivered down in marble the remembrance of the Duilian triumph, and the inventory of the spoil with which he enriched the Roman treasury.

Notwithstanding this naval reverse of Carthage, nothing decisive took place in Sicily. The Romans laid siege to Mytostratus seven months without success, sustained severe losses before this town, and Hamilcar, who had assumed the command in place of the unfortunate Hanno, soon afterwards gained a brilliant advantage over them near Thermæ. Meanwhile the Romans felt what Pyrrhus had felt before them, that even successes had been bought at a price which must end in ruin. Accordingly, they resolved to attack the Carthaginians on their own ground, where the matter must be speedily brought to an issue.

How certainly that issue might be foreseen may be learned from the whole history of the African war under Regulus, up to Xanthippus's arrival. Both consuls, Lucius Manlius, and M. Atilius Regulus, were commissioned to conduct the army over, and for that purpose collected a vast number of vessels, fastened and arranged to keep together on an attack of the Carthaginians, so that the skill of the latter in naval tactics should be of no service to them, constrained as they were to fight as if upon shore.* A similar scheme was tried by the French and Spaniards at the siege of Gibraltar.

The Roman manœuvre did not fail of success. The crews of the Roman ships, with the army which was to be transported, amounted to 140,000 men,—those of the Carthaginian fleet to 150,000. The spectacle of a sea fight between 300,000 men, divided in an immense number of vessels, must have been imposing; but the action itself had no decisive result, as, after sustaining some loss, the Carthaginians broke off the engagement, in order afterwards to assail the Roman fleet and army separately. But the Romans had no sooner landed on the promontory of Hermæum, than they frustrated the enemy's scheme by drawing their ships ashore, surrounding them with a wall and trench, and laying such vigorous siege to the fortified town of Aspis or Clupea, that they forced it to capitulate before the Carthaginians had recovered from their surprise and consternation. By taking Clupea, they put themselves in possession of the whole neck of land opposite to Carthage, and, having secured their rear, could scour the country before them.

* Polybius says, "The number of ships was so great, that any one must have been astonished; I do not say who saw, but even who heard of the greatness of the danger, and of the power of the two rival states, which may be inferred from the number of ships and men. The Romans clearly saw they must struggle for empire on the high seas, where the enemy were more than their match in the working of their ships (*ταχυναυτειν*); they endeavored, therefore, on all occasions, so to arrange their ships, that they should hold fast together, and that the line should not be easily broken (*ταξιν ασφαλή και δυσπροσδοον*)."

How little the bold enterprise of the Romans had been anticipated, or else how little trust the Carthaginians placed in their own troops, is evident from the fact, that they had neither fleet nor army in Africa, to blockade the Romans at least in their posts, if not to attack them there. The consuls waited for instructions from Rome, and receiving orders to send back all the ships but forty, all the troops but 15,000 men and 500 cavalry, with whom Regulus was to remain in Africa, they not only embarked the troops without molestation, but 20,000 men whom they made slaves; and no Carthaginian squadron so much as dared to attack Manlius on his passage. However, when it was perceived that Regulus had remained behind, and that, therefore, permanent conquest must be meditated, Hasdrubal and Bostar were appointed to the chief command, with whom Hamilcar, summoned from Sicily, was associated as a third.

v. c. 491. Regulus led his army out of the short repose of winter quarters, and opened the campaign with the capture of a town of the name of Adis, of which the situation is involved in the uncertainty of most African geography before the Roman era. The enemy, meanwhile, had levied an army around Carthage, and drawn over a part of their force from Sicily. The command was given to three generals, Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, and Bostar, who, to all the disadvantages of divided power, added that of inability, in the tenth campaign of the war, to apprehend the peculiarities of the Roman mode of fighting any more than the strength or weakness of their own armies. They avoided the plains, in which the Romans might fear the shock of their cavalry and elephants, and took position in the hills, where the nature of the ground rendered both horse and elephants useless, and harmless to the enemy. Thus they encamped on the hilly grounds near Adis, in order to relieve that town from its state of siege, and their foreign troops, unsupported by the cavalry and elephants, were routed and dispersed, after an obstinate resistance. Eighteen thousand men of the Carthaginian army fell in the battle, 5000, and eighteen elephants captured. After this action the Carthaginians retired within the walls of their capital. Regulus conquered Tunis, sixty-four other towns surrendered to him, the Numidians threw off the yoke of Carthage, and completed the devastation of the country.

Regulus wrote to the senate that the terror of his arms had sealed the gates of Carthage, and increased its population by innumerable hosts of fugitive peasants, who were cooped to endure famine within its gates. An embassy sued for peace in the Roman camp, and Regulus might then have obtained all that was at last extorted by thirteen years' continuance of warfare, and at the sacrifice of the lives of hundreds of thousands of allies and citizens. But the proconsul dreamed that he held the fate of Carthage in his hands, and was resolved that none but himself should be the arbiter of its destiny. He demanded the cession of Sicily and Sardinia; the return, without ransom, of all the Roman prisoners; the payment of ransom for all on the side of Carthage; annual tribute; recognition of Roman supremacy; renunciation of the right of making war without the consent of Rome; surrender of all but a single ship of war; and the outfit of fifty ships at

any time when Rome should require it. No sooner were these terms announced to the Carthaginian embassy, than they took their departure without returning an answer, as conditions like these seemed nothing short of absolute destruction.

Destruction indeed appeared all but inevitable, when it was for the present averted by the arrival of a volunteer from Greece (where life had become intollerable to every man of active talents), in the person of the Lacedæmonian Xanthippus. Sparta was by this time in the lowest stage of degenerate impotence, but the laws of Lycurgus still subsisted, and nobler spirits were still found there. Xanthippus is known to us only by his services in this war, but his military talents and reputation must have been acquired in the Macedonian wars of those times, for he cannot have come to Carthage as a mere military adventurer, whose counsels could have carried no authority. Xanthippus declared, with Spartan freedom of speech, that the late unbroken series of reverses, by which Carthage had been brought to the verge of destruction, had been imputable neither to her weakness nor to the force of Rome, but solely to the unskilfulness of the Carthaginian generals, who knew not how to make use of troops, in themselves extremely serviceable. The Punic leaders would, probably, rather have gone to wreck with their country than have owned themselves indebted for their salvation to a foreigner. But the people forced the government to give ear to that very foreigner, and the general voice assigned to Xanthippus the conduct of the war. So soon as the army was placed under his orders, and remodelled, and exercised by him near the city, every one felt that a higher spirit now directed their energies, and despair gave place to the full assurance of victory.

Xanthippus inveigled the Romans into a position whence all chance of escape was out of the question. Regulus's whole army was cut to pieces, with the exception of a few cohorts who escaped as by a miracle. Regulus, and with him a number of Roman knights, were taken prisoners. Xanthippus acquired the more unmingled honor by terminating thus at a single blow the war in Africa, as a foreigner could not be employed in command of the armies of Carthage abroad. He thus returned to his country with the whole renown and recompence which he had earned of the Carthaginians by one decisive action.

An embassy was despatched from Carthage to Rome with proposals for peace, or at least for an exchange of prisoners. The Carthaginian ambassadors were accompanied by M. Regulus, who had now been for five years a captive. There are few more favorite themes for poets and orators in Roman history, than the heroism and martyrdom of Regulus. He is said to have refused to enter the city, regarding himself as a Carthaginian slave; to have sought the leave of his new masters before he could be prevailed upon to attend the deliberations of the senate, and there to have opposed the exchange of prisoners with not less vehemence than the propositions for peace. It is recorded of him that his counsels determined the wavering resolutions of the senate; that no persuasions to remain prevailed with him in comparison with his honor and his oath; and that, in order to escape farther temptations, he gave out that a slow poison had been adminis-

tered to him by Punic treachery, which would soon end his days, even though the senate, consulting less the general good than that of one individual, should attempt to retain him by means of exchange, or by interposing direct authority. It has farther been described, in prose and verse, how he withdrew himself as dishonored from the embraces of his family, and was put to death, on returning to Carthage, with all the refinements of African cruelty. Dio Cassius, however, treats the martyrdom of Regulus as a piece of pure fictitious martyrology; and the calumnies against Carthage, in which the Romans constantly indulged, render it probable that the received story had exceedingly slight foundations in fact. At all events, the rationale of this heroism seems not very easy to discover, considering that, three years later, the same exchange of prisoners, to have prevented which is reckoned proof of such high merit in Regulus, was actually acceded to by the Romans, with greatly more disadvantage to their affairs.

The Roman government now gave up the idea of carrying on the war in the interior of Africa. Meanwhile they renewed their attacks on the African coast, and on Sicily. This war was especially ruinous to the Greek towns on the coast of Italy; next to these to the Latin seaports, and to those in which, since that time, colonies were planted with the obligation of furnishing hands for the sea service, in return for which the citizens were guaranteed entire exemption—*sacrosanctom vocationem*—from the land service. These marine colonies, as they were afterwards called, were multiplied amazingly after the second Punic war. Meanwhile, besides the bloody sea and land fights, one enormous Roman fleet after another was buried in the waves through the want of skill and experience of the Roman seamen and officers.

The Romans never made a brilliant figure at sea; and, altogether, the naval actions of antiquity are childish, compared with those of modern times, notwithstanding the enormous loss of human life which characterised them. However, we must not imbibe too contemptuous an opinion of the ancient navigation, from the frequent wreck of whole fleets. In the ports of Greece and Barbary, well constructed and fast sailing vessels are built without the aid of science in ship-building, from mere tradition, of which the origin clearly belongs to classical antiquity. But ships of war, which are now the finest vessels, were then precisely the reverse, as they were not built for sailing, but so as to be wholly in the power of the rowers. Accordingly, they could not weather a storm at open sea; and though they drew so little water, that when stranded their crews could commonly save themselves, their frail structure was shattered by the shock.

As citizens, the Claudian family generally merited the curses of the Roman people; as generals, they were rarely deserving of much consideration. Such honor as they had, however, P. Claudius wholly forfeited, at the same time throwing away the lives of thousands, which, indeed, he viewed with more than indifference. The Roman fleet being again manned, he thought it would be a brilliant feat to surprise that of Carthage in the harbor of Drepana. Auguries were vain to

dissuade him; he gave orders to throw overboard the cages of the pre-saging fowls, that they might drink, as he said, if they would not eat.

The Punic leader, Adherbal, was indeed surprised by the Roman attack, but was found not unprepared for such surprisal. His ships were without delay manned and put in fighting order. Adherbal did not think fit to remain and receive the attack in harbor; but, while the Roman ships were making for the port at its western entrance, he took his ships out to sea in the opposite direction. P. Claudius saw that he had missed his mark, and gave orders for retreat which were imperfectly understood. The vessels which had reached the inner part of the harbor met, in returning, those in the rear which were still advancing, and were with difficulty formed into line of battle along the coast. Adherbal, in the mean time, had already drawn out his whole fleet, enclosed that of the Romans, and cut off their retreat. The Carthaginians must have invented some machine or manœuvre to counteract the effect of the Roman grappling engines, as it is evident that they no longer dreaded them. Their crews had superior skill in evolutions: they were favored besides by the open sea, while the Romans, pinned to the coast, had no space to move or manœuvre, which would, indeed, have been impossible with their clumsy and scarce seaworthy vessels. Only the left wing escaped, consisting of thirty ships, amongst which was that of the consul himself. Ninety-three ships were taken or sunk. The Romans acknowledged a loss of 8000 slain, and 20,000 taken prisoners. The victory was, doubtless, easy; but a circumstance which seems incredible is, that the Carthaginians had not one man slain, and very few wounded.*

The shame and distress ensuing on this defeat, which at once gave a decided preponderance to the power of Carthage in Sicily, broke out at Rome in the shape of the most violent feeling against the consul. He was enjoined, in the name of the republic, to nominate a dictator, and then forthwith to lay down his office and answer for his conduct. P. Claudius, who made a jest alike of the weal or woe of his country, being satisfied that the republic could survive many defeats, and, by consequence, that the honors of his house were not in danger, appointed in derision to the dictatorship M. Claudius Glycias, the son of a freedman, one of his servants, and a client of his house. This wanton piece of insolence was, however, not endured: and the privilege possessed by the senate, of exercising their own choice, and prescribing to the consul an appointment in accordance with it, was employed by them in favor of M. Atilius Calatinus. It is told of this dictator, that his appointment was announced to him while he was sowing with his own hand the field which he occupied as a plebeian, from whence he derived the surname of Seranus. u. c. 497.

At this epoch the issue of the war must have seemed desperate, and the perseverance of the senate ruinous to the state. However, the pusillanimous recommendation of peace by a single senator, was punished in the Curia by the infliction of immediate death. Had similar constancy been shown on the part of the Carthaginians; had

* Diodorus.

they, like the Romans, struggled for the victory at the price of their blood, it does not seem improbable that success would have been on their side, notwithstanding the waste which had hitherto been made of their resources.

Rome's reverses exceeded the restorative powers of the state. The hope of forming a new fleet was abandoned and Carthalo was tamely suffered to appear on the coasts of Italy, and revenge the devastation of Africa. But the Carthaginians again took to their ships when they found the prætor had taken the field against them. A dangerous mutiny of the soldiers, who clamored for their arrears of pay, seems about this time to have endangered Carthage, and to have disappointed her brilliant hopes.

It was in these arduous circumstances, that the command of the Carthaginian forces was confided to Hamilcar, who is known under the surname of Barcas, and, more widely as the father of Hannibal. He was a young man in the modern as well as in the ancient meaning, according to which the bounds of youth were extended into advanced years, at the period when the chief command of the army was conferred on him by the government of his country. His first measure, on taking the command of the army, was to curb the mutineers of which it consisted by an iron discipline, before he would lead them out against any enemy. He then sailed for Italy, plundered the coasts of Bruttium and Locris, and, returning from thence, landed at Panormus and took post on the hill Hercte (Monte Pellegrino), of which the steep and rocky height commands the plain whereon is built the present capital of Sicily. From the harbour at the foot of this rock the Carthaginian vessels swept the coasts up to the borders of Cumæ :

u. c. and in this situation, separated less than a mile from each
199. other, the armies of both nations remained for the space of three
to years, without ever coming to a regular engagement, neverthe-
502. less, in a state of restless activity. Hamilcar hoped that the
Romans would never again be able to fit out a fleet. His object
was to harass and exhaust them; and, secure from defeat in the
strength of his position, to exercise his troops in trifling skirmishes
and excursions, till he felt himself in condition to offer the enemy a
pitched battle.

The Romans had for some years been driven from the seas; their public hoards were exhausted; the Italian towns and states on the coast suffered incessant annoyance from Carthage. Rome durst not propose new sacrifices to the subjects and allied states. In this crisis the citizens voluntarily taxed their own resources. Polybius justly awards the whole honor of the new fleet, which, under Lutatius, terminated the war, to the self-devoting patriotism of the Roman aristocracy, as knights and senators advanced the requisite sums from their own fortunes.* They recovered, indeed, afterwards, their advances out of the sums which Carthage was forced to pay. Never again had the Carthaginians looked to see such a fleet opposed to them. They fitted out theirs hastily under Hanno, in order to transport to

* Polyb. i. c. 59.

Eryx fresh troops and stores; and then, under command of Hamilcar Barcas, to attack the Roman fleet when they had taken troops and seamen on board. But the consul did not let things go so far. He went to look for the Carthaginians, forced them to come to an action in the neighborhood of the islands which lie over against the Lilybæan promontory, or, rather, the western extremity of Sicily, and won a complete victory. Fifty ships were sunk, and seventy carried off to Lilybæum, with crews amounting to 10,000 men in number. Even now, indeed, the Carthaginians did not despair: but, seeing no means of carrying on the war, empowered the leader who had hitherto conducted it with such ardor, to continue or to terminate it, as he should deem expedient. Hamilcar made good use of the circumstances. He saw that, after winning a splendid victory, Lutatius was disposed to be more cautious than Regulus had been, and moreover wished to enjoy the triumph of terminating the war. In effect, Lutatius closed a peace on such equitable terms, that the Romans at first did not think proper to ratify it. The condition of that peace, which, as we proceed, will appear of greatest moment, was, that the Romans from henceforward should have joint possession of Sicily with the Syracusans. Soon afterwards they took advantage of the unfortunate situation of Carthage to extort, in addition, the cession of Sardinia. This single condition, which stretched the domain of the Roman people beyond the bounds of Italy, occasioned such alterations in their internal and external relations, that from this moment all was changed in Rome. Here, therefore, concludes the purely Italian period of Roman history. The first Punic war remained without a parallel in the later history of Rome, whether we contemplate the grandeur of the efforts, or the sacrifices offered by the firmness of the republic.

There is a common cant, says Niebuhr, which usurps the name of philosophy, that the value of a conquest never can compensate the expense of it, and the accompanying loss of human life. The first clause of the sentence can only be true with respect to the private possessions of individual subjects of the conquering state, when the burden of imposts and corresponding diminution of property is felt to any considerable degree. The latter part of the maxim is false, if the nation remains flourishing. And a flourishing condition, not of commerce only, but of national power, vigor, and importance, acquired by conquest, gives life and energy to a state, which soon replaces any loss it may have sustained in population and resources.

CHAPTER X.

ROMAN INSTITUTIONS, MANNERS, AND MENTAL CULTIVATION UP TO THE END OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

THE early organization of a standing army in Rome contributed, in no small degree, to the rapid extension of her dominion. The character of the Roman republic was altogether military. Agriculture and war were the only honorable occupations. It may be proper here to notice a few of the leading features which characterized the military system of Rome up to the period now reached by us. According to the well-known and repeatedly quoted statements of Livy,* the legion, at the commencement of the fifth century from the building of the city, consisted of five cohorts or divisions, or, if we may use a more familiar designation, battalions. These were severally named *Hastati*, *Principes*, *Triarii*, *Rorarii*, and *Accensi*. The two first had the joint appellation of *Antesignani*, or *Antepilani*, because they were disposed in front of the standards and the *triarii*, who were also called *Pilani*. Each of them contained 15 *manipules* or 30 *centuries*; and a century consisted of thirty men besides the centurion. The complement of each cohort consisting of thirty centuries of thirty men, each must consequently have been 900 men; and the numerical strength of all five being probably the same, the legion mustered 4500. Of these, 400 *hastati*, 900 *principes*, and 900 *triarii*, 2200 men in all, ranked as heavy-armed and troops of the line; 200 *hastati* and 900 *rorarii*, 1100 in all, as light troops. These proportions are the same as those which obtained among the Greek, between the light-armed soldiers and the *hoplites*.

With regard to the three cohorts of heavy-armed troops, we learn from Varro that the *hastati* carried spears, the *principes* swords, the *triarii* *pila* or javelins, from the use of which they received the name of *pilani*. The meaning, however, of these names became obscure in the lapse of time, and in consequence of the changes introduced in military arrangements. The legion, its division, the mode of arming its several main component parts, the moveableness, and easy applicability to every peculiarity in the nature of the ground, of the order of the three main bodies into which it was divided, the *principes*, *triarii*, and *hastati*, are peculiar to the Romans. Like the division of the Spartan and the Macedonian phalanx, it was grounded upon national characteristics, but here, too, did that character display itself, which wholly and solely fixes the pre-eminence of the Romans above the

* viii 8.

other nations of antiquity. That character consists in this; that their senate, whom Cineas names, with justice, an assembly of kings, and who, in early times, were the only persons who could aspire to places of authority, so admirably understood not only how to receive a foreign regulation; when it was preferable to a native one, but how to knit it so closely with the earlier domestic arrangements, that Rome, until the period of the second Punic war, remained always the same, yet always admitted alterations. This is evidenced in every part of the military system.

Military service, however burdensome in early times, was in those times, at least, a service of honor. The mode of recruiting was such, that only the flower of the population was levied. Lists of all the young people who had reached their sixteenth year were kept in the temple of the goddess *Juventus*; and these, with the register of deaths, which in like manner was kept in the temple of Venus Libitina, and, with the lists of the censors, which contained a complete registry of births, gave the numbers of those liable to serve.

The whole army of earlier times was an image of Samnite equality in combination with Samnite aristocracy. The consul or general only, and his staff the legates, with the tribunes, were officers in our sense of the word;—all the centurions held their rank for one campaign only. The consul chose, and the senate confirmed, the legates; the tribunes, since the year 433, were in part elected by the people, and in part named by the consul in the field, but a difference existed in the rank of the two. Amongst the tribunes the number of those was often very great who had held the rank of consul, prætor, ædile, and tribune of the people; centurions and præfects, on the other hand, were named with consent of the consul by the tribune of the legion, and it was not till the legions had become standing regiments, that a regular promotion in rank was introduced. All the tribunes were either already senators, or at all events, were sure to be taken up by the censors into the senate, in case they fixed their residence in Rome. Even the number of legionaries was altered according to circumstances, without the national forces being thereby in the least disturbed; and the mode of arming also, was adapted to each new enemy.

Acquaintance with the troops of Greece, especially since the war with Pyrrhus, induced the Romans to modify their military arrangements, and to approximate, so far as it was practicable, their arms and order of battle to that of the phalangites. The arms of the Græco-Macedonian troops were at that time little round shields and *sarissæ*. The Romans had long shields, and therefore more complete protection to the body than the Grecian shield can give, and possessed the *pilum*, a formidable weapon for thrusting and throwing. The soldier of the Grecian phalanx, as well as the Roman legionary, fought at close quarters, and in rank and file, but the phalanx was immovable, and all its soldiers similar in accoutrements and weapons. The Roman order of battle admitted of contraction and extension, as every cohort and every *manipulus* formed an order of its own, and could be used

singly, so that the whole could be easily divided, and, when necessary, easily united again.

The same advances, the same adaptation to the time and to the circumstances, combined with a judicious adherence to old customs, as far as possible, is to be found in the civil constitution, in the ordination of authorities, and the functions committed to them; in the treatment of the vanquished, and the manner in which Roman laws and regulations were never intruded, but skillfully engrafted upon foreign.

At a time when the Romans were obliged to oppose unity and consistency to the intestine discord of the Etruscans and the Latins, and when internal concord was often disturbed, even amongst themselves; at a time, besides, of simple social relations; all executive power was in the hands of the kings, then of the consuls, or, when needful, of occasionally nominated dictators. The censors, how important soever their office, had only definite functions, which always recurred in the same routine; though the regulation of this magistrature, as well as of the rest, shows what care was taken to adapt the whole political constitution to the circumstances.

During the disputes which, since the establishment of the tribunate, had engrossed the whole attention of the consuls, the official enumeration and assessment of the Roman people often was omitted. Hence these functions, originally connected with the consulship, were altogether severed from it, and delegated to some one of those senators who had already held that office. As their principal duty demanded longer time for its performance, and was, therefore, to be repeated only once in five years, the censors remained full five years in office, during the first nine years which succeeded the erection of the new dignity. This, however, could not be endured by the republican jealousy; a law shortly followed, that in future they should always lay their office down on the expiration of eighteen months. Immediately on entrance to their office, they held a public session on the forum; and one tribe after the other, in succession, were made to parade past them, stated their property, and were registered anew in the scale of taxation, according to an estimate of their whole possessions, as these had been increased or diminished. In later times, the burghers, who resided in the provinces, transmitted their estimates in writing. These, engraved on copper plates, formed the register of population and taxes. We have remarked, in another place, how far the supervision of the censors over morality extended. The farming of the public lands, the superintendence of public buildings, high-roads, and aqueducts, the nomination of senators, and the right to exclude an unworthy person altogether from the senate for the space of five years, gave a dignity to those who were invested with this office, which was so much greater, the less they seemed connected with the executive power or to stand in need, like the prætor and consul, of military command.

The first nomination of prætor was, properly speaking, not the result of the increase of population, but of the contest of the patricians and the plebeians about the consulship. But the new dignity could not have been established at a more opportune time, had the direct intention been to add to the number of appointments in accordance with the

necessities of the time. By the establishment of a prætorship, the functions of the judicature were separated from those of the executive, and committed to a man who stood almost equal to the consul. The first prætor was son of the great Camillus. Gradually, the number of the prætors was increased to four, to six, and, lastly, to ten. The last alterations do not fall within the times of which we are treating. The constitution of the tribunals, and the maxims according to which decisions were to be given in certain disputed cases, underwent alterations in like manner according to circumstances; the former according to the necessities of the times, the latter according to the views of the jurists who guided the prætor, or his own. That a wide field was opened to caprice and cabals in later times, by the edicts of the prætors, is undeniable. On the other hand, the delays, the mechanical spirit to which a fixed unvarying constitution is so liable, were avoided, and the rapid transaction of business was promoted, which distinguishes the conduct of affairs at Rome in every department.

The remarks which have been made respecting the prætors, apply in a great measure to the ædiles. It is true that some obscurity involves the occasion of the earliest establishment of the dignity of curule ædiles. It may, however, be maintained, without hesitation, that at a time when, with the increase of population, the want of police came to be sensibly felt, the establishment of this office created a superior police authority, in the same way as, in England, it has been necessary to place the police of the metropolis in the hands of the home secretary.

The same may be said of the office of quæstors, so far as we understand thereby, not criminal judges, but officers of the treasury. They arose as business multiplied, were doubled when continual wars demanded standing armies, and again increased when the four regions of Italy afforded domains and contributions which required as much attention as formerly the Roman had done.

The progressiveness, the prudent and deliberate improvement which we perceive in the erection of new offices, we also find in the laws and regulations. We have shown with what tranquility, on the part of the plebeians and their tribunes, the new popular rights were won from the ruling aristocracy, without effusion of blood, and without violence, properly so called; how they were, step by step, augmented, till—at once retaining the old division of the people, retaining the laws and essential rights of the several classes—an altogether new form was called into existence. A new nobility arose, which, if it did not consist exclusively of families whose founders had distinguished themselves by extraordinary services to their countrymen, yet at least had the voice of the people unequivocally in its favor. The people, indeed, did not elect the senators, except inasmuch as those who had been invested with the first dignities thenceforward had a seat in the senate. It was, however, enjoined as a duty on the censors, in filling up the numbers of the senate, only to accept the most distinguished of the citizens. We shall content ourselves with indicating thus much, and hasten to the arrangements made by the senate with regard to the Italian states, when we shall first have thrown a glance upon the several classes of the people at Rome.

Rome's earliest history shows us a state possessing a nobility, a sort of vassals, vanquished slaves like all the other primary states, as well of other countries as of Italy in particular. Rome, however, soon acquires a mixed description of Burghers, which does not, as in Athens, merely exercise mechanical trades, but the most important part of which employs itself in agriculture, as well as the patricians and their clients. Regulations are even attributed to so early a reign as the second king's, calculated for this entirely new class, of Etruscan, Latin, or Samnite origin. The last king but one gave it, according to the legend, an importance in the state which proved the occasion of the total subversion of the regimen of castes in Italy. We will not investigate what relation the earlier knights bore to the latter, having already declared the history of Romulus mythical and poetical; but that, after the classification of Servius Tullius, and the organization, founded thereon, of the Roman army, and of the military service of the several classes of the people, the knights were inserted betwixt the nobles and burghers as a new order, is so completely made out as to need no demonstration. The *equestrian order* sprung up as an intermediate rank between the class of nobles and of plain citizens. These knights owed their rank in the state entirely to their property. To their property, also, consisting, of course, in earlier times, of land, and, in later times, in ready cash or other disposable capital, they owed their constant employment as contractors of tolls and farmers of revenue. The body of knights, without regard to age or to patrician origin, was wholly constituted by reference to the valuation of property: and even in the most flourishing times of the republic, no greater sum was required to qualify for equestrian rank than 400,000 sesterces, or about 3200*l.* of English money.

We are also led back to Romulus in the matter of the colonies, as an institution by means of which the Romans contrived to annex to themselves the force of the whole Italian population, properly so called, and to render Italy but the domain of the single town of Rome. The Greeks severed their colonies from the mother country, and pushed them into far remote regions; the Romans regarded theirs as a part of themselves; and it was not till late, reluctantly, and against the will of the senate, that they made up their minds to plant colonies out of Italy. So long as the republic lasted, the number of foreign colonies always remained very inconsiderable. The system, and its first applications, originated with Romulus, according to the ordinary accounts. The following kings are said to have founded six or seven colonies, in the number of which was Ostia, the splendid seaport of Rome, which numbered, at a later period, 80,000 inhabitants. Up to the period of the second Punic war, their number had increased to thirty, as Livy thinks, or to fifty-three, if the statement by name of the individual colonies in Asconius Pedianus is to be trusted to. These colonies lay at the two southern extremities of Italy, as well as in the northern part, in the Gallic lands on the Po. Since the Latins, and the Italians in general, participated in their victories, they allowed them also to share the rewards, and founded Latin and Italian, as well as Roman colonies, only endowed with the various rights of the

mother countries. It must here be remarked, that the colonists shared in the burdensome obligations, as well as in the honorary rights, of Roman citizens, but were much more narrowly limited in their own internal administration than the allied towns of which we shall presently make mention. The principal advantage of the Roman citizen, that of giving his vote in the public assembly of his native city, was not enjoyed as a matter of course by the colonies, unless when it was specially secured to them. These colonies formed, where they existed, a little Rome; had their senate (the decurions,) their consuls (duumviri,) and their censors (duumviri quinquennales;) and in the Roman senate there was always one or other of the great men who took charge of their interests.

While, thus, by means of colonies, Rome multiplied herself in Italy, and these colonies were knitted to the metropolis by honorary rights, and by the provision that the colonist who took up his abode again in Rome again enjoyed the rights of Roman citizenship, the vanquished states were partitioned in the most diversified manner. Even those towns comprised under the name of *Municipia*, in which we include those which had the right of Roman citizenship, with or without that of suffrage in the metropolis, were various in their modes of administration; and the senate took the most favorable occasions which offered to get such towns effectually under, without wounding the mass of their inhabitants by withdrawing from them rights of which the loss would have pained them for the moment. The subjection of the formerly free states, whenever occasion offered, was effected by converting them into prefectures. We cannot better elucidate this than by translating the words of Festus:—"Those Italian towns were called prefectures, where courts of justice, markets, and fairs were held; where the administration was local, though not composed of self-elected authorities, the government being by prefects who were annually sent from Rome. Of these states there were two species:—the one to which prefects were sent elected by the people: to these belonged Capua, Cumæ, Casilinum, Liternum, Vulturum, Puteoli, Acerra, Suessula, Atella, Calatia. The prefect of the others was appointed by the town prætor, as in Fundi, Formiæ, Cære Venafrum, Allifa, Rivernum, Anagnia, Frusino, Reate, Saturnia, Nursia, Arpinum, &c.

We must speak with somewhat more particularity of the municipal towns, the rights of the Latins and Italians, as well as of the Greek states, which received from the Romans peculiar privileges. First, as to what regards the so called *municipia*, or Italian towns, to which the right of Roman citizenship was secured; these towns either themselves elected their authorities, or received prefects from Rome. The latter regulation was inflicted as a punishment, when the state had been guilty of some gross offence, of treason or of revolt; but those also to whom no offence could be imputed, had great varieties of right and constitution. Not all received the Roman citizenship in the full sense of the word: some had it only as the colonies; others, on the other hand, could, when they had time and taste for it, go to Rome, and there give their votes, and compete for public offices. Further,

they had either their own laws, or had adopted the Roman ones wholly or else partially; not to mention other diversities. Most of these municipal towns framed their constitution entirely on the model of the Roman. We find the ranks divided, as in Rome, into senatorial or old noble families, knightly, and, in a stricter sense, civic ones. They had their consuls, censors, ædiles, quæstors, and tribunes of the people. For the rest, there was only a very limited number of such towns in Italy; and even these, for the most part, did not arrive at the full rights of Roman citizenship till a late period.

The senate well understood how to diminish and annihilate imperceptibly the privileges conceded to the Latin states at the time when the Roman armies chiefly consisted of Latin troops. Just as they had contrived to oppress Præneste, once an enormous town, afterwards insignificant in comparison to Rome, and which had been honored by a league with the new state on terms of perfect equality, so they also oppressed the Latin populations. We here speak, not of the extirpation of whole races, such as the Volsci and the Æqui, to the remnants of which the privileges of Latium were afterwards conceded,—they were treated according to the laws of war,—we speak of those who offered no such obstinate resistance, or, like the Asci and Ausonians or Auruncians, were, after their defeat, associated voluntarily by the Romans to the old Latins. We refrain from investigation with regard to the several towns and nations during the domination of the Romans: the Latin right was proclaimed equal for all states of Latin origin: yet in point of fact a very great diversity existed; so that, even among the Latins, union for one end was extremely difficult.

In early times, hardly any distinction existed between Roman and Latin citizens. On his arrival in Rome, the Latin guest was enrolled, if he thought proper, in the civic lists, as a matter of course, by the censor. This was more difficult at a later period, when the city mob became proud of those rights which gave them at least collective importance. For the rest, all the advantages which were conceded to the Latins, and which placed them on a footing of all but equality to Roman citizens, were more than outweighed by the military burdens, which pressed them more heavily than the Romans. First of all, they were forced to submit to the levies prescribed by the Romans, without having the shadow of a share in the deliberation whether war should be waged or not, and this in a state hardly ever at peace. The service imposed was so much the harder, that they did not even share that honor which alone can console the soldier for an infinity of toil and peril, equally with the Romans, with whom they had equally shared exertions and hazards. It was always Roman legions, known by name and number, which won victories, though the Latins were armed exactly like them, equally divided into legions, and equally brave. For the Latin troops were always used and designated only in the second rank, as auxiliaries. Their legions, besides, were always stronger in numbers than the Roman; their cavalry always double as strong: indeed, the Romans often demanded a double even from the infantry, and from the cavalry a tripple contingent. If we consider the enormous number of men who fell in the battles of anti-

quity, where the struggle was man to man, the loss of life in the first and second Punic wars, and the concourse from the country to Rome, the depopulation of Latium and all Italy is conceivable. The other Italian nations had been incorporated with the Roman empire on altogether different conditions, and were as we have already remarked, in manifold ways distinct from each other, as well by rights and laws, as by derivation and language or dialect. Of the Italian nations, some, indeed, had voluntarily submitted themselves, but all at a later period attempted to throw off the yoke: all were, therefore, reduced to regard their rights as a present or a privilege of the Romans. Meanwhile, the latter were artful enough to concede all possible privileges, so soon as these vigorous races would submit to martial organization.

All the populations which enjoyed the *Jus Italicum*, had their own laws and local administrations, and were not, like the conquered land (provinces), ruled by Roman authorities. On the other hand, however, the senate gave them severe orders, which the local authorities were obliged to put in execution as rigidly as a Roman could have done. Roman grandees arriving in the capital towns, or travelling through the country, allowed themselves all possible licence, and no state dared to make the slightest remonstrance; partly because every Roman senator was a formidable person in his own account, partly because these states, in those contests in their interior, and with their nearest neighbors, of which there could be no lack, considering the Italian popular character, were obliged to appeal, as the sole tribunal open to them, to the Roman senate, or arbitrators named by it. However, as the Romans never failed to confiscate a part of the land of the vanquished, and either to farm it as public domains, or assign it for a yearly rent to colonies, they could easily concede freedom from taxes; having levied them, once for all, at the outset, by confiscation of the property in the soil. Yet this freedom from taxes was in later times an advantage in comparison with which the right of citizenship was often despised. In the posting of soldiers, many had a preference over the Latins; others, again, were dealt with no less hardly than the Latins; and, finally, others were put on quite ignominious services in the army.

In civil rights, certain advantages seem to have been common to all Italians with the Romans. The Grecian towns in Italy were allowed to enjoy a free constitution, retain their old authorities, and preserve complete independence. But they soon found that an independence which hangs on the good-will of the stronger party is worse than a distinct and definite servitude. When they discovered this, they endeavored to release themselves from patronage, but were again reduced by force to submission, and were indebted from that moment to the clemency of the victor for all that they retained of their rights. The struggle took place at different times and under various circumstances. Thence, too, the conditions of the new subjection were utterly different. Yet all, when they were called upon, were bound to furnish troops to the Roman army, and pay tribute; and those which lay on the sea-side, at the time of the Punic wars, were ruined by the quota of ships and sailors they were forced to supply.

The first Greek town, which in this manner came under Roman denomination, was Neapolis or Palaiopolis, or the city of Parthenope, one of the Sirens, whose grave was shown in the neighborhood, and this town even in Strabo's time had preserved its Greek regulations. Strabo records no Roman titles of functionaries, although he tells us that Campanian names and offices had been introduced. For the rest, every thing else remained entirely Greek as before,—wrestling schools and other Grecian seminaries existed there—every five years, gymnastic and musical festivals were held; and the Romans settled there even gave Greek names to their children. The old renowned Posidonia, afterwards Pætum, became a Roman colony; while Thurium, which of all the towns in Lower Italy had first invoked the Roman protection, became a Roman colony under the name of Copia.

In all the towns of the Greeks which received Roman colonies, the Greek prosperity sank along with the Greek constitution: the stamp of their coinage more and more betrayed that art was encouraged no longer; and, instead of the former symbols of the prosperity of the town and its territory, cultivation and commerce, came the two Roman, consequently foreign, names, which mark the highest magistracy (*duumviri*.) Others of these towns adhered to the Greek constitution in their interior, as the Romans never invaded constitutions, especially those of particular towns, except in case of extreme necessity. If the little state in the aggregate did their pleasure, it might administer itself as long as it pleased.

The history of Rome under the kings, with reference to the mode of life, industry, arts, and similar objects, belongs wholly to the primitive times and primitive states of Italy. What Plutarch relates of Romulus's stone gate of the ancient Rome, does not harmonize with the history of Remus's leap over his trench. The former circumstance leads us back to Etruscan arts and manners; the latter to a primitive state, such as we might see in the interior of Africa. The buildings of a Tarquinius Priscus, and of a Porsenna, ill agree with the narratives of the ancient poverty and ignorance, with the straw huts of Romulus, and the want of all the arts of life. We therefore set out from the supposition that Rome, as a republic, retrograded the further from the old civilization, the more it formed itself into an entirely new state; and that the more it took a direction wholly military, the more the Etruscan and Latin manners yielded to the Samnite. Were, therefore, an accurate history possible of the earlier times, we should have to speak of a retrogradation to simpler manners and modes of life, of the immigration of families and tribes from the mountain and rural districts, of the gradual transformation of domestic habits and intercourse into military rudeness and simplicity. As, however, we lack materials to elucidate this retrograde movement, we take up the thread in the times when we can agree with the common Roman histories.

These times may be dated from the destruction of the town by the Gauls, to the end of the Samnite wars; for, at that period the state had acquired vigor in continual wars, but had also become impoverished, and had gone back in civilization. The ordinary public expenses of these times were paid from the contributions of the burghers, from the

limited proceeds of the tolls, from the above-mentioned imposts on public lands of which grants had been made to private persons, and from the rents of those districts which remained public property, and were farmed out as pasture or as arable. As in the time of the kings, spoils were employed in public works and buildings.

Even in early times, exceeding liberality was exercised in the outfit and indemnification of functionaries. The allowances made to commissaries named for special employments, the outfit bestowed on individual functionaries on active service, are frequently referred to by historians. The public expenses became considerable on the duration of a war, and the extension of a dominion, which at first brought little in through the entertaining of numerous subordinate functionaries, all paid by the state, for the most part changed annually, and chosen by the individual magistrates at discretion. Considerable profits also accrued from the spoils in war to the magistrates and the old and new nobility in general. This is evident from the fact, that the first strife between the old patricians and burghers arose entirely and exclusively from the circumstance that the patricians became richer and richer by war, and the administration of public posts of dignity, while the people became poorer and poorer by military service.

We shall presently see, from the narrative of the Gracchic disturbances, that the new nobility trod in the very footsteps of the old. We cannot conceal that the accounts of the want of a regular coinage, of the late coinage of silver, and the use of cattle as an instrument of exchange, would stand in direct contradiction with those of the usurious transactions of ancient Rome, if it might not be assumed with confidence, that Etruscan, Latin, and Greek coins were in use before the Roman state saw fit to coin for its own use.

We will somewhat more minutely explain what we have said of the subordinate class of functionaries, and the provision made for them, since it stands in close connection with the whole public administration, and we shall be under the unfortunate necessity in the following sections of speaking only too often, of the profits drawn by the Roman grandees from those who were their *proteges* and subjects. First, we have to remark that the inferior authorities, which did not depend on the censors, consuls, prætors, ædiles, and quæstors, but were appointed independently by the people or the senate, drew considerable emoluments, either from fees or appointments, and outfit money. These subordinate officers are commonly included under the general name of *apparitors*, or those secondary functionaries who were named at the discretion of the higher ones, without the concurrence of the senate. We know that they chose them from their clients, in order to lay the latter under obligations to them, or attach to themselves that numerous class which subsisted on such petty employments. Of these, it is proper first to name the so called scribes, who formed an important class in Rome, and to whom were intrusted the drawing up of law papers, the whole routine of finance, and the most important despatches. They purchased in part their offices, and formed so large a body of men in Rome, that it was found necessary to distribute them, like the other inferior functionaries, in regular societies, according to rank and

order. They received a small salary from the state; but occasionally participated in the perquisites of the higher officers, and laid their accounts in such a manner before them that it was difficult to detect any embezzlement. As they formed a regular class, they may be looked upon in the same light as that of lawyers,—a class to which at one and the same time the most distinguished, rich, and respected men, and the most despised, may belong. The character of a Roman official personage may therefore be judged of by that of those with whom he filled his offices. It is true, this was a later state of things: but that, at an earlier period, the military contempt of intellectual cultivation rendered accountants, penmen, and persons acquainted with the forms of law, still more necessary to the persons in power, is proved by the renowned example of Cn. Flavius, the son or grandson of a freedman, who, in the year 440 of the town, even reached the curule ædileship, and immortalised himself by drawing forth from priestly patrician obscurity the calendar or catalogue of the days on which courts of justice might or might not be held, which was before a mystery.

The servants, properly so called, of the first official persons (*accensi*), were, indeed, but little elevated above the rank of slaves, and were chiefly selected from the freedmen. The occupations of these people, as of the præcons, were so manifold, and so lucrative, that a trade was sometimes driven with their posts; and that a præco was often numbered amongst the most important personages in Rome, as may be learnt by the example of Sextus Nævius in Cicero's oration for Quinctius. In every case, the treasury had considerable payments to make for the subordinate officers in service. The number of lictors was very considerable; for the lower police authority of the triumviri capitales alone had eight of these in their service. But the most numerous were the officers and *commis* of the censors, ædiles, and quæstors. As the censors were elected for a short time only, they were obliged to leave the mechanical execution of their functions to subordinate officers, whose labors were thereafter to be guided and examined by the censors of the next lustrum. The ædiles, distracted by the care for police and public amusements, could not possibly give adequate attention to the many other important departments intrusted to them, as they entered quite new upon their office, of which the duties indispensably demanded experience. The quæstors had the public treasury under their superintendence, the administration of which was extremely complex under the Roman republic, and required the care of officers who should not be shifted annually. Quæstors, ædiles, censors, had, therefore, under their superintendence a great number of officers of all kinds; accountants, architects, scribes, surveyors, people of all trades.

As to the censors, it must be remarked, that, although the Romans undertook no buildings on account of the state, but had them performed by contract with private speculators, in the same way as they farmed out the collection, or rather the proceeds of the public revenues, they yet were obliged to cause the building contracts to be drawn up in writing (of which Cato has preserved to us a specimen in his book on agriculture), as well as the innumerable multitude of other contracts, which they could not possibly look after themselves. Even the in-

spection of the building and execution was intrusted to hired functionaries, who were bound to account to the censors.

Works of public utility had already begun to be projected. We more particularly allude to sewers, aqueducts, and highways, the crowning monuments of Roman grandeur, which excite in us more astonishment than all the Egyptian edifices, and Indian rock temples. We pass over the sewers, as they belong to the Etruscan period. The roads also, aqueducts, theatres, baths, and the like, we must not overlook, as it was in this period that the model was given according to which public works of the two former descriptions continued to be conducted, until the latest times of the emperors. The pride of a princely patrician, Appius, whom we know, from the history of Pyrrhus, as a man of lofty spirit; who looked, indeed, on his family as his country, but also looked on his country as his family; a man who may be called the express image of the ancient patriciate—of the sternness, vigor, simplicity, and constancy of the old Roman nobility—for the first time since the kingly era, employed the revenues of the state, greatly augmented as these were by the possession of Campania and the plunder of Samnium, in a gigantic undertaking,—in the building of an enormous aqueduct, and the planning of the most remarkable highway of the Roman empire. At that time, the the Romans as well as the Latins continued to pay war-taxes, land taxes, property taxes; the tithe of the demesne lands brought large sums in: and the tolls had become more productive since the domain had received aggrandizements: the number of slaves had, owing to the wars, greatly increased. Appius, therefore, could not better oblige the mass of the citizens than by undertaking an enormous public work, which should occupy them, and give them an opportunity to enrich themselves through the labor of their slaves. At the same time, he announced by these means the greatness of Rome to the whole world, and secured immortal glory to himself.

The construction of the Appian way from Rome to Capua remained for ever unsurpassed, became the model of all highways, and evidenced Roman grandeur best of all those of which we shall have afterwards to make mention.

What remains of this Appian way, exhibits up to the present times a structure which may almost be said to surpass the Etruscan walls, as it extends over so large a tract of ground. It is a broad highway, not of broken stones, but solid masonry. The stones themselves are squared by line and rule, smoothed and fitted with such nicety, that the joinings are scarcely perceptible. Each stone measures four or five feet. These freestone causeways were strewn with gravel, and furnished with stones for mounting and descending from horseback, with milestones, and with houses to put up at. Soon also gravestones and other monuments rose on every side in their neighborhood, whereby the uniformity of our turnpike roads was avoided, the traveller received instruction, and was filled with admiration and awe of the world-ruling people.

Aqueducts increased in a proportion fully equal to that of these superb and splendid highways. If due weight be given to the reflec-

tion, that projects like those of Tarquin and of Appius presuppose the outlay of enormous sums, and an extraordinary number of skilled artificers, the more importance will be attached to the recorded circumstance, that in Pyrrhus's time private houses were either wholly constructed, or at least covered in with wood; and that Rome did not begin to coin silver till after the conquest of Tarentum, or gold till after the second Punic war. Consequently, every thing in Rome was done with a reference to the grandeur of the state, its works and undertakings; nothing was done for intercourse, trade, and show in private life; all ready money was turned to public purposes of definite and obvious utility; and the Etruscans, Latins, Campanians, Greeks, were willingly allowed the honor of setting their stamp upon coins of which Rome was to make use.

The Roman family life was entirely Samnite; in other words, rural, simple, moral, and moderate. The residence of a Roman, that of the senators excepted, was in earlier times in the country: he only resorted to the town on business, and returned as soon as his business was finished. Round about him lived his children, grand-children, and clients, who stood upon a similar footing; he was at once father and judge, and the state did not concern itself about what passed in the interior of the family. Such a constitution seems to involve horrible tyranny, as the husband was lord over the life and death of his wife, the father of his son, whom he could even sell as a slave three times successively. It is well known, however, that the feelings of nature, when cherished, are superior to all ordinances. Examples of the abuse of the parental power are rare, though it cannot be denied that such examples do here and there occur. The government of families rendered it possible to dispense with courts of justice and with law books in the earlier times. When, however, the inhabitants of the town increased in number, and were more mixed, other regulations became necessary.

The Roman housewife was not severed, like the Grecian, from political life and social intercourse, confined to her own chamber, and excluded from the circles of the masculine sex, which amongst the Greeks could only be visited by a hetaira. The Roman matron was educated, honored, and admitted into male society, and a divorce, easy as it was, continued, in the time of which we treat, a thing unheard of.

Even the slaves, up to the beginning of the first Punic war, stood in a totally different relation to their masters than after the termination of that war. Italians and Romans regarded themselves as one people: their mode of life was not essentially different; many prisoners of war were voluntarily released; others, as their friends and relations were near, were ransomed; domestic slavery, and subjection to degrading services did not take place. The patrician shared with his clients and his slaves the toils of agriculture, since hunting could only be enjoyed from time to time in the thickly peopled and cultivated parts of the Roman empire, and seldom, as in the north, became a passion. Military service was to the Romans what hunting

was to the people of the middle ages. Every Roman was stimulated by love of country and love of fame, when an army was disbanded, when an expedition was terminated, to renew his enrolment immediately, engage in a second enterprise, and to continue to serve with willingness and alacrity even over his twenty years of liability. That love of fame and country alone excited these old Roman soldiers, may best be learned from the well known example of the *primipilus* Ligustinus, quoted by Livy. Ligustinus's speech is too well known to require insertion in this place: besides that, it belongs to a much later epoch; but precisely for that reason affords evidence that the elder Samnite Roman life maintained itself in the country long after its extinction in the town, and that, even after the second Punic war, an officer who had served as major in one year, to use a modern expression, might be employed as an ensign in the next; or, in other words, that no centurion could hold himself entitled to make a permanent claim on his grade in the service.

As no consideration was to be gained by trade or industry, but only by valor in war and by good use of patrimonial property, it is easy to conceive how the provisioning of an increasing metropolis was found in the fourth century of the town a work of such difficulty, that the sale of grain was given in charge to certain state commissioners, who had a regularly elected president (*præfectus annonæ*), at their head. This functionary is noticed on an occasion in which we perceive distinctly, that there were in Rome private individuals even in those times, whose property so greatly exceeded that of their fellow citizens as to place them in condition to maintain a princely expenditure. For example, Spurius Mælius was accused of having courted popular favor by gratuitous distribution of grain, in order to gain possession of the sovereign power. As he bought up the grain which he purposed to distribute in Etruria, he must certainly have had silver money, since the Etruscans had coined from time immemorial, and shared the Mediterranean trade with Carthage.

The Romans also carried on a maritime trade in earlier times, not, indeed, through the native race of inhabitants, but through strangers who had settled amongst them; Latins who had submitted to them, and Etruscans who found more protection from them than from their own effeminate countrymen, addicted as they were to piracy. This may be easily inferred from the founding of Ostia, which is attributed to a very early period. Rome, had her usages been different, might by means of the harbor of Ostia, have become a naval power, as the greater number of the Etruscan states, which were situate almost all in the interior of the country, had become by similar establishments.

The maritime trade actually carried on by the Romans may be inferred in particular from the circumstance, that from the time of the foundation of the republic, until two years after the landing of Pyrrhus in Italy, they concluded three or even four treaties with the Carthaginians, and, according to the common accounts, one with the Tarentines concerning the number of ships with which they were licensed to circumnavigate the promontory of Lacinium.

Many individual traits from domestic life give indications of a greater degree of luxury and industry in the city than we can infer from the accounts concerning the military class who play the first part in the Roman history. Roman dames wore purple robes with a gold trimming (the so called *stola*); they employed dentists to fasten the teeth in their mouths with gold, in the modern fashion; and in the twelve tables a law is to be found against the luxury of burning golden ornaments with the dead, and an allusion to the use of gold in the teeth. The Romans commenced at a much earlier era than the Greeks—who, however, from their vicinity to the East, and from themselves possessing gold mines, were much richer in gold—the practice of bestowing crowns of gold on their conquerors; and so early as eleven years after the first Punic war, they made the vain attempt to stem by laws the influx of luxury, an attempt renewed in all times among all nations, but which never yet was found to succeed.

The liveliness and relish of life which we find among the Greeks we cannot expect to find among the serious, sturdy Romans, intent as they were upon the useful. On the other hand, they are also far from the levity and wantonness which constantly display themselves in the Greeks, and which, even in Sparta, appeared in the abandonment of the women, and in the laxity of the bonds of wedlock. When we come to speak of the Roman games and diversions, both these points will admit of further explication; we shall in this place only indicate a few particular circumstances. Horse-racing and martial games appear to have been naturalized amongst the Romans from earlier times: whatever required art or adroitness was foreign to them. Mimes and dancers, who entertained the Etruscans with indecent postures, were borrowed from that people—no Roman made a show of himself—and since the introduction, at the beginning of the first Punic war, of the gladiatorial games, which so admirably suited the rough character of the Roman people, sanguinary combats and wild-beast baiting became the favorite pastime of the people. The music was of a loud or ludicrous kind: the flute-playing and drinking-songs, of which we shall speak presently, were never brought to perfection like the Greek music; and the solemn sacrificial rites at which music was used, were carried on amidst boisterous screams, springs, and stamping dances. In the comic history told by Livy of the contests of the censors and flute-players, the latter appear quite as village musicians, and worthy servants of Etruscan entrail inspectors.

It agrees extremely well with this, that we find from the regulations which were made not long after these times, that the lowest description of luxury, the pleasures and expenses of the table, threatened to gain early predominance, and attracted the attention of the censors and the senate. This regarded eatables as well as wine. It was soon found necessary to prohibit the importation of foreign wine, as Italian wine was disdained by Roman palates, until wine-growing and wine-making in Italy were brought to the pitch which they reached in the times of Augustus. For the vine required a very peculiar management, in order to afford a good wine, under the then and actual method of training practised by the Italians. This was felt by Cin-

neas ; for, if the bon-mot which Pliny puts in his mouth be genuine, he could not at all conceive, accustomed as he was to the low training of Greek vineyards, how wines trained upon stately elms, and here and there forming high avenues, could possibly afford good wine. When Italian wine was set before him (and assuredly the worst was not put upon the table,) he said that "it did not surprise him at all that the parent of such wine should be hanged so high."

The Romans had been involved in continual warfare : every Roman was a soldier ; the senate consisted of distinguished officers. Fashion, therefore, and the all-powerful example of the higher orders dictated simplicity, and the manners of the monarchy were forced to yield to those of the camp. The female sex alone knew and exercised some degree of luxury in dress, carriages, cushions, and golden ornaments ; the male sex became rougher and sterner during the Samnite wars, and in the wars with the Gauls, as these wars lasted through a whole generation, so that the growing race served under the same standards under which their fathers had served. The Etruscans, Latins, and Campanians were either converted entirely to Romans, and taken into their armies, or left to themselves and their own government. In the one case, they adopted the martial and rural manners of the Romans under whom they served : in the other, they were utterly innoxious to them. From the moment when the Romans vanquished Lower Italy, and came into collision with the transmarine Greek states, all these circumstances were changed. A richer booty, a number of slaves who had learned in the East and in Greece Proper the art to make themselves agreeable as ministers of lust, a multitude of vagabonds, who attached themselves to the few families of Rome, which, in point of fact, ruled Italy, could not fail to be perilous to a virtue which did not rest on principles but on habit. How speedy, too, was this alteration ! In the course of a few years the inhabitants of the wealthy towns of both Calabrias were not merely vanquished and subjected like the nations within the Appenines, or extirpated, like the Samnites, but plundered, taxed, and carried away as slaves, on the pretext of repeated attempts at revolt. The Greeks amongst them brought their talent in all the arts of life amongst men who had just enriched themselves by violence, and, therefore, were impatient for immediate enjoyment. On the other hand, the Lucanians, Bruttians, and other rough populations furnished slaves on whom severity was necessarily and willingly practised.

In the last years of the first punic war, all the circumstances altered still more strikingly. The Romans acquired a fleet, without being a trading or even a seafaring people ; they plundered the richest region of the then world, the coast of Africa ; and from the spoil of a people indebted for its prosperity to trade, that is to say, to their skill in taking advantage of the artificial wants of foreigners, they brought numberless things over to Italy, with the use of which they had previously been unacquainted. The single campaign of Regulus brought a body of slaves to Rome, equal in number to a fifth part of the then body of citizens. How must this have altered manners and customs ! How differently in all respects from the Italians, whom the chance of

war had thrown into the hands of their enemies, must people have been treated whose speech was not understood, who had been forcibly brought together from the most distant lands, and who were accustomed to a merciless government.

Neither art nor science flourished among the Romans in this first period; and when art or science was wanted in their great undertakings in peace and war, they were forced to betake themselves, first to the Etruscans, then to the Greeks. The whole of the early culture of Italy seems to have been a religious culture, and the arts and all the branches of industry stood in connection with this culture. We have already called attention to the manner in which the brotherhood of the *frotres aruales* stood connected with the agriculture of the Samnites, the priesthood of the patricians among the Etruscans with astrology; and we refer those who may wish for more precise information to Niebuhr's disquisition on the Etruscan cycles. We must, therefore altogether exclude the royal era, which is known to us only from obscure legends, adorned by later rhetoricians; since it is clear that a completely different sort of cultivation became prevalent in the republican times from that which existed previously. Men in years, who had grown grey in the practical details of war or peace, conducted the government of the state; distinct regulations excluded before a certain age from the magistracy; the people were perpetually engaged in the disputes about debt, about patrician prerogatives, about *meum* and *tuum*; were called out anew to warfare almost annually, and had only the brief interval between the campaigns for re-establishing their private economy, disordered during the absence of the father of the family. In such a state of things, where could be room for scientific efforts? The whole of Roman culture, therefore, had retrograded, especially since the erection of the republic, and we shall see in the next period intellectual cultivation introduced as a foreign luxury, to which the genuine old Romans are inimical. Cicero, who never forgets the rhetorician when he aims at commending philosophy to his hearers, does not fail to make this clear to us through his praise of the olden time, for he very skilfully exhibits the predominance in the mind of the Romans of the practical and real over all the purely mental pursuits.

We find the same thing over again in the regulation of sacred worship: and Machiavel, who had thoroughly the spirit of the old Romans, has admirably elucidated this in his Discourses on Livy. We are too little acquainted with the sacred poetry of the Romans to undertake to show, by a comparison of them with Grecian hymns and the oldest lyrical poetry, that religion had been from the earliest times a political machine, for the skilful use of which the few families to whom the care of the state was committed had formed a firm union. We shall therefore only briefly remark, that the whole affairs of religion stood under the direction of the practical understanding; and that, though it is true that entrance was thus effectually barred against priestcraft, yet on the other hand, science and imagination could not, as amongst the Greeks, employ the popular persuasion, in order to raise even common souls above daily life and its occupations. An

aristocratical college, which filled up its own numbers, and consisted of four members and a president (*pontifex maximus*), all of them men who occupied, and had long occupied public offices, presided over all ceremonies. At a later period, indeed, four plebeians were added; but these were all chosen from amongst men who, as senators, had already entered the body of nobility. It was not till a very late period (v. c. 649) that the people acquired a share in their election. All the other priesthoods were subordinate to this college, which depended on the senate and the people. Every ceremony, even the fearful devotion, depended on formulas, of which, like those of the English courts of justice, the observance was enforced with minute accuracy. Thus, a state order regulated every banquet and sacrifice; music and dancing were prescribed with equal precision as the formulas of prayer. Here it may well be imagined that no room was left for poetry, still less for devotional songs or sacred dramas. This college of the superior priests was flanked by that of the augurs, who were neither priests nor jugglers, but statesmen, whose age and consideration in the state maintained the old superstition, and made use of it for the advantage of the government. No mysteries, no rites for the excitement of the fancy, not even for the subterranean powers—for the solemnities of the *Bona Dea* were merely a female festival. Even the business of the vestals did not rest on secret tradition, or on legendary tales, which had been solemnised by popular songs. The priests of particular deities were, indeed, fettered by certain rules; but even the three of the fifteen priests held in highest respect, those of Jupiter, Mars, and Romulus, were in public offices, and their influence was more properly secular than spiritual. We could easily demonstrate in a similar manner of the so called *Salii*, of the *Epulons* and *Curions*, that they were restricted to definite, merely outward forms, and subordinate to the senate and the people; by consequence, that they were civil officers, destined to reinforce the popular morals through superstition, feasts, and offerings, or to guide them by these means in the direction desired by the civil authorities. No new ceremony, no temple, no altar, festival, or solemnity, could be introduced without sanction of the senate and consent of the tribunes.

We speak not here of rural feasts, and rustic music and poetry: these could not be wanting in the old religion and mode of life. Cicero mentions several species of ancient popular poetry in a well known passage, in which, however, he expressly says at the same time, that no one of these species of national poetry had any thing in common with the literature of his own time. He mentions, first, the songs at sacrificial nuptials and public banquets, with the musical accompaniments to them; but it is easy to see that he is speaking of something that was antiquated, and had vanished without leaving a trace behind. We must, indeed, lament that Atticus's labors on the subject of this elder Roman literature are no longer extant, as Cicero himself confesses, that all which he promulgated about it has merely been abstracted from that source. (*Tusc. Disp.* l. v.)

We should expect to find a second species of literature in Italy, where there always has been, and still is, a great taste for the bur-

lesque, even if Cicero, Horace, and St. Augustin had not expressly spoken of it, and if the laws of the twelve tables had not denounced the punishment of death against satirical songs, which, flying from mouth to mouth, and sung at festivals, wounded those who were hit by them more deeply than the sharpest weapon. These satirical songs, however, even had they been preserved, would upon us have been entirely ineffective, as they were aimed at individuals, and only referred to particular objects. The same holds good of the dramatic entertainments, of the Atellan and Oscan drolleries, and the humors of the vintage.

More attention than is merited by these rude jests would (if the writings of an Atticus and Varro had been still preserved) have been due to those early literary efforts which contain serious doctrines or historical matter, or which delivered down to memory a peculiar description of rigid moral precepts of the Samnite people. In this respect, much similarity existed between the Samnite stock and that of the Dorians, or the towns ruled according to the principles of Pythagoras. Cicero cites in particular a poem, of the didactic sort, of Appius Claudius Cæcus, who obtained distinction as an orator, even at a period as yet unacquainted with Grecian models.

With regard to historical poetry, it has not indeed been preserved in its original shape, but the whole of the earlier Roman history, as Livy has handled it, and as it every where presents itself in the Roman poets and orators, flowed out of old songs, and these must have been preserved to the time of Cicero, though he complains that songs which had been known to Cato were wholly lost in his times. As the Greeks to the cithara, so, says Cicero, sang the oldest Romans to the sound of the flute, the honors and the deeds of men renowned in the olden time; and, as Cato, in his historical work, the Origines, mentions, every single guest in succession sang a particular deed, or particular man, whom he held deserving of special praise, or about whom he knew a song by heart.

No one will not expect, in this earlier age, to meet with regular oratory, but the political constitution and the wants of the demanded eloquence; and this, according to Cicero, was not lacking. We must keep the more sharply in view this department of the earlier Roman literature, as we shall presently see that it was from this quarter that the Greek literature, after several fruitless attempts to bring it by other ways among the Romans, and procure it an influence on social culture, finally found admission. This is a remark repeatedly made by Cicero, who has taken all possible pains to bring together a long catalogue of orators from the period preceding the first Punic war; but it is easy to perceive that for the most part he selects names purely at hap-hazard. Had he but been acquainted with as many speeches of earlier times as we find in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy, assuredly he need have been at no loss. He names a pair of Valerius; speaks of written funeral orations preserved in families of distinction; but acknowledges that not much reliance can be placed upon the genuineness of these documents. He thinks the Roman history has been much disfigured by the use of these suppositious funeral ora-

tions, as in them not only false facts were given, but false consulates and triumphs, and even false family registers, genealogies, relationships, accounts of the relation between plebian and patrician families. Thence is clearly to be inferred that Cicero speaks of such discourses as the families afterwards brought into circulation under the names of renowned men of an earlier period; for immediately after the death of the men who were praised, and at their graves, open untruths could hardly have been uttered. The discourse of Appius Claudius against the war with Pyrrhus was in Cicero's time extant in writing. He praises it, as might be expected of his patriotism; but he succeeds ill in suppressing an involuntary sneer. Among a great number whom he designates as orators merely on conjecture, Cornelius Cethegus is particularly distinguished. Ennius, to whose testimony Cicero appeals, has named him a pleasing orator, in verses which, however, do not sound very pleasingly.*

In the exact sciences, also, some attempts were made, before the Grecian period, by the Romans; but Cicero says expressly that they only pursued mathematics in the rudest practical sense; that they stopped short at arithmetic and land-surveying,† and hence allowed those parts of science to retrograde which already had been brought to greater perfection in Etruria. This may be seen from the broad facts, that they neither improved their calendar, nor were even in a condition to erect a common sun-dial.

The latter fact is so striking, that it would seem wholly incredible without express and circumstantial mention. We shall therefore give a rapid sketch of the history of the Roman clocks. In the year 402 of the town, no other means were known for facilitating in some degree the calculation of time to the Romans, than to set up a pole to mark the shortest shadow, by consequence the hour of noon only. Of sun-dials, properly so called, no one, as yet, had any idea. In Sicily, splendid sun-dials were discovered, of which one was brought from Catana to Rome, and set up, without its occurring to any one to adapt its position to the meridian of Rome. It was soon discovered that nothing could be done at Rome with a clock which had gone extremely well at Catana; and the censor Quinctus Marcius Phillippus had another set up. This, however, soon proved altogether as useless as the first. That, however, a method of reckoning time might not be entirely wanting, the renowned water-clock of Scipio was set up in lieu of a sun-dial towards the close of the following century, as the suitable arrangement of the sun-dial was despaired of. In latter times, indeed, Rome was amply provided with sun-dials.

In earlier time, the land-surveyors, or *agrimensores*, exercised a science of their own. But we cannot decide with certainty how far

* Additur orator Corneliu' suaviloquenti
Ore Cethegus Marcu' Tuditano collega,
Marci filius . . .

† "In summo apud Græcos honore geometria fuit; itaque nihil mathematicis illustrius. At nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate, hujus artis terminavimus modum."—*Cic. Tusc. Disp.* lib. i. c. 2, 3.

the geometrical science of the Etruscans, which descended to the Romans, may have gone, since the remains still extant of the writings of these agrimensores at the utmost only here and there show scattered traces of earlier science, but as a whole, belong to the later times of the Roman empire. So much, however, we know with certainty, with regard to the so-called gromatici, that they formed a sort of engineer corps in the Roman camp and army, and that their science was carried pretty far for the exigences of warfare. There were in every Roman camp two centuries, which understood the science, or, if the term be preferred, the art, of land-surveying, and were under the command of chosen officers. For these situations men were carefully picked from amongst the Romans themselves, and from the cavalry of the allies, and were such as had served their time and presented themselves as volunteers.

We close this sketch of the earliest Roman mental cultivation and science with the general remark, that, rude and rough as the Romans may appear, their whole life had a serious tone and an admirable unity, and that the sort of elementary instruction which alone they possessed, coincided with their mode of life admirably. Domestic occupations were shared between man and wife; the man an industrious husbandman, a stout warrior, a sound statesman, who valued only those things which had some immediate reference to these the occupations of his life, and whose virtue consisted in the ignorance of vice. The recognition of right, the science of *meum* and *tuum* in all the manifold and intricate occurrences of life, a genuine Roman branch of knowledge, was necessarily included in the circle of a culture of this sort. But of this hereafter.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

FIRST TRANSACTIONS OF ROME WITH GREECE.—SECOND PUNIC WAR.

CARTHAGE, by the cession of Sicily, was placed in a highly critical position, as Rome governed the whole island, in part indirectly, in part directly, and could transport a powerful army to the African coast at any moment. A sudden descent on Africa from Sicily, which had already been twice attempted, with great injury to Carthage, was hard to prevent, even if the latter ruled the sea, as the passage is so short that from the extreme point of Sicily the African coast can almost be descried by the naked eye in clear weather. Hence, Carthage was in a dangerous situation. Her trade had suffered sensibly; she was forced to look out for new resources, and Hamilcar Barcas thought and toiled towards this object incessantly. He determined to anticipate an attack of the Romans, by first assailing them from a quarter where they did not expect him, and felt himself doubly stimulated to this adventurous policy by an affront which he considered himself to have undergone from the Romans, and by the hard conditions exacted by them from his native town in profound peace.

These provocations originated as follows:—

The Carthaginians, immediately after the end of the first Punic war, became involved in a dispute with their own soldiers, which might easily have turned out as destructive as the war with the Romans. These soldiers consisted of the dregs of the most different nations.* Their demands, when they had once discovered their own strength, were exorbitant. Gisgo, who had been their favorite general in Sicily, sought vainly, in his solicited office of arbitrator, to accommodate the contests about military pay and prizes which the soldiers had begun with the senate. A runaway Roman slave, a Campanian by birth, Spendius, in league with an African, Mathos, contrived to frustrate all attempts at amicable arrangements. It seems the jealous government of Carthage was afraid to employ in this war their only able gen-

* Polybius (l. i. c. 67.) says there were amongst them Iberians, Celts, Balarians, no inconsiderable number of semi-Greeks (*μιξέλληνες*), most of whom were deserters and slaves, and that by far the greater number of them were Libyans.

eral, and resorted to the most extreme methods before it would replace Hamilcar Barcas at the head of the army.

Hanno, whom this supicious policy placed in the chief command, was guilty of such blunders as a general, that the mutineers, even after Hamilcar had inflicted a defeat on one division of their army, with a loss of 6000 dead and 2000 captives, were strong enough to shut him up in his camp, and drive him to such extremities, that, without the unexpected aid of the Numidians, who had been their accomplices, he would hardly have escaped destruction. Navarasus, a Numidian of rank, who had formerly served under Hamilcar, and formed an attachment for him, offered to desert, while Hamilcar, on the other hand, promised to bestow on him, on condition that he kept his word, the hand of his daughter in marriage. The Numidian accordingly deserted to Hamilcar with 2000 of his people, and the mercenaries were beaten. The contest nevertheless, was a protracted one.

In this tottering posture of their affairs, Hiero was especially active in offices of friendship to the Carthaginians. On the other hand, the latter fell at first into disputes with the Romans, having established what we should call a blockade system, and kept it up by force against the Italians. So soon as they gave satisfaction to the Romans, the latter in like manner displayed magnanimity towards them, and carefully avoided giving a dangerous example by encouraging ferocious insurgents.*

That the Romans did not allow themselves to be led away by excessive generosity in state affairs, they proved immediately afterwards, when an occasion offered of seizing Sardinia. Probably from imperfect information, Polybius ascribes to this island greater importance than it can have possessed.† Nevertheless, its population must in those times have been more considerable than at a later period; and a glance at the map shows the importance of such a possession to Carthage. The Carthaginians, during the war in Africa, were compelled to leave this island entirely to its own fate: their garrison took

* Polybius (i. 83.) has given so succinct a narration of these occurrences, that we cannot recount them better than in his own words:—"The Romans also faithfully observed the league, and omitted the performance of no amicable office (*προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον.*) At first arose a slight misunderstanding, with regard to which matters stood as follows:—The Carthaginians caused all vessels and crews to be made prize of, which sailed from Italy to the African coast; and had made in this manner nearly 500 captives. This occasioned reciprocal *eclaircissements* between them and the Romans. Ambassadors were sent on both sides: the Carthaginians made every concession; and, on the other hand, the Romans returned, without ransom, all the captives retained by them since the Sicilian war. From this time forward they did, frankly and readily, whatever was desired by the Carthaginians; and even allowed the merchants of the territories subject to them to supply the Carthaginians with necessities, but prohibited all traffic with their enemies. Afterwards, when the mercenary troops in Sardinia revolted from Carthage, and invited them to the island, they did not listen to them. Moreover, they would not accept the offered surrender of the burghers of Utica, because they were resolved so strictly to observe the alliance."

† In this manner, he says, were the Carthaginians deprived of the island of Sardinia, an island highly important (*διαφερόσα*) for its extent, population, and productions.

independent possession of it, and the Sardinians at length rose *en masse*, fell on these mercenaries, and compelled them to take flight to Italy. Here they had at first in vain addressed themselves to the Romans, until the latter saw that the Carthaginians were likely to finish their wars in Africa sooner than had been anticipated. Then it was that they first made preparations to occupy the island as an abandoned estate. This was learned by the Carthaginians, who fitted out a fleet and army, to vindicate their claim to the island, which they founded upon their prior possession. The Romans denounced these preparations as a flagrant breach of the peace, which they compelled them to repurchase by the cession of Sardinia, and by the payment of a considerable sum of money.*

From this moment both nations were occupied, each in a different quarter, in founding altogether new dominions. We shall speak first of the Romans, as the history of the Carthaginian conquests leads us directly to the second Punic war. In the period immediately succeeding the first Punic war, the Romans reduced to subjection Upper Italy, which, being considered as Gallic land, was afterwards treated as a conquered country, while all the rest of Italy was entitled *ager Romanus*. U. C. 519.

Before we come to speak of this conquest, we must notice another enterprize, which mixed the Romans up for the first time in the affairs of Greece, and gave importance to their arbitration even across the Adriatic.

When the Romans at a former period occupied Brundisium, they came into connection with three Grecian towns on the eastern coast situate amidst plundering barbarians,—Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Epidaurus; of which the first, in particular, was treated in a very friendly manner by the Romans. These towns, as well as all the coasts at the southern point of the Peloponnesus, at that time suffered from a wholly new, partly Grecian, partly barbarian power, which had arisen on the coasts of Illyria and Dalmatia, and was composed of Greeks from the island of Paros, who had formed themselves a settlement on the long island of Pharos on the Dalmathian coast.

The kingdom of Illyria consisted, like that of Epirus, of warrior tribes of the mountain regions, which even up to our days are possessed by rapacious and military inhabitants. From the earliest times

* About the year u. c. 515: the cession of Corsica took place two years afterwards. Polybius relates the transaction (i. 88.) as follows:—"About the time the Carthaginians had nearly finished the war in Africa, the Romans formed a determination, prompted by the mercenary troops who had gone over to them, of fitting out a fleet to make a descent on the island above mentioned. This the Carthaginians took ill; because, in their opinion, dominion over Sardinia more properly belonged to them; especially, being already on the point of pouncing on those who had deprived them of it. The Romans seized this pretext (*της αφορμης ταυτης λαβόμενοι*) to declare war on the Carthaginians; maintaining that these hostile preparations had been made by the latter, not against the Sardinians, but against themselves. The Carthaginians whose escape from the foregoing war had been quite unhopd for, and who were nowise in condition for the moment to resume hostilities with the Romans, accommodated themselves to circumstances, and not only ceded Sardinia, but paid the Romans 1200 talents, merely that they might not be compelled to make war at that moment."

Illyrian princes made themselves known as enterprising leaders of robber hordes. At length, under Pleuratus's son Agron, they formed so important a land and maritime power,* that the Macedonian king employed their aid against the Ætolian league. The Illyrians ventured to meet the assembled power of the Ætolians in light barks in behalf of the beleaguered Medonians; and, having been fortunate in this first expedition, no ship or tract of coast on the whole east of Greece was any longer safe from them. Polybius remarks that the death of the Illyrian king Agron, and the womanish caprice of his wife Teuta, who in the name of her son Pinnes conducted the government, contributed not a little to the unsparring ravages inflicted on the whole line of coast.† The Epirots and Acarnaians, whose plundering propensities are equally well known with those of the Illyrians, eagerly united with them, and gave rise to a predatory system, of which the victims were the towns of the Achæan and Ætolian league. Even the allies of Rome suffered from these robberies, and the Romans had been often already solicited for assistance. At length, when the abuse became too flagrant, and the Illyrians sent whole fleets to sea, they despatched an embassy, which, under pretence of remonstrating, was sent to collect the requisite intelligence. They found the Illyrians and their queen in full preparation for new undertakings. Issa, one of the Dalmatian islands, which had hitherto repelled the Illyrians, was besieged, and great preparations were made against Corcyra and Epidamnus, or Dyrrachium. This it was which probably moved the younger of the two ambassadors (both of the family Coruncianus) to give the queen a vehement and threatening answer, which did not properly come within his commission. "We Romans," he said, "have the admirable custom of avenging with the whole force of the state offences done to private individuals, and aiding those who have undergone injustice. By the aid of the gods, therefore, we shall speedily and vigorously endeavor to constrain you to ameliorate the royal regulation of Illyria." The queen received this blunt declaration with senseless female vehemence; and was so embittered by the tone of the Roman ambassador, that she sent assassins to intercept his return.

This violation of international law gave the Romans, what they had long wished, a fair pretext for undertaking an expedition against the

* Polyb. ii. 2. *Δυναμιν περὶκην καὶ ναυτικὴν μεγίστην εἶχε τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς βασιλευσσομένων ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς.*

† King Agron (says Polyb. ii. 4.) when his war-galleys returned, and he had accurately learned from the leaders what had been the real amount of danger, fell into fits of immoderate pleasure on having vanquished so warlike a people as the Ætolians. On the strength of this, he began a course of such banqueting and carousing, that he caught an inflammation in the lungs, and died in a few days. His wife Teuta took up the reins of government, and entrusted to her faithful friends the several branches of administration. She, after the fashion of women, (*χρησμένη λογισμοῖς γυναικεῖσις,*) had before her eyes only the fortunate issue of the last undertaking, left all other considerations entirely out of account, first allowed pirate ships to be fitted out by private persons, then collected a fleet and army equal in force to the former, and gave its leaders orders to treat every land as an enemy's country.

Illyrians. Thereby they brought Corcyra into circumstances of dependence, and attached to themselves the three Grecian towns of that coast: as they attached to themselves Hiero of Syracuse. Both consuls, Fulvius with a fleet, and Posthumius with a land army, were despatched on this undertaking, and found the more facility in the achievement of their object, as Demetrius of Pharos, who had hitherto been of the queen's councils, suddenly deserted to them, and procured them entrance every where. Teuta soon found herself abandoned on all sides. The traitor Demetrius held in possession the greater part of Illyria; the Roman army and one of the consuls went back into Italy; Posthumius only remained behind with forty ships in Illyria, and levied for himself an army of natives. Teuta was now reduced to despair: she begged for peace, and obtained it, but under the most rigorous conditions; such as, the evacuation of great part of her territory, which Demetrius received as a reward for his treason; the payment of a yearly tribute; and total renunciation not only of plunder, but even of navigation above the Lissus with armed vessels.

The most important effect, however, of this victory over Illyria was the manner in which the success of the Romans influenced the Greeks, whose absurd flattery let the conquering state into the secret of their national weakness.* All this was the work of two years. So long as the Romans were engaged in no other war, and could keep an eye on the Illyrians, the latter abstained from robbery. So soon, however, as the Romans became involved in the war with the Gauls, of which we shall immediately speak, they began their lucrative practice anew, and no Grecian state, excepting the Rhodians, even attempted to check them. These piracies were principally carried on by Demetrius, who was intimately leagued with Macedonia. It was precisely this circumstance which induced the Romans to greater vigilance; for the connection of the Illyrians with the Macedonians was doubly dangerous, as a new war threatened to take place with Carthage. They, therefore, neglected affairs in Spain, where their armies had become requisite for the succor of their allies against Hannibal, and directed their forces first towards Illyria. The consul Æmilius, who led this expedition against Demetrius, found (as the latter had Greeks in his armies, and used Greek tactics,) a more obstinate resistance than he had looked for. The Romans, however, at length gained the day, and soon completed the conquest of Illyricum. We are not informed what regulations they afterwards

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* Polybius (ii. 12.) after setting down the articles of peace, subjoins—"When this was executed, Posthumius sent ambassadors to the Achaian people, who, so soon as they had arrived, and obtained hearing, stated the causes of the war, and of the passage of the Romans over the Adriatic (*απελογισαντο τας αιτιας τς πολεμς, και της διασαςεως.*) Thereafter they related what had happened, and publicly read the articles of the peace with the Illyrians. Having received the fitting tokens of honor and amity, as well from the Ætolians as Achaians, they sailed back to Corfu, having relieved the Greeks from a tolerable (*ικανς*) fright. The Illyrians had proved themselves not enemies of this or that, but equally of all states. From the time of this occurrence (*απο δε ταυτης της καταρχης.*) the Romans began to send embassies to the Corinthians and Athenians; and it was then first proclaimed by the Corinthians that leave should be granted the Romans to take part in the Isthmian games."

established there. It is certain that they kept a firm footing on the islands of the Illyrian coast. But on the continent the Illyrian kings seem, during the second Punic war, to have recovered their independence, and maintained it to a later period. Demetrius escaped, acquired great influence at the Macedonian court, and spirited up king Philip against the Romans.*

At the same time that the Romans came into nearer connection with the Greeks, and reduced Dalmatia and Illyricum into a state of dependence, they pushed for the first time over the Po, and founded colonies in Upper Italy. A war with the Gauls gave occasion to this movement; which deserves attention, partly on its own account, partly because Polybius on the occasion gives us a very minute description of the population of Italy before the second Punic war, and of the martial spirit of that population. Upper Italy, from the Alps as far as the Apennines, was by this time wrenched out of the sphere of earlier Tuscan civilization. The ancient towns had vanished; the condition of the inhabitants was similar to what we find it afterwards in Gallia Proper. The description which Polybius gives of the situation of Lombardy, shortly after the second Punic war, exactly coincides with Cæsar's account of the situation of France. There was much pasturage, little agriculture, no houses but huts, no artificial wants, no importations from abroad, no regular alliances, a multitude of scattered tribes, in loose and precarious union,† which rallied round some brave and influential man, or served him as soldiers. Silver was less valued by them than gold, as they had no minute wants to be supplied by aid of silver, and only desired gold as the readiest means of conveying their riches, which consisted in herds, from one place to another. It may well be conceived how easily such tribes could be moved to excursions into foreign lands, and how little they were calculated to contend with regular troops. The fear entertained of the Gauls by the Romans was, therefore, only in so far justified, as it rested on the

* Polyb. iii. 19. Demetrius had vessels in readiness, in solitary places, in case of an unfortunate issue. To these he betook himself, embarked, and secretly sailed by night. Thus he escaped, quite unexpectedly, to king Philip, with whom he remained during the rest of his life. He was certainly a man of a bold and enterprising spirit, but devoid of all reflection and deliberation. His fate was, accordingly, suitable to the conduct which he had held during the whole course of his life: he fell in an injudicious and rash attack upon Messene, which he had undertaken with Philip's approbation. He then briefly adds, upon the Illyrian transaction,—“The Roman consul Æmilius, on the first attack, took the island of Pharos, and laid it waste (κατεσκαψε.) When he had afterwards taken possession of the rest of Illyria also, he arranged every thing there to his own mind, returned to Rome at the close of the summer, and held a triumph with great solemnity.

† Polyb. ii. 17. They lived in unfortified hamlets, without any of the wants of more refined life (της λοιπης κατασκευης αμοιροι καθεσνοντες) for they slept upon bare straw, and the principal part of their food was flesh; nor had they other occupation than war and agriculture. Their mode of life was, therefore, extremely simple, because every science and art was wholly unknown to them.

Their chief care was employed about these confederacies (μεγιστην σπουδην εποιουντο); since the most formidable and powerful man amongst them was he who had most persons in service and attendance upon him (θεραπευοντα και συμερι φερυμενους αυτω).

remembrance of the battle on the Allia, and on the reflection that, in war, with rude populations, much may be lost, and little is to be won.

A law of Flaminius, which afterwards occasioned tumults in Rome itself, proved the proximate cause of warfare with the Gauls.* The Picentian territory, from which the Romans at an earlier period had driven the Senonian Gauls, had hitherto remained public property of the Romans, and as such had been used by the Gauls, on payment of certain rents. Flaminius, a man who was resolved to achieve and did achieve his whole public career against the will of the senate through that of the people, procured the passing of a law, shortly before his first consulship, that this tract of land should be withdrawn from Gallic use, and distributed amongst a Roman colony. The Gauls were deeply embittered by this measure of the Romans, and by the inroad made on their lands in time of peace. United for once, they took up arms, and prepared for an incursion on the districts across the Apennines. The eighth year after the partition of the Picentian, territory was fixed for the attack; but the Veneti and Cenomones allowed themselves to be lured away from the league of their fellow-countrymen, and were drawn into one with the Romans, through the arts of their ambassadors, whereby these Celts, who were now obliged to leave a part of their men for the protection of their borders, were prevented from marching with their whole force over the Apennines.

The number of this Gallic army are reckoned by Polybius a 50,000 foot and 20,000 horsemen and wagons. As they advanced, Atilius, one of the consuls, was sent with a consular army to Sardinia. The other encamped near Ariminum, to observe the enemy's movements. With a third the consul marched to meet the Gauls as they entered Etruria, and came upon them amidst the hills which enclose the Val di Chiana. The Romans were so alarmed by the approach of their old enemies, that they put out their whole force, and enrolled all who could bear arms in Italy,†

The catalogue of fighting men made on the occasion has been preserved; and we remark, with astonishment, that, even after the dreadful wars of the Romans in Central Italy; after all the scenes of conflagration,

* The words of Polybius are as follows:—*Ταῖς Φλαμίνιος ταύτην τὴν δημαγωγίαν εἰσηγήσαμεν καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν γε καὶ Ῥωμαῖοις, ὥς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, φάτεον μὲν γενέσθαι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τε δὴμὸν καταστροφῆς.*

† Polyb. ii. 23. in fin. The Romans (of δὲν τῇ Ῥωμῇ) were seized with an extraordinary terror, and believed themselves to be menaced by a great and fearful peril. This was natural, as the dread of the Gauls lay on their souls from of old. Since, therefore, their whole souls were exclusively bent in that direction, they partly levied new armies, partly made a conscription of those who were already trained to arms, and gave the allies notice to hold themselves in readiness. They gave a general order to all subject to them to furnish lists of men of an age fit to bear arms, as they would gladly know the whole effective force that they could muster. They sent the best and most select troops out with their consuls; they provided such stores as had never before been seen, of corn, arms, and all munitions of war. They received ready assistance, however, from all quarters; as the inhabitants of Italy were panic-struck by the approach of the Gauls, and did not now consider that they were summoned to the aid of the Romans, or that the question now was, what people should hold the foremost rank in Italy; but every one held the peril to threaten his own fields and his own town."

gration and slaughter; after the extirpation of the Samnites; after the ravages of the war with Pyrrhus, after the enormous losses of men by sea and land, Italy, exclusive of Lombardy, could, in the second Punic war, place 700,000 men under arms.* The prætor's army allowed itself to be entrapped by a stratagem of the Gauls, attacked them fiercely, was totally routed, and driven back on the hill above mentioned. Happily, at this critical moment, Lucius Æmilius appeared from Ariminum with his consular army, and the Gauls, on the advice of their king, resolved first to secure their spoil on the other side of the Appennines, and then return afresh to the attack. Æmilius did not dare to follow them, although he had drawn around him the remains of the prætorian army. The Gauls had arrived happily in their country, through Siena, Pisa, Val di Magna: they fell, however, amongst the maremme as they marched along the sea-coast, and, moreover, found a new enemy there, whom they had not expected.

The consul Atilius was at that moment returning from Sardinia: he learned what had just happened at the promontory of Telamon, landed his army, marched to meet the Gauls in front, while two other armies were in their rear. Although, however, the Gauls were attacked at once in front and rear, they did, as Polybius testifies, all that could have been expected of the most experienced troops and leaders in such a situation. They drew up in a double order of battle, but could not make head against the Roman swords with theirs, which were merely fit for thrusting, were besides not sufficiently protected against the Roman javelins by their shields, and could not make available the most effective part of their auxiliary forces, the Gæsates. These barbarians, with their usual excess of daring, had thrown off their clothing in order to fight naked in the foremost ranks, and perceived too late that the brutal bravado, which was perfectly appropriate to their native modes of arming and fighting, was altogether misapplied against Roman armies. The Gauls suffered a total defeat, and a passage for Rome was cleared to the Po.

* Pliny confirms the statement of Polybius with regard to the effective force of the populations, and Eutropius and Orosius cite the authority of Fabius Pictor. We confine ourselves, for good reasons, entirely to Polybius. He says, that four Roman legions marched out with the consul; that each of these legions then consisted of 5200 men; that the allied troops, added to each of these two consular armies, were 30,000 infantry strong, with 2000 cavalry. Of Sabines and Tyrrhenians, who could have marched in case of necessity. He reckons 4000 cavalry, and more than 50,000 foot. Of Umbrians and Tarsinates, 20,000 were brought together; and these reinforced by 20,000 Veneti and Cenomones. These were destined against the Gallic hill country, to distract the attention of the Gauls by a threatened inroad into their country. The other armies were as follows:—In the Roman territory itself remained, as reserve, 20,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, composed of Romans; of allies, 30,000 foot and 2000 cavalry. Lists of all able-bodied men were brought: of Latins, 80,000 foot, 5000 horse; of Samnites, 70,000 foot, 7000 horse; Japygians and Messapians, 50,000 foot and 16,000 horse; Lucanians, 30,000 foot, 3,000 horse; Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, Vestini, 20,000 foot, 4000 horse. Besides these, were two other divisions, one in Sicily, the other in Tarentum, each of which was 4200 infantry, and 200 cavalry strong. Consequently, the whole number of Romans and Campanians was 250,000 foot, with 23,000 cavalry; so that the sum total of all the troops primarily destined to the defence of Rome amounted to 150,000 foot and 6000 cavalry. The whole number of Romans and allies able to bear arms exceeded 700,000 foot and 70,000 cavalry.

In the following year, the Bojeri submitted themselves to the consuls, Q. Fullius, and T. Manlius, who, however, did not find it advisable to pursue the war further. Flaminius penetrated into the lands on the other side of the Po, but brought the Roman army into great embarrassment: for it may be inferred from Polybius's narrative; that neither he nor his colleagues had those military qualifications which so dangerous a war required. The senate knew this; and there was consequently no lack of unfavorable prognostics in this year, which were intended to withhold from rash enterprises a man in whom no confidence was placed. He conquered, nevertheless, in despite of the auspices of the senate (whose letter he delayed to open till after the engagement,) by means of the arrangements made by his tribunes; for he himself had drawn up his order of battle badly enough.* The tribunes had remarked that the Gauls made use of long swords of badly tempered steel, perhaps of brass, which became bent at every cut; so that their wearers were obliged again to straighten them by setting their foot on them. Accordingly, they ordered their men to use the sword, instead of the pilum. The Roman sword at that time was solely adapted for thrusting, and much shorter. With regard to the bad arrangements of Flaminius himself, Polybius observes, that he had drawn out his order of battle so close to the river, that the principal advantage of the Roman tactics, of re-forming the line, when it had received an impression in front, somewhat farther back, by drawing back the manipuli, or enabling the cohorts to retreat, not at once, but by slow degrees, was totally lost. If, therefore, the least disorder had taken place during the action, the Romans would have been driven into the river. The senate afterwards did what it could to disoblige the man of the people. All solemnity of reception was refused him; nay, immediately after a triumph had been produced for him by the people, he was forced to lay down the consulship.

One of the consuls of the following year, M. Claudius Marcellus, an excellent soldier and equally good general, completed the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul, although a reinforcement of an army of 30,000 Gæsates had been procured from Gallia Proper. Two places which the Gauls seem to have fortified at that time in the tract between the Ticino and the Addua, Acerra and Mediolanum, were taken,

* This is expressed by Plutarch (in Marcello) in the following words:—"When Fulvius and Flaminius marched with large armies against the Insubrians, the river which flows through the Picenian district was seen flowing with blood. It was said that three moons had been seen; the priests who had inspected the birds during the consular elections maintained that they had indicated evil and adversity (*μοχθηρας και δυσοριδας αυτες γεγονεναι τας των υπατων αναγορευσεις*) when the election was announced. The senate, therefore, despatched letters into the camp, and recalled the consuls. They were enjoined to hasten with all expedition to Rome, to resign their office, and by no means to give battle to the enemy as consuls." Plutarch subjoins to the passage quoted a lengthy moral application, and talks a vast deal of the religious turn of the old Romans. If their manners, however, be looked at in a broad light, all is resolvable into the circumstances that the higher ranks at that time still held closely together; that the exclusive family system was still tolerably stable, and that scepticism had not yet obtained diffusion.

the Gauls beaten in a bloody engagement, and the Insubrians, who held possession of the Milanese, wholly reduced to subjection. On this occasion, the Romans pursued their customary policy: they placed colonies in the newly conquered land; first at Mutina,* then at Cremona and Placentia. The two last were especially calculated to retain the land in subjection. In each was collected the large number of 6000 colonists, and an order of knighthood erected from the outset, in order to maintain a native army constantly ready to be opposed to the Gauls. Hardly were these preparations ended, and the foundations of the colony laid, when the Gauls ventured a new attempt to rid themselves of the Romans and Latins, who were settled, or appeared about to settle, in their neighborhood. The struggle which arose on the occasion was still raging when Hannibal marched into Italy.

Precisely at the point of time when the Romans turned Sardinia and Corsica into provinces, set bounds to the Illyrian piracies, obtained a firm footing on the coasts, or, at least, on the islands, of that country, and began to treat Cisalpine Gaul as a conquered land; the Carthaginians, likewise, had acquired an augmentation of power, of far more immediate use to them than the precarious or hardly maintained acquisitions of the Romans. The warlike populations of Iberia, divided into innumerable little states, were, like those of Gaul, engaged in eternal feuds among themselves. This made it easy for the Greeks, Phœnicians, and, at last, Carthaginians, not only to place factories but to found cities in Spain, and to bring whole districts under their dominion. Before the first Punic war, the Carthaginians had subjected almost the whole of the present Andalusia to their empire, but were compelled, first by the adverse course of that war, and afterwards by the disturbances in Africa, to call home all the troops which remained faithful, and to leave their foreign possessions to themselves. So soon as intestine war was brought to an end, they naturally turned their views again upon Spain.

Hamilcar Barass was sent into that country, at the head of an army, in the year of the town 517, and penetrated into the interior from the neighborhood of Cadiz, where he had landed. His march, however, rather resembled that of a band of freebooters than any regular military enterprise. The Carthaginian leaders were compelled to make war support itself: their conquests belonged to their country, but their army belonged to themselves. It is, therefore, nowise necessary to call to our assistance the internal play of parties in Carthage, in order to explain to ourselves the succession of the members of one and the same family in command of one and the same army.† Hamilcar sacked and destroyed the towns which resisted him in those provinces of Spain the possession of which seemed to

* This may be inferred, I think, from Polyb. iii. 40. It does not exclude Niebuhr's opinion, that Mutina had been formerly one of the Etruscan towns on the Po.

† Appian, who follows the Roman accounts which, Polybius (iii. 8.) has extremely well impugned, might be taken as authority for this assertion; but we

him of most immediate moment to his country, in the present Andalusia, affording naval and military stores; and in Estremadura, which contained the richest mines of silver. The farther he proceeded into the north of Spain, the more obstacles attended his advance. He carried on a merciless war for nine years, and made his way into Portugal and into the kingdom of Leon. Here, however, he met with a more obstinate resistance. Several tribes combined their forces against him; and one of their leaders, called by the Greeks Orisson, contrived to lull the Carthaginian general Hamilcar into security, took advantage of his confidence, and lured him to destruction.

The circumstances of Hamilcar's defeat and death have been diversely told; but the immediate sequel shows that the Iberians did not extract the full advantage from their hitherto successful revolt and from the rout of the Carthaginian army. Hamilcar had taken with him his son Hannibal, and his son-in-law Hasdrubal, and the army had belonged to himself. Hasdrubal had erected in Spain a sort of principality, which was nearly independent of Carthage, although he patriotically devoted his powers and revenues entirely to the benefit of his country. He was so much beloved in the army as to be chosen commander-in-chief by it, immediately upon Hamilcar's death, without waiting for orders from Carthage. He even won the affections of the Spanish people, by the mildness of his administration, and received their homage as a monarch freely elected by themselves. He vanquished Orisson, captured twelve towns in the southern part of the kingdom of Leon, and extended the new realm which he had founded to the Ebro. A capital and a port were required for the conquest of all Spain, and for keeping communication open with Africa. He chose a situation in a central part of the coast, and in the midst of some of the finest scenes in Europe, on the borders of the present Valencia and Murcia. The new town was designed to unite the qualities of fortress, emporium, arsenal, head-quarters for troops, magazine of all the stores requisite for land and sea-service. He gave it the name of New Carthage; and it rose in a short time so rapidly, as to rival Carthage itself, and give occasion to the Grecian colonists settled on the Spanish coast to foresee the ruin of their trade and their ultimate subjection of Carthage. They applied to the Romans, and courted their alliance; a boon which they might well know that Rome never refused to any weak state, as a prelude to its future subjugation. Saguntum, a colony of the Zacynthians, and the present Ampurias, at that time known by the general name of *Emporium*, were amongst the most considerable Greek towns across the Ebro.

do not presume to oppose such an authority to a solid writer, except when peculiar circumstances testify against the latter. We will briefly characterize the mode of warfare in Spain, from Appian. He says (de Reb. Hispan. et. v.), "Hamilcar crossed over to Iberia, and there acquired rich spoils at the cost of the Iberians, who had shown him no hostility whatever, because he sought an opportunity of absence at the head of an army, and, at the same time, of acquiring popularity (αφορμὴν... δημοκρατίας). Whatever he robbed he distributed; part to the army, that it might follow him with more alacrity, part he despatched to Carthage, there to be divided amongst the adherents of his party (τοῖς ὑπεραντὶ πολιτευομένοις διεδίδε), till at length a combination took place between the chiefs of the several tribes and the other powerful men in the land."

They obtained a promise, through Roman intervention, from the Carthaginians, that they would neither cross the Ebro with an army, nor encroach upon the freedom and independence of the Grecian states in Spain.

Hasdrubal fell by assassination, in the eighth year of his Spanish government. At his death the army took a similar liberty to that which it had taken before, by placing at its head Hannibal, Hamilcar's son, who had already held the second command under his brother-in-law, Hasdrubal. The rulers of Carthage again found it advisable to confirm the choice. But the posture of affairs was greatly altered. The Romans had conquered the Gauls, and had just despatched a fleet to humble Illyria. A few years only of peace would be required to give security to their colonies in Upper Italy, to confirm their empire over the Adriatic, and afford them time to turn their views upon Spain. Hannibal would not wait for this; he hastened to complete what his two predecessors had begun, in order next to grapple with the Romans on their own ground. Immediately after assuming command of the army, he had shown himself to be a man of extraordinary talent, by accomplishing what his father and his brother-in-law had left imperfect. In the short space of a year and a half, he enriched his army by the plunder of the opulent Althæa, in the territory of the Olcades; marched against the Vaccæans, in the present kingdom of Leon; captured Arbucala and Elmantica, and routed in his march back to New Carthage a considerable army of Carpetanians, Olcades, and other tribes, which attempted to dispute his passage through New Castile. After he had reduced the land, as far as the Ebro, to subjection, he sought on the other side of that river also allies amongst the natives; with whom the Carthaginians, on their side the Ebro, and the Greeks on the other side, were in a constant state of discord. On this circumstance Hannibal grounded his plans against Saguntum and Rome. He stirred up a quarrel betwixt the Saguntini and the tribe of Torboletes, his allies: incited the latter to represent their grievances at Carthage; and received full powers to act in their behalf,—powers which he forthwith employed in a manner contrary to the express terms of the last treaty with Rome. One cannot but feel astonishment at the influence which must have been held in Carthage by a family which could raise three of its members in succession to royal power in Spain, could commence a dangerous war at a wide distance from the capital, and could hurry a most circumspect state to the most precipitate measures. Astonishment, however, may cease, on reflecting that the government of Carthage was in the hands of a mixed aristocracy, consisting in part of the members of the principal old families, in part of the most opulent merchants. Amongst the former, the family of Barcas stood pre-eminent, the latter were obliged to it for a new source of opulence. They saw the Greeks excluded by its efforts from participating with themselves in a lucrative branch of trade. They had, at least, the prospect of seeing Gaul and Italy rendered equally accessible to their shipping by Hannibal, as Spain had already been rendered by his father.

The Saguntini judged of Hannibal from a close view much more justly than the Romans could form a distance. The Roman envoys, as was shown by the event, were by no means very eminent proficient in the art of divining the purposes of the man to whom they were sent. Accordingly, Hannibal fully attained his ends. He outwitted the Romans; who, indeed, sent several embassies, in compliance with the repeated importunities of the Sagunines: but Hannibal knew how to baffle all these envoys, until he had brought Saguntum to extremities, convinced as he was that his native town would not in the moment of victory abandon such a brilliant acquisition. The Saguntines, solely supported by the embassies, not by the fleets and armies, of Rome, were pressed by a military power, which Livy rates at the seemingly somewhat exaggerated account of 150,000 men. Nevertheless, they held out eight months longer; and Saguntum evinced a constancy of which we find extremely few examples, except in Spain, where similar ability in defence, and similar contempt of death in the hour of desperation, have been displayed at Zaragoza in our own days, no less vividly than in old times at Saguntum or Numantia. The town was taken, Hannibal's army carried off enormous booty, and all the male inhabitants were massacred.

The tidings of the terrible catastrophe of Saguntum were received as a double reproach by the Romans, since the town had long considered itself as their colony, and was even indebted to them for its last constitution. Armies and fleets were given to the consuls of the following year, Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius, in order to take the offensive against Carthage at once in Spain and Africa. But, first of all, Rome despatched an embassy to Carthage, to demand whether Hannibal had demolished Saguntum with or without instructions from his government. That such an embassy, which, besides, had express orders to declare war, could not possibly end otherwise than with such a declaration, was foreseen at once by Hannibal, who accepted, under the circumstances, an invitation into Italy, which was given him by the Gauls. They informed him that the rout over the Alps was difficult, indeed, but not impracticable, and their brothers in Gallia Proper promised him free passage. Before the Roman ambassadors had even returned home from Carthage, Hannibal had broken up his quarters at New Carthage. He resolved to invade Italy by land, as he could not hope that any harbor in Italy, or any part of the coast, would be accessible to the fleets of Carthage. Before he commenced his march, he repeatedly sent reconnoitring parties, who examined the routes and passes of the Alps, and negotiated so skilfully with the several Gallic tribes whose territories were to be crossed in his march, that Livy is forced to confess that the Roman ambassadors, who travelled, on their return from Carthage, through Spain and the south of Gaul, to gain over the Spaniards, and dissuade the Gauls from granting a passage to the enemies of Rome, were every where laughed to scorn in the public assemblies, in which resided the right of war, legislation, and supreme government, and found a friendly hearing at the Grecian town of Marseilles only.

The march undertaken instantly after by Hannibal, through an inhospitable tract, peopled by no less rude inhabitants, without accurate knowledge of the country through which his march lay, a march which he pursued five months, and brought to a fortunate issue, is justly numbered with the greatest undertakings ever planned or accomplished. The difficulties and dangers of a march across the Pyrenees, through the whole south of France, over the snows and rocky clefts of the Alps, may be estimated sufficiently from the simple statement, that Hannibal, without taking account of his losses on this side the Pyrenees, lost, during the march from the Pyrenees to the Rhone, 1000 horse and 12,000 foot soldiers; and that, after his passage over the Alps, little more than the half remained of the troops which he had brought with him from Spain. The whole march was performed with inconceivable celerity. He arrived in Italy five months after setting out from New Carthage, notwithstanding being detained by his battles betwixt the Ebro and the Apennines.

While Hannibal marched from the Pyrenees to the Rhone, the consul Scipio had also embarked with an army destined for Spain. He learned, in the neighborhood of Marseilles, that Hannibal was on the point of crossing the Rhone. He hastened up; but Hannibal having given him the slip, and gained several day's march on him, did not hold it advisable to pursue him farther, reembarked his troops, returned to Italy, and made every preparation for attacking him, so soon as he should descend into the present Piedmontes. Hannibal spent fifteen days in the passage of the Alps, yet greatly got the start of the consul. Thus, by the time that Scipio crossed the Po, Hannibal was already on the banks of the Tesino. Both leaders had strong motives for giving battle immediately; Scipio, that Hannibal might not profit by the invitation of the Gauls, one of whose princes had set out already to meet him: Hannibal, that he might win a decisive victory before Scipio's army had received its expected reinforcements. Fortune favored Hannibal. He and Scipio chanced simultaneously to set on foot a general *reconnoissance* with their whole cavalry. They came thus into each others presence: the Romans were routed, and Scipio forced to fall behind the Po.

The appearance of a Carthaginian army in Italy, at a time when the new colonies of Mutina, Cremona, and Placentia were threatened by the Gauls, diffused universal terror in Rome. The other consul was hastily recalled from his expedition to Africa. Tiberius Sempronius lay at that time off Lilybæum, with a fleet and army. On receipt of the intelligence, he immediately assembled his troops, gave orders to the fleet to make all sail to the Italian coast, and instructed the tribunes to lead the army, in separate divisions, to Arminum, where these divisions should all unite again on a certain day. No sooner had these several divisions, by different routes, reached their destination, than Sempronius resumed the command, and hastened up to reinforce his colleague. The latter had, at first, maintained his ground in the neighborhood of the Po; but the Gauls of that region having given him unequivocal proofs that he was likely to be worse off with them than with declared enemies, he fell back again as far as

the Trebia. Here he was met by Sempronius, who ardently longed to distinguish himself, and both, united, were beaten in a general engagement, which was attended with immense loss to the Romans, more especially as Sempronius had left in his rear the Trebia, so that the fugitives whom the enemy failed to reach were drowned in the river. It is true that the same circumstance saved the remainder of the Roman army, and Sempronius even tried to make the senate and people believe that, in point of fact, he had come off conqueror; a rhodomontade too clearly at variance with the situation. After the battle all the Gallic tribes revolted from the Romans. One of the consuls threw himself, with the remains of the army, into Placentia; the other into Cremona. These events took place towards the close of the year.

During the winter Hannibal felt that he must not remain among the Gauls, if he meant to make sure of their permanent assistance. He therefore resolved to advance into Etruria early in spring. Of three regular routes from Upper Italy into Tuscany, the Aurelian way was too circuitous; the Flaminian, which led to Ariminum, was occupied by the consul Servilius; on the third and the most direct road, Flaminius lay encamped with his army. Hannibal, therefore, chose a less frequented line of route, which detained him three days and nights in the most unwholesome region of Italy, and cost him the lives of many of his troops. Fortunately for Hannibal, Flaminius was less able and experienced at the head of an army than in the popular assemblies of the capital. Against the will of the senate, he had a second time been elected consul, had left the city, and even defied their injunctions to return to it, and now commenced the campaign in the teeth of auguries and auspices. One of the most hot and hasty of human beings thus matched himself against the most deliberate and coolest! He allowed himself to be blocked up between the hills which enclose the Thrasymenian lake, and now bear the name of Gualandro and Passignano, and fell with his whole army a sacrifice. This fatal engagement took place in the vicinity of Rome. The rout was dreadful; but Hannibal knew the strength of Rome too well to venture an attack upon the city, which, in the happiest event, could have had no other consequence than the temporary possession of deserted walls. He hastened to regions whence he hoped to be able to maintain communications with Carthage and with Macedon. He marched to Spoleto, took the route up the Nar, through the defiles of the Apennines, and afterwards encamped in the neighborhood of Arpi and Luceria, in order to pour his troops into Campania, reinforced by the Samnites.

The Romans now resorted to that measure which they were always wont to take in the last extremity. They created a dictator; and as every thing had been ruined by the precipitate proceedings of the consuls of the two last years, they elected to that office an aged, cautious, and experienced man. The new dictator, Fabius Maximus, took the best mode of annoying Hannibal, quietly permitted him to devastate Campania, but kept him out of the towns, and followed every where close on his footsteps, in order to take instant advantage of any

false step he might make. Hannibal's plan was obviously to weaken Rome by repeated disasters, and thus to alienate Italy from its cause. With this view, he maintained, in all his addresses and proclamations, that he had only come to Italy to contend for it against Rome. He was forced to make war support itself; and, by pursuing this for seventeen years, has acquired, with those who judge men by their merits, not by their fortunes, a higher renown than Alexander gained by the conquest of the world.

The Romans had reached the end at which they aimed in the appointment of Fabius; and, since it went against their policy to leave a dictator long in office, they recurred to the choice of consuls for the following year. Unfortunately, one of the new consuls, Terentius Varro, was resolved not to be placed in vain at the head of a splendid army. Instead of the usual number of four legions, eight had been voted to the two consuls, in this as in other cases of extremity. According to the express words of Polybius, the number of soldiers in each legion had been brought up to 5000, and a double contingent demanded of the allies. Æmilius Paulus therefore advised his colleague in the consulship to pursue the system of Fabius a while longer, and not to expose recklessly to destruction so superb an army, the last which the allied towns and colonies, exhausted by Roman levies, and by the protracted presence of Hannibal, could be expected voluntarily to afford. However, we cannot implicitly trust the narrative of Livy, when he throws on the plebeian consul all the blame of the loss at Cannæ. Polybius expressly says, that, even before the consuls had arrived with the new troops from Rome, Hannibal, by seizing the castle of Cannæ, where the Romans had their magazines, had driven Cnæus Servilius, who commanded the Roman army, into such straits, that he announced to the senate an action as inevitable. The senate had consented to the engagement, on the sole condition of waiting till the consuls had come up. That the loss of the battle was mainly caused by Varro's incapacity and imprudence is a point on which all authorities are agreed, as they likewise are on the masterly style in which Hannibal formed his order of battle, and employed the various national tactics and weapons in his army. He even knew how to make an ally of the terrible south-easterly wind of Apulia, mentioned by Pliny and Horace, as well as by Livy, and which often instantaneously dries the fruit and withers up the foliage in whole districts.

The defeat of the Romans was one of the most dreadful mentioned in history. More than 50,000 Romans found their death in the action; very many were slain afterwards; and 10,000 were made prisoners.

So soon as the intelligence became diffused in Italy, the Samnites, Bruttians, and Lucanians declared themselves in Hannibal's favor. Arpinum, and even the flourishing metropolis of Campania, called in his aid. About the same time, the prætor, who was sent into Cisalpine Gaul, with a Roman army, was inveigled into an ambuscade, and perished with his whole army. Hannibal made haste to employ the victory: but he found himself in a more brilliant than advantageous position as a stranger at the head of Italians, held together by no common bond, and of Greeks, in whom he could place no sort of confi-

dence. The Romans, on the other hand, displayed the same tranquillity and constancy which had hitherto always saved them in the greatest dangers. They even, in order to tranquilise the populace after its own manner, betook themselves again to the cruel device of human sacrifice, which for a long time had fallen into oblivion. They buried alive in the ox-market (*in locum saxo conseptum, jam antea hostiis humanis, minime Romano sacro, imbutum*) a male and female Gaul, and a male and female Greek. The principal means of their salvation, after the day of Cannæ, consisted in avoiding a decisive battle in Italy, and in carefully watching the movements of the enemy, whom they sought by every method to deprive of the means for carrying on the war, while they opened out for themselves new resources in Spain and Sicily.

The main point was to gain time for recovering the confidence and self-possession lost by their troops; and no one gave them more assistance towards this end than Marcellus. This officer, who afterwards reached such eminence, was in Sicily at the moment when the Romans suffered the rout at Cannæ, and was recalled, as a more spirited and enterprising general was wished for, in conjunction with Fabius, whose caution was considered excessive. On his appearance in Italy, he led into the field the Romans who were shut up in Casillinum, cut to pieces the straggling bands of Hannibal, whenever they strayed far from the main army; and restored to his troops courage to look the enemy in the face. Finally, when Hannibal took possession of Campania, he made every exertion to save such districts as allowed him to save them.

The Romans had in some degree recovered their wonted spirit, but they still fought with continued ill success. Petilia, Consentia, all Bruttium, fell into the enemy's hands; Croton and Locri were occupied by Hannibal; and the Romans were compelled to have the whole coast carefully guarded by divisions of their coasting fleet, in order to cut off his communications with Philip of Macedon. On the death of one of the consuls of the year v. c. 539, Marcellus was elected in his stead; but grounds, which Livy insinuates rather than indicates, induced him to lay down his office in favor of Fabius. He accompanied the latter as pro-consul; saved Naples, which was thoroughly well disposed to the Romans, and Nola; where, on the other hand, the people would have gladly received Hannibal. There it was that Hannibal, for the first time since he stood at the head of an army, suffered considerable loss, was repulsed, and saw more than 12,000 men of his best cavalry go over in a body to the enemy. It is particularly evident on such occasions how unequal was the effective force of Hannibal to a Roman army. The latter obeyed its leader unconditionally, and all the allies followed his directions. how different was the case often with Hannibal! Thus the Bruttians and Lucanians, who styled themselves his allies, plundered the Greek towns on the coast, which he himself had taken under protection.

The consuls of the next year, Fabius, the most cautious, and v. c. Marcellus, the most enterprising, of men, re-established the 540. power of the Romans in Italy; while in Spain and Sicily revolutions

took place which struck all Hannibal's victories with inevitable barrenness.

In the devastation of Samnium, by which Fabius revenged the revolt of the Samnites, Marcellus acted no part; for he went over to Sicily, where he remained, in the quality of pro-consul, until he had reduced the whole island to subjection. Hiero, the truest ally of the Romans, had at length grown feeble with age; while his son Gelo, in order to emancipate himself from the oppressive alliance of Rome, which amounted, in point of fact, to subjection, would have espoused the Carthaginian party. During this contest, and just as all preparat-
 u. c. tions were made for revolt from the Romans, Gelo died. The
 539. old father died in the following year, and left his little kingdom to his grandson Hieronymus (Gelo's son,) who, early corrupted, took the reins of government in his fifteenth year. Three men, among whom were Andranodorus and Zoippus, the two brothers-in-law of Hieronymus, were placed at the young man's side by his dying grandfather. Both had Carthaginian leanings; the third, Thraso, was well inclined to the Romans. The young monarch gave himself little trouble about politics: he had things of nearer concernment to attend to, in the shape of pleasures. Accordingly, Andranodorus and Zoippus immediately established relations with Hannibal; Carthaginian ambassadors, whom Hannibal had selected with consummate skill, appeared in Syracuse. Amongst them were two Syracusans, who had found protection in Carthage; and both of whom, particularly one of them, Hippocrates, quickly contrived to win for themselves considerable influence, in a court which contained an infinite number of counsellors, and, as usual where there are too many counsellors, very little council. Thus the thoughtless youth, even before aid from Carthage made its appearance, was plunged into a war with the Romans.
 u. c. He himself fell, at the commencement of the war, by the dag-
 540. ger of an assassin, who, after his murder, called on the Syracusans to restore the republican forms of their constitution.

Against this new republic the Romans sent Marcellus, the greatest general then in their employment. Well they knew, the artful oppressors of foreign freedom, that, if once the banner of independence were vigorously raised, all Sicily would instantly rise against them. However, there was no occasion to fear this; the Syracusans were too disunited, too corrupt, too cruel, for such a part. Andranodorus and his friends formed the design of seizing supreme power. But their plan was discovered; the popular rage was turned on the aristocracy; and a dreadful massacre followed, including innocent and guilty. Then, on the corpses of women and children, they founded an insane democracy which here, as elsewhere, terminated in military despotism.

Epicyles and Hippocrates, two devoted adherents of Hannibal, with their military followers, now became the rulers of Syracuse; while Marcellus, on the other hand, brought a Roman army before its walls. During a whole year he lay, without any result, before the town, till chance made him remark a weak point on the land side. Syracuse, in point of fact, consisted of five towns, the fortress Achradina, with the island of Ortygia, the towns of Epipolæ, Tycha, and Neapolis.

The two last were taken during a festival of Diana, which united the defenders in festive and joyous groups around the temples, a thousand picked troops of Marcellus's army having climbed the walls at dead of night in the place above mentioned, and having opened to their countrymen the Hexapylæ, and various approaches to Tycha. Achradina and the island of Ortygia were in the mean time stoutly defended by Epicydes. The Carthaginian fleet, under Bomilcar, received orders to hasten to the assistance of the town; but, not daring to give the Romans battle, proceeded to Agrigentum, and there landed troops, which were afterwards wholly swept away by a pestilence. Marcellus reduced Achradina and Ortygia, through the treachery of one of the three commandants, a Spaniard. After its conquest the town was given up to plunder: the lives of the inhabitants were spared. A richer booty was made, according to Livy, than even at the subsequent conquest of Carthage itself, that emporium of the commerce of the then civilised world. An enormous number of works of art were carried off to Rome, and all Sicily was subjected to the Romans.

The same year in which Syracuse was conquered by Marcellus, the opulent Campania was attacked by the Romans in earnest, and succumbed far more deplorably, in the following year, than Syracuse. Capua, and that part of Campania, which, after the battle of Cannæ, had attached itself to Hannibal, at that time enjoyed a vain independence. Hannibal stationed only a few troops there, and so soon as his presence was necessary in Apulia, the Romans could turn their whole force against Samnium and Campania. This they did, in the year in which Syracuse was captured by Marcellus. Both consuls, Q. Fulvius and Appius, took up their position in Samnium, brought agriculture to a stand in all Campania, and soon effected a close blockade of Capua. Hannibal then lay with his whole army in Bruttium and Lucania, endeavoring to replace with new levies the defection of the Thurians and Consentinians, who had again restored their allegiance to the Romans. A party in Tarentum invoked Hannibal's assistance. He gained possession of the town, and drove the Roman garrison into the citadel.

While Hannibal lingered in Lower Italy, the Roman consuls had made all the requisite preparations for the siege of Capua, which at that time contained a Carthaginian garrison. They had stopped the supplies of this great and populous city, and the Campanians, too lazy and too cowardly to help themselves, had addressed to Hannibal urgent prayers for assistance. He sent Hanno, who collected into his camp the requisite stores for the provisioning of Capua, but the indolent and thoughtless Campanians let slip the day which had been appointed for them to fetch away the provisions. Hanno bestowed the bitterest reproof upon their negligence, appointing, however, another day; but, before this arrived, the Romans had taken measures to bar all approaches. The consuls now commenced the investment of Capua, and Hannibal, who could not withdraw his presence from Lower Italy, left the Romans time to take a strong position before the town, and to fortify themselves so completely behind a double wall and trench, that his efforts to save Capua, when he appeared at last, could

not but be fruitless, unless, indeed, the consuls should venture into the open field. But from this two events of recent occurrence might well deter them. Hannibal had cut to pieces shortly before 8000 Roman troops in Lucania. This detachment had been trusted with signal folly by the senate to an old major (*centurio primipili*), who, on the strength of being a tolerable *chef de bataillon*, imagined himself more than a match for Hannibal in his own arts. Moreover, Hannibal immediately afterwards slaughtered 16,000 Romans, led by a prætor.

u. c. 542. Though the consular year had come to an end, the Romans left at the head of the army before Capua the consuls of the former year, who carefully kept within their intrenchments, which Hannibal vainly attempted to storm. It was then that, repulsed from the camp, for the first time he made an attack on Rome itself; not that he hoped to surprise the town, but merely in order to draw off the two armies from before Capua. His camp was pitched three miles from the town, where the panic was extreme; yet the siege of Capua was not raised, though Fulvius was recalled with 15,000 men, and the command divided between him and the consuls. The Romans cautiously avoided an action, and Hannibal was too good a general to attempt the storm of a town like Rome, where almost every senator was an officer, and every burgher a soldier, particularly after the defensive army of both consuls had been reinforced by 15,000 picked troops, withdrawn from the army before Capua; besides which, Hannibal had only taken provisions for ten days. Accordingly, he did not find it advisable to protract his stay in the neighborhood of Rome. He returned to Bruttium, leaving Campania to its fate. Meanwhile the distress of Capua rose to the highest pitch; an embassy which the besieged despatched to Hannibal was intercepted: and the garrison was finally compelled to surrender.

u. c. 543. Campania was now public property: seventy Campanians of the first families in the country were executed, 300 thrown into prison, others distributed throughout the Italian towns, while the whole remaining population was dragged into slavery. It had likewise been proposed to lay the town and the whole district around Capua waste. This had been determined against, on the argument of utility. The circumjacent land being well known as the most fertile in Italy, it was thought fit to preserve the town as a market for agricultural produce, in order to keep the land in cultivation. To this end, a rabble of freedmen, traders, and artificers were retained for the population of the town; but the whole body of free burghers, without even giving them hopes of return, were scattered into various districts. The innocent houses and walls, however, were neither pulled down nor destroyed by fire, an instance of forbearance for which the Romans not only reaped the advantage resulting from the preservation of these buildings, but gave themselves also all the airs of clemency amongst the allies.

On commencing his Italian expedition, Hannibal had left behind his whole baggage, and a not inconsiderable force, in the present Catalonia. On the coast of this district most of the Greek colonies were situate, which had been from time immemorial friendly to Rome. To

the native spaniards, Scipio, who had been sent by his brother, the consul Cneus, to Spain, with a fleet and army, announced himself as a liberator. Hanno had gained over one of the Spanish princes of these regions; others, however, coalesced with Scipio, and the latter beat and annihilated Hanno's army near Scissis. It is true that Hasdrubal set himself in motion from the other side, but he durst not attack Scipio in earnest till, in the following year, a fleet with considerable reinforcements came in from Carthage. This fleet, which was intended to support the operations of Hasdrubal, was attacked by Scipio, who, by its annihilation, secured for himself naval superiority. Supported by the Roman fleet, he marched into the present kingdom of Valencia, made immense booty, but failed in the attempt against New Carthage, the metropolis of the Carthaginians in Spain. Meanwhile, the renown of the clemency, kindness, and magnanimity of the Romans, moved many of the innumerable little states, into which Spain seems to have been at that time divided, to unite themselves with him, while others stoutly adhered to the Carthaginians. The Celtiberians in particular fought boldly for the Romans, and inflicted two defeats on the Carthaginians, even before Publius Scipio appeared with a fresh army of 8000 men and a fleet. U. C.
537.

The narrative of the Roman deeds in Spain sounds so splendid, that it might have been expected all Spain would have been conquered in the course of the next year. This, however, did not by any means follow. Hasdrubal not only maintained himself in the whole tract on the other side of the Ebro, but even resolved, so soon as the Carthaginians had despatched a new army under Himilco into the south of Spain, to hasten into Italy, according to his brother's invitation and the instructions of the Carthaginian senate. How he could hope to cut his way through Catalonia, the inhabitants of which were all in alliance with the Romans, through the Pyrennees, in the teeth of a wholly unbroken Roman army, seems inexplicable; the more so, as the Romans, on the tidings of his march towards the Ebro, went to meet him south of that river with an army fully equal to his own in strength. Here they scattered his forces in a battle, which, if we give credit to Eutropius and Orosius, was amongst the most important and decisive in the whole war, and which, nevertheless, decided nothing. Hereupon the Carthaginians sent to Spain Mago, the third brother of the Barcides, and brought their Spanish army up to 60,000 men.

A series of Roman victories, during two successive years, enfeebled Carthage, owing to the efforts she was compelled to make in order to save Spain, in the same manner as Rome was exhausted by her exertions to keep possession of Italy. Yet the Scipios could as little expel the Carthaginians wholly from Spain, as Hannibal could attain his end in Italy.

In the year in which Marcellus subdued Sicily, the Romans began to repose more trust than formerly in their Spanish allies, whose unsteadfast character had not seemed to invite confidence. This reliance in the natives cost Cneus Scipio his life and his army. At the head of the Carthaginian army in Spain stood at that time Hasdrubal,

Hannibal's brother, another Hasdrubal's Gisco's son, and Mago, Hannibal's second brother: Publius Scipio marched with a considerable army against the two latter, Cneus against the former. In the neighborhood of the town of Anitorgi the two brothers parted from each other; Publius, with his whole army, was surrounded and cut off by the Carthaginians, Numidians, and the prince of the Ilergetes, (Indibilis, or Andobal,) excepting a few troops which were posted in another quarter. The victors instantly hastened from the field of battle against Cneus, even before the latter had intelligence of his brother's destiny. The Romans had been shortly before deserted by the Celtiberian army, in which they had placed the greatest confidence: Cneus was surrounded and despatched, with most of his men. Of the whole Roman army there was nothing now remaining but such scattered detachments as had betaken themselves to Fonteius, who, indeed, was no especially skilful general. Fonteius had been lieutenant of the Scipios; but the army did not give him credit for power to preserve it after the rout of the main body, and chose a knight, Marcius, for its leader.

This new general, who afterwards, in the brilliant bulletin which he despatched to the senate, styled himself *proprætor*, and thereby excited great disgust at his arrogance, and that of the army, well knew how to inspire the Roman soldiers. How he set about this has with great art been described by Livy, who seems, however, to have exaggerated somewhat the result of his efforts. It was assuredly sufficient, that, with the relics of the demolished army, he not only checked the Carthaginians in mid career of their victories, but even restored to his own men their former self-reliance, and delivered to the new commander sent by the Romans a courageous and well-disciplined army.

Claudius Nero, to whom the command was transferred, did not display in Spain the skill which he exhibited a few years after as consul; but rather, by his oversights, enhanced the renown of the man whom the senate had not held worthy of the *proprætorial* dignity. Marcius had attacked the Carthaginians with the relics of a routed army, and victoriously extricated himself from their superior force. Claudius, on the other hand, neglected to keep Hasdrubal fast, whom he had shut up in a narrow pass of the wood of the black stone, not far from the present Jaen. The Carthaginians extricated themselves unhurt from the difficulty, and Claudius, too late, offered them battle. It was soon found expedient by the Romans to seek a more energetic and more enterprising leader, and they found him in the son and nephew of the Scipios who had fallen in Spain.

At the age of seven-and-twenty, Publius Scipio, afterwards known by the surname of the elder, united all the qualities of a soldier and a general with all the arts of a popular speaker, and all the address and insinuation of a man who seeks his fortune by popular favor. Accordingly the people hailed with eagerness his candidateship and nomination to command in Spain. He landed with 11,000 men in the bay of Ampurias, and determined to signalize his appearance by an exploit, which, whether successful or not, was sure to earn for him great repu-

tation. The Carthaginian army was scattered through the country ; their leaders were not wholly united, and put trust in the Spanish nations, whose hostages were guarded in New Carthage. Consequently, the speedy capture of this town must inflict a double loss on the Carthaginians : they would be cut out from the whole line of coast, and it would be easy to alienate the Spaniards from them when possession had been taken of their hostages.

It was apparently on these grounds that Scipio formed his plan of commencing his career in Spain with the capture of New Carthage ; a plan in which he was eminently seconded by fortune. He imparted it to no one but to his friend Lælius, who commanded the fleet, made forced marches of extraordinary rapidity, and, before even the rumor of his approach could have reached a Carthaginian army, he appeared under the walls of the surprised town, discovered on the sea side a point where, at certain times, the place was accessible, and got within the walls at the second storm. As this town contained arsenal, wharfs, magazines, and military depots ; as it was the central point of the whole trade of the Carthaginians with Spain, it may easily be conceived that an immense booty came to the share of the victor. Meantime, the point of most importance certainly was, that the Spanish hostages fell into his hands, and that he thereby gained occasion to wean the Spaniards wholly from Carthage. Therewith, it seems, he busied himself exclusively for some time, and with good success ; and these his efforts to win over the Spaniards cramped his undertakings against Hasdrubal and the other Carthaginian leaders.

The grounds which induced Hasdrubal to seek his elder brother in Italy, while the younger, Mago, endeavored to collect a new army in the more remote regions of Spain, have been brought together by Livy in an imaginary narrative of the consultations held between both brothers.

Hasdrubal performed the march through Gaul and over the Alps much quicker and more easily than Hannibal ; and, if any thing could be deduced from Livy's narration, calculated solely for rhetorical effect, we would affirm that Hannibal, throughout the whole twelve years, had received succors and troops by this circuitous land route. One thing, however, appears from Livy, namely, that Italy by that time was reduced to despair ; that it was only with the utmost trouble, and by aid of the harshest measures, that the Romans could recruit their army ; that Etruria was ready every moment to take up arms against Rome ; that the Romans had therefore been obliged to station a separate army there ; and that the towns were only kept in check by the most vigorous military measures of their garrisons. In this respect Livy gives the remarkable statement respecting Arretium and the Ligurians, or inhabitants of the coast from Monaco as far as Etruria, that unless the Romans had despatched a considerable force to keep a look-out on their movements, they were ready to send 8000 men to effect a junction with Hasdrubal. But the Gauls in upper Italy, besides were continually on the point of taking up arms. Thence the Romans made in this year a last and important effort, and called out

the forces of all the allied towns; but, that Scipio sent several thousand men from Spain into Italy, is what Livy hardly dares to maintain. Unfortunately, Hasdrubal, on his entrance into Lombardy, committed an unpardonable error. Instead of advancing immediately into Etruria, he marched first towards the Roman colony of Placentia, which he could the less hope to take at the first onset, as Hannibal, eleven years before, after the battle of Trebia, had tried his force against it in vain, and from prudence had immediately renounced a regular attack. So soon as the Romans had learned the arrival of Hasdrubal, they sent one of the consuls out against him, while the other was destined to hinder the junction of Hannibal with his brother.

The latter attempt would scarcely have succeeded, had not Hannibal, on the intelligence that his brother was besieging Placentia, postponed, for a time, his purpose of marching rapidly into Upper Italy, and moved from the Tarentine territory farther southwards. Hasdrubal had meanwhile given up the siege of Placentia; he had put himself in motion, and despatched Gauls and Numidians with letters to his brother. These messengers had penetrated successfully through all Italy; they were discovered at the end of their journey on Tarentine ground by the Romans, and robbed of their letters. By this disaster, intelligence of Hasdrubal's approach reached the Roman consul sooner than Hannibal himself, and Claudius took occasion to pay back to the Carthaginians a like artifice for that which they had practised against him in Spain. This decided the destiny of the two belligerent powers in Italy. Hasdrubal had written that he would join his brother in Umbria: the consular army which stood opposed to him was fully sufficient to stop him: the senate and the consul Livius were therefore also much displeased when they learned that Claudius Nero had adopted the resolution of quitting his camp near Canusium, with the choicest troops of his army, and reinforcing his colleague, in order, in conjunction with him, to rout the one brother ere the other should have obtained any intelligence of his approach.

However, neither the cunning of Nero, nor the bravery of the Romans, was exactly what decided the result: fortune which was bent upon exalting Rome, and destroying Carthage, broke, to speak with Æschylus, the beam of the balance, and made the scale of Rome to sink. It were otherwise impossible that Hannibal should have remained a whole fortnight quietly in his camp, while Livius marched from Casilinum to Sena, and from thence back to Casilinum. Nero had only taken with him 7000 men in this march, which was quickened by all possible methods; horses, carriages, and provisions, being put in requisition. These troops, however, were picked from the Roman soldiers, and from the whole disposable force of the allies.

Hasdrubal was not deceived, however cautiously Nero had made his nocturnal entrance into the camp of his colleague, and how carefully soever his arrival was concealed, by not a single new tent being put up, the 7000 men being distributed through the whole camp. The Carthaginian general knew, from his Spanish experience, that when two commanders, with equal authority, were in a Roman camp, the evening march was twice sounded; hence he detected Nero's arrival.

Precisely this, however was his misfortune. He might easily have defended himself for several days in his camp: during this time Hannibal would have moved to his assistance. He could not, however, explain to himself the arrival of the other consul in any other manner than by Hannibal having been beaten; and therefore was fain to attempt to save his army by a hasty retreat. The Romans hastened after him, and it was out of his power to avoid an action.

Unfortunately, no more than an insignificant fragment has been preserved of the eleventh book of Polybius. This book gave a detailed account of Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy, of his character in general, and of the battle which he gave both the consuls at Metaurus, in the district of Sena, or, to speak after a more modern manner, on the rivulet which, near Fossombrone, not far from Fano, flows towards Sinigaglia till it falls into the Adriatic. Livy, however, as appears from the fragments, has closely followed Polybius. Both are agreed in eulogizing Hasdrubal; both acknowledge that his position was an admirable one, and that the victory was in his hands till Claudius made a wholly unusual movement, withdrew to the rear of his own troops with a part of the left wing, and then turned the right flank of the enemy. Hasdrubal himself remained dead on the field, after having fulfilled all the duties of a good leader: his army was annihilated in the action, or at all events immediately afterwards.

Whatever credence be or be not given to the anecdote that Claudius sent Hasdrubal's head, in the New Zealand fashion, to Hannibal, and that the latter exclaimed, "he recognized in this head the destiny of Carthage," it will at all events be allowed that, after the loss of Spain and Sicily, the destruction of so considerable an army must ruin all the hopes of Hannibal. It is all the more astonishing, that, limited as he was to Bruttium, he knew how to maintain himself in Italy unconquered, and, what is more, kept his troops supplied with provision in a region not remarkably rich in produce. The impracticability of victualing armies in the mountainous parts of Lucania and Bruttium, appears to have kept the Romans from falling with combined force on Hannibal.

The following year was decisive, with regard to Spain. Scipio put a total termination to the war in that country, occupied the territory of Cadiz, and suppressed the movements of the natives, who, wiser than their countrymen, had become aware that the Romans would establish a footing in Spain, and oppress the freedom of the land far more than the Carthaginians had either been able or willing to do. In Italy the Romans contented themselves with observing Hannibal, but chastized in the mean time all the revolted states, but the last finish to the oppression of the wasted land, and especially endeavored to annihilate the Lucanians, the last allies of Hannibal.

We shall return in a future chapter to the character of Scipio, and show that he was already going the monarchical road by way of democracy, which, after him, all the great men of Rome tacitly followed: the same road by which, at length, after Sylla's death, Cæsar attained absolute power. In this place the hint may suffice, that Scipio, how

praiseworthy soever he may have otherwise been, knew no bounds to his ambition; that in Spain, and at the court of Syphax, according to the testimony of Livy, his most ardent admirer, he vied with any Numidian in the arts of smooth hollow cajolery; and even in the Roman senate made himself obnoxious as a demagogue, so soon as his self-love was offended. He now entered into negotiations with the faithless princes of the Numidians, or native Africans, who furnished auxiliary troops to the Carthaginians, and who, like the Arabians, like all rude, especially all nomadic nations, had no idea of truth and of fidelity. On this he reared the whole plan of his military ambition, to which, as he well knew, the more intelligent part of the Roman senate was altogether hostile.

Massinissa, a man equally renowned through his implacable hostility against Carthage, and through the part assigned him by Cicero in his little tract on Old Age, was gained over by Scipio, when the latter sent him back his nephew, who happened to be among the captives, and displayed an openness, magnanimity, bravery, similarity of character, and similar ambition, which could not fail to fascinate a man like Massinissa. He gained the grovelling soul of Syphax through interest and flattery.

Scipio, confiding in the right of hospitality, which even the faithless nomad never violates, ventured to cross over into Africa without attendants, and to share table and bed with his former antagonist in Spain.

On the strength of his connections with the Numidians, Scipio, on his election as consul after his return from Spain, desired of the senate the commission to cross over to Africa with an army; or, as this procedure was named, he demanded Africa as a province. In order that no impediment might be thrown in his way on the part of his colleague, his party had taken care that his colleague in the consulship should be P. Licinius, the pontifex maximus, whom his religious duties did not allow to absent himself from Italy. He meditated besides, if the senate refused him its concurrence, to apply himself next to the people, which he had wholly in his power. The older senators, without exception, opposed themselves to his inordinate ambition; he was even, by intervention of the tribunes, compelled to renounce the hope of bringing the matter before the people, yet Sicily was given him for a province, with the express condition that he might cross over to Africa on his own account, with an army which he had gathered together as consul, not in the service of the senate, but through personal and official influence. At the same time that Scipio made preparations to attack the Carthaginians in Africa, Mago had collected
 U. C. 549. an army together at Minorca, and addressed himself to land on the Genoese territory, where they were ready to receive him with open arms.

In the preparations which Scipio made for his African expedition, shows itself, for the first time, the wholly altered position of Rome with regard to the Italian states, as well as the political preponderance of individual families and individual men. Scipio was well pleased that no formal levy was allowed him, which would have kept him within certain bounds; for he was thus left at liberty to employ the

splendor of his name, the influence which a consul such as he had on the subject states, and the anxiety of particular towns and states, especially in Etruria, lest they should be made to pay dearly for their former lukewarm services, as well as their desire to secure themselves a powerful protector in the senate. Mago landed in Liguria earlier than Scipio in Africa; at first with only a very inconsiderable force: he was, however, reinforced by the Carthaginians, when they learned that eighty provision ships which they had sent to Hannibal had been captured off Sardinia, and they ordered him to make the attempt to effect a junction with the former. To this determination conducted not a little the landing which Lælius, Scipio's friend, had made in Africa. The Carthaginians hoped to hold the enemy back in Italy. They deceived themselves. The whole year of the consulship, indeed, was consumed in preparations; but the landing of Lælius, his negotiations with Massinissa, the force which Scipio had collected, and the panic which seized the Carthaginians, induced the senate to delegate the command for the following year also to the consul; and since the senate, at the same time, destined Sicily for another's province, it was a mere and empty form if it was not expressly declared that Scipio was destined for Africa.

In the interval of time betwixt Scipio's first journey to Africa and the landing of the Romans, the Carthaginians had connected themselves more closely with the perfidious Syphax, as being the most powerful amongst all the Numidian princes, by giving him to wife Hasdrubal's daughter, Sophonisba, who had formerly been betrothed to Massinissa. Massinissa, indeed, thereby gained a pretext to justify his desertion of Carthage; but the Roman writers vainly seek to conceal from us that this occurrence took place much later, after he had already concerted with Scipio the revolt from Carthage. His desertion was the more unjustifiable, if, as Appian records, he had been brought up and educated there. When Lælius landed in Africa he joined him. On the number of companions which he brought with him, and on his own effective force, authorities differ. Livy recounts that, expelled by Syphax from his little kingdom, he awaited Lælius with sixty horse in the neighborhood of the Syrtis. Appian will have it that he accompanied the Carthaginian army till the landing of Scipio, and deferred till then his traitorous desertion. However this may be, Massinissa and his subjects were indubitably of the greatest use to Scipio immediately after his landing, as the Carthaginians and Syphax had set on foot so numerous a force, that Scipio was in no degree a match for them in the open field. At home the Romans were not much better off with the Etruscans than the Carthaginians with the Numidians; for a Roman consul took occasion, exactly at that period, to curb their disposition to revolt, by prosecuting, with merciless legal proceedings, the most respectable inhabitants of the country.

Thus the situation of Rome and Carthage, in the last year of the war but one, was pretty equal. Mago and Hannibal occupied Italian ground; Scipio was laying siege to Utica: the hope of each of the principals in the war, however, rested on intelligence with the subjects

of the other. The Romans themselves saw this, and adopted the otherwise wholly unc customary measure that Scipio should remain at the head of the army till the war was ended. He was favored by fortune, or rather by the heedlessness of the Carthaginians, who did not take a lesson from the destructive conflagrations which had already often destroyed their camp and their army. The Carthaginians and Numidians had no order of encampment, nor regular entrenchments nor tents; but every one of their soldiers, in particular the Numidians, built their separate dwellings of chance-collected materials. They consisted of huts covered with rushes, or penthouses of sedge and reeds. This en-
t.c. campment Scipio resolved to set fire to, and while it was in 551. flames to attack both armies. The plan was formed in winter, the execution delayed till spring; but the manner in which Scipio, according to Polybius, lulled the Carthaginians into security by negotiations, is not eminently honorable for the Roman hero. The execution succeeded beyond all expectations; the army was scattered; the leaders only, Syphax and Hasdrubal, made their escape with a few horse; and the circumjacent towns were sacked by the Romans. That great numbers perished in the action is highly credible; yet the Carthaginians, as well as Syphax, very soon collected a new army, which was reinforced by a considerable number of Celtiberians from Spain. This army also was routed in an open engagement by Scipio; but the Celtiberians made such an obstinate stand against the Romans, that, during their fight with the Carthaginians, Hasdrubal effected his retreat to Carthage, and Syphax to his own principality.

It was not until the loss of this battle, and the revolt of many towns and districts, that the Carthaginians unwillingly resolved to recall Mago and Hannibal out of Italy, and thereby transfer to Africa the seat of the whole war. At this time Massinissa, reinforced by Roman troops, first put himself in possession of his patrimonial domains, which had been torn from him by Syphax at an earlier period; then he routed Syphax in a cavalry engagement, and captured his person; lastly, he conquered Cirta. Here he sacrificed to the Romans his love and the life of Sophonisba, who, as captive, gave him her hand, in the hope of saving her life, and rendering herself useful to her country. In recompence for the murder of his wife, he received from the Romans a kingdom, which was not theirs to give, and petty badges of honor, which he needed not.

The Carthaginian state-messengers instructed to recall the two generals from Italy were received by them in a very dissimilar manner. Hannibal complied unwillingly, tardily, and with evil presentiment. Mago, who was stationed on the territory of the Insubrian Gauls, and had shortly before been attacked and repulsed by the prætor, P. Quinctilius Varus, and the proconsul, M. Cornelius, eagerly seized the pretext for evacuating Italy before he should have suffered greater damage, but died of his wounds before he reached Africa. Hannibal's arrival, indeed, restored the affairs of the Carthaginians; but he himself did not find it advisable to measure his force with his enemies in the field, and would willingly have treated for peace on equitable terms. Scipio seems also not to have wholly been disinclin-

ed to enter into negotiations, as it was only by appointing a dictator that the Romans had been able to hinder the consul of the former year from contesting his command with him, and it would not be possible, even by the vote of the assembled people, to hinder the next consul from crossing over into Africa, and partaking with him the dignity of general.

The wish of both commanders brought about the renowned conference, which Polybius and Livy have described each in his own manner. The first, like a philosopher and statesmen, the second like a rhetorician and speechmaker, put in the mouth of both great generals such thoughts and words as each considers fitted to their character. Polybius, however, makes Scipio propose such conditions as Hannibal could by no means acquiesce in. Arms must decide; and they did decide in the fall of the year (October,) in the action which ^{U. C.} is commonly, though without any foundation, distinguished as ^{552.} the battle of Zama. Hannibal was routed; but Polybius has justly awarded no less renown than to the valor and ability of the victor, to the admirable qualities which Hannibal on this occasion, displayed in his masterly retreat from the field of action to Adrumetum. To the mighty debt which Hannibal imposed upon his country must especially be added, that he employed his whole influence in bringing about a speedy peace, however well he knew that he himself would be the sacrifice of that peace.

During the settlement of the terms of peace, Livy narrates a trait completely characteristic of a mercantile community. The Carthaginians had taken the other stipulations very easily; but when it came to payment of money, general lamentations and complaints broke out in the town. Hannibal alone is said to have burst into an ironical laugh. When reproached on the subject, he is said to have answered, that they should then have wept when surrender of their weapons was demanded, when their ships were burnt, when every war was prohibited which should not be undertaken with the concurrence of the Romans. For the rest, Hannibal looked for nothing in Africa but intestine discord: but these unhappy conditions became still more destructive from the circumstance that Massinissa, unfortunately for Carthage, lived on to extreme old age. As connected with the Scipio family by friendship and hospitality, he had acquired a very extensive domain by the peace, and was thus enabled incessantly to affront and annoy a commonwealth which he held in inextinguishable hatred.

CHAPTER II.

SUBJUGATION OF GREECE.

IMMEDIATELY after the close of the second Punic war, the Romans engaged in a new quarrel with Macedon. In order to trace the progress of events of this momentous contest which was now to be waged between the destined conquerors of the civilized world and the dynasty which boasted the most recent claims to that title, we must take with us some knowledge of the state of Greece as the Romans found it at the period when they first mixed in the internal affairs of that country, and of the leading points of Greek manners and character as they appeared in the times subsequent to the conquests of Alexander—in the times of Macedonian ascendancy. Some attention seems, in the first place, due to the Macedonian tactics, as military force had become the mainspring of affairs, and the destiny of states depended on armies and their generals, as it has done in times less remote from our own. The Macedonian armies of this period were completely artificial machines, which, of course, required continual feeding and oiling, from a corresponding and equally artificial, system of finance. This, in a great degree, accounts for the subsequent conquests of the Romans, who opposed a living force to the Greek military machinery, the springs of which had been weakened by the common decay of finance and science, attendant on the usual abuses of arbitrary power.

The military tactics of a nation, however combined and modified in practice, may, in general, be reduced in principle under one or two descriptions. They either depend on individual action, or on the action of masses. The former system takes no account of the dead weight of the mass, the latter equally supersedes individual activity.

The tactics of half-savage nations commonly depend upon masses: the Cimbri, for example, kept their ranks together with chains. Many nations have never advanced beyond, while some, on the other hand, have reverted to, this system of tactics. It was exemplified in the highest perfection under Philip of Macedon, who lengthened the spears and added to the ranks of the Grecian phalanx. Philip required a numerous and a rapidly formed army; and naturally adopted tactics of such a kind that a raw recruit, if he had but vigorous limbs, might be made useful from the very day when he first joined, having nothing to do but perform the simplest movements, in which he could mechanically imitate his comrades. The Macedonian phalanx was drawn up in column sixteen deep. The rear ranks were regarded so completely as a mechanical mass, that, when an attack took place in the rear, evolutions were required to bring the foremost ranks again into front.

They were armed with sarissæ, or spears, twenty-four, or at least twenty-one, feet in length, so that five spear heads projected before each one of the front ranks. From the sixth rank rearward the phalangites took no active part in the conflict, and their sarissæ were presented at such an angle as to form a sort of penthouse for warding off missiles from the ranks before them. This order of battle was calculated wholly to produce an overpowering mechanical force with the minimum of personal exertion and exposure: a system which, as it divests martial exploits of all heroic attributes, cannot but render the nations which use it essentially unwarlike.* A dying glory still smiled upon Macedon, from the yet recent exploits of Alexander; but conquest itself had exhausted the numbers and vigor of the conquerors, and the phalanx, which had comprised the *elite* of the Macedonian commonality, while the cavalry represented the body of nobles, was now in a great measure composed of mercenary soldiers.

Since the time of Alexander, and partly in consequence of his expeditions, the resources of Athens had undergone material diminutions, her trade had passed into other hands, her foreign possessions had been lost, and her revenues had dwindled down into absolute insignificance.† Yet, Athens was still hailed as the metropolis of art and science, and her venal panegyrics were as eagerly sought by monarchs as the victor wreaths of Olympia had ever been by freemen. Athenian poets, players, and philosophers, Athenian solemnities, and mysteries, and courtesans, better retained their old renown than Athenian citizens and soldiers. The Athenian people dealt in wit, ingenuity, and flattery, which whoever could give them largesses, games,

* I cannot here refuse myself the pleasure of transcribing the remarks of Colonel Napier on the Macedonian tactics, as reproduced in our own times:—

“The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied and recovered their order, after such a severe check (after the battle of Vimiera,) was admirable; but their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised. Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, it may have been successful, but against the British it must always fail; because the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well-disciplined, to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet.”

“The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short of the actual charge; but, as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line, aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon shots, as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns; which, blinded by smoke, unsteadfast of footing, and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion. No example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm and even victorious, at the moment when the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, well-managed columns are the very soul of military operations; in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front.”—*History of the War in the Peninsula*, book ii. c. 6.

† Polyb. Hist. ii. 62.

and spectacles might command, whether he were a native rhetorician, like Demetrius Phalereus, or a foreign tyrant, like Demetrius Poliorcetes. During this period, the Athenians, in common with the other Greeks, began to play the part which they sustained under the empire of Rome. They offered their services every where, as talented and witty companions, as erudite professors, schoolmasters, masters of the ceremonies, buffoons, poets, and flatterers, to every one who could feast and pay them. It is a characteristic feature of the period here treated of, that in Athens, as in Antioch and Alexandria, science and art were viewed so much as a necessary of life, that even the contemptible tyrants who sprung up in their petty states, even the most abandoned debauchees in dissolute courts and cities, showed a craving no less eager for intellectual than for sensual pleasures. Even the courtesans very commonly studied, polite literature, in order to acquire the frivolous wit which was distinguished by an epithet appropriated to it (*ευθλιτος*.) A long list of courtesans has been handed down to us, many of whom enjoyed equal celebrity to that of any general or monarch, their contemporaries. Many of these ladies attended the lectures of the philosopher Stilpo. Glycera, whom Alexander and Terence have immortalised, when reproached by the philosopher with corrupting youth, aptly replied, "Then, Stilpo, we are both reproached with doing the same thing. You, it is said, corrupt all who come to you, by instituting all sorts of sophistical enquiries, and engaging them in barren and useless logomachies. I, as you say, corrupt them likewise. Since, then, they are spoiled either way, it matters not whether it be by a philosopher or a courtesan."

In Sparta, extreme inequality of fortune had produced the same effects which it is sure to produce every where; servility and meanness on the one hand, caprice, profusness, and insolence on the other. Agis was the only one of their monarchs who aimed at effecting a radical reform in the constitution, with the pious hope of remedying and checking the abuses and usurpations of oligarchical power, and bringing about the restoration of ancient manners and usages. How visionary were these designs, became abundantly evident, so soon as the attempt was made to put them in execution. The sort of men who must be used as instruments in accomplishing a social revolution in corrupt times are never fit for the subsequent part of citizens in a republic; and the purer and the nobler the enthusiasm of their leader, the more grossly is he sure to be betrayed by his own tools, who pursue their personal ends under the standard of the public freedom. Agis fell the sacrifice of his own uncalculating zeal: and the Spartans of the subsequent times, like their worthy descendants the Mainotes were famous only for predatory expeditions by land and sea.

While Athens and Sparta sank into deeper and deeper degradation two new constitutions, or, rather, federal unions, in the Peloponnesus and in Ætolia, took a compact form. These were, the Achæan and Ætolian leagues, which had long existed, but had only recently risen into importance. The object of both was, to unite under one republican head a number of states, small and feeble separately, for the purpose of national union and defence in external transactions, yet without

alteration either in the internal constitution or independent station of the several members.

The Ætolian league, which had long existed in barbarous obscurity amongst the petty cantons on the northern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, claims precedence as the elder of these confederations. It seems to have arisen, like other unions of the same kind, from community of usages and dialect in the states which composed it. War was its main object: war of aggression, for the purpose of plunder; war of defence, against the pursuit and reprisals of the plundered. The title, therefore, of *στρατηγος* well suited their annual president. The assembly of all the Ætolian name was held annually in the autumn, at Therma, in the temple of Apollo, for the purpose of ratifying or rejecting decrees and propositions, confirming or putting an end to alliances, determining war or peace, distributing privileges, receiving embassies, and appointing the officers of the league.

The structure of the Achæan league has been thought deserving of ampler record than that of the robber union of the Ætolians. The name of Achæans, after it had ceased to be applied, as in the Homeric age, to the Grecian tribes in general, became restricted to those on the southern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, extending from Sicyon to Elias. The confederation, celebrated in history as the Achæan league, originally consisted of twelve petty states or cantons:—Dymæ, Phara, Tritæa, Rhipes, Thasium, Patræ, Pellene, Ægium, Bura, Carynia, Olenos, and Hellica. To these original members of the confederation Sicyon was afterwards added under the celebrated Aratus, together with the republics of Corinth and Megara. It is known, with more precision of the Achæans towns than of those of Ætolia, that they had each their public assemblies, councils, civil and judicial officers, but that certain general laws were valid for all. All the towns, moreover had a common circulating medium, as well as an uniform system of weights and measures. At the general assemblies of the league, which were held in Ægium, every citizen of any of the allied states might be present, and had the right of speaking and moving resolutions. It appears, however, that, in fact, as might have been anticipated, these meetings were attended only by wealthy and powerful delegates from the several states and districts forming the league. Thus the government, though in form democratic, was not in effect an ochlocracy. As in the Ætolian league the executive power and the chief command, in time of war, were held by a strategus, who was annually elected, who also presided in the assembly, and alone was suffered to make long speeches, but to whom a military title seems to have been less appropriate than when bestowed on the chief of the Ætolians, as the Achæan league was instituted exclusively for defensive purposes.

Such was the state of the leading powers of Greece at that period when the gradual decline of the Macedonian monarchy had cleared an easy theatre of conquest for an ambition not to be slaked with the whole heritage of Alexander. That heritage of kingdoms might even now feel itself menaced on both sides of the Hellespont, in Syria and in Egypt. In Asia Minor, Pergamus, which we shall find a staunch ally of Rome, and, of course, in the end requited with ingratitude,

had risen by degrees to a considerable kingdom, having the city of the same name for its capital. The Rhodians, in these times a formidable naval power, we shall find acting the same part, and treated in the same manner. Syria, which was established as a kingdom by Seleucus Nicanor, one of Alexander's principal officers, extended from the Ionian coast to Armenia and Persia. The dynasty founded by Ptolemy also continued to rule Egypt, and possessed, besides, the island of Cyprus, as well as several provinces on the continent of Asia, and disputed, at the time which we are treating of, the possession of Cœlesyria with the Syrian monarch Antiochus. All these powers, of Grecian erection, became involved, on one side or the other, in the contest, in which the only parties first engaged were their parent states, allies, or rivals, in Europe.

A struggle for ascendancy on the eastern coasts of the Adriatic between Rome and Macedon, the two military powers who could alone pretend to measure themselves with each other at this period, was an event sooner or later of inevitable occurrence. Its actual approach was, however, hastened by the transactions of Philip, the reigning monarch, with Hannibal during the second Punic war, which had given Rome a fair ostensible ground of provocation, of which, when Carthage was off her hands, she did not pause to avail herself. Hannibal had made overtures of alliance to the king of Macedon immediately on entering Italy. It was not however, till after the apparently decisive day of Cannæ that these overtures were accepted, and that Philip sent ambassadors into Italy with full powers to close a league offensive and defensive. These ambassadors were intercepted in Campania by the Roman prætor, from whose hands they escaped by pretending a mission to the senate, and were attended by a Roman escort to Hannibal's head-quarters. There a treaty with Hannibal was closed; in which Philip promised his aid to the Carthaginians, and on the other hand received the promise that the Romans should be bound, during peace, to renounce their allies and acquisitions across the Adriatic. Philip now prepared to cross into Italy. In this enterprise, however, he was not favored by destiny. At the moment of the fairest opportunity for the passage, he received the false intelligence that the Romans were awaiting him with a superior fleet, and therefore sat down to the siege of Apollonia, the oldest allied town of the Romans across the Adriatic. Meanwhile the prætor Valerius had collected a considerable number of vessels, took from the king Oricum, which he had previously conquered, attacked the army with which he was besieging Apollonia and effectually forced him to renounce his passage to Italy. About the same period the Ætolians closed a league with the prætor Valerius, who continued still to command the fleet off Oricum; and a war broke out between Macedonia, the Ætolians, Eleans, Spartans, whom the Messenians also joined. The Romans alone extracted profit from this situation of things; they were enabled to dispense with the army which they had previously destined for Greece: a sanguinary yet indecisive war detained the king in the vicinity of his territory.

Having brought their war with Carthage to a conclusion, and not

choosing to let slip the opportunity of humbling so distinguished and so dangerous an enemy as Philip, the Romans now thought fit to engage as principals in the contest which that prince had already drawn on Macedon by his imperious conduct towards the other independent states of Greece and Asia Minor. In answer to solicitations from Rhodes, Athens, and Pergamus, to throw their decisive weight into the scale against Philip, they returned the imperial answer, *that they would look to the affairs of Asia.** They sent, moreover, an embassy to Egypt, to address the king of that country for aid in the event of war between Rome and Macedon. This embassy was farther commissioned to carry a threatening message from the senate to Philip himself. Æmilius Lepidus was pitched upon for this part of the duty, apparently expressly as being the youngest of the ambassadors. The tone in which he set about his work of mediation plainly evinced that the senate was in fact resolved upon war. When Æmilius Lepidus, says Polybius, came into the royal presence, he told the king that it had seemed good to the senate to require of him, that he should neither make war on any one of the states of Greece, nor lay hand on what belonged to Ptolemy king of Egypt; and that he should submit to arbitration (*i. e.* their arbitration) all matters of dispute with the king of Pergamus and the Rhodians. If he complied with these requisitions, he might preserve peace with the Romans; if he refused compliance,† the immediate consequence, for him, would be, war with the Romans.‡ Philip replied, as no man could avoid replying with any pretence to energy of character,—“I pardon your rude and arrogant demeanor for three reasons: first, because you are a youth but little versed in affairs; secondly, because you are a very fine young man; thirdly because you are a Roman. With reference to the object of your mission, I wish and pray the Romans, above all things not to break the peace, and not to commence hostilities against me. If, however, they think proper to do so, by the aid of the gods I will then stoutly withstand them.” After a conference thus conducted, they parted.

The Romans had already completed their preparations for war, which was now declared in form; but during the first two years in which their armies were led by the consuls Sulpicius and Villius, the war was brought to no decisive issue. It was, indeed, a war which could only be terminated by foreign assistance. The very keys of the country, now its theatre, as well as the subsistence of the troops when they arrived there, depended on the zealous co-operation of the Grecian states: and the honor of concluding the war was reserved for Flamininus, who was half a Greek himself in manners and character; and who, on attaining to the consulship, in the third year of the war, hastened at once to the field of action.

* “Sub idem fere tempus et ab Attalo rege et Rhodiis legati venerunt nunciantes Asiæ quoque civitates sollicitari. His legationibus responsum est, curæ Asianam rem senatui fore.”—*Liv.* xxxi. 2.

† πειθαρχειν.

‡ ετοιμῶς ὑπαρξεν τον προς Ρωμαιοις πολεμον.

Flamininus first made Thessaly the base of his operations, and drew over to him the robber hordes of Ætolia. He, moreover, succeeded in winning the Achæans, amongst whom a powerful party was hostile to Rome from patriotic motives; and brought matters so far in the year of his consulship, that in any event he could not fail to reap the glory of terminating the war. For either the exertions of his friends and clients would procure an extension of his term of command, and in that case he would urge conditions of peace that Philip could not accede to; or a successor would be appointed to his command, and in that case he was prepared to grant peace to Philip on the terms which he himself had proposed. It turned out that his period of office was protracted to an indefinite period, and, consequently, his friends in the senate drove off all discussion of peace, while Flamininus himself sternly repulsed all overtures of that nature, confiding the decision of the contest to the next campaign. That decision, under the circumstances, could not be long doubtful. Not only had Flamininus cajoled into the field against Philip the Rhodians and Attalus king of Pergamus, with the whole effective force of the Ætolian and Achæan leagues, but Attalus and the Achæan strategus had also induced the Bœotians to swell the grand alliance of Rome. The armies met in Thessaly, near Cynoscephalæ, and the forces of Philip were routed with immense loss. He, however, showed great generalship in effecting his retreat, and great skill in his negotiations for peace. The Roman consul, who had reasons of his own for wishing to close a treaty expeditiously, accorded to the king a personal interview in the Vale of Tempe, and imposed on him no more rigorous conditions of peace than before. This treaty proved the source of speedy ruin to the freedom of Greece, as Flamininus made haste to declare the independence of all the states which Philip was forced to relinquish: thus purposely strewing aliment for the Grecian spirit of discord, and sowing pretexts for Roman armed intervention at no distant day.

Flamininus received universal homage as liberator of Greece, proceeded in triumph through that country, and showed himself at the Nemean games, at which he presided in royal state, as a spectacle to all the Greeks. In the following spring he erected his tribunal publicly at Elatia; and here, too, in a vast assemblage, in view of all Greece, decided the internal affairs of the Greek states. It may well be believed, on the word of the Romans themselves, that his decisions were more just than those of Greeks would have been; but, nevertheless, the sight of a Roman setting himself up in ostentatious pomp as a supreme judge over Greece was a melancholy spectacle for both nations. To the Greeks, the Roman sitting as judge, with themselves at his feet as supplicants, seemed the precursor of the degradation and slavery which awaited them: the Romans, on the other hand, thereby contracted the thought and habit of capricious domination over friendly states. At the assembly which Flamininus afterwards held in Corinth, he played yet another part. An immense multitude gathered around him: he complacently figured in Greek discourse, addressed exhortations to the Greeks, who, on their part, either because they were easily moved, or because they wished to please him, wept. Fla-

mininus wept likewise. A deplorable scene!—hypocrisy on both sides. From Corinth he proceeded through all Greece, amidst the shouts of the populace. The effect of all these scenic illusions struck the Roman people: the *nimbus* which he diffused around him in Greece extended to Rome; and since that time he divided popularity with the Scipios amongst the leaders of that party which was then totally altering the inward frame of the Roman constitution.

It was not till the war of the Romans with Philip took a turn decidedly disadvantageous to the latter, that the attention of Antiochus was too late attracted to the affairs of Asia Minor and of Europe. Too late he hastened to make peace with Egypt, betrothed his daughter Cleopatra with Ptolemæus Epiphanes, and promised that he would, one day, give his daughter Phœnicia, Cœlesyria, and Palestine for a dower. Moreover, he married a second daughter to Ariarathes of Cappadocia; and offered a third to Eumenes of Pergamus. He then proceeded to occupy the towns on both sides of the Hellespont, which occasioned several embassies and unpleasant altercations to pass between him and Flamininus. Antiochus at length despatched ambassadors to Rome, who gave and received nothing but vague declarations. Nothing like vagueness, however, (*nihil jam perplexe**,) could be charged on the language shortly afterwards employed by commissioners sent from the senate, at the head of whom was Flamininus; and who demanded of the Syrian monarch, in a tone of the most consummate arrogance, the cession of Cœlesyria, the evacuation of all the free Asiatic towns by his troops, and, above all, that he should neither cross into Europe in person, nor send troops thither. Antiochus dissembled his intentions, and quietly pursued the course of policy on which he had entered. At a subsequent conference, however, of which some curious circumstances have been handed down by Livy and Polybius, the admission of the ambassadors from Lampsacus and Smyrna, who had solicited the intervention of Rome against Antiochus, put the king out of patience, and provoked him to declare that his affairs required no arbitrators, and that, had it been otherwise, the Romans were the last whom he should recognise. The congress was dissolved with the highest dissatisfaction on all sides; and Antiochus ought immediately to have taken the field against Rome. Instead of this, he spent more than three years in preparations, lost time in receiving and returning embassies, and all the while took no decisive measure.

During this interval, Hannibal, who had been driven from his country by an adverse party at Carthage, of which a tool was made by the Romans, took refuge with Antiochus at Ephesus. He met with a friendly reception for his person, but with no effective pursuance of his counsels; and it soon appeared that a plain straightforward warrior had no chance among Græco-Syrian courtiers.

About this time the Ætolians, having received some mortal offence from the Romans, who had already ceased to value their alliance, sought that of Antiochus, and invited him to cross over to Greece. Accordingly he led his troops into Europe, made Demetrius his head-

* Liv. xxxiii. 34.

quarters, caused himself to be chosen generalissimo by the Ætolians, and endeavored to draw the Athenians and Bœotians into league with him; an attempt which proved abortive, and of which the success would have been at best an equivocal advantage, as the policy of all the Grecian states was at that time so contemptibly faithless and imbecile, that their fickle co-operation could be of little use to any party. Antiochus and his allies the Ætolians were twice defeated at sea by the Romans (with whom Philip was now allied,) while an army of the latter power made its way by land to the Hellespont. Antiochus precipitately withdrew his troops from the neighboring towns, and was as rapidly pursued by the Roman army, till he was forced into action on the mountain ridges of Sipylus, and, after sustaining a total defeat, submitted, for the sake of peace, to conditions which were even more humiliating than those which he had shortly before spurned at. The territory taken from Antiochus by this treaty was partitioned out by the conquerors in an apparently magnanimous, but, in point of fact, exceedingly artful, manner. Every thing appeared to be done to reward the Rhodians and Eumenes king of Pergamus for their zealous adhesion to Rome; but every thing, in reality, was done to introduce perplexity into their reciprocal relations so effectually, that matter of dispute should never be wanting; in order that perpetual pretexts might be afforded for summoning the adverse parties to plead their claims at Rome, or for sending from thence delegates to assume jurisdiction as over subjects.

About this time an army was marched, under Fulvius Nobilior, into Ætolia, for the purpose of reducing that country completely to subjection, a purpose not so easy of accomplishment as the previous undertakings in Asia: as this was a land where every village formed a sort of republic, and where the fortunes of a people did not hang by those of a single man. Nor could even the Roman consul expect any remunerating advantage from reducing to despair a people whose poverty equalled their martial spirit. His plans were, therefore, principally levelled at Ambracia. This town had once been the metropolis of Pyrrhus. A splendid building, called the Pyrrheum, consecrated his memory, and the whole town was adorned with works of art of all descriptions. When Fulvius, after a lengthened siege, in which were exhausted all the means suggested by the art of war in antiquity, compelled the town at length to a capitulation, and to the surrender of all its works of art and of all its treasures, he granted to the poor surrounding peasantry easy terms of peace, which were afterwards confirmed by the senate. This, too, was an instance of the employment of that method which contributed so much to Roman greatness. *Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos* was the maxim on which Rome acted with regard to the Ætolians, as to the other states which successively felt her power. Their metropolis was impoverished by heavy contributions, and the connections of the country people were henceforth confined to their separate cantons.

The conclusion of peace with Antiochus left leisure to the consul Manlius to gather the materials of a triumph by the conquest of the Galatians, or Gauls of Asia Minor, who stood in about the same rela-

tion to the other states of Asia Minor as the Ætolians to those of European Greece. The result of a collision between hordes of rude barbarians and the best troops of the ancient world might have been anticipated: the spoil was enormous. The greater part of the fugitive Gauls escaped across the Halys, and from thence sued and obtained conditions of peace.

From henceforward we find one Roman commissioner after another appearing in Greece expressly for the purpose of perplexing the affairs of the Achæan league, as well as of Macedon. Livy traces the course of dispute with the latter power, not so much to Philip's resentment of his defeat at Cynoscephalæ, and of the hard conditions thereafter imposed on him by Flaminius, as to the manner in which he was subsequently treated by the senate. The disorders of the Thracian towns in his neighborhood, which the Romans had thought proper to emancipate after their usual fashion, totally unaccustomed as they were to freedom, and unfit for it, gave Philip opportunity to interfere in their civic arrangements, and to reduce some of their number to subjection. This was argument enough for fresh disputes with the Romans.

Three Roman senators were appointed to enquire as to these matters on the spot, before whom the king was cited as an accused party, the ambassadors of the Thessalian towns appearing as his accusers, and the Romans assuming to sit in judgment on both. They pronounced against the king; but Philip did not acquiesce so tamely as was expected of him. Perceiving on the part of the Romans a settled purpose for his abasement, he changed his tone, remonstrated, threatened, and showed the arrogant emissaries of Rome, to their amazement, that he was not to be brought to submission without having once more tried the fortune of war.

From this moment a rupture took place between the Romans and Philip; but the latter, in order to gain time before the final appeal to arms, sent his favorite son Demetrius to Rome with pacific overtures. The prince returned the bearer of mild and equitable terms of peace; but unfortunately excited the suspicions of his father by his undissembled partial disposition towards the Romans, and pride in the marks of favor which the senate had bestowed on him. His brother Perseus, whose character deserves a place on the tragic stage between Atreus and Richard III. of England, employed every means to aggravate the fatal distrust of Philip, and wove his toils so skilfully and securely as to entangle and destroy both father and son. Philip, urged by causeless suspicion, engendered on his hatred of Rome, doomed his innocent son Demetrius to death, and himself soon after fell into a sickness rather of mind than of body, on his route from Thessalonica to Amphipolis. He was, according to Livy, consumed with sleepless anxiety, and haunted incessantly by the phantom of his innocent and murdered son, while he exhausted himself in frightful curses on Perseus. His death, however, would not have been too sudden for timely news of it to have reached his nephew Antigonus, whom he designed to succeed him, but for the arts of his physician Calligenes, who, from the moment that his case became hopeless, sent an express to Perseus

through relays ready posted for that purpose; and, when the death of the monarch actually took place, kept it concealed from every one beyond the walls of the palace till the prince's arrival.

u. c. 575. Perseus had no sooner ascended the throne than he followed the steps of his father, without possessing either his talents or good qualities. His first act as a monarch showed hostility to the Romans; and the first occurrences of his reign, his want of judgment as of fortune. Whether he really meant to act on the aggressive against the Romans, or merely to prepare for an attack on their side, could not well be decided, such was the rapidity with which the forces of Rome took the field. Notwithstanding, however, this promptitude of attack, ten years were allowed to elapse in abortive campaigns, disastrous to the Roman arms and character, before at length a general was chosen from one of the few families who at that time possessed (and deserved, it must be added) preponderant influence. This was Paulus Æmilius, who was connected by marriage with Scipio's family. This new leader brought new talents and forces to the contest, and finished it with quite unexpected celerity. The main point was, to bring the cunning and cowardly foe to action; that achieved, the issue of the day might safely be trusted with a leader of such tried and approved skill as Paulus Æmilius. Rome triumphed; and the Macedonian monarch, more solicitous for his treasures than his honor, sought safety for them and for himself in the oldest and holiest temple of Samothrace, where, however, he was betrayed by the Cretans; and, not having sufficient courage to terminate a wretched life by a voluntary death, submitted to the indignities of a Roman triumph, and, after four years' captivity, died at Alba. Deserted by their king, the Macedonians had no other course open than that of unconditional submission to the victor: all the towns, accordingly, opened their gates. Four republics were formed out of the ruins of the kingdom of Macedon, and cut off from all connection with each other. Each of them had not only its own metropolis and its own government, but commercial and connubial relation with each other were prohibited to the citizens of these several republics. They were, moreover, debarred from keeping up any military force, with the exception of a scanty band on their frontiers. Metallic mines were not to be worked, and wood was not to be felled for ship-building. It was clear that such a regimen was a mere prelude to plain subjection, and that the degradation of Macedon to a province would soon portend the reduction of all Greece.

No sooner had the Romans brought their contest with Macedon to a close, than they plainly evinced, by their conduct towards the other states of Greece, their resolution thenceforth to recognise not the shadow of Grecian independence. After the overthrow of Perseus, indeed, Greece, disunited and enfeebled, could have little hope of the results of armed resistance to Rome. The ferment of the Greek population, however, rose higher and higher, and reached its utmost pitch on the appearance of commissioners from Rome, who assumed the arbitration of all disputes which arose in these petty and quarrelsome republics. It needed but a spark to explode the mass of discontent and

discord; and this was supplied by an ill-timed squabble between the Achæan league and Sparta. Four-and-twenty citizens of the latter state, who had been sentenced to death by the league, escaped to Rome, and appealed to the senate, who, as usual, assumed to decide upon the matter. The Achæans, however, did not choose to admit the decision of Rome, but attacked and routed the Spartans, and pursued their advantages over them till the appearance of Aurelius Orestes with instructious from Rome, which not only decided the cause in favor of the Spartans, but prescribed, in a manner, the utter dissolution of the whole league, by which the larger and smaller states had been hitherto kept in some connection. The announcement of his mission by Orestes, at the general assembly in Corinth, threw the Achæans into such transports of indignation that they immediately elected as strategus, Critolaus, a known enemy to the Roman name. At this crisis a fresh revolt broke out in Thrace and Macedon, under the conduct of an adventurer, who gave himself out for a son of Perseus. The appearance of this impostor at first excited little attention at Rome; but after he had routed a Roman army under Juventius Thalma, u. c. it seemed necessary to send against him the prætor Cæcilius Me- 607. tellus, who speedily earned the title of Macedonicus, by putting an end to the war, and transforming into a Roman province the four above-mentioned Macedonian republics.

Metellus honestly wished to prevent war with the Achæan league, and to save Greece from herself and from his countrymen. But the Achæans blindly followed the rash counsels of their leaders, and met the overtures made on the part of Rome with invasion and insult. Accordingly, Mummius, consul elect for the ensuing year, a man wholly devoid of cultivation, and destitute alike of taste and respect for art and science, received a commission to proceed to the entire subjugation of Greece. Before the inauspicious arrival of Mummius, the noble Metellus had exhausted every means which lay in his power to alienate the Achæans from their demagogues, and to win their ear to rational representations. But a fatally-timed enthusiasm for independence had seized the Achæans, who chose rather to dare the utmost extremities than accept such a peace as was offered by the forbearance of Metellus. They collected their whole force on the isthmus of Corinth, and awaited with their raw and hasty levies an unequal shock with the veteran legions of Rome. The result was the total defeat of the Achæans. Corinth was burnt. Mummius, aided by ten other Roman senators, completed the reduction of the Peloponnesus and all Greece into the state and denomination of a province. Conformably, however, with the usual method of Roman conquests, the several states and cities retained their own forms of internal polity.

The barbarous spirit manifested by Mummius in the sack of Corinth has met with its meed of historical reprobation. He, indeed, caused very many works of art to be transported to Rome, those being an indispensable adornment to a triumph; but as the general's taste for such productions was much on a par with that of his soldiers, what spirit or what principles were likely to guide the selection? We know that he caused a number of the most excellent works to be set

up to auction, and was ignorant enough to seek to diminish the chances of loss which, however short the passage, attended the transport of goods by sea, in those times, by imposing an obligation on the mariners to replace their value. The kings of Pergamus, who were better judges, at that time appropriated a portion of the vast deposit of treasures of art in the wealthy Corinth: part was enveloped in the flames which consumed that splendid city, part swallowed up by the waves, and the remainder scattered among barbarians in and in the neighborhood of Rome.

Of all the states compelled to bow beneath the Roman dominion, Athens was the most fortunate. The Roman grandees soon felt that no one flattered better, and extended his patron's renown farther, than an Athenian orator, poet, or philosopher. Athens, therefore, remained the higher institute for accomplishment in the Roman world also, as it had been in the Greek, and again acquired, through literary importance, the rank it had politically forfeited. Rhodes was oppressed in every possible manner; and the Romans, who were otherwise accustomed not to trouble themselves about trade, became all at once interested in the promotion of free trade on the *Ægean* sea, so soon as an opportunity occurred of annoying the Rhodians. When the latter required back from the Romans the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Delos, as old possessions, the Romans granted their prayer on condition only that they should make Delos a free port, open to all vessels, and where no harbor-duties should be levied. Thus Delos, as Strabo also remarks, again became the central point of traffic, and the depot of goods, as Rhodes had formerly been; and the Rhodians complain, in the Roman senate, that their harbor-dues and customs now bring them in only the sixth part of their former revenue. These dues had amounted formerly to nearly a million of drachmas. The same ambassadors calculate the revenues which the Rhodians had derived from two Carian towns only, Kaunus and Stratonicea, at 120 talents.

In the treaty already mentioned, between Antiochus and the Romans, one of the articles prescribed the surrender of the person of Hannibal. He fled for a last refuge to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia, and being followed even thither by the poor vindictiveness of the enemy, terminated his own life in the sixty-fourth year of his age, in the year of Rome 635, B. C. 119.

CHAPTER III.

DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE.—ROMAN MANNERS AND POLITICS.

CARTHAGE, in the fifty years which elapsed between the second and third Punic wars, had begun to enjoy a new flush of prosperity, in consequence of the abstinence prescribed to it from all military enterprises by its rival. It was ruled by an aristocracy of wealth, and a triple division of parties, distinguished as Roman, Numidian, and democratic, each of which had as its chief some influential head of a family had recently sprung up within its walls. Hanno and his family stood at the head of the partisans of Rome: Hannibal Psar and his friends at the head of those who were backed by Massinissa; Hannibal, surnamed the Samnite, and Carthalo, were leaders of the democratical party.

Amidst the frequent disputes arising from the above-mentioned intestine parties, Massinissa had sought to seize for himself one tract after another of the Carthaginian territory; and the Romans in the character of arbitrators, always well knew how to secure his plunder for him, by means of decisions ostensibly grounded in equity. Finally, he stretched out his grasp even over the district of Tusca, a tract of land which we can only compare with certain tracts of Holland, or the garden-grounds in the neighborhood of London. The Romans sent ambassadors of whom Cato was one. That personage was assounded at the power and wealth of a trading state, which had even yet the commerce of the world in its hands; and when the Carthaginians would not refer their undoubted right to foreign arbiters, he returned to Rome with a heart swelling with rage.

After this epoch, the senate only cast about for a pretext to accomplish the destruction of Carthage: and this was easily found, as the party contests in Carthage continued. The Carthaginians expelled from their city the friends of Massinissa, who took their part, and sent his son to Carthage. The son of the hereditary enemy of the party then predominant in the town was unfavorably received, and his life endangered—a new pretext for war. Massinissa took the field, and besieged the town of Oroscopta. The Carthaginians, who marched to his encounter with a numerous army, were beaten, and the younger Scipio, who came over by chance from Spain, in vain endeavored to bring about a reconciliation. In the sequel, too, the war was not successfully conducted; the Romans, nevertheless, declared it a formal breach of treaty, and decreed a general levy in Italy, without howev-

er, making known against whom these preparations were intended. The Carthaginians, in straits between Massinissa and the Romans, endeavored to appease the storm. They sent delegates to Rome, banished the leaders of the democratic party and their followers, for having been abettors of war, and volunteered on every point the fullest satisfaction.

The Roman senate was divided; vague and equivocal answers were given; embassies hurried to and fro. At last Utica, the largest and richest town on the African coast, revolted from Carthage, and the Romans seized this moment to declare war in form, and to commit the conduct of it to their two consuls, Manilius and Marcius, with express instructions not to let themselves be misled by any negotiations or intelligence of treaties. While the consuls proceeded to action, the senate gave a gracious reception to the supplicating embassy of the Carthaginians, and promised easy conditions, if they surrendered 300 children, of their most respectable families, as hostages, into the hands of the consuls. The Carthaginians complied with the demand, and brought the children to Sicily, though they already knew beforehand that the Romans would not fulfil their promise. They even delivered up to the consuls, on their landing in Africa, all the arms and engines which lay stored up in their city, and offered further to perform whatever should be prescribed to them. But *one* stipulation had not been anticipated by them; namely, that they should vacate their city, give up all their old occupations, settle again in another place, and adopt entirely different habits. This stipulation was declared immutable by the Romans. Neither the ambassadors nor the aristocratic rulers of Carthage dared to lay it before the people, and when, at length, it was laid before them, a revolt broke out. All classes and orders combined for a desperate resistance.

From this moment began a war of despair against rapacity: for the latter passion alone, according to Appian, had assembled under the Roman eagles an unusually strong army. This enormous force was, however, compelled to relinquish the siege of Carthage, and to encamp at some distance around the city, where Censorinus, as well as his colleague Manilius, particularly, indeed, the latter, suffered ignominious defeats. The whole year elapsed without the besiegers having dared to hazard a general attack, and the besieged took new courage. In the following year, under Calpurnius Piso, the Romans were not more fortunate. But in the next year, the people that is to say, in particular, the combined family adherents of the Scipios, and of Paulus Æmilius, promoted to the consulship a man who was equal to the war and a favorite in the army. Such a man they found in the son of Æmilius, whom the son of Scipio Africanus the elder had adopted, and this man, Scipio the younger, was elected consul, at the moment he was canvassing for the ædileship. Scipio was chosen commander, not on account only of his family connections, having displayed brilliant military qualities in Spain and in Africa. He first restored discipline in the Roman camp, then blockaded the town more and more closely, and made the entrance of the harbor inaccessible by a dam. Thus he wore out the winter. Being

elected for the next year generalissimo of the Roman forces, he began his undertakings anew in spring; but, like the French at Zaragoza, in our own times, he was obliged to take by storm one part of the town after another, one street after another, with great loss. The town itself became a prey to the flames. The burning of Carthage lasted seventeen days; and during this whole time, the Roman soldiers plundered the burning houses, and carried off into slavery the unfortunates who attempted to save themselves or any part of their property. All the buildings spared by the flames were pulled down; and Carthage thenceforth remained a heap of ruins.

The new universal empire, which may be said to date from the final subversion of Rome's most active and formidable rival, was of a wholly different nature from those of the Greek or eastern conquerors which had preceded it in the history of the world. The provinces of the Roman empire were not so much incorporated with, as rather one by one annexed to it: they form, in fact, an aggregation of petty states, under wholly different laws, but over which a Roman public personage holds government. The first care of the Romans, when they erected a new province, was to separate the interests of the several parts of the former state, and create party divisions. All those who had previously betrayed their sovereign, or their fellow-citizens, received privileges: if towns, an enlargement of territory; if subjects, an independent existence, or a partial relief, or even an entire exemption from taxes. The loyal and steadfast lost their former privileges, saw Roman farmers of the revenue introduced among them, and obeyed the Roman senator who was sent to them, and the suite by whom the latter was surrounded. Thus, at a later period, were to be found in the provinces, Roman colonies, municipalities, towns, of Latin right, free and allied towns, with properly so called subjects beside them. The sole advantage commonly derived from Roman conquest to the conquered nations was an ameliorated legislation or arrangement of the existing laws, but, unfortunately, as we shall see from the oration against Verres, this advantage was most commonly lost by the mode in which law was administered.

Jurisprudence, and the study of the forms of an artificially constructed constitution, the art of war, the scientific practice of agriculture, and systematic household economy, were the only indigenous sciences of the Romans, a people wholly concerned about material and practical objects. These sciences must so much the more arrive at a high perfection, as military service and civil administration, or use of public affairs for private profit, were the sole pursuits of the higher ranks of society.

Since the moment when the north of Italy, Sicily, Spain, Sardinia, Macedonia, Greece (now denominated Achaia,) had become Roman provinces, the whole frame of the state underwent a change. Rome not only became a conquering military state, but it was more and more attempted to transform the constitution from aristocratic to democratic form, in order to be able to use the people for oligarchical ends. The new Roman may be designated as a conquering military state, in contrast with the earlier, which was military, but not conquering. The

maintenance of old customs, of the consciousness of manly superiority over neighbors,—glory, not wealth,—was the object of old Rome. The whole state system rested on landed property and agriculture: every one was, indeed, a soldier but every one was dismissed so soon as the enemy was vanquished, and was obliged again to present himself when a new expedition was begun. In form, indeed, the constitution endured even to latter times; but continual military expeditions, and the occupation of the new provinces, incessantly demanded new armies. In consequence the greater part of subaltern officers, and all the privates, became soldiers by trade, who only gave up their occupation when they were located somewhere as colonists; and even then very frequently again abandoned agriculture as too toilsome, sold, or let lie waste their little property, and hastened to the standards anew. As these soldiers were at the same time citizens, and gave their votes in the town, and as these popular voices, owing to the constantly augmented efficiency of the tribunes, were of necessity highly important to the generals, who also were always at the same time civil functionaries,—they began even at this time to canvass the favor of the army. Then began the attachment of the army, or the citizens who had served in any important campaign, to some individual, with all the evil consequences which this attachment drew after it.

The public wealth of Rome, at this period, may be judged of from the statement of Pliny, that, after the subtraction of all outgoings, 726,000 pounds of gold, and 92,000 pounds of silver in ingots, were to be found in the public treasury; besides, which, also, 775,000 pounds, proceeding from extraordinary branches of revenue, were disposable. Consequently, about this time the burghers became exempt from war-taxes, and all the populace streamed into the town. Easily could the Romans now hold festivals and games which came up to those of the old hierarchical states, easily undertake the construction of edifices and labors like theirs. All the arts of the Grecian world, all the inventions of earlier times, all the sciences, even then did homage to the Romans, and already they understood the art of extorting treasures in all quarters.

Among the edifices and public works undertaken and executed in these times, we would make particular mention of the highways. It must be left undecided whether first the Flaminian and then the *Æmilian* road were founded, or *vice versa*. Certain it is, that both these roads were laid down at this period, on the pattern of the Appian Way, but with essential improvements with reference to outward embellishment. The one of these highways led from Rome to Rimini, the other from Rimini to Bologna; and, towards the end of this period, was continued from thence as far as Aquileia. About fourteen years after the first formation of these highways, the Romans began to pave the streets of their capital with flag-stones, and to lay down excellent roads in every direction round the city. The Romans adopted these improvements from the Carthaginians and their African domains, which, like Holland in former times, and many districts of England at present, resembled a carefully irrigated garden, and to which continued lines of splendid buildings gave every where the aspect of a

town. On the origin of paving, Pliny and Isidore give us the information that the Carthaginians first paved with flat stones; that the Romans imitated from them this method, which was thus diffused through all the towns of the then known world. The ways about Rome (*viæ rusticæ*) were certainly easier to *macadamise* (for something of the sort was undertaken on them) than the roads of our northern lands, where, in no season of the year, a continuance of good weather can be reckoned upon.

In the subsequent period, none of the directors of public works (the censors) rendered themselves more renowned by their undertakings than M. Porcius Cato, till Gracchus and those who followed v. c. 570. his steps, from political motives, sought to surpass whatever had been undertaken at any previous epoch. Cato and his colleagues caused the places within the town, where marsh and standing water were still extant, to be drained; and these hollows, as well as the Aventine Hill, which was still unpaved, to be provided with pavement: they spent about 250,000*l.* (Dionysius says 1000 talents) on the cleansing of the subterranean channels of the town. Flaccus caused a lofty mound to be carried over the marshes near Terracina (*Aquas Neptunias*;) and a causeway to be formed in this manner where nothing but morass existed previously. He caused a hill near Formiæ to be excavated, and the road carried through it. Cato bought two palaces on the market-place at Rome,—that of the Mænian and that of the Tatian family, four large booths and public houses, and built upon the open space thereby acquired for the state that public edifice which was named, after himself, the Basilica Porcia. On this occasion Mænius reserved for himself a columnar interspace of his former family seat, that at the public games his family might retain a prescriptive place.

Already the inventions of luxury were forced into the service of rudeness; and cruelty and murder, for the amusement of the ruling people, came in place of the arts of the muses, which had animated Greece. In the times of which we are treating, gladiatorial games, whether derived from Spain, or whether standing in connection with the sanguinary funeral solemnities and human sacrifices of the Tuscans, came in use into Rome; and, so soon as these were once introduced, to naturalise the Greek drama was altogether out of the question. That portion of the Roman aristocracy which had hoped to smuggle in the legitimate drama, alternately, at least, with scenes of blood and slaughter, the woes of triumph, and the grossness of the other public amusements, was, even in these times, compelled to renounce its purpose, though the whole power of the state was in its hands. As for what concerns the gladiatorial games, Livy calls it an evidence of the veneration of the Spaniards for the noble victor of Hannibal, that, in the combats which he instituted in Spain at the grave of his father and uncle, men of the noblest families had poured out their blood to do him honor. So far as this went not even the sanguinary middle ages. With the knightly combatants, blood and murder were merely fortuitous consequences, not intentional aims for the amusement of the bystanders. The actor in Rome stood in no estimation; his trade was an illiberal one: the noblest end of dramatic representations never

entered the heads of ordinary Romans. What could encourage the genius of a poet? With reference to the difference of position of the dramatic artist in Greek and Roman Society, Livy remarks, that it was no rare occurrence among the Greeks, for rulers and princes to employ actors in state affairs. The son-in-law of Gelo, in like manner, had entertained an actor for his confidant. This actor, he goes on to say, was a man of family; for, among the Greeks, no man of good family was ashamed to show himself in public in the character of an artist.

Through the games and distributions to the people, which more and more became matter of custom, not only the populace was corrupted, but the honest countryman also was attracted into the town, where he became, by habits of idleness, lazy and worthless. Part of the Roman nobility, who felt this in a lively manner, tried every means in their power to stem the deluge of corruption; and the struggle between those who insisted on the maintenance of the old national character, and those who aimed at promoting the transition to general cosmopolitan cultivation, imparts peculiar interest to the history of this period.

This struggle, indeed, is outward and political, but it is also internal and spiritual; a struggle of culture against rudeness, of Grecian refinement against barbarian energies. Taking Cato as the representative of the old Roman manner of life, the Sabino-Samnite character, we shall exemplify with most ease the alteration of manners in this period, by exhibiting him in contrast with his opponents. It was not, however, he alone who had undertaken the conflict against the new usages,—a conflict which was also that of the middle class of Roman nobility against the few families which aimed at predominant influence through popular arts and mental cultivation. Valerius Flaccus, a patrician of the old school, and the family and party of Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, were equally active and powerful with himself: but the times, and the effect of a rapid transition to wealth from poverty, was more powerful than all three together.

If Cato's life be regarded as the life of a mere private man, it offers only acerbity and rigor: it presents, however, a wholly different aspect, if one contemplates him as the representative of the elder Italian popular character. The whole history of this period turns upon the struggle of the two antagonist principles and their representatives; and the character of the Catonian party offers us many features of the Italian popular character in the oldest times, which strikingly resemble the more modern. Who does not in Cato's vehement bitterness retrace a leading feature of the modern Italian, who is vehement and implacable when his feelings are once irritated? Who known not that in Italy are most frequently to be found in conjunction, the strange combination of grovelling cupidity and boundless indifference towards external goods? For what regards the first point, we need not, as in other cases, betake ourselves to Plutarch's collection of anecdotes; we can judge of it from Cato's own work on husbandry and household economy (*De Re Rustica*), the only one of his works which has been preserved, although in a wholly altered garb of diction.

At the very outset of the book on husbandry, he sees nothing to find fault with in a respectable man endeavoring to enrich himself by trade; for profit and gain appear to him an important object of life; only he looks upon the mercantile profession as too hazardous. On the other hand, he reprobates wealth from usury as dishonorable. The mode of life of the ancient Roman nobleman,—how he regulated his house, how he acquired wealth by the use of his property,—can nowhere be learned better than from Cato's short introduction to husbandry, which embraces the whole art of household economy.

If we could enter more into details in this place, we would gladly illustrate Roman economy with reference to buildings, from the book of a man who during his censorship built so well and so cheaply, and the terms of whose contracts drove contractors and speculators to despair; but, for that purpose, we should have to go into technical particulars, and, therefore, hasten rather to features of the old Italian character. To that character belongs a fund of cordial and sincere superstition, and Cato is by no means lacking in this. We find sympathetic cures, nay, even *abracedabra* is called in as an auxiliary in cases where surgical aid is employed at the same time. Sociability and mirth pushed even to buffoonery, traits of the old as well as of the modern Italian character, are ascribed to Cato as well by Plutarch as by Cicero. The latter says he kept on foot, with equal care, the old custom on all points, hospitality and neighborly feeling, not only amongst the country nobles living around him, but also according to good old fashion, between the clients and patrons, who, in other cases, already began to play the princes towards their clients. Cicero gives more precise information on the point of sociality, and the manner in which Cato revived the old Italian practice of taking meals in common. The orator makes Cato himself speak with warmth of feeling of his joyous meals at the Sabine farm,* where young and old, where every one who was lively and conversible, where the neighbors daily, till deep in the night, remained in company with him; chatted with entire cordiality, chose a president for the evening, drank with moderation from small beakers, sat in summer in the cool of the evening, in winter in the sun, or by the fire.

While we recognise with pleasure, even in Cato's generation, the old Sabine discipline in the simplicity of life, rural employments, sociality and cheerfulness of the Roman country nobleman, yet we perceive with horror that the treatment of slaves, even in ancient Italy, and according to old Roman manners, was still more degrading to humanity than in Greece, and can be compared only to the treatment of negro slaves in modern times. As Cato bought slaves, like hounds or foals, young, in order to sell them again when grown up; he treated them exactly like hounds or foals; used them well, because they had a money value, but otherwise viewed them merely as live stock, not as persons. This, however, we find less surprising, as, even in his

* De Senectute, c. xiii.

warlike undertakings, Cato opposed rigor and cruelty, as genuine Roman policy, to Scipio's mildness.

His vanity, pushed even to a comic extent, is, in like manner, a trait of the old Roman character, particularly of those men who were necessarily indebted for their first advancement to making their own merits tell;* and, above all, of those who resorted to the capital from the country or the municipalities. Let us only rememember how far from agreeable, amidst wholly different manners, is this characteristic feature in Cicero's character.

As for what regards the manners of later times, to which we set the Catonian in opposition, we have shone above, that, up to a certain time the Romans remained perfectly contented with the knowledge of law and military art; that they founded no province in Italy, consequently had no need of foreign manners and foreign political science. This state of things altered so soon as they came into possession of a Grecian province in Sicily, and into connections with Egypt and Greece. Here they could not carry matters through by open force; certain sciences, as well as arts, became necessary. Thus, for example, mildness, friendliness, gentleness of demeanor, were of more service, even in the most desolating wars, to Marcellus and the younger Scipio, than their bravery and their Roman temper. But only a few were at this time in condition to procure themselves this cultivation; thence, we see it hereditary in certain families; and, unfortunately, public functions also became the private possessions of these families. The men who were formed by this new education must of necessity, address themselves first to the people, and take every means of courting popularity. The senate, in so far as it consisted of partisans of old Roman usages, was, at the outset, diametrically opposed to them, but could not hinder them treating the other senators as their clients.

In the case of Publius Scipio, one could understand, from his high-toned character, from the services which he rendered to his country, and the gratitude which was due to him, how he won and retained a preponderant influence; but his whole family shared his consideration. To Lucius, the brother of Africanus, who carried on the war against Antiochus, no writer has ascribed even the most ordinary talents: nevertheless, he was suffered to enrich himself and his friends at the expense of the vanquished and the Romans. He was condemned; his goods were partly sold; but this did not prevent him from holding games, at the charge of the Asiatic states, which were amongst the most splendid ever given in Rome. Moreover, the renowned defiance of Publius to his accusers, when, on the anniversary of the victory over Hannibal, he summoned the people to the temples of the gods to render thanks for that victory, instead of defending himself, indicates, indeed, a noble consciousness of high merits; but in this defiance also lurks that feeling of the first men of the Roman state, which we shall henceforth often meet with, namely, that public services confer a right to look upon and use the state as property.

The practical application of this maxim was not, even then, neglect-

* μεγαλανχίαν ὡς επακολούθημα τῆς μεγαλουργίας οὐκ εἰσέφερε.

ed by the leading men of the period. This appears from what we have said above of the oppressions practised, to which we will here add only a few further particulars. In reliance on their relatives and friends, who knew how to prevent enquiry, or, at least to frustrate its objects, the men of importance took possession at pleasure of the public property (*ager publicus*) bordering on their possessions, and that in the most fertile as in the most unfruitful regions. They formed thereby, even in these times, the princely estates which swallowed up by degrees the little possessions of the small proprietors, forming, in fact, the flower of the Italian race. Sometimes, indeed, as well with regard to similar abuses as in reference to this, strong measures were taken; but we shall presently see that these were of little avail, and that, so early as the epoch of the demolition of Carthage, the depopulation of Italy had reached a dreadful extent through the use of the land for the purposes and profits of the great families, as well as through its cultivation by slaves. Equally vain with the measures and arrangements of the senate against the *Latifundia*, or counties and principalities, as we should call them, which were acquired by degrees by the leading senators, were the exertions of a Cato, Fabius, Flaccus, and their friends, to check the oppression exercised in the provinces, by means of indefatigable judicial accusations, as well as of their own better example. What availed it that Cato studiously exercised in Sardinia the moderation of old times, when no one followed his example? Livy himself confesses, how smoothly soever he knows how to dress it in words, and turn it to the renown of his hero, that the elder Scipio was not disinclined to the courtly manners and polished Grecian flattery, the reigning tone of this corrupt age, the refined exterior veiling inward rudeness or corruption.

In this point, also, Cato discerned, with perfect justness, a commencement of the coming dissolution. The meanness of the minor Asiatic kings and princes, who styled themselves freedmen of the Roman people, and were not ashamed publicly to appear as such in the eyes of their own subjects, who came to Rome, and applied every art of seduction, every talent of social intercourse, and the most refined corruption, to lead astray the most important personages, appeared to him even equal to the power of Carthage in mischief. He at length procured a law to be passed against all royal visits to Rome, in order at least to fence off from the the Romans the immediate action of courtly manners and Asiatic corruption.

Through the manner in which even the most illustrious Romans now availed themselves of the people against the senate, as well as of the senate against the people, when their interest required it, the people itself, and along with the people its tribunes, acquired an importance which they had previously never possessed. They would even then have been more powerful than the consuls, if they had not been too numerous to be easily united in one plan. Already, before this period, in the struggle between the consuls, not in the popular assembly alone, but in the senate itself, where originally they had hardly a place, far less a decisive influence, we find the tribunes as judges of the allotment of the provinces. Who can wonder, under such circumstan-

ces, to see the abuses arise which gave occasion to the Gracchic commotions?

It was said with perfect truth by Cato that the Roman people of his time resembled a flock of sheep all following the bell-wether, and that the mass of the people was a hungry horde, which gave such laws as, were best fitted for the belly.* He openly reproached the people with constantly calling the same persons to offices of honor, and thereby making masters for themselves. He maintained, with justice, that a republic like the Roman could not exist so soon as a precious fish should be valued at a higher rate than a ploughing ox. If we scrutinise Cato's acts and regulations during the term of his office, it is true that much which he did proceeded from that pugnacious bitterness which must be contracted by a man engaged in constant strife and inflictions: as, for example, that he took away his horse from L. Scipio, and expelled Manilius from the senate for kissing his wife at a wrong time. But Most of his acts indicate a man who aimed, by every method, at keeping up the yielding Roman spirit and tone of sentiment. Luxury had made such rapid advances, that Cato, rigid as he was, must have felt the entire restoration of the old order wholly out of the question. How willingly soever he would have effected that restoration, he could only aim at imposing restraints, and that was what he did aim at.

The principal cause of decay in morals and discipline was unfelt even by Cato himself: even he had no perception of that which alone could save the state; namely, the increase of the free population of Italy, and diminution in the number of slaves.

So early as the middle of the second Punic war, the poorer burghers and middle class were so oppressed by war-taxes, that the great had full opportunity of purchasing many estates for themselves, and incorporating them with their previous possessions. This impoverishment of the lower and middle classes of the Italian burghers in the interminable wars, whereby the great and leading personages became enormously wealthy and all-powerful, as well as the attractions offered to emigrants to Rome by exemption from imposts and distributions of victuals, induced even then the burghers of the municipal towns to repair to Rome, in order there to creep into the lists of citizens, and caused them to be compulsorily recalled by their fellow-townsmen, as those who remained must necessarily sink under the municipal burdens if one after the other should withdraw themselves from them. This occasioned in after-years the rigorous measures, the consequence of which was the so called Social War. Whole tracts of land were desolated, not only by the direct devastations practised by the enemy, whereby the country people were forced, through want of slaves and cattle, and also because the buildings were partly ruined, to give up agriculture, and emigrate to Rome, but more especially by the merciless proceedings of the senate against all who, during the war, had been chargeable with faults of any description.

* Plut. Cat. Maj. c. 8. *Χαλεπόν μὲν ἐστίν, ὡς πολῖται πρὸς γαστέρα γέλειν ὡτα οὐκ ἔχουσιν.*

Exactly in proportion to the decrease in the number of free citizens, was augmented the number and motley mixture of slaves; among whom, so early as the close of this period, were to be found people of all nations, of all ranks, of all possible abilities and acquirements. How they were viewed and treated we have mentioned above, where we indicated the leading error of Cato. We have shown that he treated slaves worse than we are accustomed to treat horses, which many a kind-hearted man continues to feed in their old age; while Cato, on the other hand, used a slave so long as his strength lasted, but then sold him, in order, as he expresses himself, that he might not need to fodder him any longer. We must not, indeed, imagine, that, so early as this period, any Roman grandee was possessed of the enormous number of slaves which, according to Petronius and Pliny, were afterwards kept; but we, nevertheless, find all the essential disadvantages of the increase of slaves, in Plautus ascribed in common to the Romans and Greeks. Plautus's *Casina* gives us a good image of the base ingredients brought into all the relations of life by the slave system. As in the *Casina* the increase of slaves, and its consequences, are shown; so, in the *Bacchides*, particularly in the third scene of the third act, in a dialouge between Lydus, Philoxenus, and Mnesilochus the old Roman education is contrasted with the new one, as the old and new Athenian education are contrasted in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. In the perusal of the whole piece, one is struck, even to shuddering, at the perverse mode of intrusting to a slave the discipline and education of sons. What sort of a generation must form itself, in this manner among the aristocracy, and among the rich of the following times, when the relations between the superintendent and those consigned to his charge were such as are depicted in this piece! It must, however, already have been so in these times; and here, too, Cato seized the right point of view, and vigorously set his face against the abuses of a time which sacrificed moral and physical strength to intellectual accomplishment. Cato suffered no slave near the person of his son; he taught him what he could himself, and preferred no surveillance at all to that of a man for whom his son could feel no respect. So early as these times, domestic concerns and those of husbandry were transacted by particular descriptions of slaves, and the servants of wealthy houses were so numerous that it was necessary to place the *atrienses*, as a sort of overseers or housekeepers, over a vast number of slaves. We find one set of slaves appropriated to sweeping cobwebs off the columns, another to cleaning the metal largely employed on doors and walls among the ancients. Henceforward the young Roman would necessarily learn cruelty and contempt for human nature among a herd of menials only kept in order by inhuman punishments, in that house where of yore the sons of clients had formed his youthful society, and where, even in riper years, the slave had continued the comrade of his labors.

Since Roman individuals and families had possessed themselves of enormous estates, immense wealth, and armies of slaves, the constitution and nature of the state were totally altered. Debts and usury

ground down the inhabitants of the towns; imposts and the revenue farmers, the provinces.

If we consider what Cato says, in the very outset of his work upon husbandry, of the insecurity of Roman mercantile dealings, and how he himself, instead of driving any reputable trade, carried on the meanest description of usury under borrowed names, we shall easily understand the high rate of interest, the numerous laws against usury, and the mischievous effects of them. In the first times of the republic, it was notoriously the debtor laws, usury, and the rigor of usurers in high stations, which drove the people to despair. After the establishment of tribunes, and mitigation of the rigorous laws of debtors, we hear, indeed, for some time, nothing about usury, and the misery arising from it; but at the period when the plundered wealth of the world flowed together by degrees into Rome, the want of ready money pinched anew whole classes of citizens. So early as the era of the war with Antiochus, a device had been invented in Rome for evading the penal inflictions against usury, consistently with suing for and collecting the amount of debts. The Roman who lent money at interest, concealed himself under the name of a Latin, who was not bound by the laws which obliged the Roman citizen. In this manner the practice of usury again reached such a pitch, that it was deemed necessary to take general measures against it. But these measures were rendered more than ordinary difficult, by the impossibility of knowing the extent of the evil. The tribunes, therefore, carried through an ordinance, according to which all allies who had lent money to a Roman citizen should announce themselves; and a term should be appointed, after the lapse of which every one who lent money, if prosecuted, should be free to choose whether he would be judged according to Roman laws or those of the allies. The amount of the debts, however, was found on enquiry, to be so enormous, that the senate, through the tribune Sempronius, caused the proposition to be brought before the people, and to be passed into a law, that all allies, and the Latins in particular, should have no other law with regard to Roman citizens, in matters of debt, than the Romans had with regard to one another. In the comedies of Plautus, we find that which the laws prohibited proclaimed from the stage as an open and allowable branch of traffic. In a passage in *Curculio*, were Plautus enumerates all the trades which were driven in Rome without being exactly reckoned honorable, and states the places where those who carried them on were to be found, he says that the usurers took their seats by the old booths. In another place he speaks of people who lent money by single days, and caused to be paid to them daily a denarius of interest for a mina of Grecian money.

The provinces must next feel the effects of debt and usury, just as they, also, alone felt the pressure of duties and revenue farmers, while the rabble of the town was freed from imposts, and fed in idleness. How cunningly this was set agoing appears on occasion of the burdensome salt-tax, the augmentation of which was carried through by the censor Livius (the same who had vanquished Hasdrubal on the Metaurus,) for which he received the nickname *Salinator* from the people.

Livius aimed at drawing a larger revenue from the salt-duty than that which the state had hitherto been in receipt of, while that article, in all Italy, cost the sixth part of an *as* (sextans). Since, however, he durst not offend the town population by a rise on a prime necessary of life, he contrived that in Rome salt should retain its ordinary price, but in villages and places of small size should be sold dearer, and dearest of all in places uninhabited by Roman citizens. It is easy to see what oppressions must be produced by such inequality within the bounds of one and the same state; what arbitrary acts on the part of the revenue farmers.

The unfortunate system of handing over the collection of the taxes to individuals, nay, even whole classes of men of consequence, in return for a round sum, even then occasioned the most crying iniquities. Of this we shall cite a few particular instances. So early as the middle of the second Punic war, when the Roman T. Pomponius Veientanus, general of the allied troops, was taken prisoner, and the army cut to pieces by Hannibal, Livy says that the man was no great loss, as he was the cause of the imprudent commencement of the conflict, and had formerly been farmer of the revenue. As such, he had known and practised all the base arts which are exercised in political transactions; and, besides, all the faithlessness and treachery which the trading companies of farmers of the revenue were wont to exercise. Contemporary with this Pomponius shone a certain Posthumius, who was not ashamed to perpetrate towards his native state, in extreme emergency, a fraud in our days customary with none but the most abandoned class of traders and seamen, against assurance companies. Posthumius, and the knights of his trading partnership, undertook the delivery of military stores, but first obtained public guarantees that such commodities as were shipped and lost at sea, should be made good from the public treasury. Thereupon they freighted vessels with articles of no value, appraised them at a high amount, and caused them to be sunk at sea. The scheme was detected, and two tribunes proposed the imposition of a money fine on Posthumius; but were v. c. not able to carry it through. First of all, a tribune, nearly re- 542 lated to the delinquent, impudently opposed himself to the motion; and no sooner was his veto set aside, than the trading company resorted to open violence. The farmers of the revenue, and their friends, while the people were voting, arrayed themselves in regular line of battle against the other citizens, and would have commenced a conflict, had not the consul closed the assembly.* At last, indeed, the senate interfered. Posthumius and the other leading authors of the fraud and revolt were forced to quit the city; but a thousand times for one the interest of the senate was identified with that of the equestrian order, who formed the bulk of capitalists. At the epoch of the second Macedonian war, abuses in farming of the revenue had already reached such a pitch, that the government was wholly at a loss for means to protect the provinces where once the knights and their satellites had fixed themselves, from their depredations. Livy, in informing us

* Liv. lib. xxv. c. i.

that the senate, on dividing into four parts the kingdom of Macedonia, conferred on these a republican constitution, and forbade the use of all their mines and domains, expressly declares, with reference to this point, that the Roman public revenues could not be administered without the aid of farmers of the revenue: but that, wherever a revenue farmer made his appearance, there the rights guaranteed to friendly states (*jus publicum*) and the liberties bestowed on them, became a mere shadow.

If, however, the Roman state, even at this time, was suffering from the wounds of which it finally bled to death, yet the two principal props of the state, the credit of the senate, and religion, or if the phrase be preferred, the superstitious dread of the gods entertained by the multitude, and the skill of the state functionaries in making use of that dread, remained still unimpaired and immovable. In this respect the want of mental activity among the Romans, and the slight share of the lower classes in the culture of the higher, for once shows itself in a point of view advantageous to political life; for it is remarkable how long the priestly mummeries, which were soon exploded in Athens, could be carried on in Rome. In order to show how closely, in the period which we are treating of, religion and worship still stood in connection with the state, and how thoroughly the political use of devotion was understood by the senate, we may refer to its proceedings on occasion of the war with Antiochus, when it enacted the same comedy with the priesthood of the Feciales, which already it had rehearsed at the commencement of the war with Pyrrhus, and, by virtue of a decree of the senate, caused it to be formally asked, whether a declaration of war must be made to king Antiochus himself, or whether it was enough to give notice of the commencement of hostilities at the advanced posts; whether, in this case, any special announcement of hostilities must be made to the Ætolians? Whether peace and alliance must not first be renounced with the latter, before war was commenced with them? It is easy to see that the senate would gladly commence the war by surprise, evade the customary delays, and yet avoid having the general voice against them. The Feciales helped them out with an approving judgment, and all was in order.

However strictly religion bound the individual, it was yet subjected to the senate and the people; since, in case of disputes on the usages or rights of the different priests and religious functionaries towards each other, no priestly tribunal, but the people, pronounced in the last resort. One of the most remarkable contentions of this nature, in which prætor and senate were forced to encounter a pious fraud with a pious fraud, is related to us in different ways by Livy and by Pliny. One of the Roman law officers (*scriba*,) pretended to have found two stone coffins under the Janiculum, with an inscription according to which the one coffin purported to contain the corps of king Numa: the other, books he was stated to have written. The one proved to be empty; in the other were found seven Latin scrolls concerning the right of the superior priests, seven others, composed in Greek, contained a sort of philosophy, such as Numa might have very well held. When the prætor learned that these books became diffused, and much

read, he begged for an inspection of them. Even the tables of contents of the books and chapters proved to him that the reading of these books must be destructive to the whole of the established ceremonial. He, therefore, declared he must burn them, but that he freely permitted the finder to try every possible means for their preservation. The latter made application to the tribunes, who, however, abstained from bringing the affair before the people. They referred him to the senate; and that body resolved, solely on the conscientious oath of the prætor, that the perusal, nay, the existence, of the books would be extremely pernicious; that the books should be burned; but that the finder should receive in compensation a sum of money, such as the prætor and tribunes should award to him. The finder rejected the money with disdain; a regular *auto-da-fe* was made of his books, in which the sacrificial slaves performed the same functions as in later times were committed to the hangman on works of a dangerous nature. But how skilfully, even in these times, the men who, according to Roman usage, combined the priestly character, in their own persons, with the highest civil dignities and functions, provided for the maintenance of formalities, in order to rivet in men's minds reverence for the gods, appears from the example of Publius Scipio. During the march against Antiochus, he caused his whole army to halt, and himself remained behind in Europe, in reality because he had heard of the embassy of Antiochus, and formed the design to wait for it; but he gladly used this opportunity to call into remembrance the observance of an old Roman sacrifice. Scipio, it seems, was one of the Salians. In the beginning of March was the festival and dance of the Ancilia, when the god of war was honored with a general feast of peace.* In the same manner, Cicero makes Lælius give himself credit that he coped, by aid of superstition itself, with a proposition regarding religious ceremonies, which could not but be particularly agreeable to the people.† It is evident that, in matters of religion, the oligarchical party, which in other respects favored all innovations, saw much farther even than a Fabius Maximus, who, according to Cicero, did not even scruple to declare quite openly, that the auguries and auspices were mere political engines.

In like manner, as religion, with all its establishments and regulations, stood fast as yet among the Romans, and had an effect upon the people widely different from that which the corrupt Grecian worship had about the same time upon the Greeks, so the tone of Italian manners was, beyond comparison, better. Especially great appear the Romans and Italians in the unity of their sentiments and strivings

* "Principio nimium promptos ad bella Quirites
Molliri placuit jure, deumque metu.
Inde datæ leges; ne firmior omnia posset,
Cæptaque sunt pure tradita sacra coli.
Exuitur feritas, armisque potentius æquum,
Et cum cive pudet consemisse manus.
Atque aliquis, modo trux visa jam vertitur ara
Viraque dat tepidis salsaque fara focis."

Ovid Fast. iii. 277.

† *De Amicitia*, c. 25.

against foreign influence; and their military rudeness shows in the most advantageous light, when we compare it with the base and grovelling temper of the Greeks, with their enmities and envies amongst one another, and their readiness to sell country and friends to the highest bidder, or to offer them up to their petty passions and grovelling desires. Of the Athenians, Polybius says expressly, that, so soon as they had nothing more to fear from the Macedonian kings, and were placed in the enjoyment of a secure peace, they were wholly under the guidance of their demagogues, and troubled themselves not at all about the general interests of Greece. They adapted themselves entirely, he says, to the will of those who stood at their head, and acted the part of the most contemptible flatterers towards all kings, especially the Ptolemies.* No description of popular decrees, he adds, no sort of public proclamations, were too bad to be issued by them; for the men who stood at the head of their affairs had lost all shame. The same meanness which Polybius objects to them towards the most wretched rulers, they also exhibited towards the Romans, and even in view of all Greece. When Quinctius Flaminius had conquered Philip, and destroyed the Grecian freedom by the severance of all connection between the individual states, it was the Athenian ambassador who, in the great assembly near Corinth, surpassed all the other delegates in his creeping adulation. He not only thanked the Romans as extravagantly as possible; he not only extolled their merits towards Greece; but had the meanness to accuse of evil intentions those who dared to express themselves freely; and to forward, through the tenor of his discourse, the plans of the Romans, who aimed at subjecting Greece without exciting disturbance, "The great merits of the Romans," exclaims the wretched flatterer, "are detracted from by some among us; even what they mean to do is made matter of calumny, and that by people who had cause humbly to give thanks for the favor which the Romans had shown them." The Ætolian ambassador, who was as far, indeed, as the other from consulting the true interest of Greece, justly expatiated, in open assembly, on the depth to which Athens had sunk; that her citizens, once the founders and leaders of Greek freedom, were the same who, through their despicable flattery, for the sake of procuring petty advantages for their town, betrayed the freedom of all.† The Achæan *strategus* rose next, to abuse the preceding speaker terribly. How truly great Rome appears on the other hand—how superior in council as in force. The ensuing subjugation of Greece will not astonish any one who does but weigh the import of this single scene.

* "εις παντας της βασιλεις εξεκεχυντο."—*Polyb. Hist.* v. 106.

† Liv. l. xxxiv. c. 23.

CHAPTER. IV.

LITERATURE AND MENTAL CULTIVATION UP TO THIS PERIOD.

IN the first period of Roman history, terminating with the first Punic war, we made only general remarks on the intellectual progress of the people, as, in default of a complete literature coming down to us from this period, we should dread being reduced to give conjectures in lieu of history. We closed our observations with regrets at the loss of the relics of old Italian language and cultivation, and fitly, therefore, commence with the first dawning of the new illumination derived from the Greeks, which, since the subjection of Magna Græcia, but especially since the cession of the Carthaginian districts of Sicily, became a fashion in Rome, and on many accounts a necessary accomplishment of the statesman. The great world took part, though with illustrious exceptions, in the Grecian artificial mode of life, and, in defiance of all upbraidings from those who still adhered to ancient usage, the Roman grandees, to whose protection entire Grecian towns and states already had betaken themselves, took into their houses and suite the most eminent Grecian artists and poets.

Clearly, therefore, the mental cultivation which the Romans received came to them from without, as a necessity of political life, as luxury and amusement, not as the natural result of any progressive social developement. It was *proteges*, anxious to recommend themselves, that first diffused it: it was the little circle of educated aristocrats, that took up a matter which it regarded as its own cause, but which never became the cause of the nation. This must never be left out of sight in the study of Roman writers, if one wishes to avoid the danger of critical obliquity.

When the Greeks and their closest followers, an Ennius and others, exerted themselves to recommend the Grecian culture to their patrons, they made the first experiment with poetry. It would have been difficult to find favor for Greek philosophy with the Romans, whose sound manly understanding and sternly practical policy had raised them to the power which they now possessed. The Greek political science they then needed not, because their constitution had at length acquired a full developement, and, during the protracted contentions between the burghers and nobility, a practical political wisdom had penetrated all classes, which instinctively worked better, and produced fairer fruits than the Grecian wisdom had procured to any Grecian state. Civil law, judicial administration, religious rites, were matters of immemorial tradition, brought with them from their original abodes by the patricians, and for a long period guarded as a profound mystery. In these points, therefore, no Grecian instruction was available.

Nothing was left, except to bring into vogue the portion of literature ministering to entertainment. The men who wished to introduce amongst the Romans a taste for Greek literature, endeavored to make themselves popular as poets in the Grecian taste; and in this succeeded, as we shall see, in so far as they acquired renown, and consideration among particular families. Their intrinsic merits were either very small, or the Italian national poetry, which was driven into oblivion through their means, was very indifferent. It almost seems as if Cicero were jesting, when he notes with perfect seriousness the tardy growth of Roman poetry, by saying that the Greeks had their earliest poet, Homer, so early as several hundred years before the building of Rome; the Romans the first of theirs Livius, not till 510 years after that era.

Nævius, though of his labors, also, we have only fragments, is, for one reason, more important than Livius towards elucidating the nature and direction of Roman culture. He ventured the experiment of applying himself, not to the patrons of poor poets and Greeks who crowded to their tables, but to the people; and of making comedy, the models of which he borrowed from the Greeks, in the manner of Aristophanes, truly popular, by making it political. He brought on the stage the Scipios, Metellus, and other men of the first rank who abused their political influence, and thereby rendered himself and his pieces agreeable to the people. Unfortunately, however, he was one of those persons of no consequence, who, in Rome, did not stand under the safeguard of the laws, but under the commission of three, which presided over the execution of criminal judgments, and exercised a summary jurisdiction on insignificant persons such as Nævius. They found him guilty of ridiculing persons of respectability, and threw him into a dungeon, where he lay in a dreadful state of duration, till the tribunes of the people found two pieces which he had written in prison adapted to their purposes, and procured his liberation. One would almost believe that his poetical history of the first war with Carthage likewise contained sarcastic passages, for he was afterwards banished from the city, and died in Utica. It may easily be imagined, that after such an experiment, no one indulged the idea of becoming a popular poet, or of applying their abilities to any other employment than such as might be entertaining or flattering to the ruling class, which did not exactly coincide with what suited the people, or was fitted to awake in it the taste or impulse towards Grecian culture.

Of all using the Latin language, who busied themselves in these times with the literature of Greece, and sought to naturalise it in Rome, none have become more celebrated than Ennius, because he went diametrically the opposite way to that which had been taken by Nævius, and in this way arrived at the goal of competence and consideration. In the mean time, while we leave to learned philologists the more exact investigation of Ennius's merits with regard to Roman language and literature, we delineate him here only so far as he presents himself in the light of an historical person, in intercourse with the most distinguished Romans, and adapts his labors more or less to these outward relations. If we may believe Silius Italicus, he recommended

himself first to the leading families in Rome, as an admirable proficient in the Oscan tongue, and a warrior. Afterwards he taught the Oscan and Greek language in Rome, especially pointed out the internal connection of the three languages, and proved, to the influential Romans, with whom the entire command of their own language was a paramount object, that, without knowledge of the two other languages, a thorough learning of the Latin was impossible. Of this, even Cato allowed himself to receive conviction from Ennius, as the younger Scipio afterwards from Lucilius. That Cato, the sworn enemy of all Grecian culture, who spurned from him all manner of acquaintance with the language of fashion, so long as it appeared to him only as such, was drawn even in his old age to the study of Greek, Cicero, the admirer of Ennius, justly entitles his highest triumph—for, that he won over the Scipios will appear to us less striking, inasmuch as he wrote a heroic poem, of which this family was the subject. According to Horace, the cunning Lucilius imitated the example of Ennius, and the scholiast adds, that, as Ennius praised heroic deeds, so he the moral virtues of the high families. This, at a time when not as yet a tribe of hungry poets, as in Mæcenas's days, drove a trade of versification, would infallibly make the fortune of a poem.

It is manifest, if one only considers the manner in which Ennius is cited and used by all later Roman authors, that by dint of his labors, and those of his friends, by example of a Marcellus, Flamininus, and the Scipios, but, above all, by the conversion of Cato, the tone of mind in Rome was completely changed; and the craving for Greek culture became generally predominant. Meanwhile, the result was the same which in France, and even more in Germany, took place in the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century; the nation itself took absolutely no part in the efforts which occasioned such agitation in the ruling houses, or families distinguished by birth and station.

Roman annals in verse, which were calculated for those by whom Ennius was patronised, appear not to have pleased the people particularly well; however, the historical field found many laborers in a generation so fertile in occurrences. Critical spirit, vigor, freedom from prejudice, are not, indeed, to be looked for. Cato's historical work, which embraced the early Italian history, discovered an energetic and investigating mind. The rest, of whom we will here name only a few, appear narrow and exaggerated in the single views and narratives which are cited of them by Polybius. The most eminent, at least the most renowned amongst them, is the senator Fabius Pictor, who wrote during the second Punic war, and would consequently pass for the best evidence concerning the events of that war, had not Polybius placed us in a condition to form an altogether different judgment of him. He cites a passage from Fabius, elucidates it, and then proceeds:—"But why do I adduce such a history as that of Fabius? Not as though I believe that any one could be misled by the efforts of which I have just given an example; for the absurdity will be discerned, at the first glance, by any one who takes the book into his hands, even without any examination. I only wish to show those who may happen to read the books of Fabius, what manner of man they have before them, that

they may not merely regard the name of the writer, but the nature of the things themselves. In the scrutiny of historical accounts, many pay attention, not to the subject, but to the annalist, and allow themselves to be misled by the circumstance, that the author of the annals was a member of the senate, and contemporary of the events of which he wrote the history : they accordingly believe that whatever he says must be strictly true."

Marcus Acilius Glabrio, like Cato, who attended him as lieutenant in the war against Antiochus, wrote Roman chronicles, but in Greek, from which Claudius Quadrigarius translated them into Latin ; but they were full of strange stories, such as those of Valerius Antias and Piso. The national features, however, which we are here tracing continually more and more receded ; and Roman civilisation, instead of being progressively diffused among the people, became ever more the property of certain circles and societies in the high world. This may be best exemplified in the history of the drama.

The Roman stage became in a manner merely an enjoyment, procured to themselves, through the medium of readers, by the circles who monopolised that tone and that refinement which were aimed at by the composers of the pieces. Public representation, at last, was quite out of the question. Between Plautus and Terence, in the order of time, there lies only an interval of a few years ; but the contrast of their manner and their diction is so immense, that one might imagine a whole century lay betwixt them. In this interval the great mass of the people had sunk from rustic simplicity to barbarous rudeness, through incessant wars, through the bloody gladiatorial games, and baiting of wild beasts ; and the small accomplished body into whose hands the conduct of the state came by degrees, had received so high a culture from Greek teachers and Greek intercourse, that it deemed itself very frequently obliged to make use of the Greek language, because it could find no Roman expression for its new ideas.

Plautus very well understood the course which he must take, if he meant to make his comedy a popular amusement, in the strict and proper sense of the word. He openly expresses approbation of Nævius, for having entered on the path already indicated ; but gives it at the same time to be clearly understood, that the destiny of that poet floats before his eyes ; and, therefore, seeks to entertain the Roman public in a manner less dangerous to himself. He, indeed, took his pieces from the Greek ; he, also, in the whole of them, retained Grecian manners and characters ; but since he sold these pieces to the ædiles for the popular festivals, he was also forced, in some degree, to adapt them to the popular taste. Thence the coarse jests that he is blamed for ; thence he plays on words, double meanings, and obscenities. But from thence also precisely it arises, that he transmutes Grecian manners and allusions, on fit occasions, into Roman ones ; and, from the midst of the real life around him, brings to light the weak points of manners, men, and customs, without exactly giving personal offence to any one. With regard to the number of pieces which he wrote, much uncertainty, it is well known, prevailed even so early as Gellius ; and Varro recognised only one and twenty as indisputably genuine,

of which twenty have been preserved. *Ælius Verus* received as genuine five and twenty. As Plautus's pieces present, in general, neither Roman manners nor characters; as his genuine humor and true talent were only employed in modelling Greek originals for the Roman stage; we can use neither his pieces, nor those of Terence, in illustration of Roman life and intercourse.

Though the main strength of Plautus lay in delineation of character, yet he nevertheless eschewed Menander as too refined for the Roman public: he selected Diphilus and Philemon, and inserted in their pieces, from which he took his materials, much additional vigor and raciness from the old comedy, or at least after its manner. The wit and diction are right Roman, and peculiarly Plautus's own; both are admired by a Cicero and a Cæsar. The life which he paints, with the exception of the individual traits above alluded to, which he inserts from Roman life, is entirely that of the later corrupt Grecian era. We will go into only a few details, in order to make this evident. In the *Bacchides*, the whole piece describes a pair of strumpets, who end at last by turning the head of even the old father. A trick which, in our times, would bring a servant to the hulks, forms the *nodus*; and either the *Bacchis* or the chorus (*grex*) says, at the end, that the piece was no worse than daily life; it being quite an ordinary occurrence for fathers to run after the same girls who were visited by the sons in brothels. The same thing recurs in the *Asinaria*, a piece belonging wholly to Diphilus, and quite worthy of the world in which Diphilus lived. A father lets himself be squeezed out of money, in order to pass a night with his son's paramour, and is dragged by the lawful wife, amidst threats and scoldings, from the haunts where he is drinking and diverting himself with the son; lastly, a criminal fraud of the domestic slave is represented on the public stage as a circumstance of common life. Verily Romans, in whom there was still a spark of the old fire, could not possibly contract a taste for science and poetry which came to them recommended after this fashion.

What a tissue of indecencies is depicted in the *Cassina*! Most of the scenes of this piece might be witnessed daily in the Syrian towns, in Athens or Alexandria; but matters had not yet gone so far in Rome. In truth, says Plautus, or whoever else may be author of the prologue in one respect the Roman manners are still far beneath the Greek and African: in Greece, in Carthage, even in Apulia the marriages of slaves are declared legal; but in Rome, slaves are left to couple like mere brutes. Just at the end of the prologue is exhibited another shameful practice of the Greeks: that, namely, of bringing on the stage public women as mute personages, and commending them in this way to the audience, as is here done in so many words.

In the short interval between Plautus and Terence, the Great Roman houses had more and more assumed the character of princely or ruling families: the Scipios, Metellus, Appius, and others, in the town and in their country houses, formed a court around themselves. All the arts and sciences were exercised by slaves in such houses; all departments of service had their appropriate class of functionaries. In

this manner, the upper ranks became highly accomplished through those about them; through their manner of life, and even through their ordinary business, their tone became refined in the same degree as the people retrograded, because its literature was totally neglected; while the Greek could be acquired only in great houses, or by a very long and very troublesome process. It was, therefore, of necessity, that the Greek drama was driven into the halls of those in high station. The fine tone of Terence could not be understood in the din of the multitude; and he has no right to complain, as he does, that the people desert him, because they had rather see sanguinary conflicts than a regular piece, whose refinements were beyond their comprehension. The Roman aristocracy did not even desire seriously to inspire theatrical taste into the people. Spectacles of cruel triumph; exhibitions of wailing lords and princes, who went behind the car of the generals: thousands of unfortunate captives; interminable lines of treasure-waggons, and slaves who carried the world's spoil, in crowded procession: wild-beast baitings; conflicts of gladiators, served a much better purpose to the ambitious, in whose view the people was but a machine, and war and its fruits a medium of advancement, than the arts of the Muses. The fine world, on the other hand, caused to be read to them the comedies of Terence, who took from Menander the half comic, half serious tone of morals; and learned the refinements of the Roman language from Scipio, Lælius, and their friends, who even took active part in the production of these pieces.

Terence almost servilely translated Menander and Apollodorus; from them, in a manner exclusively, he took the plot of his pieces. This sufficiently shows that he did not count on the mass of the Roman people,—wherefore, also, he is wrong to complain of deficiency of sympathy in that quarter. Of the ease of his expression, of the grammatical correctness of his diction, we have not here to treat; it is enough for us to have indicated, that neither he, nor, after him, Pacuvius, Attius, nor Cæcilius, succeeded in giving the drama a national character, however they might be patronised by the educated Romans, especially in the higher and more refined circles.

In the unaccustomed form of an imperfect democracy, which was gradually assumed by the Roman commonwealth, rhetoric and dialectics were quite indispensable studies. This was discovered speedily: accordingly, so soon as it was perceived how much the Greeks were before the Italians in rhetoric and dialectics; how useful they might be made as instructors and models; how intimately philosophical is connected with rhetorical culture, a zeal entirely new sprung up for Grecian culture in this department, and for its transplantation to Roman soil. Direct utility, the enjoyments and the honors of public life, circulation of interest, daily and nightly occupied the Roman. To him, therefore, as to the Frenchman, the form of expression, the melody and cadence of language, must be vastly more important than to nations in which an inward life has grown along with the outward.

The first Greek rhetorician who gave regular lectures in Rome was

Crates, who came in the suite of Attalus, ambassador from Pergamus. Crates was detained in Rome by the breaking of a leg, and commenced, for pastime, a course of lectures (*αρχουσεις*). Ennius was just then dead. The lectures of Crates aroused such attention, and attracted such a concourse, that Cato, who had already begun to perceive what he afterwards (his Roman dispositions notwithstanding) adopted as a principle, that agriculture was not exactly a lucrative pursuit, and was accordingly looking about him for other sources of emolument, employed his cherished slave, Chilo, to keep a sort of *trivial* school; or, if the phrase be preferred, a gymnasium for Greek grammar and rhetoric. About this time, two Roman knights also appear as public teachers; and this proves, more than any thing else, a total change in which active life stood to the new studies. Ælius Lanuvinus and Servius Claudius held it nowise prejudicial to their honor to come forward in the character of public teachers; and this fell out at the time when the crafty Athenians impressed, by the selection of the ambassadors whom they sent to Rome, on the senators and the whole aristocracy, quite a new idea of the utility of that Grecian wisdom, hitherto viewed merely in the light of amusement and luxury.

The only account extant of this embassy is in Plutarch's life of Cato, and in Gellius, so that doubt even hangs about the persons of the envoys. It is on all hands agreed that the choice had fallen on the heads of the philosophical schools, from which the orators and statesmen of Greece at that time commonly went forth. Three considerable schools existed then in Athens, for persons who devoted themselves to public affairs and life in the world; and the most celebrated speakers of their age presided in all three. Carneades conducted the Platonic school, the Academy, which had now become a school for embuing people of the world with an eloquence and philosophy such as are suited to the world. Aristotle's school had, from its first foundation, been practical, and rhetoric and dialectics were practised by the Peripatetics with equal zeal, after their master's example, as the natural sciences. Critolaus stood at their head. Dialectics were made by the Stoics the main branch of their study, and their eloquence was fitted to their philosophy; their aim was condensed energy. At their head stood Diogenes, known by the name of the Babylonian, because he was born at Seleucia, on the Tigris. Even before these three had obtained audience in the senate, the Romans flocked around them to learn how different from Roman was the character of Grecian eloquence. The philosophers, particularly Carneades, as before them Polus and Gorgias, in Athens, invited the dictation of a subject of discourse; and Carneades showed equal adroitness one day in inculcating the exercise of strict justice, as another, in taking ordinary worldly wisdom under his patronage. Acilius Glabrio, who further proved his preference for the Greek language by composing his annals in Greek, was their interpreter in the senate: and the attention which was excited by the new wisdom and eloquence was so great, that Cato pressed for the dismissal, with all possible speed, of so dangerous an embassy, and expressed himself willing

rather, without more ado to grant their petition, than to abandon the Roman youth to further temptation.

This avidity for Grecian accomplishments will occasion less surprise, if it be called to mind that 1000 Greeks, of the most distinguished families, who had enjoyed the philosophical and rhetorical culture of their times, were at that time distributed as hostages through the most respectable families of Rome; that Polybius was one of their number, and that Panætius, whom Scipio so frequently mentions, had an equally distinguished place in the family of the Scipios. However, it cost pains to force the novelty into adoption; for the old Crassus, as censor, declared publicly, that a Grecian school of eloquence, for and against a cause, was a school of impudence. Nevertheless, instruction in eloquence proved a lucrative trade in the city, where rhetoricians *v. c.* multiplied, so that those who cherished old Roman sentiments, 592. scarcely six years after the above-mentioned embassy, caused to be passed by the senate a police-regulation against the rhetoricians, the execution of which was entrusted to the prætor.* The result was, that eloquence began to take the shape of an art, and that, after the dry annals of a Fabius Pictor, Cato, Piso, Fannius, Vennonius,—Antipater began to write something more than annals, and that Rutilius ventured to open out a new course for history.†

In these times the physical sciences also found some entrance. In this respect the Romans were in general greatly behind-hand, and in building, road-making, aqueducts, and other immense public works, Etruscan or Greek science could not easily be dispensed with. It was then, too, that the scientific studies of the Romans seem to have led them to the Epicurean philosophy, unfit as it otherwise was for the condition of those times, in which religion remained still so deeply rooted in the people. This school then busied itself especially with natural science. Amafanius found the knowledge of the Epicurean labors already diffused among the Romans, and devoted a work to *physical things*, which excited little attention, but of which, had it been extant, we should perhaps, have judged less harshly than Cicero, who appears, in point of fact, to have been no proficient in natural science, however he may here and there trick himself out with borrowed feathers. Afterwards, as is well known, Lucretius Carus introduced the whole Epicurean system into his poem on the Nature of Things.

Rhetoric became the groundwork of all the new intellectual culture; entered into all the branches of science, and even took hold of poetry; yet first through Cicero's agency, who thus impressed a direction on the whole succeeding literature. He himself has pointed out to us the progress of eloquence up to his own times. Among the orators of earlier times, Cicero particularly magnifies Appius Claudius, of whom we have above spoken, Sergius Galba, Lælius. The author of the little work on celebrated orators, which is usually appended to

* "Curarent philosophi et rhetores ut Romæ ne essent."

† Vossius de Historicis Latinis.

Tacitus, considerably limits this eulogium. He says, "with regard to Sergius and Lælius, and the other elder orators by Cicero, distinguished with perpetual panegyric, I need not any apology if I venture to acknowledge that much was yet wanting to their eloquence, which was merely a growing one, which had not hitherto reached to any perfection." This is not the judgment of that later author from whom the passage is taken, but of Brutus, who is acknowledged by that author as the only unsuspicious and entirely competent judge. Nature would appear to have refused the gift of oratorical excellence to Metellus, Scipio, Lælius; for we find that, though, they could help out Terence with language and wit for his dialogue, neither Polybius, nor Panætius, nor all the other Greeks, whose intercourse and instructions they affected with such ardor, could form them into orators deserving the name. The art was carried farther by Æmilius, Lepidus, whom Cicero also cites under his nickname of Porcina. Cicero commends his exemption from that roughness which as yet had stuck to the elder speakers, and his happy choice of expressions.*

The renowned Cornelia, the mother of the two Gracchi, is not only known as having conducted the education of her sons, and *through* those sons, but also as an authoress; and two of her letters have even been preserved to our own times. She set the tone which, according to Cicero's testimony, afterwards became the prevailing one. As the French language was formed in Paris in the circle of certain ladies, where the *litterateurs* who frequented them received that touch of refinement and of delicacy, only appreciated by a select few, so like qualities of wit and expression to those recognised by the Frenchman as the tone of particular *salons* are by Cicero distinguished as a certain indefinable *Roman* something in expression.† He goes so far as to trace this *Roman* something and its influence on oratory, society, and language, to the distinguished females of the age, just as philosophy is traced to certain schools.‡ He considers the antique tone, admired in Plautus and Nævius, with its unexhausted energy and natural independence, its liveliness without licence, to emanate from Lælia; refers the newer, more refined, tender, and finished tone of social intercourse, to a whole series of other ladies.§

* Brutus, c. 25.

† "Quare cum sit quædam certa vox Romani generis urbisque propria, in qua nihil offendi, nihil displicere, nihil animadverti possit, nihil sonare aut olere peregrinum, hanc sequamur; neque solum rusticam asperitatem, sed etiam peregrinam insolentiam fugere discamus."—*De Oratore*, l. iii. c. 11.

‡ Ibid.

§ Brut. c. 58.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

SPANISH WARS.—SIEGE OF NUMANTIA.

AFTER the second Punic war Spain was partitioned into two Roman provinces, to which two prætors were annually sent to find pretexts for plunder and a triumph. Pretexts for these objects were abundantly supplied by the turbulent and restless dispositions of all the Iberian tribes, from Catalonia to Lusitania. The Lusitanians, in particular, found it easier to rob their neighbors than to labor for themselves; and as they did not abandon their predatory habits, even after the lands in their neighborhood had become subject to Rome, the prætor soon repelled their aggressions, and made severe reprisals on the Lusitanian territory. The consul Lucullus carried desolation through their fields and valleys, while the prætor Galba made demonstrations of occupying the mountain passes. Several districts offered to give hostages for their good behavior,* and Galba appeared to entertain their suit. He pretended to compassionate their condition, to ascribe their depredations to the poverty of their country, and to offer them richer places of abode, if they felt disposed to quit their sterile fastnesses. In this way he inveigled many thousands from their mountains, and made a wholesale massacre of all who came in on the strength of his promise. This unheard-of act of atrocity had the results which ever attend such measures. A war of vengeance was commenced v. c. by the countrymen of the slain, which, in any event, was likely 604. to be equally destructive to the Romans as to the native populations.

The Lusitanians found in Viriathus, one of their countrymen, a leader well acquainted with the country, and who knew how to employ his local knowledge. To the Roman mode of fighting he opposed an original system of tactics, well suited to the nature of the ground, as well as to the Spanish mode of arming and national character. Not the Lusitanians alone, but all the mountain tribes from Galicia to Catalonia, were now in motion against the Romans. Amongst

* Appian says, *τινων προδιδενομενων*.—*De Bell. Hispan* c. 58.

the mountain tribes, the Celtiberians were eminently formidable, especially the natives of the present Old Castile. They possessed a strongly fortified place, Numantia, near the sources of the Douro, and towards the borders of Navarre, capable of containing a force of many thousand men, and very difficult of access.

During five years the Roman allies and subjects were molested and plundered by the predatory hordes of Lusitanians. The occasion seemed of such urgency, that two consuls, with consular armies, were successively sent to Spain. One of them, Fabius, forced Viriathus to evacuate the Roman province; but instantly on his departure the war broke out with redoubled fury. In the sixth year of the Lusitanian war the Romans found themselves still engaged in irregular and obscure hostilities, which lost them men and treasure, without offering hope of advantage from victory. The rage of warfare by this time had extended throughout the whole hill country into Navarre: the prætor Pompey, who stood at the head of an army despatched against Viriathus, allowed himself to be wiled into the mountains, and was routed with considerable loss. The consul Cæcilius Metellus, who had as prætor reduced Macedonia to a province, and had been graced for that achievement with an honorary surname, though he attacked the Celtiberian tribes with some advantage, could not succeed in disarming the rude warriors of the hill country. The above-mentioned victory over the prætor gained by Viriathus made it necessary to concentrate against him the whole force of the two armies. Quintus Fabius Maximus took the command as consul, and retained it as proconsul in the U.C. following year. In this year Viriathus succeeded in blocking the 612. whole Roman army up in a mountain pass, as the Samnites of old in the *Furcæ Caudinæ*. He had them now completely in his power; but used his fortune with unwonted moderation. He offered the Romans a free passage, on the single condition that they would leave his countrymen in peace in their own territory, while, on their part, he promised the cessation of predatory excursions. The proconsul acceded to these terms; the Roman people confirmed them; and this sanguinary war, which had continued now for eleven years, seemed concluded to the satisfaction of both nations.

This peace, however, displeased one of the members of the new oligarchy, which now had the ascendant in Rome. Q. Servilius Cæpio found himself baffled in the cherished hope of succeeding his brother Fabius at the head of an army in Spain, and accordingly plied the senate with the most urgent representations, to persuade them to confer on him full powers for recommencing hostilities. The senate refused to commit such a direct breach of its recent engagements, and refused to sanction a formal renewal of war; granting, however, secret permission to Cæpio to make war on the Lusitanians on his own account. It is not known whether this appeared too serious an undertaking to Cæpio, or whether he failed in lashing the Lusitanians into hostilities; nor is it known how he finally moulded the senate to his

purpose.* What is certain is, that a breach of the peace was at length sanctioned by that body.

Cæpio now took the field against Viriathus; but soon found that he was not to be reduced in open warfare. Viriathus made conciliatory overtures, which Cæpio encouraged, and invited the Lusitanian general to accredit three ambassadors to conduct negotiations in the Roman camp. These he induced by magnificent offers to murder their brave leader. After the deed the assassins found protection in the Roman camp, but the reward which had been promised was flatly refused them; and the Romans unreservedly avowed their satisfaction in having excelled even traitors in their treachery. The bond of union maintained by Viriathus between the several populations was now broken; and the Romans succeeded in confining the Lusitanians within their mountain fastnesses. On the other hand, a new war broke out in the north-eastern division of Old Castle.

This war with tribes, whose principal fortress and place of arms was Numantia, soon engrossed the whole attention of the Romans. A town possessing some 8000 defenders set the power of the republic at defiance. Consuls and proconsuls, with armies of 30,000 and 40,000 men, suffered the most ignominious reverses, and saved themselves by treaties, to which the senate refused its sanction, without, however, punishing their authors, or indemnifying those who had placed reliance in Roman faith. That state which aspired to subjugate the world could not subdue a single town without placing itself under Scipio's conduct, who had already founded far too great an influence on the ruins of Carthage.

Meanwhile Pompeius continued the contest with some ad- u. c.
vantage as consul, and even refused the most reasonable condi- 613.
tions when the Numantines themselves proposed to capitulate. The Numantines and Termantines, according to Appian, offered in concert to throw open the gates of their towns to the Romans, to furnish clothing for 9000 men, 3000 ox-hides for shoes, and 800 horses for the cavalry service; and, moreover, to give 300 hostages. But, as the war took a less favorable turn in his proconsulship, he meditated bringing it to a close by double treachery towards Rome and towards Mumantia. A verbal treaty was closed with the Spaniards; a written one, of different tenor, drawn up to be laid before the senate. The Numantines performed their part of the treaty; but Popilius Lænas, who was appointed as a successor to Pompey, refused to fulfil the terms of the treaty in favor of the opposite party, and referred them to

* The account of these transactions is to be found only in Appian, whose narrative is so summary and naked, that it is vain to look for any internal connection in it. His facts are strung together without natural consecutiveness, and with no regard to geography or topography. His statements with regard to Cæpio (c 70.) are as follows:—"When Cæpio succeeded Servilianus in the command of the army, he disparaged, in his reports (*διεσαλλε,*) the peace which had been just closed, and affirmed it to be in the highest degree dishonorable. Accordingly, the senate at first gave him leave to give Viriathus any underhand annoyance he could. On his pressing the senate further (*ὡς δ' αὐθις ἐρωχλει,*) and, incessantly sending fresh reports, the senate permitted an open breach of the peace, and a formal commencement of war with Viriathus."

the decision of the senate. In that assembly Pompey disowned the unwritten negotiations, in impudent defiance of all evidence; the senate annulled them, and war began anew.

Popilius Lænas cautiously abstained from all attempts on Numantia; and his successor, Mancinus, who kept the town in a state of blockade for some time, durst hardly venture a movement beyond the trenches of his fortified camp. Whenever the Romans ventured out, they were cut off in detail by the natives; and Mancinus at length set his army in motion with so little precaution, that a few thousand Spanish troops, who followed close at his heels, contrived to pen up the Roman troops in a narrow pass, and to bar their issue. Recourse was had to negotiation, under the conduct of one of the most considerable persons in Rome, the quæstor Tiberius Gracchus, son of the famous Cornelia. The Spaniards, who confided more in him than in the proconsul, only demanded, as before, to be left in peace and quiet*; and allowed the Roman army a free passage. The senate no sooner learned this termination of the affair, than it declared it would not hold itself bound to the treaty, and prepared to despatch the consul of the following year against Numantia.

New disasters, but no decisive result, took place in the following year, under the consulship of Lipidus and Calpurnius Piso.

U. C. But at length the war was placed under new auspices. Scipio, the 617. popular idol, seemed the only leader who could wash out the long dishonors of the contest. A man who had such influence as Scipio, no less in the allied states than Rome; who in the war with Carthage, had raised and maintained an army from his private resources;† who combined all the great qualities of a general, with all the highest attainments of a statesman, had of course, very superior means of concluding the contest to those which had been possessed by his precursors; yet even he was detained three years before this insignificant fortress, and, when he took it at last, was forced to behold a yet more horrible spectacle than he witnessed in the agony of Carthage. Those women and children sought their death in the flames who escaped the sword; and Scipio held his bloody triumph in Rome without exhibition of spoil, the vanquished having destroyed their arms—they possessed no other treasure.‡

* *Περὶσχόντων αὐτὸν τῶν Νομαντίνην, καὶ πάντας ἀποκτείνειν ἀπειλούντων εἰ μὴ συνθόβοι εἰρήνην συνέθετο ἐπὶ ἴσσει καὶ ὁμοίᾳ Πρωγαίοις καὶ Νομαντινοῖς.*—*App.* l. vi. c. 80.

† “Jugurtha joined the army in Spain from Africa, not in the character of ally of the Romans, but in that of a friend of Scipio, and brought with him twelve elephants, and a good number of archers and slingers.”—*App. de Reb. Hisp.* c. 89.

‡ Florus's description of the last hours of Numantia does not exactly agree with that of Appian, which was probably derived from the work of Rutilius Rufus, an eye-witness. The passage of Florus is, however, of such beauty as may excuse its insertion:—“Itabue deplorato exitu in ultimam rabiem furoremque conversi, postremo mori hoc genere destinarunt. Duces suos, seque patriamque ferro et veneno, subjectoque undique igne peremerunt. Macte fortissimam et, meo judicio, beatissimam in ipsis malis civitatem! asseruit cum fide socios, populum orbis terrarum viribus fultum sua manu, ætate tam longa, sustinuit. Novissime maximo duce oppressa civibus, nullum de se gaudium hosti reliquit.”—*Lib.* xi. c. 18. § 15.

About this time a revolt took place amongst the slaves in Sicily, now reduced to a province of Rome, and, like Italy itself, divided into vast private estates. Under their leader, Eunus, a slave like themselves, of Syrian origin, they withstood the force of successive prætors during four campaigns, till at length Perperna succeeded in enclosing them in the fortress of Enna, and taking the place by storm with the slaughter of 20,000 of the insurgents. The rest of their number were nailed to crosses along the highways throughout the island.

CHAPTER II.

AGITATIONS OF THE GRACCHI.

WHILE Scipio was in Spain, there arose in Rome itself a series of revolutions, which continued for a century, and ended in the establishment of absolute military power.

The first occasion of disturbance was, that Roman public functionaries, or even simple senators, or members of great families, were in the habit of committing the most flagrant acts of violence, and of making the most extravagant and oppressive demands throughout the allied towns of Italy. The inhabitants of these towns (part of whom possessed the right of suffrage at Rome) only, therefore, waited for an occasion of revenging themselves on their arrogant lords and masters; and this made every tribunitial movement in Rome doubly terrible, because it might so easily extend itself to the rest of Italy.

The second capital grievance throughout Italy was the depopulation of the land and disappearance of the free population, while the multitude of slaves ever increased. Agriculture, it is true, was admirably conducted, but in the manner of a wholesale manufacture. The hands employed in its processes were merely used as machines. The city became filled with Roman citizens who had sold their patrimonial heritage, or with colonists and disbanded soldiers, who had not thought it worth their while to cultivate the allotments of land which fell to their share from the public domains, and had parted with them to some grandee who possessed estates in their neighborhood. The effect of the increase of slaves, and their employment instead of free day laborers, struck Tiberius Gracchus so much in a journey through Italy, that, as he afterwards expressly declared, he was led by this observation alone, to entertain the thought of a new division of the public property.*

This led at once to the main ground of debate. We have seen that the Licinian law was expressly enacted to hinder the rich, who had in their hands all the public offices, and consequently all the means of appropriating state property, from converting the *ager publicus*, or demesne lands, into private estates. The practice thus prohibited had, nevertheless, become general. The cultivated land had been converted into pasture, and the herds, it was found, could be more cheaply tended by slaves than by freemen. This process was productive of

* One of Cæsar's wisest laws was enacted against the ever-increasing employment of slave-labor:—"Neve hi qui rem pecuariam facerent minus tertia parte puberum ingenuorum intra pastores haberent."—(Suet, Cæs. c. 42.) See also Mitford's History of Greece, vol. v. p. 401.

effects extensively mischievous, as the greater part of Italy, at one time or another, had been converted into Roman public property. Men the most enlightened and the farthest removed from demagogues, the *princeps senatus*, Appius Claudius, the great jurist, Mucius Scævola, and the *pontifex maximus*. Crassus, acknowledged the universal empire of Rome to depend on the race of free Italian husbandmen. They united with Gracchus, so soon as he came forward with his proposal for the re enactment of an agrarian law, or, at least (as was the case with Scævola), took no part against him. By the turning of vast tracts into pasture, the public revenues also suffered, as the grazing-money and other dues reserved on lands thus employed were in practice found so difficult to be levied, that they were finally abolished altogether by the Thorian law. The amount of the dues was likewise often disputed with the revenue-farmers, by the influential families who possessed themselves of the public estates. When Tiberius Gracchus, on taking the office of tribune of the people, openly declared his design of renewing the agrarian law, he was, of course, regarded by one party as author of seditious movements and dangerous disturbances, by the other as assertor of the old Roman immunities. At first, he sought to reconcile the maximum of improvement in the condition of the poorer burghers with the minimum loss to the rich, by not insisting on the entire re-enactment or enforcement of the Licinian law in all its original strictness: but proposing compensation to the occupants for the buildings and improvements on the lands which came within its provisions. His proposal went to divide among the poor so much of the common lands in the occupation of the rich as exceeded a certain extent. The father of a family might possess 500 *jugera* in his own right, half that extent in the right of his son. Pasturage was to be allowed for 100 head of oxen and 500 sheep. Employment was to be given to a certain proportion of freemen, as shepherds and herdsmen, as well as husbandmen. Three commissioners should annually be appointed to superintend the division of the public lands, and take care that the Licinian law respecting them should not again fall into desuetude, like every other regulation displeasing to the richer class. Appian and Plutarch have delivered down to us fragments of the speeches held by Gracchus, in order to obtain the suffrage of rich as well as poor in favor of these proposals. He addressed the former, very inappropriately, with appeals to their magnanimity and patriotism: the latter with the more persuasive inducement of deliverance from a state of contempt and misery. These fragments clearly show that his views were excellent at the outset, however the abstract merits of his scheme might seduce him into forgetting to weigh the means of its realisation. On the part of the senate (*i. e.* of the present possessors of public property), he encountered, of course, the most vehement opposition. Repulsed by the senate, he threw himself on the people. His colleague Octavius steadily forbade the slave whose duty it was to read the laws (which no tribune could read to the people in person) from promulgating the motion of his colleague. Gracchus, on the other hand, vehemently insisted that his bill should be read. And now commenced the long reign of disorder.

The people were furious. Octavius persevered in his opposition. Hereupon his antagonist stopped the whole machine of government, by proclaiming a *justitium*, or cessation of public business. So long as this interdict continued, the sittings of the prætor were suspended, and all the public offices closed. Tiberius took the further measure of sealing up the treasury, and thus stopping payments in every branch of the public service. To reduce Gracchus to submission, the rich called out their freedmen and clients. A regular tumult took place in the open forum. Even when Tiberius had at length carried his first point of getting his rogation read to the people, and had proceeded to erect booths for the voters, and caused the balloting-boxes to be placed in readiness, these boxes or urns, in which the votes were deposited, were removed by force by the partisans of the senatorial faction. From this moment the tribune also became head of a faction. To all the porticoes, walls and monuments, tablets or placards were affixed in which he was called on to carry through the good work he had entered upon in favor of the poorer class of citizens; and, according to Sempronius Asellio, in Gellius, he never left his house without an escort of three or four thousand men.

The senate might still have compromised, and given up something to save much. This was desired by Manlius and Fulvius, who would willingly have been friends both of the senate and of Tiberius. Tiberius, too, allowed them to persuade him to try a last appeal to that body: but the insuperable obstinacy of men who would not yield up even the smallest part of the public plunder, so long their undisputed possession, drove him back to the people. There Octavius stood again in his way. An ordinance of Sylla put it afterwards in the power of the senate to set aside the veto of a pertinacious tribune. When a tribune maintained obstinate resistance to any public measure, the question was referred to the senate, whether his intercession appeared to rest on private or on public grounds: *referebatur ad senatum, e republica essetne intercessio necne*. If the senate declared no public grounds to exist (*non esse*), he was next, in a friendly manner, advised to desist from his opposition—*agebat senatus cum eo ut tolleret intercessionem*. From that moment the resolution of the senate was considered valid against the tribunitial intercession: but only as *senators auctoritas*, not as *senatus consultum*. No such constitutional power was, however, possessed by the people at this, or, indeed, at any subsequent period. Tiberius, therefore, sought his remedy beyond the pale of the constitution. He declared, that either he or his colleague must quit office, if they continued to stand opposed to each other in a matter of such vital importance; and that it was for the people to judge which of the two was their real friend. The tribes were thereupon summoned to the vote; and so soon as the first, whose suffrage commonly drew after it that of the others, had declared itself against Octavius, Tiberius conjured him to yield. Octavius, notwithstanding, persisted. Seventeen tribes already having given their voices against him, Tiberius renewed his intreaties before he took the vote of the eighteenth, whose suffrage would decide the majority. Octavius persisted in his veto, and was formally deposed from his functions.

The rage evinced by the people against Octavius on his de-
position deterred others from following his example; and Ti-
berius not only passed his law, *Lex Sempronia*, but procured his own
nomination, with that of his father-in-law Appius Claudius, and his
young brother Caius, as commissioners for carrying the new Agrarian
act into effect. Hereupon his friends, for the most part country people,
returned to their harvest-work; while his enemies, on the other hand,
remained at their posts in the capital, and the senate sought, by every
possible artifice, to delay the execution of the new law. The injudi-
cious friends of established usages and regulations, according to their
usual practice, exasperated the opposite party by petty indignities aimed
against its leaders. In this spirit, the senate refused the usual out-
fit to the commissioners appointed under the new Agrarian law, and
voted them a contemptible sum (six sesterces, or somewhat less than a
shilling apiece) for their daily allowances. The consequence was,
that they appeared as martyrs in the public cause, and were amply in-
demnified in their circuit for the meanness of the government, by the
liberal reception of individuals. Tiberius now thought himself obliged
to strengthen his party. He studied popularity with the rabble of
the city, to whom he had not at first deigned to address himself: he
betrayed the greatest anxiety about his personal safety, and made
known a long list of new reforms in his contemplation.

The extreme measures now proposed by Tiberius, who was compel-
led to fly to the multitude from the rancor of the senate, justified the
anxiety displayed by the landed interest with regard to his views,
though not the means of which they availed themselves to prevent his
re-election for the subsequent year. The electoral assembly was held:
Rubrius, the friend and fellow tribune of Gracchus, presided: two tribes
voted for Gracchus, but the opposite party got up a regular fray in the
forum. Rubrius was either frightened or pretended to be so; in brief,
he gave up the presidency to Memmius, whom the opposite party had
brought, in place of Octavius, in the college of tribunes. The other
tribunes, indeed, made opposition, but the voting proceeded, and Mem-
mius took good care that it should go against Gracchus. The latter
dismissed the assembly; and, in his official capacity, adjourned the
election to the following day. The evening passed in preparations on
both sides for the morrow's conflict. Gracchus, says Appian, made as
though he had given up all for lost: he stayed out in the forum the
whole evening, attired in mourning: presented his son to the people,
and commended him to their guardianship, as if he were himself about
to sink under his enemies.* The poorer citizens, not only feeling
sympathy with Gracchus, but apprehending that his destruction
would be followed by their own servitude; revolving, moreover, that
Gracchus was exposed to such dangers on their account, accompanied
him home with loud lamentations, and bade him be of good heart for
the morrow. These demonstrations restored his courage; he assem-
bled his friends during the night, and concerted with them a signal
for the fray, should force be necessary.

* "αὐτίκα ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχθῶν ἀπολούμενος."—*De Bell. Civ.* l. i. c. 14

On the morrow the senate was assembled at the capitol, in the temple of the Goddess of Public Faith. Gracchus wished to hold the electoral assembly also at the capitol; his followers occupied the posts from whence, in case it came to blows, they could assail the opposite faction to advantage. These facts being learned by the senate, it declared that the moment was come when the state must be preserved by forcible means; and that the consul must stop the course of legal proceedings, and appeal to arms. In other words, it was resolved to entrust dictatorial power to the consul by the usual formula,—*Caveant consules ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*.

But Mutius Scævola, who had supported the proposals of Gracchus at the outset, refusing to be employed as a tool by the enemies of improvement, another instrument was sought for putting their plans in execution. Nasica, whose ancestors had acquired a name in the public service, did not hesitate to take the place of the consul, on his refusal to act. He declared that, since the consul, out of too solicitous care for the laws, was allowing the Roman empire, and, along with it, all its laws to perish, he himself, as a private man, took upon him the care of the republic. In order to do equal justice to both sides, we must not here forget the statement of Appian, that the tumult in the popular assembly, where the election of the tribune was to be held, had already reached such a pitch of violence, that the senatorial party and their clients had been driven from it by force, in order to carry the election entirely by the votes of the poorer class; and that Fulvius Flaccus, who brought Tiberius information from time to time of what was going on in the senate, of which he was a member, did his best to heighten the commotion. From the upper steps of the temple, where the senate was assembled, Nasica addressed the senatorial band around its entrance, drew his *toga* over his head, and led them to charge the adherents of Gracchus. The latter, unprepared for such an attack, took flight, were pursued by the senators, their clients and servants, knights and other citizens, and Gracchus himself was slain, with a considerable number of his followers, in their flight from the capitol.

The senate sanctioned this proceeding as one of necessary rigor; and even the consul defended an act which he had not chosen to execute. The slaughter of Gracchus and his friends was declared *pro-justa cæde*; while, on the other hand, the people were exasperated to such a degree against Scipio Nasica, that it was necessary to find a decent pretext for sending him out of the city. He went to Asia under a *pro forma* commission from the senate. The friends of Gracchus were hunted down without mercy. The senate, indeed, durst not directly recall the commission for dividing the public lands, especially as Papirius Carbo, a member of the popular party, succeeded Gracchus as tribune; and, in the year after his tribuneship, obtained a place in that commission with the friend of Tiberius, Fulvius Flaccus, and Caius Gracchus, his younger brother. But the oligarchical party had by that time gained a new prop in Scipio Æmilianus, who had returned from his Spanish victories with the honorary title of Numantinus. The commissioners for division of land not only met an

obstacle to their proceedings in the resistance of the senate, and that of all persons in the magistracy; but so many litigious difficulties arose in the assignments of land, that even the soldiers who had served under Scipio could not obtain their allotments. They applied to their former general; and Scipio employed this pretext to wrest the whole affair out of the hands of the commissioners. He caused instructions to be given to the consul, Sempronius Tuditanus, to give summary judgment in all cases arising under the recent enactments. The latter extricated himself from the business, under the pretext of putting an end, by force of arms, to the robberies of the tribes of Istria. Thus a total stop, for the present, was put to the promised division of land. Scipio died suddenly soon afterwards; and the circumstance of his death was turned into matter of suspicion against the still subsisting party of Gracchus, who were naturally embittered by his conduct in the recent transactions. U. C. 624.

Caius Gracchus, the brother of Tiberius, was only twenty years old when his brother, the tribune, procured his nomination as a commissioner for the division of public lands. His share in this commission, of course, contributed to the discredit into which it fell after the death of Tiberius. Caius, however, early displayed such eloquence and ability, that the senate sought a pretext for removing him and his friend, Fulvius Flaccus, from the city. The senate conferred on Fulvius a commission in the south of France, and kept Caius three years as quæstor in Sardinia. This mode of conferring offices amounted to a disguised exile; and the popular party, not without reason, viewed the removal of both their defenders as a sort of declaration of war: they accordingly held secret meetings in Rome, and throughout Italy, to lay down plans of future proceeding. The Roman laws were rigid enough against political unions of all kinds, and the senate only needed a man daring enough to enforce these laws with equal disregard of reason and justice. Such a man was Opimius, as we learn from the following history, in which his name occurs only too often. To this man, therefore, the senate entrusted the criminal investigation concerning the existing conspiracy, in which the mass of Italian allies were implicated; whose assemblies were held in Fregellæ, a place so near Rome, that the city precincts (*pomœrium*) extended in later times over the former domains of this town. The prætor fell on the focus of conspiracy with fire and sword, and even destroyed the town of Fregellæ, by way of a warning example. Numitorius, the first citizen of Fregellæ, who, to secure his own impunity, had betrayed his fellow citizens, although he alone had enabled Opimius to discover the conspiracy, narrowly escaped condemnation, and afterwards lived in Rome abhorred by all honorable men, but not the less courted by those who valued opulence far above honor.

The ferment which inevitably followed the severities and cruelties of the now unchecked oligarchy, favored the schemes of Caius Gracchus and Fulvius. The latter returned a conqueror from Gaul, where he had repulsed the tribe of Salians from the Grecian town of Marseilles, which had long been in alliance with Rome. Caius Gracchus left his proconsul, Aurelius Cotta, behind in Sardinia, when he found

his stay prolonged without necessity, and returned to Rome without being recalled. The censors, indeed, instituted proceedings against him on this account; but, as he presented himself in the character of a candidate for the tribuneship, and the people crowded furiously round the court, the judges durst not sentence him, and the senate could not prevent his election. His tribuneship, under the circumstances, could not but be a stormy one; and Gracchus himself felt that violent means alone could bring about the sweeping organic changes which he meditated. This was felt with the still surer presentiment of affection by his mother, the illustrious Cornelia, who had already dearly purchased the success of her maternal aims at distinction as the mother of the Gracchi. The fragments of her letters to Caius, preserved by Cornelius Nepos, forebode the issue of that course in which her younger son was now treading the footsteps of his brother, though not with equal singleness of purpose:—"You will say," she writes, "that to be revenged of our enemies is glorious; to none can that vengeance appear more glorious than it does to me,—if, however, it be attainable with safety to the republic. But if not, let our enemies escape, and remain our enemies, rather than that the republic should suffer ruin and dissolution." In another epistolary fragment, probably addressed to him on the intelligence of his standing for the tribuneship, she thus adjures him:—"I can swear by the gods, that, saving those who slew Tiberius Gracchus, no enemy ever gave me such trouble and affliction as you do in this matter;—you, whom it behoved to supply the place of the children whom I have lost, and to diminish, to the utmost, my anxieties in old age. Do not embitter the short remnant of life which is now left me. Cannot that consideration give pause to your eagerness to precipitate your mother's dissolution with that of the state? When will the madness of our race have an end? When shall we cease for shame to perturb and trouble the republic? If nothing else will do, compete for the tribunate, do what you will, when I shall feel it no longer. In that day you will honor me with the rites due to a parent;—In that day you will lavish vain ceremonial on the memory of her whom, alive and in presence, you have left abandoned and derelict. But Jove forefend that you should persist in this career of madness; which, if you do, I fear you will store up for yourself such life-long misery, that never again can you feel self-approbation."

These warnings were thrown away upon Caius, who, unlike his brother Tiberius, seems ever to have acted upon personal rather than public consideration. The very first measures which were proposed by him bear the stamp of private vindictiveness, and of love for low popularity. One of those measures was a special law against an individual, which in Rome was no less odious under the name of *privilegium in aliquem*, than prosecution by bill of pains and penalties commonly is in this country. Octavius was the object of this motion, and the purport of it was, that no magistrate once deposed by the people should be eligible to office ever after. This *privilegium in Octavium*, however, was afterwards withdrawn.

Another law, proposed and carried by Caius,* provided that monthly sales of corn from the public granaries should be made to the people at five sixths of the market price. He farther procured to be passed a law to abridge the term of military service,† by which no one was obliged to enter the army before seventeen years of age, and the legionaries were to receive clothing as well as pay. These laws exposed their author to the merited reproach of providing for the idle mob of the capital at the expense of the provinces, and of giving gratifications to the soldiery for the sake of securing their votes in the public assemblies.

Gracchus appeared to aim at subverting the whole system of government. The highest classes of citizens had hitherto given their votes first in the assemblies of the centuries; and their vote, in most cases, had drawn that of the others after it. But Gracchus introduced a law that the order of voting should in future be decided by lot. To make it clear that the sovereign power was not in the senate, but in the people, he caused the hustings (rostra,) from which orators addressed the people, to be so disposed that the speaker no longer faced towards the place where the senator sat, but towards the thickest concourse of the multitude.—“Even in the form of these assemblies,” observes Ferguson, “all appearances of respect to the senate was laid aside. The rostra, or platform on which the presiding magistrate stood, was placed in the middle of an area, of which one part was the market-place, surrounded with stalls and booths for merchandise, and the courts of justice; the other part, called the comitium, was open to receive the people in their public assemblies; and on one side of it, fronting the rostra, or bench of the magistrates, stood the curia, or senate-house. The people, when any one was speaking, stood partly in the market-place and partly in the comitium. The speakers directed their voice to the comitium, so as to be heard in the senate. This disposition Gracchus reversed; and, directing his voice to the forum, or market-place, seemed to displace the senate, and to deprive that body of their offices as watchmen and guardians of the public order in matters that came before the popular assemblies”

When he had gained complete mastery over the people, he first succeeded in carrying the point, that not Opimius, but C. Fannius, should be elected as consul. He then again sought for himself the tribuneship, and had no sooner obtained it, than he proceeded to attack the senate in a more sensitive point than ever. The decuries of the judges had been hitherto filled by senators only. Tiberius had passed a law appointing them to be chosen from the senators and equestrians indiscriminately. Caius now introduced a regulation,‡ that the judges should be chosen from the equestrian order exclusively.§

* Lex Frumentaria.

† De militum commodis.

‡ Lex Sempronia judiciaria.

§ This regulation of Caius was again amended by Livius Drusus, who procured a law that the judges should be chosen from knights and senators jointly. The subsequent changes of regulation on this point may be summarily indicated as follows:—in the year B. C. 90 (U. C. 664,) the prætor, M. Plautius Silanus, brought forward the Lex Plotia, according to which every tribe had the privilege of ap-

Caius aimed at extending the right of suffrage in Rome to all Italians, by procuring the repeal of a law which prevented their reception into the register of citizens at Rome, when they had not previously been erased from that of their native town. This proposal was distasteful to the city population, and to Fannius the consul, backed by Caius. Accordingly they took the part of the senate, and drove out the Italians, who flocked in numbers to the city. On this occasion, Caius lost the reputation of energy, and the favorable prepossession that every thing must yield to him, as he quietly saw strangers of respectability, who had been summoned by him to Rome to aid in the passing of his law, dragged from the forum before his eyes by the consul's order, as vagrants and disturbers of the public repose. In order to freshen up his popularity, he proposed the construction of new roads, edifices, and public works, that he might have at his command a tribe of contractors, capitalists, money-brokers, and laborers. He had already proposed the foundation of new colonies at an earlier period. Supported by him, his colleague, Rubrius, now made the proposal to extend colonization beyond Italy.

It was always with reluctance the senate sanctioned the formation of colonies beyond the bounds of Italy: all of the colonies out of Italy belong to a later period. It is evident how especially odious must have been the proposition of a colony in Africa, by the restoration of Carthage under the name of the Junonian colony. The senate, however, acceded to every thing, appointed ten commissioners for the establishment of this colony, and Caius Gracchus received permission to travel about with Fulvius Flaccus in order to collect their colonists. Meanwhile the senate availed themselves of this absence of the tribune totally to eclipse him in esteem, by means of his colleague, M. Livius Drusus. Livius, backed by the senate, systematically opposed Gracchus, and laid his veto on all the measures proposed by him;—in order to outbid him with the citizens and allies, not only proposing to establish for the burghers a great number of colonies, and amongst these three very considerable Italian ones,—Squillacium, Tarentum, and Neptunia,—but to pass a law for the allies, which placed them on a perfectly equal footing with the Romans with regard to military punishments.* The senate gave its support to these proposals, while it thwarted Gracchus in all his undertakings. The love of those whom Caius had won by offering and affording the most, soon passed to him v. c. who could give more, and the senate succeeded in carrying the 632. election of the merciless Opimius to the consulship.

Gracchus now stood a third time for the tribuneship, by virtue of a provision contained in one of his own laws, that a tribune, who had in-

pointing to the judicial functions, fifteen citizens, senators, or equestrians. This regulation was repealed by Sylla, who constructed the courts of justice solely from the ranks of the senate. About the year 70 B. C., the prætor, Aurelius Cotta, opened the courts to senators, *tribunis æranis*, and equestrians. When Pompey, in his second consulship (B. C. 55,) again regulated this matter, he annexed the following condition to the provisions of the *Lex Aurelia*; that wealthy persons only should be appointed.

* *Lex de tergo sociorum.*

roduced a project advantageous to the people, might be successively re-elected a sufficient number of times to carry it through for the benefit of the commonwealth. This time, however, Caius was not elected; it is not easy to say whether, as Plutarch thinks, because his own colleagues had been gained by the aristocracy to give a false return of the votes, or because he had the majority really against him. Meanwhile, he and Fulvius remained members of the commission which was sitting for the partition of the lands, and which was especially empowered to settle 6000 Roman citizens in the new Junonian colony, on the former site of Carthage. While the two friends of the people were absent, first to collect their colonists, and then to found the colonies, a string of prodigies were announced, which signified the displeasure of the gods at the rebuilding of Carthage; and the tribune, M. Minutius, called on the people to repeal the law which established this new colony.

Caius and Fulvius returned, and endeavored to maintain their law; their friends streamed to Rome; disturbance, noise, and violence filled the forum. This had been expected by the senatorial party; and it seems to have been inferred by them, from the former demeanor of Caius, when he quietly allowed his Italian friends to be driven out of the city, that he had not courage to face a civil war. Nor were they mistaken. On the decisive day, the consul, Opimius, occupied, with his armed force, the most advantageous positions on the Capitoline hill, and awaited the signal for attack in the temple of Castor and Pollux. Caius would not hear of open conflict, yet the next morning he entered the assembly attended by armed men. A struggle was inevitable; the senate only waited a pretext for authorising the consul to commence active hostilities, for which they had made ample preparation. They had armed themselves, their clients and partisans, who were ready to act at the word of command against Caius's party. The equestrians were also arrayed for service, and every knight brought two armed slaves with him. The accidental murder of a consular lictor furnished the desired pretext, and the senate passed a decree to meet force with force. The rest was the affair of the consul, who had his own vengeance to gratify, as well as that of his order. Driven by force from the forum, Gracchus and Fulvius turned their houses to fortresses, and were summoned to give account of their proceedings. At this moment, when all were in arms, Fulvius would have occupied the Aventine; but Gracchus wished to negotiate, and sent a messenger to the consul. Opimius threw his messenger into prison, and marched with an armed force against the adherents of Caius, who fled; he himself escaping across the Tiber, where, in order to avoid the rage of his enemies, he caused himself to be slain by his confidential slave, Philocrates. Flaccus was betrayed by a friend with whom he had concealed himself. Several hundred citizens, it is said, were slain on the spot: the number of the judicially murdered is computed by the documents quoted by Plutarch at some thousands. This cruelty of the conquering party bred the bitterest enmity between the aristocracy and the people, the rich and the poor. The conquerors, and most of the grandees, were confirmed in their arrogance, and conceal-

ed their pride and profligacy so little, that the corruption and unblushing abandonment of the sovereign oligarchy in Rome, can be fitly compared with no other phenomenon in history, but the shamelessness of the ruling order in the age of Louis XV. Men like Opimius Scaurus, Calpurnius, abused the highest dignities in a manner the most scandalous, for their private ends, as was evidenced by the scenes unveiled to the popular indignation shortly after in the course of the Jugurthine war.

It is one of those perpetual contradictions in the nature of man, which so frequently salute, the student of history, that in these times, when the most important forms of the constitution were transgressed without hesitation by all parties, the most rigid adherence was enforced to the veriest trifles of ancient observance. The amusement of the people had become a matter of public charge; gladiators and wild beasts were provided by the state, and frequent accidents took place from the falling in of the scaffoldings erected for the temporary use of spectators at public shows. Nevertheless, the erection of a theatre built of stone was denounced as a Grecian innovation. The work, when advanced nearly to completion, was pulled down by order of Scipio as consul: and an edict passed, that no permanent structure of the kind should be in future undertaken in Rome, or within a mile of its walls.*

* Val. Max. l. ii. c. 4.

CHAPTER III.

JUGURTHINE WAR.

The course of events in the Jugurthine war is of more moment with reference to the internal relations of Rome, than on account of the extension thereby received by the Roman province of Africa; and Sallust has very judiciously commenced the general history of his own times with the narrative of this contest.*

Massinissa, the ally of Rome, died in extreme old age. His U. C. 605. three sons at first divided the kingdom of their father amongst them. Two, however, died in the same year, which had witnessed his death, and the whole of Numidia fell to Micipsa alone. The latter adopted Jugurtha, a son of his deceased brother Mastanabal; and perceiving that Jugurtha had won the friendship of Scipio Æmilianus, constituted him, after his death, heir of equal parts of his kingdom with his own sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal.

Jugurtha was an *African* prince. It is needless, therefore, to express so much astonishment as Sallust, that he sought to deprive his kinsmen, the sons of his benefactor, of power and life. We know from later sources the nature of rulers in these regions and climates. It might rather excite surprise, that in his violent designs he neither dreaded the protection which the Romans had promised Massinissa's descendants, nor the guarantee they had given Micipsa, that his sons should not be subjected to any territorial encroachments. But Jugurtha knew the Roman aristocracy and men in general. He had served with the Roman legions at Numantia, could calculate the weight of money and influence on their leaders; and, accordingly, did not hesitate to put Hiempsal to death, and to seize the share which the latter had possessed in the realm of Numidia. Adherbal escaped Jugurtha's hands, fled to Rome, and solicited the senate for protection and vengeance. But Jugurtha had a stronger party than justice. The consul Scaurus, indeed, urged rigorous measures;† but the majority of the senate resolved that Adherbal and Jugurtha had equally a claim on their protection, and appointed ten commissioners to make equal division of the realm of Massinissa, between the brother and murderer

* Sallust states, as his inducements to write an account of this war,—“Primum, quia magnum et atrox, variaque victoria fuit; dein, quia tum primum superbix nobilitatis obviam itum est, quæ contentio divina et humana cuncta permiscuit.”—(c. 5.)

† Sallust thus characterises this eminent man:—“Æmilius Scaurus, homo nobilis, impiger, factiosus, avidus potentix, honoris, divitiarum: cæterum vitia sua callide occultans.”

of his grandson. At the head of the commission stood the merciless Opimius, who, with his fellow commissioners, sold Jugurtha the better part of the land in debate, in utter disregard of the rights of Adherbal and the precepts of equity.

u. c. 630. So early as the following year, a new war broke out between these two near relations and mortal enemies: Adherbal was defeated near Cirta, but had time to take refuge in that place, where he hoped to maintain himself long enough to be rescued by the armed intervention of Rome. His ambassadors appeared there; and his letter moved the senate to despatch a Roman embassy to Africa. Jugurtha, however, put them off with excuses, and pursued the siege of Cirta with redoubled activity. On the reiterated prayers of Adherbal, a new embassy came from Rome, with Scaurus, *princeps senatus*, at its head. His first step was to summon Jugurtha before his provincial tribunal. On this, a body of Roman troops, who had aided in the defence of Cirta, supposing their exertions no longer necessary, and relying on Scaurus and the Roman commission, capitulated with Jugurtha, and forced Adherbal to follow their example. Jugurtha, without any regard to the declarations and threats of Scaurus, put Adherbal to death, and took possession of his territories.

When this intelligence reached Rome, the senate appeared irresolute. It was only when informed that a tribune elect had begun to agitate the matter among the people, that Calpurnius received a commission to vindicate the honor of the Roman name by the punishment of Jugurtha. Jugurtha sent ambassadors to the senate, who refused to receive them unless he should first deliver himself up to the Romans in person. Calpurnius, whom the Numidian had corrupted by his presents, assured Jugurtha of pardon, and possession of his throne, on condition of his making a sham surrender of himself and of his military power into the hands of the Romans.

Unfortunately, Memmius, who was then tribune, stirred up the people, by unveiling the disgraceful traffic of these magnates with Jugurtha, and proposed and carried the mission of the prætor Cassius to Africa, to investigate the matter on the spot. As Jugurtha had ostensibly surrendered himself to the Romans, he was invited to come to Rome under assurance of safe-conduct, in order to be questioned in the open assembly of the people with regard to the whole course of the late occurrences. Jugurtha appeared: Memmius proceeded to examine him before the people, but he was interdicted from answering by a corrupted tribune, Bæbius, and even had the audacity, during his short sojourn at Rome, to cause a Numidian prince, who was there at the time to be assassinated. After this new atrocity, the Numidian was forced to decamp. Albinus recommended hostilities, and the former scenes of corrupt traffic were reproduced on the same theatre.

In the following year, Albinus left his brother Aulus as his substitute at the head of the army. The latter was beaten, and thereupon closed the most disgraceful treaty which had been ever contracted by

Romans.* Violent disturbances broke out at Rome on this intelligence. The consular election was postponed by the tribunes, and the business of the state brought to a stand, till the popular mind was calmed by the election of Metellus as consul, who instantly proceeded to Africa, to supersede Albinus at the head of the army. Metellus found he must place the army on another footing, before he could hope for a fortunate termination of the contest. Having restored discipline, he soon retrieved the honor of the Roman name; continued during the whole year in Africa as proconsul; and, if he did not wholly end the war, he was nevertheless honored with the surname of Numidicus, as an acknowledgment that he had only been recalled, because the people chose to make him atone for the transgressions of the whole body of nobles.

The odium into which that body was brought by the exposed transactions of Scaurus and his colleagues with Jugurtha, was most unjustly made to involve the proud but noble Metellus, by whom the Numidian was driven out of his kingdom in the first campaign. Metellus would even have captured the king, and put an end to the war, if the Mauritanian sovereign, Bocchus, had not taken the part of the latter. Meanwhile every possible step had been taken by Metellus to drive his new ally to extremities, when Marius, whose public career will presently have to be noticed, rendered his purposes suspected to the people, and accused him of protracting the war, in order to remain at the head of an army, to retain the rule of a rich domain, and provide for numerous friends and relatives. The people listened to Marius, elected him consul, and gave him the conduct of a war in which the senate had so lately intrusted the whole command to Metellus.

During all this time Jugurtha showed a malignity of character, combined with a consummate and sustained policy, military talent, and contempt of all laws, divine and human, that cannot without astonishment be contemplated. Metellus had taken Marius and Rutilius with him as lieutenants, to whom he could, without scruple, intrust the second place to himself in the army, because they had so distinguished themselves under Scipio at Numantia, that there was only one voice in the Roman army with regard to their merits. Sylla was attached as quæstor to Marius; and though they belonged to different parties in politics, yet Marius made use of him, because he had no turn himself for diplomatic intrigues and strokes of finesse, and yet perceived that the issue of this contest would depend on such practices. The event sanctioned his choice of Sylla, who cleared his way successfully through the labyrinth of African cunning and treachery. Jugurtha was reduced to extremities. Bocchus discovered that no advantage was likely to accrue to him from continued hostilities with the Romans; and Sylla who was sent to his court, knew how to work on his hopes and fears. Bocchus was at length induced to give up the person of

* Sallust (c. 38) gives the terms dictated by Jugurtha;—"Si secum fœdus faceret, incolumis omnes sub jugum missurum, præterea ut diebus decem Numidia decederet." The Roman leader accepts these terms, "*quia mortî metu milites nutabant.*"

his ally, by the prospect of obtaining a grant from the Romans of part of his dominions. Marius thus concluded the war in his third year of supreme command; but, to his great disgust, he had to share the renown of its termination with Sylla, and to find that the aristocracy, though they could not dispense with his own services, yet on all occasions sought to give his quæstor an invidious preference.

In the regulation of Africa, after the overthrow of Jugurtha, the Romans pursued their usual course of conduct. They inured the people by degrees to foreign domination, and familiarised them with the prospect of one day becoming subjects of Rome. One division of Numidia, bordering on Mauritania, was granted to Bocchus as a reward for his services in betraying Jugurtha. Another division, adjoining the Roman province, was annexed to it. A third was bestowed on Hiempsal II., a grandson of Massinissa.

CHAPTER IV.

CIMBRI AND TEUTONES.—SOCIAL WAR.—DISORDERS IN THE CITY.

MARIUS, who soon proved himself so eminently fitted to ride the waves of military democracy, combined with many qualities of the good old Roman character the coarse and earthy soul of a peasant struggling into eminence; and exhibited, from the entrance of his career, the low and grovelling cunning, as well as the stubborn remorselessness of nature, which seems instinctive properties of the mean yet energetic spirit, exclusively intent on self-aggrandisement. He was a *protege* of the family of Metellus; his father, a sturdy peasant of the old breed in a village of the neighborhood of Arpi, having been one among the clients of that family. But he soon perceived that the patron only contemplated raising his client up to a point where he might feel the full weight of his own superiority. The times were unpropitious to the pride of Metellus and his compeers: Marius, even as tribune, proved to his patron and to the whole senate that the days were past when patrician pride was patiently endured, because it was linked with merit and celebrity. Marius, during his tribuneship, made regulations against the influence of the nobility at elections, entitled the *Lex Maria de Suffragiis*. It was usual for the citizens, in going up to give their votes, to pass between railings which fenced them off from the multitude without. The aristocrats had made use of this circumstance, by causing the space between the rails to be made sufficiently wide for their partisans and dependants to stand ranged in the inside, in order to ply the voters with solicitations or menaces. The law of Marius limited this space, so that only the voters should have room to pass. The popularity which Marius might have acquired by this reform of elections, was for the moment effaced by another measure passed during his tribuneship, and which seems to show that he did not at the outset deal in all the low expedients of a demagogue. He abolished the pernicious regulation of Caius Gracchus, for distributing corn at a low price to the multitude from the public granaries, failed, accordingly, in his canvass for the ædileship; and, when he became a candidate for the office of prætor, was forced to adopt the usual ignoble means of popularity. From this time forth he became the man of the people, and, by consequence, the sworn foe to the nobles. It has been mentioned, in the history of the Jugurthine war, how he was raised on the shoulders of the people to the command in Africa. He was elevated to the consulship in the year in which he conquered Jugurtha; and in the following year he received the command in chief against the barbarian tribes of the Cimbri and Teutones,

v. c.
648.

who at this time threatened Rome with destruction. But, to his great disgust, the senate contrived again to attach Sylla to him, that he might, as in the preceding war, be a sharer in his glory.

The most erudite enquiries as to the origin and causes of the popular migration which has received the name of the Cimbrian war have led to no definite result, owing to the almost entire ignorance of the Greeks and Romans of the nature of the northern populations and languages. That the migration was neither purely Scandinavian or German, nor purely Celtic or Gallic, clearly appears from the accounts of the order of march of the Cimbri and Teutones, as well as of their bodily stature and mode of fighting. The barbarian torrent seems to have originally been loosed from the farther side of the Elbe; from whence a mingled horde of Germans and Scandinavians, of gigantic stature, savage valor, and singular accoutrements, descended southwards. On their route, a number of Celtic tribes, of which the inhabitants of the north of Switzerland and the neighborhood of Toulouse, or the Tigurini and Tectosagæ, are distinguished by name above the others, joined them; and in conjunction with them threatened to pour upon the Romans, who just then were pressing farther and farther on the side of Carinthia towards Austria, and on the west from Provence towards Toulouse.

v. c. 641. On the side of Carinthia, the Romans took the whole of Noricum under protection; and Carbo was destroyed with his army, in endeavoring to keep off the Teutones from that territory. On the other, they had extended their province from the Alps and the Genoese frontier to the Pyrenees; and had forced the native tribes as far as Lyons to accept their protection. The barbarians, instead of pouring on Italy after defeating Carbo, turned back and spread desolation in Gaul; and the Romans despatched an army against them under Spurius Cassius. This army was annihilated by the Celtic hordes, who had associated themselves with the Cimbri and Teutones. The barbarians terrified the Romans by their enormous stature, by their firmness in order of battle, and by their mode of fighting, of which the peculiarity consisted in extending their lines so as to enclose tracts of a league or more, and in forming barriers around them with their war-chariots.

The danger to the Romans from the combined German and Celtic populations seemed the greater, as the Jugurthine war in the beginning of the contest engaged their best generals. They therefore sent v. c. 647. Cæpio, quite in the spirit of the senatorial party of his times, plundered the Gauls, and seized their sacred treasures, instead of preserving discipline.* He retained his command and his army during 648. the following year also, though Manlius, the consul for that year, made his appearance in the province with a new consular army. Negligence, vanity, and jealousy, seem to be imputable to both commanders: they quarrelled, kept their armies asunder, and were utterly routed in succession. But the barbarians had no idea of following up

* Joh. Muller, Bell. Cimp. p. 17.

their victories; and, instead of concentrating their force for a descent upon Italy, they wasted Spain, and scoured the Gallic territories.

While the barbarians plundered Spain and Gaul, Marius was actively employed in exercising and disciplining his army. He busied the legions not only in military exercises and camp fortifications, but in digging canals and draining the unhealthy marshes near the Rhone. In Rome, his presence in Gaul was acknowledged so necessary, that, according to Cicero's testimony, even his enemies gave their votes for his continuance four successive years in the province, and at the head of the army, which, in a manner, had been formed by himself for the conflict with the Teutones. At length, in the u. c. third year of his command in Gaul, in his fourth consulship, the 651. Teutones and Ambrones made their appearance in the south of France; while the Cimbrians, and all the tribes united with them, attempted to break into Italy from the north-east. Marius held his soldiers back for a long time from a general action, and inured them to the impression which the aspect of the barbarians and their terrible mode of fighting was apt to make. At length, in a pitched battle near Aix, he destroyed the whole power of the Teutones and Ambrones. While yet engaged in solemnizing his victory, and burning, in honor of the gods, the useless waggons and martial spoils, he received the news of his re-election as consul for the next year. Lutatius Catulus, his colleague of the former year, remained, indeed, in this year, also, as proconsul, opposed to the Cimbrians; his talent, however, was not confided in, and the command in chief was given to Marius, though Catulus at the same time remained at the head of his own army. Catulus himself was no great general, but he had made use of the quarrel between Marius and Sylla to procure to himself, as lieutenant and subordinate officer, the latter, who had been in the army of Marius, and who had roused his commander's jealousy in Gaul, through valor and military skill, even more intensely than previously, as quæstor in Africa, through his dexterity in diplomatic transactions, Marius had taken Sylla, at first, as lieutenant with him to Gaul; afterwards the people had made him military tribune, and he had continued in the army of Marius; but the one circumstance, that the two men belonged to different parties in the state, whose violent animosity was just about this time renewed with double rage, was enough as a substantive cause of enmity; the consul's jealousy of the talents of his subordinate was another. They parted; and the Roman world ascribed the victory won by Catulus over the Cimbrians on the Etsch to the judicious arrangements and movements planned and executed by Sylla: that Marius had no further part in the affair than as he finished the destruction of the enemy with his army, he himself confessed.

It was highly prejudicial to Rome, that after this battle more than 60,000 of these terrible barbarians, and in the whole war more than 150,000, were made slaves, and distributed, for the most part, throughout Italy, Sicily, and Africa, at a time when Sicily had already been laid waste by successive servile wars, and similar wars daily threatened explosion in the other lands.

The intestine commotions of Rome, the renewed strife between no-

bles and people, the interposition of the Italians in that strife, and the beginning of the civil war between Marius and Sylla, claim from this moment our principal attention. The year in which Marius held his second consulship, and the next following, are especially remarkable for the inveteracy exhibited by four tribunes against the senate collectively, or against its individual members. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the great great grand-father of the subsequent emperor Nero, summoned the most considerable senator before his tribunal, deprived the college of priests of the right of filling its own vacancies, and assigned the right of election to the people. Cassius Longinus framed the terrible enactment, that no man who should once have been sentenced to penalties by the people could ever be restored to honor and office by the senate; and C. Servilius Glaucia, who had been infamous as prætor, as tribune not only restored the courts of justice to the knights, which had recently, by Servilius Cæpio, been divided between them and the senators, but also, by a law which Cicero designates as a terrible one,* encouraged the allies to the accusation of senators, by promising them the Roman right of citizenship whenever they should prosecute a public officer to conviction. The fourth, M. Acilius, even made the attempt to agitate afresh the affair of agrarian division. All this was but a prelude to the disturbances occasioned by Saturninus after the victory over the Cimbrians.

Saturninus had conducted himself in such a manner as prætor in Ostia, that it was out of the question for him to expect any further curule dignity. He therefore threw himself at once into the line of a demagogue, excited the most violent disturbances as tribune, and endeavored to draw Marius into his party by holding out allurements to his rapacity and ambition. Saturninus had been tribune twice in succession, and had during that time persecuted Metellus and the whole senatorial party with the utmost rancor. He now wished to be chosen a third time; and promised, in return, to help Marius to a sixth consulship. Marius, indeed, through Saturninus's efforts, obtained the consulship; but that consulship was the grave of his reputation. He was a poor speaker; lost all self-possession at the moment when he needed it most; and was jealous to a frantic extreme of talent and eloquence in others. Saturninus, however, could not carry through his own election as tribune: after a long contest, another was elected. This last elected tribune, Annius or Nonnius, was despatched by Saturninus's myrmidons on the evening of the same day on which he had been installed in his office, while the capitol was occupied by Glaucia during the night; and early on the next day a tumultuary election established Saturninus in the place of the murderer.

A tribune chosen in this disorderly manner could only hope to maintain himself by disorderly proceedings. A series of laws providing for the distribution of food to the populace, for an increase in

Cic. pro L. Corn. Balbo, c. 24. "Quod si acerbissima lege Servilia principes viri ac gravissimi et sapientissimi cives hanc Latinis, i.e. fœderatis viam ad civitatem populi jussu patere passi sunt—præmium quod nemo assequi posset, nisi ex senatori calamitate, neque senatori, neque bono cuiquam nimis jucundum esse posset."

the pay of the soldiers, and for the aggrandizement of the power and influence already conferred on Marius, were brought forward, and in part carried. In order to annoy the senate, the old regulation was renewed, that every decree of the people should take effect without its concurrence; and, moreover, it was on pain of death prohibited to interrupt a tribune in his motions before the senate. What was more, an obligation was laid on the senate to sanction within five days every act of the people. Through these regulations in favor of democracy, Saturninus hoped to maintain himself in the tribuneship; to make Glaucia, for the next year, consul; the quæstor Saufeius, prætor. At all times ready to repel force by force, he kept a band of armed freedmen constantly about him. The consular elections, also, were held under constant dread of violence; yet Glaucia, after all, was not chosen. The first choice fell on Antonius; the second on Memmius, whom the senate supported against Glaucia, but of whom the latter rid himself as Saturninus had done of his rival as tribune. This murderous act, coupled with the purpose avowed by the three leading demagogues and their followers, of occupying the capitol and maintaining their measures by main force, afforded the senate a fair pretext for giving the consuls authority in the usual terms to save the state by extraordinary measures. Accordingly, Marius, as consul, was under the necessity of putting himself at the head of the aristocratical party, to crush his friends. He would willingly have saved them, but could not. One was despatched in the conflict; the two others were stoned to death from the outside of the Curia Hostilia, where Marius had shut them up for safety from the conquering party.

Having made himself contemptible to both parties in the state, Marius quitted for a season Rome and Italy: on the other hand, Sylla began his career just at the same point of time, by canvassing for the higher public offices. He became prætor without having been ædile; and immediately afterwards found an opportunity in the Social War to show his martial qualifications in the most brilliant light, and to win the favor of an army, which afterwards, in the Mithridatic war, he made entirely his own by virtue of the spoils of Greece and Asia.

The disturbances in Rome, which gave occasion to the Social War, had their origin in the rigorous laws through which it was sought to prevent the introduction of the Italians into the Roman civic register,—a measure which was equally obnoxious to the mass of the poor citizens, who did not choose to share with others their right of suffrage, from which profit might be extracted, and to the aristocracy. In reliance on the city population, the consuls, Licinius Crassus and Mucius Scævola, at length ventured to revive the law of Pennus passed u. c. 627, which prohibited a concourse of aliens to Rome on days of public assembly, and required all the Italian towns from time to time to recall their denizens. This measure set all Italy in commotion; the burghers of the different towns held assemblies, and formed close combinations with each other. It transpired, that the allies meant to take advantage of the festival of Jupiter Latialis, in order to revenge themselves on the Romans, or to extort the right of citizenship by violence. In the year of Rome 662, Livius Drusus, favored at first by the senate, came forward with a series of proposals, whereby he hoped to please

all parties equally ; and as commonly is the case in such attempts at mediation, enlisted all alike among his enemies. He aimed at winning the poorer class of citizens by allotments of land, and the wholly indigent by distribution of corn ; to diminish the restless city populace by sending out colonies ; to restore the courts of justice to the senators, and to compensate the knights for the lost tribunals, by making 300 knightly families senatorial. In behalf of the Italian allies, he proposed their admission on the rolls of Roman citizens.* The Livian laws (excepting the last) was carried ; but their execution was difficult, if not impossible ; the senate either procured the assassination of Drusus, or sanctioned it at least, inasmuch as it prohibited any proceedings against the murderers ; and declared null and void all the Livian enactments, on the motion of the consul Philippus. Immediately thereafter, Varius made it a treasonable offence for any one to propose to confer the right of citizenship on the allies. On this the Marsians instantly took up arms, but were withheld from further advances by fair promises. Shortly afterwards, however, the war broke out in earnest. The Italians agreed to form an independent confederation ; to compose a senate of deputies from the allied towns and states ; and to elect quæstors, prætors, and consuls, from those states in rotation.

The number of Italian tribes which took part in the social war has been variously stated. It is conjectured by Micali, from a rare Samnite coin, on which eight men of different nations appear to be represented in the attitude of taking an oath, that the league was composed by eight principal nations. That the Samnites were amongst the most embittered against Rome at this epoch, he infers from another coin, on which the Samnite bull is represented in the act of setting his hoof on the Roman she-wolf.

v. c. 663. The struggle which now began was tremendous ; for the troops which had been furnished by the allies had formed, in general, the most effective part of the Roman army, and now confronted Rome, with her own weapons. The only means of escaping from destruction, was to detach from the alliance some considerable number of states, and rather to confer the right of citizenship upon them, than to set at stake the existence and supremacy of the capital. This was done : the senate declared at the outset, on the motion of L. J. Cæsar, the consul, through the Julian law, that all the allied states which had not entered into the combination should receive the right of citizenship. In the following year, the *jus Latinum* was conferred upon the colonies across the Po. But the senate firmly refused terms to such of the allies as had openly commenced hostilities, and levied forces to meet those of the rebels, partly in Rome and Latium, in the Sabine district, in Etruria, and Umbria, where the people wavered, and were only retained in allegiance by the opportune concession of the civic rights, partly from Liguria and Lombardy (Gallia Cisalpina,) both which latter districts of Italy vigorously supported the Romans. They were, however, compelled, in the course of the war, to arm the freedmen, and to form from among them twelve cohorts, in order to defend the coast from Cumæ to Ostia. Finally, after many defeats and victories,

* *Lex de civitate sociis danda.*

and after the fall of 300,000 brave men, the Romans were obliged to concede what they should have conceded at first, on the motion of Plautius Silvanus, who proposed that all the Italian allied states, which should have laid down their arms within sixty days, should receive the right of citizenship. But the states which had once taken up arms, now showed themselves obstinate; and the effusion of blood, and the desolation of Italy, continued for some time longer. The narrative of this inglorious struggle is obscure and imperfect. Its final termination will be presently found due to Sylla, the thread of whose achievements it is now time to resume.

The treatment shown by Sylla towards his soldiers; his adroitness, now in the application, now in the forgetfulness, of strict Roman discipline; his extortions in behalf of the soldiers; his humor, and his own propensity to those amusements and pleasures which he permitted to those who toiled in his service; made him the idol of the army. His merits were so fully recognised, that, according to Velleius, he was chosen, almost unanimously, consul, in his forty-ninth year v. c. and appointed to the command of an expedition against Mithridates of Pontus. 665. His army lay at that time in the neighborhood of Nola; he had destined it to go with him to Asia, as he meant to leave with his colleague the troops which had been levied to finish the war in Italy.

He had travelled to Rome for investiture in his consulship, and proceeded into Campania for the completion of his levies, when intelligence reached him that violent popular tumults had broken out in the city, and that Marius was again there, endeavoring to obtain, by means of the people, command of the army against Mithridates, which the senate had conferred upon himself. The tribune Sulpicius paraded the streets, surrounded by armed bands, and a set of ruffians whom he called his anti-senate; and the Italians, who claimed to be inserted in the civic register, streamed in extraordinary numbers to the city, on the promise of Sulpicius to bring forward a law which should confer on them a greater share in the government.*

The law was proposed; thousands of the new citizens were in the town; both parties, the old citizens and the Italians, fought with sticks and clubs in the streets and on the forum; and the law was near being passed by force, when Sylla was summoned out of Campania to the aid of the senatorial party. The senate was assembled in the temple of Castor, and regularly blockaded by the people, because it had caused to be announced the measure, usual in extreme confusion, of an interruption of all public business. In the clamor which arose for the removal of this interdict, Sylla's son-in-law was slain; his colleague escaped the hands of the mob with difficulty; and Sylla himself, to save his life, was compelled to take off the restriction of business, merely to be let out of the city. He betook himself to his army, while Sulpicius carried his law, and the appointment of Marius in Sylla's stead, as commander-in-chief against Mithridates.

* He urged their distribution through all the tribes; whereas, in their first insertion into the register, they had either been thrown into the eight insignificant ones, or eight new tribes had been erected for them, whose suffrages had only then been demanded, when the old five and thirty gave no decision.

U. C. 655. This was the signal for military government in Rome, which henceforward began to be treated in the same manner by its own generals, as the whole world had already long been treated by the Romans. Sylla declared to the army, that might prevail in the place of right at Rome; that the authority of the consuls was defied, and the old citizens oppressed by the new. He marched immediately on the city, without, however, communicating his ultimate intentions to the soldiery. The senate was kept under duress by Sulpicius and Marius; Sylla, consequently, despised the delegates nominally sent by it, but made use of the time spent in negotiation to occupy the Cælian gate, and the walls in the neighborhood of the Esquiline. Pompey had occupied the Colline gate, with a legion; and another had gained possession of the wooden bridge; while a fourth remained in the neighborhood as a reserve. Sylla himself hallooed on his troops to murder and plunder, and Rome was instantly stormed like a hostile town. The opposite party resisted long and bravely: when they were driven back, Marius vainly attempted to arm the slaves.* Rome now offered the aspect of a conquered city. Sylla's route was tracked with burning streets and streams of blood. A price was set on the head of the tribune Sulpicius; but when the same extreme measure was proposed to be extended to Marius, the venerable augur, Q. Scævola, loudly expressed his dissent, and replied to Sylla,—“Thou mayest point in vain to the bands of soldiers with whom thou hast beset the court; thou mayest vainly reiterate menaces of death; thou never shalt bring me, for the sake of the few drops of blood that creep in my old veins, to declare Marius an enemy of his country, who has rescued this city and Italy from destruction.” Marius, by a sort of miracle, escaped pursuit, after romantic adventures, and made good his retreat at last to an island on the African coast. The slaughter in Rome, on entrance of the troops, did not extend to the heads, properly so called, of the popular party; and accordingly, without new scenes of bloodshed, or a formal proscription, Sylla could not at present effect the complete revolution desired by him.† But for this there was no time, as the expedition against Mithridates required his instant departure from Italy. He extorted a solemn oath from Cinna, consul elect for the following year, that he would attempt no alteration in his recent arrangements in the city; the object of which was to curb the popular power, by restoring the mode of voting by centuries, instead of by tribes; and to strengthen the authority of the senate, while he increased its numbers. Cinna took the oath without hesitation; but did not even wait for Sylla's departure out of Italy, in order to commence new disturbances.

Plutarch, in the life of Sertorius, reckons at 6000 the number of the slain in the party struggles before Sylla's departure. This may, probably, be exaggerated; but even Cicero names this contest a war, in a place where he is treating of the bloodiest scenes of civil contention.‡

* Plut. Sylla, c. 9.

† Sylla's mode of proceeding is thus pithily stated by Cicero:—“Legionibus in urben adductis, quos voluit expulit, quos potuit occidit.”—Philipp xiv. c. 8.

‡ Philipp. xiv. c. 8.

CHAPTER V.

WAR WITH MITHRIDATES.—SYLLA'S DICTATORSHIP.

MITHRIDATES VI., the reigning monarch of Pontus, a kingdom which had risen on the ruins of the Macedonian dynasties of Asia Minor, was a prince endowed with unerring tact in availing himself of circumstances, and extremely little scrupulous in the choice of means to his ends. He continued true to this character through his whole life. His first plans were not levelled against Rome; his aim was to unite under his sceptre all the barbarous nations around the Black Sea, the regions on the Mæotis and the Tanais, and placing himself at the head of all the coast towns, to raise by their aid the barbarian tribes in their vicinage to the importance of a first-rate power. All the Greek towns on the Euxine, which had much to endure from the plundering Sarmatians and Scythians of Southern Russia, and the savage tribes of Caucasus, and were often entirely ruined by them, saw with pleasure the rise of a Greek empire of which they were destined to form integral parts.

When the king of Pontus had firmly established his power in a northern direction, prospects opened of rendering Asia Minor wholly dependent on him. But this was not so easy as his previous undertakings, in regions of which the Romans had no knowledge, and whither their arms had never as yet penetrated. Cappadocia and Bithynia now were in question,—two kingdoms which the Romans had long regarded as their tributaries—where the rapacity of their delegates found emolument, and the ambition of their great men employment. Bithynia was wholly in dependence on the Romans. Over Cappadocia, also, they had long assumed the guardianship.

Athens was the bulwark and head-quarter of Archelaus, who led over to Greece a division of Mithridates's army at the time when Sylla, attended by Lucullus and Muræna, crossed the sea, and marched on the above-named city. Sylla in the attack spared neither divine nor human property; he scrupled not to annihilate the most glorious works of art, and to despoil the region around Athens, the pleasure-groves and monument which, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the whole world had regarded as things sacred and inviolable. Six times was the town stormed. The last time it was taken, and wasted with fire and sword: the monuments indeed, were spared; but the inhabitants were hunted down without mercy. Cruelties still greater would have been exercised, had not Meidias and Calliphon, and the other Athenians previously banished from the town on account of their Roman sentiments, thrown themselves in supplication at Sylla's feet. After-

wards, when he captured the Peræus, he destroyed by fire the monuments and buildings there. Among them was the masterpiece of Philo, the Athenian arsenal. Archelaus was well aware that he, with his barbarian horde, was no match for a Roman army, and therefore did not wish to come to a general action; but his fellow leader Taxiles, had other views, and involved him in an engagement with the Romans. Archelaus was twice beaten, at Chæronea and Orchomenos. But Sylla had conceived so good an opinion of his military qualities, that on many occasions he testified his esteem for him in a manner which rendered him suspected to his king. Meanwhile Archelaus took advantage of Sylla's good dispositions, and the altered state of things in Rome, where Marius now again ruled, and Sylla's friends were mercilessly persecuted, to propose a peace on favorable terms to his master. Though Rome was in the hands of his enemies, and these had sent Valerius Flaccus, with a consular army, straight to Asia, to carry on the war which Sylla was waging in Attica and Bœotia, yet the latter rejected, with Roman pride, the proposal to cede Asia Minor to Mithridates, and in return to receive aid from him in the imminent civil war. In Delium, near the strait which separates Eubœa from Bœotia, Sylla and Archelaus held negotiations, the latter having full powers to finish the war on any conditions; since it was well foreseen by the crafty monarch that Sylla would soon be called away by intestine discords, and that a favorable occasion would then offer itself to him for retrieving all that any treaty could take from him.

U. C. 667. In Asia, a new struggle seemed prepared for the army of Sylla, with another led by a chief of the Marian party. Cinna, in the preceding year, had raised Valerius Flaccus to the consulship along with himself; and the latter had crossed over to Greece with two legions, in order to take the command away from Sylla. He had not dared to seek out Sylla himself, but had carefully gone out of his way into Asia, in order to finish the war there, before Sylla had done his work in Greece. Flaccus, being no general, had gladly accepted Fimbria's offer to attend him in the quality of lieutenant, but the latter combined with first-rate talents as an officer, all the corruption of his age, and took advantage of the unskilfulness of his general for his own ends. Even in the march through Thessaly, Flaccus had excited such discontent by his severity in the army, that a part deserted to Sylla, and the rest were only diverted by Fimbria from following their example. Not long afterwards, Flaccus quarrelled with his lieutenant: and the latter employed his influence in the army, fell on the consul by surprise, slew him, and assumed the command, without commission from the state, and without any official character. How superior in these times was a Roman army to any other, and how intrinsically feeble the whole artificial power of Mithridates, was abundantly clear in this instance; for Fimbria chased the king, without the slightest trouble, from Pergamus, shut him up in Pitane, and would there have taken him captive, if Lucullus, to whom he sent a message, had aided him with his ships. But Lucullus would receive no communication from Fimbria, who had no right to apply to him; still less would he

assist him to conclude the war without Sylla. Mithridates, therefore, escaped to Mitylene, and from thence to his states.

Sylla must before have commenced negotiations with Fimbria's legions; for at Thyatira he set himself down at once at a very small distance from his camp, had friendly intercourse with his soldiers, and called upon Fimbria himself to lay down an unauthorised command. Fimbria answered, that Sylla had as little right to command as he. But, however firm his deportment, however earnestly he summoned the soldiers and officers to resist Sylla's authority, he could not move them to take up arms against their fellow citizens. The steadiness and self-possession shown by Fimbria, even when he found himself deserted by his truest friends and his whole army, and the death which he voluntarily chose in preference to Sylla's offers of safe-conduct home-wards, would have been worthy of a better cause and a nobler-minded man.

While Sylla was concluding, for the present, the Mithridatic war, and plundering all treasures, sacred and secular, in Greece and Asia Minor, civil discord was raging in Italy, and victims were offered up by thousands to the restored ascendancy of Cinna and Marius. The former having been declared by the senate to have forfeited the consulship by his factious motions in favor of the Italian allies and the exiled Marius, had maintained his place at the head of a consular army, whose numbers were swelled by deserters from that of his colleague, as well as by recruits from the country, and now brought Marius back to the very gates of Rome in triumph, in spite of the feeble resistance of his fellow consul Octavius, and of Metellus, whom the senate summoned in haste from service against the revolted allies who were still under arms. In this emergency it seemed better to capitulate with Cinna and Marius, than to expose Rome to the horrors of a storm. The senate accordingly offered to reinstate Cinna in the consulship, and rescind the sentence of Marius and the other exiles, providing that, on their part, they would spare the blood of their enemies, or, at all events, proceed against them according to the laws of the commonwealth. Marius kept up a sinister reserve as to the terms of the senate: pretending, first, that he was outlawed, and, consequently, could not, without a formal decree of the people, re-enter the city; next, he would not wait till all the tribes had given their votes on the motion for his recall, which was laid before them by the tribunes, but marched in as an enemy, closed the gates, and put to death the most highly respected, honorable, and eloquent men in Rome. Merula, who was invested with the most sacred priestly office, that of flamen dialis, died on the altar of Jupiter, whose servant he was. Octavius was slain on the consular chair in his robes of office. Catulus, who had once been Marius's colleague in the Cimbrian war, was driven to self-murder by the rigor of the unfeeling old man. The rage of slaughter lasted five days and nights in succession. All who could save themselves fled to Sylla, or to Metellus and others who still commanded troops in Italy, who would not acknowledge the newly restored faction and the tyranny of Marius and Cinna. A senate assembled around Sylla, in opposition to the senate of Marius. On the wild rage of his

enemies Sylla rested a firm confidence of introducing a new order of things in Rome, and remodelling the whole state so soon as he should have obtained possession of Italy by force of arms, on which every thing now depended. His opponents were in no slight consternation at the intelligence of his victories in Greece. Old Marius, the only man who competed with him and his friends as a general, died on v. c. the seventieth day of his seventh consulship. Valerius Flaccus, whom Cinna took as colleague in the place of Marius, it has been seen, was in no condition to snatch from Sylla the Mithridatic laurels.

In the city, military measures, which Cinna had never approved, ceased to be executed, but arbitrary government went on. Cinna was v. c. third time chosen as consul and took Papirius Carbo for 669. his colleague. In the following year he was a consul for a fourth time, and Carbo for a second time with him. This Carbo, who descended from a family perfectly odious to the aristocratic party, was, besides, an extremely incapable person; and his incapacity was of necessity doubly destructive to his party, when he came to stand alone at its head. Sylla brought his army to Dyrrachium,—all the efforts of the well-intentioned to reconcile parties had failed; Cinna, on his part, had assembled an army, and was resolved to seek out Sylla on the other side of the Adriatic, when he was murdered by his own troops in Ancona. Carbo was not the man likely to execute what Cinna had failed in; the troops were untrustworthy, all the arrangements unskilful; the year was allowed to expire amidst preparations. When Sylla appeared in the neighborhood of Tarentum, Scipio and Norbanus, men without talent and as it should seem even without courage, had undertaken the consular office, and stood at v. c. the head of two separate armies, which were by no means 670. very ardently devoted to them. Lucullus, Metellus, Crassus joined Sylla with their armies, and Cn. Pompeius, afterwards surnamed the Great, came forward for the first time so prominently about this epoch, that Sylla postponed even senators of consular rank to this young man who had never held any office of trust or dignity.

The preponderance of military talent was wholly on Sylla's side—the majority of the senate was in his camp—yet he could not march immediately upon Rome; and this year too elapsed without a decisive action. In Italy, meanwhile, murder, conflagration, and plunder went v. c. on, as the revolted Italians were the principal prop and strength 672. of the opposite party to Sylla's. In the following year, Papirius Carbo was a third time consul, and adopted the young Marius as his colleague. The latter was beaten by Sylla, not far from Rome, at Sacriportus, and the first result of this defeat was a new scene of slaughter at Rome, where all the friends of Sylla were murdered before he made his appearance; the second result was the blockade of the young Marius in Præneste. Before Præneste fell, Sylla had once more to contend before the gates of Rome with the Samnites, Campanians, and Lucanians, led by Lamponius, Telesinus, and Gutta, who had made themselves known as chiefs of the insurgents in the Social War. Sylla's wing was overthrown; but Crassus, who led the other wing, with this obtained the victory, while Sylla abused remorselessly. Blood flow-

ed in torrents; even the prisoners of war were cut to pieces, and that at the same moment when Sylla had assembled the senate before the town in the temple of Bellona. Immediately afterwards, Præneste was taken; and on this occasion, also, many thousand Samnites and Prænestines were slaughtered in cold blood. All this, however, was merely a prelude to what Sylla committed afterwards as dictator, in order completely to carry through his proposed reformatations in the state. Never before, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus has well remarked, had the name of dictator been understood in the sense it was now taken by Sylla. Cæsar alone afterwards used the dictatorship in the same sense, but according to his nature, less cruelly. In order to give some semblance of right to the despotic power which Sylla intended to exercise, he procured his nomination as dictator to be performed in an extraordinary manner. There was only a single example in Roman history of a dictator being elected by the people, namely, Fabius Maximus, after the battle of Thrasymene. This example was followed. The senate chose an interrex, who assembled the people when it was ordained that a dictator should be elected in the person of Sylla for such time as might be necessary to remodel the government, and should be empowered to give the state such form and laws as he deemed most suitable.

A man who, like Sylla, combined in his own person all the accomplishments and all the corruption of his times—who seemed to stand on a solitary eminence, whence all things human and divine, as well as the lives of thousands, and all human opinion, faith, and knowledge appeared insignificant trifles; a man who had seen, suffered, and enjoyed whatever the world could afford, and was tired of it all,—who stood at the head of three and twenty legions, or 120,000 men (according to others a double number), was more capable than Robespierre and St. Just, who had something of the sort in contemplation, of bestowing through the extirpation of one generation a wholly new constitution on another. He aimed at exterminating all that could offer resistance to his plans—at modelling a new constitution out of the forms of the old, with more extensive powers to the aristocracy—and putting an end to the malversations of persons in authority, as well as to the abuses of the tribunitian influence. He was as far, however, from finding in the upper classes, to whom he gave preponderance through massacre and proscription, as Robespierre and St. Just had been from finding in the populace, such a generation as would have been necessary to impart to the new system any stability and duration. However wise are the laws which have been named after him the Cornelian, and great part of which have been preserved by Justinian up to our own days; yet the measures which he took for giving rewards to his adherents and security to his new constitution were merciless. To set himself up as king or despot in Rome, formed no part of his plan: probably, because the honors of tyranny did not seem to him an equivalent for its troubles and anxieties. Meanwhile, to be ready in case of necessity to enforce his commands by *voies de fait*, he formed a sort of body-guard of the slaves of proscribed and murdered grandes, to whom he gave freedom and property, and who composed, under the name of Cornelianians, a clientage of 10,000 men, in-

dissoilubly attached to Sylla's fortunes. In like manner he made provision in Italy for the army which had served him in that country and in Asia, and planted his true legionaries in the place of the extirpated population of whole districts. During two years Sylla retained the extraordinary powers which had been committed to him. In the first year he caused two consuls to be chosen as his subordinate officers—in the second he was consul and dictator at once in person, and took Metellus Pius for his colleague. In the third year, he not only declined the consulship, but quite unexpectedly laid down the dictatorship, convinced that he could resume his former dignity at any moment when it might be necessary.

To explain the multitude of victims offered to his rapacity, his plan of reformation, or his personal safety by Sylla, would lead too far into detail. Appian gives the number of the slaughtered at 100,000 Roman citizens, 2600 knights, 90 senators, and 15 men of consular rank.

It may be sufficient here to touch upon those regulations of which the object was to establish an aristocratic government, at a period when Sylla might have learned from his own experience, that a well organized monarchy was the only form of government corresponding with the wants of the people, as well as those of his grandees. The senate, not the people, was in future to be ranked as the highest authority of the realm: thence the tribunes were deprived of their influence. It was decreed that senators only should be capable of that dignity, but should be excluded by acceptance of the tribuneship from every other magisterial function. The right of appeal to the people was taken away from them; that of intercession limited to certain defined cases, and subjected to the decision of the senate (as was already observed in narrating the agitations of the Gracchi.) That body, greatly weakened by his proscriptions, and by the persecution under Cinna and Marius, was strengthened by Sylla, through the infusion of 300 knights, whom he caused to pass a regular election through the tribes. He increased the number of quæstors to twenty, that of prætors to eight, and ordained that offices should only be sought by regular gradations. The high priests should again, as formerly, fill vacancies in their numbers by their own election, instead of being chosen by the people; their number was fixed at fifteen, like that of the augurs and the guardians of the Sibylline books. For all offices up to the consulship, he abolished the regulation, that a certain number of years must elapse before ascending from one to another; but ten years were to intervene betwixt every consulship. He restored to the senate the tribunals, withdrawn from it since the time of the Gracchi, and endeavored to set limits, by severe regulations, to the abuses of judicial and administrative functions.

The principle followed by Sylla in his endeavors to establish a firm basis for his new institutions, lies in the answer given by him, in perfectly cold blood, on being asked when the executions should terminate. In the same style in which Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon declared that all the enemies of the people must die, he openly pronounced that all his enemies must die; and in the execu-

tion of this threat he remained a little behind his word as did the above mentioned heroes of the reign of terror in France.

While Sylla exercised sovereignty in Rome, Pompey raised himself to a height of reputation which involved him in an error with regard to the force of his own talents. Sylla, who regarded himself not as a great man, but as a man favored by fortune, fancied he saw in the first occurrences of Pompey's life, tokens of the same favor of fortune which had formerly thrown Jugurtha into his own hands, and procured him a share in the conquest of the Cimbrians.

Pompeius Strabo, the father, had, in the course of the Social War, laid waste, and repopled with his dependants, the district of Picenum, and had consequently established there that species of influence which was required in order to fix the place for his family amongst the ruling houses of Rome in these times. In like manner, Syracuse was under the patronage of the Marcelli, Lacedæmon of the Claudii, the Allobroges of Faibus Sarga, Bononia of Antonius, &c. The enormous wealth amassed in the most disgraceful ways by his father enabled young Pompey still more to extend his family influence; so that, on Cinna's death, without having held any public office, and without any legal commission or authority whatever, he assumed the functions of prætor at Auximum, and gathered round him the host of his Picenian dependants, and the relics of his father's old army. Putting himself at the head of these volunteers, he joined Sylla, after gaining important advantages over the troops of the opposite faction; and Sylla was so delighted with his lawless vigor of conduct, that he saluted him, on meeting, with the name of *Imperator*; or, in Plutarch's expression, he shared with a man who had no right even to sit in the senate, a title for which he was then contending with Marius and the Scipios. The same independent mode of proceeding, which Sylla at first received with applause, could not fail in the end to make him jealous of his youthful adherent. He did not, however, consider it advisable to give any provocation to a young man whose popularity with the troops already rivalled his own; and, on his retirement to his country estates in Campania, and death, in the course of the same year, Pompey came to be generally regarded as chief of the aristocratic party, and as heir of the influence exercised by Sylla on the soldiery. This appears on occasion of the quarrels which, immediately after Sylla's death, broke out between the two consuls, Lepidus and Catullus. Æmilius Lepidus, the only one of the rapacious grandees of this period who seems to Cicero comparable with Verres, wished to avail himself of Sylla's death and his own consulship to elevate himself to the head of a party: with these views, he proposed the recall of the exiles, the restoration of their property, and the abolition of all the Cornelian laws.

This proposal, in fact, amounted to nothing less than a new revolution, which could only be effected in the same manner as the preceding one;* consequently, Catulus, and the senate with him, opposed it;

* "Nam cum jure belli Sulla dictator proscripsisset inimicos; qui supererant, revocante Lepido, quid aliud quam ad bellum vocabantur? quumque damnatorum civium bona addicente Sulla quamvis male capta, jure tamen repeterentur, repetitio eorum procul dubio labefactabat compositam civitatem."

Florus, l. iii. c. 23. s. 3.

but Lepidus, before even the time of his consulate was elapsed, betook himself to his province, Cisalpine Gaul, and here, and in Etruria, all the exiles who were robbed of their property, all who were unsteady and rambling, flocked to him in multitudes. He approached the city; but Pompey, by authority from the senate, who had renewed the Plautian law, declaring it capital to surround the senate with an armed force, and Catulus with him as consul, had occupied the Janiculum and the Milvian bridge, and drove Lepidus back: his army was scattered. However, the disturbances were not therefore appeased as yet. Lepidus kept his footing in Etruria, where he took a strong position on the promontory near Cosa; and his comrade, too, the prætor Brutus, seemed resolved to remain in Modena. Pompey was sent against both though he could not be said to have any other right to this command than his hereditary succession to the military dominion of Sylla, and the senate's apprehension of a new revolution. Pompey put a speedy termination to the business, and now took a station in Rome such as no one had ever attained before him.

CHAPTER VI.

SERTORIUS.—SERVILE WAR.—PIRATE WAR.

THE wars in Spain, in Dalmatia, on the Macedonian frontiers, the undertakings of the pirates, the servile wars in Italy and Sicily, occupied a considerable number of legions during this period, and gave the friends of Sylla opportunity enough to assert their position by force of arms. But their disunion among themselves rendered it easy for a man far superior to them all in spirit and talent to exalt himself, by unobserved steps, above them. Julius Cæsar alone, among all the great men of the period, had rightly judged from the first that neither adhesion to the detested party of Marius, nor attempts to shine in the new aristocracy introduced by Sylla, could raise him to the height at which he aspired, as he felt himself worthy of it. He waited quietly till his time came, and encouraged, meanwhile, every alteration in the state which went to restore to the tribunes the power of which Sylla had despoiled them.

It has already been seen that Lepidus and Brutus were unlucky in their attempt at overthrowing the whole Syllian constitution; Turpilius, a tribune of the people, was bent, at least, on restoring the rights of the tribunes, even if he could not hope to effect a total revolution; he was, however, too insignificant to carry through such a project. Sicinius, who repeated some time afterwards the experiment of Turpilius, and even summoned before the tribunal of the people the consul Curio, who sturdily opposed him, is said to have atoned, with his life, the biting jests which he heaped upon Curio's gesticulations and the gouty unwieldiness of his colleague. In all probability Curio U. C. had him murdered. This, however, did not prevent the affair 679. again being agitated; this time, indeed, with assent of one of the consuls. The tribune Opimius, supported by the consul Aurelius Cotta, carried through the restitution of the character of inviolability to the tribunate, the right of intercession, of proposing laws, and harranguing the people.

Four men of Sylla's school, or, in other words, of the confidants and partners of his policy, stood at this time at the head of affairs, and attracted around them a court composed of all the other senators. Of these the most powerful was Pompey, Crassus the richest, Lucullus the most splendid, and Metellus the noblest, till he yielded, in Spain, to the vices of his age. All four appeared either together or in succession at the head of the affairs of the state, or as leaders of the armies which were levied in Spain against the native inhabitants and the rel-

ics of the party of Marius, in Italy against the slaves, in Asia against Mithridates and the pirates.

Sertorius, who had held command in Spain under the Marian party, and had served that party actively in Italy, on its ruin in the latter country hastened back to Spain, and found no difficulty in resuming possession of the province, but by Sylla's command was soon again expelled from it by Annius, who was sent thither by the dictator with not inconsiderable forces. He was compelled to fly to Tingis on the Mauritanian coast, where he soon gathered around him all the Romans, Italians, Spaniards, and others, who either fled from the dread of Sylla's system of terror, or had actually escaped the general massacre; and among these so great a number of eminent senators of the Marian party, that he was borne out in affirming that Rome's legitimate government consisted not in the new senate of Sylla at Rome, but in the old one which he had brought together in Africa.

Sertorius combined with all the talents of a Roman general the qualities of a second Viriathus, and his manner of life to the last was completely adapted to that of the Spanish tribes, who attached themselves with the greatest ardor to him. He was in the neighborhood of the Ebro when Metellus was sent against him. The latter, indeed, drove him from the Ebro, and advanced to the sea coast; but neither he nor his soldiers could endure the hardships and privations of a war which was sometimes wholly left to the conduct of the native Spaniards, and waged by them in their own peculiar manner, sometimes again conducted in the Roman mode by Sertorius. The war was drawn out into length. Sertorius formed a regular government, and an army of Spaniards, disciplined in the Roman fashion, and at length entered into alliance with Mithridates, the latter having recommenced the war, and having offered a place of refuge, at his court, to the adherents of Marius.

u. c. 678. From various causes, vehement apprehension was excited by the movements in Spain; a wish was also perhaps felt to remove Pompey from Italy. He was therefore sent to Spain with a second army. His destination there was to partake the command with Metellus, with the title of proconsul, though up to this time he had held none of the higher administrative functions.

679. In the following year, Metellus, as well as Pompey, were successful in an attack on certain Spanish towns, and in desultory actions with Sertorius's subordinate officers, but in the battle between Pompey and Sertorius on the Sucro (Xucar,) the advantage was on both sides so exactly equal, that Sertorius would have renewed the action the next day, had not Metellus, come up to Pompey's aid with his whole army. From thenceforward the Roman generals combined all their movements; though each remained at the head of his own army. Sertorius, however, never showed himself in a light more brilliant than at that epoch, and this year also elapsed without any incident of importance in Spain. In the following year, Metellus and Pompey again divided their forces, in order each to carry on the war in separate districts.

The nature of the ground in Spain, and the manner in which the

war was carried on by Sertorius, and especially by his bands of native Spaniards, made the provisioning of the Roman army a matter of great difficulty. Metellus had, therefore, applied to Rome, but a terrible dearth in that town obliged the senate to yield to the urgent petitions of the people, and to apply the sums intended for Spain to the purchase of grain for the capital. Pompey, who had employed on the Spanish war a large part of his own fortune, was on the point of returning with his army to Italy, and that at a time highly inconvenient to Lucullus, who therefore gave himself all possible trouble to procure the transmission of the requisite reinforcements and supplies in money. Sertorius, nevertheless, maintained his footing during the whole following year against the combined Roman armies; and if he sunk in the succeeding year, his fall was effected solely by the senseless ambition and ludicrous conceit which urged his lieutenant Perpenna to spirit up the insurgent army against their heroic leader. Many of the Spaniards fell off; many Romans deserted to Metellus; Sertorius himself became embittered, harsh, unmerciful, and Perpenna had him finally removed by assassination, but found himself very much mistaken in his calculations of an advantageous peace, or a continuance in the chief command. The Spaniards shrunk with horror from the murderer of their general, and with his Romans alone he was no match for Pompey: he was accordingly beaten, captured, and, on Pompey's command despatched without more ceremony.

The honor of the victory and consequent subjugation of Spain was, indeed, divided between Metellus and Pompey, as both obtained a triumph; but the favor of the people was bestowed on Pompey exclusively; for it was he whom fortune had crowned in all his enterprises, and who understood so to use her favors as to grace middling abilities with the show of innate greatness of mind. While Pompey was in Spain, Crassus had done highly important service to the state by putting an end to a servile war in Italy, which was doubly dangerous to Rome, as her armies were already engaged in three different quarters, and agriculture and pasturage in Italy were exposed to the risk of ruin, not only through the revolt itself, but even through the victory, and the massacre among the slaves inevitably consequent on it.

The oligarchy, who pushed aside and exterminated the free population of Italy, to supply its place with slaves, may well be deemed the authors of the Servile war. Chance, it is said, prompted some of those unfortunate beings, who were selected from the strongest and most agile of the slaves for gladiators, to betake themselves to flight, in the hope of either reaching a place of refuge, or, in the worst event, of dying with arms in their hands on a nobler arena than that of the amphitheatre. Chance provided them with arms, procured them a leader in the Thracian Spartacus, and in a short time the number of slaves and poor mountaineers who made common cause with them increased so much, that they took and plundered several towns in Campania, and made an attempt on Capua, which failed, indeed, but, however, proved their numerical strength and daring. Soon afterwards they formed communications as far as Lusania with the shepherds who kept the numerous herds of the oligarchs. These shepherds and mountaineers

were rendered hardy by their occupation; they were admirably fitted for mountain warfare, and had acquired the art of riding in the plain. They united themselves with the Thracians, Cimbrians, and Germans, who were led by Spartacus. Among the gladiators who were let loose from the various fighting-schools, the Gauls were exceedingly numerous, and formed an army apart, under Cœnomaus and Crixus. These last hordes attempted to hinder the prætor, Vatinius Glaber, who was sent with a Roman army against them, from falling behind the Apennines, and atoned for their audacity by a defeat. The Gallic division was beaten, Cœnomaus left dead on the field; while Spartacus, on the other hand, entered Lucania at the head of more than forty thousand men. Here he cut to pieces the whole Roman army with which the prætor had attempted to enclose him; arrayed his men in the arms seized from the enemy; Metapontum became the spoil of the slaves; they endeavoured to establish themselves in Thurium, and Spartacus seemed intent on establishing order, obedience, discipline, and some degree of regular organisation. It should seem that this attempt was not successful, and that he could not even set any sort of limit to the wild waste of the hordes at whose head he stood. However, at the close of the first year's campaign he had brought matters so far, that the prætor to whom the conduct of the war was committed, was obliged to abandon to him the whole district from Acerenza to Reggio (*i. e.* Basilicata and Calabria,) where he also maintained his footing during the following year.

Spartacus had meanwhile time to become convinced that in the long run nothing was to be done with his undisciplined hordes. He called on his army to use the opportunity to decamp with the spoils of the towns and districts wasted by them, to disperse themselves across the Alps, and return to their respective countries. As, however, Crixus and his men opposed this proposition, the army divided in two; Crixus, with his Gauls, pursued his devastating march through Apulia, and along the coast of the Adriatic sea; while those who came from Thrace and the neighboring regions, and with them the Lucanians, followed Spartacus, who meant to move along the line of the Apennines to the Alps.

u.c. 682. The Romans at length took up the matter seriously: the consuls of the year were sent to meet the slave armies. The consul Gellius marched with the prætor Arrius against Crixus, who had penetrated up to Monte Gargaro, and after having won an insignificant advantage, gave himself up to a besotted security. He was cut off with his whole army. Spartacus, on the other hand, sufficiently proved to the Roman leaders, that in prudence and in judgment he was far their superior. The Roman general wished, as his army stood in the enemy's presence, to attack the slaves in concert with his colleague, but was utterly routed before the eyes of that colleague, to whom Spartacus had barred up the way. Gellius suffered, in like manner, a defeat on the same day. The prætor Manlius, and the proconsul Cassius, had collected several thousand men in Upper Italy, but they fixed themselves in separate encampments, and the number of their troops was insignificant: these also were routed, and Cassius lost his life.

From this moment nothing could have hindered Spartacus from pursuing his route across the Alps. The Po was, indeed, swollen, and all the vessels moored on the opposite shore. It would, however, have been easy to effect a passage over the river. It was now that, to his misfortune, he formed the determination to march upon Rome. Athwart this march the prætor Arrius threw himself, having assembled a regular force in the Picenian district. Here he gave battle to the insurgents, who advanced in great numerical force, and the Romans were again beaten.

This action was the climax of the fortune, and at the same time the goal of the career of these insurgents, against whom an experienced, if not eminently able general, Crassus, a leading oligarch, was now sent as prætor. Crassus had acquired some fame as a general from the circumstance, that Sylla had been indebted to him for his last and most important victory. He now led into the field all that was left of the consular army, and six complete newly levied legions. He called, moreover, the veterans, of Sylla's campaigns to arms; and Spartacus soon perceived that he was now in presence of an enemy very different from any whom he had hitherto encountered. He was forced to renounce his attack on Rome, and, even when he withdrew towards Lucania, Crassus followed him closely. Both leaders avoided with equal adroitness a general engagement, but Crassus cut to pieces in detail all the divisions which ventured to any distance from the main army of Spartacus, and drove it at last into the farthest corner of the Abruzzo. Here Spartacus opened negotiations with the pirates, in order to obtain a passage to Sicily. The project failed: the slave army consequently encamped in the Sila forest, where Crassus shut it up with a wall and trench. Nothing else remained for the slaves than either to perish by sheer hunger, or to storm the Roman entrenchments. They chose the latter alternative, surprised the Romans, scaled their walls, and found themselves happily liberated.

The first consternation at Rome was such, that, perhaps on Crassus's own suggestion, the idea was entertained of recalling Pompey out of Spain. The senators, however, recovered their self-possession, on learning that the hitherto united slaves had fallen out among themselves, and that their several divisions had formed separate encampments. It was now that Crassus himself apprehended Pompey being sent to his side, and thus enabled to reap where he had sown; he, therefore, sought to bring the whole affair to a speedy decision. As, formerly, under Crixus, so now, the Gauls had isolated themselves from the rest of the army; they had formed a separate camp, and accordingly they first were cut off. Immediately afterwards, Spartacus was reduced to a situation so desperate, the only choice remaining to him was, either to begin the engagement under the most unfavorable circumstances, or to surrender himself and his army at discretion into the enemy's hands. He chose the former alternative, and found what he sought—a heroic death.

While Crassus chased the separate scattered members of the army, and cut them down on the spot, or consigned them to execution in cold blood, one division of some thousand men escaped his observation, and

reached Upper Italy just at the moment when Pompey had arrived there on his return from Spain. The latter had the good fortune to capture this remnant, and was mean enough publicly to claim a share in the glory of Crassus on the strength of this achievement. This of itself was enough to have produced a quarrel, even if both had not been already at bitter variance; as Crassus had been long in the habit of ridiculing the surname of Great, which Pompey had received so prematurely. Pompey, however, possessed in such a distinguished degree the public favor, that Crassus durst not attempt to obtain the consulship without being assured of his concurrence. Pompey was v. c. raised to the consulship simultaneously with Crassus, without 683. having been previously invested with any of the other magisterial functions, which, according to old usage and recent law, were not to be overleaped. As Metellus, Crassus, Lucullus, had their adherents in the aristocracy, Pompey could only humble them through the favor of the multitude; consequently, even during his consulship, he showed himself in the character of a man of the people, and thus, in effect, undermined the establishments of Sylla, which he had helped v. c. to base in bloodshed and proscription. Since this epoch, we 684. find Pompey fairly established as the popular idol, and invested with an undisputed autocracy. Amidst the loud applauses of the people, the tribune Gabinius moved for his appointment as commander-in-chief by land and sea, from Spain as far as Syria; and delivered to him a military power which had hitherto been entirely without precedent. This took place on occasion of the protracted war with the pirates:—a maritime contest no less strange in its character than the Servile War. Of this contest, previously to the share in it now taken by Pompey, we proceed to recount the more important particulars.

The Rhodians, so long as they had a considerable land force and fleet, maintained a very efficient maritime police; and even if they could not wholly prevent the depredation of the numerous coast towns on the south coast of Asia Minor, and the islands, set, however, certain limits to it. Since the jealousy of the Romans, who had at that time no naval power whatever in those regions, no longer allowed Rhodes the possession of a fleet of war, and especially since the subjection of Carthage and Corinth, piracy became a lucrative trade. Already had the towns and islands exercising this trade entered into regular alliances, supported by the kings of Egypt and Cyprus, against those of Syria, with whom they were in a state of constant hostility. They had established a slave-market in Phaselis and Delos, where several thousand slaves were often disposed of at a single sale.

The Romans tolerated this nuisance as long as they were not immediate sufferers: they even received, through the agency of these pirates the requisite supplies of slaves of Syrian, Minor Asiatic, and Greek descent and education. They connived at the abuse the rather, as Scipio Numantinus, after a visit of observation to the Asiatic courts, acquainted them that the Syrian kings, like those of Egypt before them, from reasons of state and finance, protected the pirates.

When the Romans gained the mastery of almost the whole of Asia Minor, the matter touched them somewhat more nearly. But by this

time these marauders had whole fleets on the high seas, and either beat those which were sent against them, or, if they themselves were occasionally beaten, soon showed themselves again in threefold strength. The islanders of the Egean sea, the inhabitants of the coasts of Pontus, Pamphylia, Rhodes, Crete, Cyprus, found the traffic lucrative, and equipped privateers—families of consequence embarked on the same bottom with them; and even Roman delegates made formal contracts with the pirates, and partook their profits. After the first Mithridatic war, as Mithridates protected them, and Sylla had neither time nor inclination to pursue them, they not only plundered mariners, but towns and temples, ravaged the coasts, landed in Italy, carried off travellers, magistrates, women and children, extorted from them exorbitant ransoms, and rendered communication with Rome insecure, and the provisioning of the metropolis often difficult, sometimes wholly impossible. Thereby the Romans were driven at last to serious measures against them, and determined to attack them at their head-quarters. This employment was entrusted to the proconsul Publius Servilius Vatia, who took with him as lieutenants, Labienus, Cæsar, who entertained a personal spite to the pirates, in whose custody he had been, and Valerius Flaccus.

This expedition, to all outward appearance, had the most brilliant result: but the number of towns and states was so considerable, which exercised this predatory traffic, that immediately after the triumph of Servilius the seas were as unsafe again as before. It certainly seems as if the issue would have been more decisive, if the command u. c. for the subsequent year had been left to Servilius, in order to 678. seek the robbers out in the skulking holes which remained to them. Instead of this, one of the consuls, the year in which Servilius had finished his undertaking, was destined to succeed him. The consuls of the year were Lucius Cotta and Octavius; of these the first received another employment, the second fell ill, and Cethegus and Præcia, who distributed at that time public functions in Rome, procured the delegation of this weighty affair to their worthy associate, M. Antonius, son of the famous orator. Him we know from Cicero's discourse, as a worthy precursor of Verres. Without talent, without principle, as his history evinced; he was misled by those around him negotiated with the pirates, and even shared their spoil with them. The Cretans alone were destined to be punished for having associated with Mithridates, and taken part in the piracies; but Antonius conducted himself very injudiciously. He was beaten in a sea fight, but fortunately died immediately afterwards of a fever.

The Cretans now in vain attempted to conjure down the storm which threatened them from Rome; a manifest defeat must of necessity be avenged by the senate, unless the Cretans voluntarily accepted such conditions as left no pretext remaining to Hortensius and others who insisted on war. And truly the Cretan nobility would have acquiesced in any demand. But the people were unmanageable, and the Romans sent the consul of the previous year, L. Metellus, to Crete. The war was now waged on both sides with unheard-of fury and cruelty. Metellus seemed bent on the utter extirpation of the 684.

Cretans ; the latter made a desperate defence ; victory, indeed, remained finally with Metellus, who received the surname of Creticus, but he was disabled from taking and farther measures against the pirates ; and while he was carrying on the war with Crete, the latter gained continual accessions of power and numbers. How much they had increased is clear from the circumstance that when Metellus went to Crete, they laid regular siege to Syracuse ; and that from fear of privateers, the transport of goods to Rome was almost stopped.

The consequent rise of prices rendered the motion of Gabinus to give Pompey unlimited powers over the sea and sea-coast, as far as thirteen miles inland, in order to be able to attack the pirates on every point at once, so acceptable, and public confidence in Pompey was so absolute, that Cicero cannot paint in colors lively enough the noisy jubilation of the people. The dearth of bread in the town was instantly mitigated, as the confidence of the corn contractors in Pompey's measures was boundless. Pompey, indeed, made as if he did not at all desire the enormous powers, the immense army, and influence thereto annexed, over the numerous senators holding commissions under him. Nevertheless, he took good care to bring together a multitude of his country friends into town, who filled the forum and temples, and struck terror by their threats into all who offered any opposition to Gabinus, as was vainly attempted by both consuls, and even by two of the tribunes. The motion of Gabinus passed amidst loud acclamations, and Pompey, when he entered the city, and deigned to accept the enormous power conferred on him, demanded and accepted, in addition, almost as much again as Gabinus had proposed, although even this had already appeared exorbitant. The event corresponded entirely with the anticipations. Forty-nine days after Pompey's departure from Italy, which took place in the autumn, the war was ended, the pirates had surrendered themselves, were transplanted from their skulking holes into other regions, and the sea and the sea-coasts restored to security. The Cretans had recourse to Pompey for refuge from the exterminating warfare of Metellus, and found him well disposed to put in force against Metellus his commission, in which Crete was included. This, however, he did not succeed in doing. But on the other hand he received, through another tribune, command in chief in the war against Mithridates, and exercised imperial power, from thence-forwards, as far as Mesopotamia and Arabia.

CHAPTER VII.

ASIATIC CONQUESTS OF POMPEY.

WHILE the Romans had enough to do with Sertorius, the Servile War, and the pirates, Tigranes of Armenia, whose new monarchy also comprised the last portions of Syria held by the dynasty of Seleucus, and Mithridates, became the principal powers of Asia, and entered into a closer alliance. Tigranes, (B. C. 76.) overran Cappadocia, and Mithridates fell upon Bithynia, which the Romans claimed as a heritage left them by Nicomedes III. To conquer Cappadocia was not the object of Tigranes; he only wished to accomplish a scheme in which he had previously been thwarted by the Romans, *i. e.* to transplant the population of this territory into his own states. He is said to have dragged away more than 300,000 men, but the numbers do not admit of precise calculation. Before Mithridates this time invaded the Roman provinces, he sought to secure himself, by improvements in discipline, against the superiority of the Roman tactics, which he had sufficiently experienced in the course of the last war.

When Mithridates recommenced hostilities, both consuls, Cotta and Lucullus, sought and received the command of the armies ^{U. C.} against him. Mithridates had overrun Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and Bithynia; but Lucullus occupied Phrygia with nearly 40,000 veteran troops, and Cotta had likewise under him a considerable body of troops. Mithridates could, therefore, easily be attacked on two sides; but Cotta dreaded the necessity of sharing the honor of victory, and ventured an engagement while Lucullus yet remained at a considerable distance from Bithynia. This battle was lost, and Cotta compelled to throw himself into the neighboring town of Chalcedon. Mithridates immediately closely invested Chalcedon; but Lucullus making his appearance and impeding his communications, could not maintain himself in his position with the enormous multitude which he had brought with him. He raised the siege and fell back upon Troas, but immediately after began the siege of Cyzicus.

After lengthened and fruitless operations against Cyzicus, at the most inclement season of the year; after the surprisal and destruction of the greater part of his army by the consuls, and the destruction of almost his whole fleet by that of Rome and by tempest, Mithridates still proceeded to form new fleets and new armies from the remotest part of his empire, while Lucullus sought to obtain possession of the fortified towns on the coast, in order to close against him the maritime ports of his own territory. He gladly received the capitulation of such towns as voluntarily opened their gates; granted them freedom

from military burdens, and allowed them to retain their old constitutions, to the great discontent of the legions, as well as the jobbers and usurers in their train, who found themselves deprived of their accustomed and various sources of plunder.

Meanwhile, the farther Lucullus forced his way the more arduous became his undertaking; for he not only arrived at unknown and impervious regions, but had also to engage in harassing sieges, and to contend with a foe exhaustless in expedients. It is not, therefore, surprising, that in the third year of the war (U. C. 683.) Lucullus still held Amisus in a state of siege, and was forced to struggle in earnest near Cabira with Mithridates, who had returned from the remoter parts of his kingdom. Fortune at length favored the Romans; a panic terror spread itself through Mithridates's army: when he attempted to lead them out of a region where provisions failed, his soldiers disbanded, his generals either perished or were taken prisoners; he himself only escaped the pursuit of the Romans with difficulty, and betook himself to Tigranes of Armenia.

Plutarch gives us an account of an embassy despatched to Tigranes, by Lucullus. He had chosen for this office the proudest member of the proudest family in Rome, his brother-in-law Appius Claudius, who, without experience in life and affairs, on his first audience summoned the king either to deliver up Mithridates, or prepare himself for war with the Romans. Accosted in this manner in the presence of his own court, an oriental prince could reply no otherwise than Tigranes did:—He should know how to defend himself. Lucullus was thus plunged into new difficulties. Pompey lay on the coast with an immense force, and with yet more imposing titles of authority. He himself received no reinforcement, was at variance with his knights, and remained some time quietly at Sardes. But regarding the Armenian war as a trifle, he commenced his march, with only two legions, against the distant metropolis of Tigranocerta. His expedition was prosperous: he climbed the Taurus, crossed the Euphrates, reached the coast of the Tigris, beat a detachment of troops sent against him, and invested Tigranocerta.

The disorder of oriental hosts, and presumption of their leaders, gave an inevitable victory to the few thousands whom Lucullus led against myriads into the field. Tigranes was beaten, the new capital Tigranocerta taken, even the ancient royal seat of the Armenian kings, Artaxata, menaced, and all Armenia would have come along with this town into the hands of the Romans, had it not happened, as it often does, that the highest point of Lucullus's fortune was also the beginning of his reverses.

The rough climate in northern Armenia, the snow-topped mountains, the shocking roads, the rudeness of the inhabitants, gave the soldiers, long excited against Lucullus, a pretext for sturdily refusing to march further, or persist in the siege of Artaxata. He endeavored in vain to win them by the conquest of Nisibis, and by the plunder of that opulent town. The soldiers were discontented with having passed at the outset two winters encamped before Cyzicus and Amisus, with never having been under a roof since, and, last of all, with having been compelled, even in summer, to carry on a wintry campaign

in Upper Armenia. The demagogues in Rome, who could not endure the aristocratic Lucullus, (while they worshipped as a god the ambitious Pompey although he had been Sylla's sword and poniard,) caused his command to be taken from him. Lucius Quinctius, one of the prætors, especially urged the recall of Lucullus, on the ground, that though in possession of Cilicia, the coasts of Asia Minor, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Pontus, Armenia, and the whole country as far as the Phasis, even after he had taken the royal residence, from motives of self-interest he prolonged the war, as though his mission had been, not to conquer kings, but utterly to strip them of their possessions.

To complete the evil fortune of Lucullus, Mithridates chose the moment while he loitered with his legions in the enervating climate of Mesopotamia, to take advantage of his absence, and make an attempt on his old kingdom. He was received with exultation: all flocked around him. Pontus renewed its allegiance to him: he took possession of Cappadocia; and Fabius, the commander of the Roman troops which had been left behind, escaped, not without trouble, to Cabira, where he was closely blockaded by Tigranes, so soon as the latter had obtained some advantages over Fannius in Armenia. Fabius was superseded, indeed, by Triarius, and the latter gained at the outset some insignificant advantages; but Mithridates afterwards beat him completely at Dadasa. Here the whole Roman army would have been swept away, if a severe wound had not held the king back from following up the already acquired victory. The whole of Pontus was reconquered, all the Romans expelled, when Lucullus, being at length informed, marched from Mesopotamia, where he had hitherto remained in hopes of inducing his army to make an expedition against the Parthians. It was his own brother-in-law, Appius Claudius, who stirred up the army against him, and openly sanctioned the mutiny of the soldiers. They had already long been at variance with each other, and he now announced quite openly to the legions, which had become completely corrupted in Mesopotamia, that they no longer owed Lucullus any military obedience, that his province had been transferred by the senate to Glabrio, and that in Rome they thought of subordinating Glabrio's command to Pompey, as well as that of the army against Pontus. It was in vain for Lucullus to expel his brother-in-law from the army; it was in vain for him to direct his march against Pontus, in order to reconquer it ere Glabrio, who had already landed in Asia, should have assumed the command. His legions refused to render him any military service, as a decree of the senate had taken the command from him. Glabrio promulgated this decree through all the provinces, and summoned all the troops away from Lucullus. Glabrio, however, durst not show himself in the army, having learned with what audacity the legions had refused to obey Lucullus's orders for marching against Tigranes, and how perilous the state of affairs had become in Pontus and Cappadocia.

Considering that Glabrio kept aloof in Bithynia, that Lucullus was deserted by his troops, that the two allied kings had recovered their territory, and were more powerful than ever, it may be conceived how

even men who deserve credit for true patriotism, such as Cicero, for example, even without private ends, might sanction the proposal of the tribune Manilius, whereby the even now enormous power of Pompey was still farther increased by dominion over the whole of the eastern world. Pompey had distributed his lieutenants, all consulars or prætorians, from the Straits of Gibraltar to those of Constantinople, in such a manner, that the pirates only here and there ventured to offer resistance, and for the most part made a voluntary surrender: 368 gallies were either captured or sunk by him, 120 harbors rendered unserviceable, 10,000 pirates slain, and 20,000 taken prisoners, towards whom he conducted himself with signal wisdom and clemency. With such of them as had not grown old in the predatory trade, he repopled those districts of Cilicia which Tigranes had depopulated, particularly the region of Mallos, Abana, and Epiphania: Soli was made entirely a new town of, and denominated thenceforth Pompeiopolis. Even Dyme in Peloponnesus, received a new population from Cilicia, and was converted anew from a desolate spot to a highly populous town. From whom could a termination to the long and harassing war with Mithridates and Tigranes be more rationally expected, than from a man to whom so boundless a power had previously been given? Boundless, indeed, was the power which Pompey received through the Manilian law. But at that time he was the idol of the people; and Cæsar, as well as Cicero, spoke in favor of the motion, because they hoped in this manner best to flatter the people, and appropriate a share of the favor lavished upon Pompey. Catulus and Hortensius, however, raised their voices against a proposal, by virtue of which the whole aristocracy was made dependent on one man. The law passed notwithstanding, and the issue corresponded with the expectation of both parties, the friends of Pompey and those of the old constitution. The war was ended gloriously; the friends of the all powerful general acquired treasures and dignities, the people largesses, spectacles, games; but none believed any longer in the republic. All that was now asked was, whether Pompey was to remain in tranquil possession of understood supremacy, or whether another would find means to appropriate his power, and gain mastery over the the state and over the citizens.

The ill feeling exhibited by Pompey towards Lucullus on taking his command from him, the petty jealousy prompting him immediately to alter whatever had been done or arranged by the other, engendered the bitter hostility which afterwards produced a three fold schism in the Roman aristocracy, at a time when it should have united its whole force against a man who, unobserved, alienated from Pompey, and attracted to himself the popular favor. For the rest, the event of the operations which Pompey now undertook against Mithridates and Tigranes could not possibly be doubtful, as he had not only command of a tenfold greater power than his predecessor, but had succeeded in forming negotiations with Phrahatas of Parthia, concerning a treaty which Lucullus had never seriously intended. Unconditional surrender of his kingdom and his person into the hands of the Romans, and surrender of all deserters, were the only terms of peace offered by

Pompey to Mithridates. Mithridates, however, thought that he might still accept a peace which threw himself and his territory entirely into the hands of his enemies, after he had ventured his utmost. Accordingly he encamped over against Pompey, and took up such an excellent position, that the latter did not consider it advisable to attack him. Instead of venturing an engagement, Pompey surrounded the adverse army, enveloped it at length entirely, and kept it six weeks in a state of seige. But Mithridates knew the ground better than the Romans; he slipped with his army through the Roman posts, and reached the mountain pass which led to the Euphrates. Here, however, Pompey had anticipated him; near the place where he afterwards built his triumphal town (Nicopolis,) he had occupied the sides of the valley through the middle of which Mithridates must pass, and finally attacked him to advantage. The liberal accounts of the Romans reckon at 20,000 the number of the enemy slain in this attack; the army of Mithridates was dispersed, and only single divisions made their escape to Armenia. Mithridates himself, after this overthrow, at first sought refuge with Tigranes, but the latter was at variance with his own family, that is to say, with the grandsons of Mithridates. He had caused two of his sons to be put to death, and was engaged in such a quarrel with the third, that the latter afterwards leagued himself against him with Pompey. His court was, therefore, no place of abode for the king of Pontus, who fled to Dioscurias in Colchis, and from thence into his Bosporan kingdom, or the territory betwixt the Don and the Dnieper.

Pompey, now in possession of all the states of the fugitive monarch, was in no haste to pursue him, but, like an oriental despot, founded a large city near the Araxes and Euphrates, Nicopolis, for peopling which he provided in the same manner as Nebuchadnezzar and Tigranes had done for theirs. Crowds of men were removed, by his orders, from other towns and regions, and, moreover, a considerable number of Romans, especially invalids and poor, whom he wished to provide for, were located along with the natives. At this time Pompey was in treaty with the young Tigranes, to be spared the necessity of a troublesome campaign, and to obtain with ease, through the schism in the royal family, what he would otherwise have had to obtain, with much more difficulty, through warfare. The son of the king of Armenia had married the daughter of the Parthian monarch, and, by aid of his father-in-law, had robbed his father of most part of Armenia. He was already laying seige to him in his capital of Artaxata, when the inroad of Tartarian hordes forced the Parthian king to draw off his forces, and to leave his son-in-law to his fate; on which the latter, pursued by his father's vengeance, threw himself into the arms of Pompey, and marched with the Roman army against Artaxata. The old tyrant, as mean in misfortune as arrogant in prosperity, sent a supplicating embassy to Pompey, nay, even came in person out of his stronghold as a humble petitioner, and abandoned himself, and all he possessed, to the discretion of the Roman general. Pompey had no idea of keeping Armenia, its retention being attended with great difficulty and slight advantage, nor did he wish to make the young Tigranes great and powerful at the expense of the old. He,

therefore, guaranteed to the latter possession of Armenia Proper, on condition of leaving Sophene to his son, and all the lands on this side the Euphrates to the Romans. The expectations of the young Tigranes were wholly deceived by the treaty; he considered himself overreached by Pompey, withdrew himself secretly, and possessed himself, in the province of Sophene, which was destined to him, of a little fortress, which had expressly been excepted from his allotment, on account of his father's treasures being deposited there. But as Pompey feared lest the resolute youth might league himself with his father-in-law, he attacked him, and had him laid in chains. He was afterwards led in triumph at Rome.

After the war with the young Tigranes, Pompey remained in Armenia during the whole winter, and when, at last, he broke up his quarters, pushed northwards as far as the Kur. However, the wary Roman did not consider it advisable to contend with the wild inhabitants of Georgia, Mingrelia, and Imiretta, in their own impassable mountains and savage defiles, so that he speedily retraced his route to Armenia. He occupied all the forts and towns of Pontus, carried off the treasures and collections of Mithridates, arbitrarily gave the priestly principality of Comana to the sons of the traitor Archelaus, shared Sophene betwixt the Galatian prince Deiotarus, who had done him good service, and the king of Cappadocia, who abdicated his government in favor of his son, Ariobarzanes II., if the name of government can be given to a slavery under the Romans, at whose discretion and pleasure he was forced to oppress his own subjects. The adroitness which distinguished Pompey on all occasions, he also displayed in his treaty with the Parthian king. Instead of provoking him, and entangling himself in ticklish undertakings in the remote East, he proceeded by way of negotiation. We do not know precisely what was the issue of the first transactions; but when the Romans had conquered Syria, Tigranes fell out with the Parthian king, and Pompey, who was applied to for aid by both parties, seized the opportunity of coming forward as mediator, and of accrediting this mediation in Rome as the solemn award of an umpire.

Pompey marched towards Syria, as the prospect of an easy conquest and great booty invited him from that quarter. He was especially urged, according to Plutarch, by meditation on Alexander's deeds, which haunted him perpetually; but circumstances had certainly, at least, as much to do with his movements as the mere desire of imitating Alexander. The part of Syria which Tigranes had ruled, was formally ceded by him to the Romans; for another part the princes of the Asmonæan or Maccabean house contended; to a third, or rather to all Syria, claims were advanced by the last offspring of the Seleucidæ, Antiochus Asiaticus. As for what regards the Asmonæans, the one, Johannes Hyrcanus II., was in open war with his brother Aristobulus II., and gave Pompey an invitation to Palestine. Antiochus Asiaticus had been formerly acknowledged by Lucullus as the only rightful heir of the Seleucidæ: this was sufficient for Pompey to sternly refuse his recognition. It must, however, be acknowledged, for the sake of justice, that Pompey, to help Antiochus to the possession of a

throne, which he claimed as heir to his father, must have first conquered his kingdom for him, as petty rulers had started up in every town and district. Pompey expelled all these tyrants, and subjected the whole land to the Romans.

All the territories and nations, even the Arabian emirs, to whom Pompey extended his arrangements, quietly acquiesced in his decisions. In Palestine only Aristobulus, who had occupied and fortified Jerusalem, refused to obey Pompey's command and yield the succession to his brother Hyrcanus. Even he did not at first dare to resist the will of Pompey, but showed himself equally indisposed to compliance with it : he negotiated and hesitated, remained a short time about Pompey, then took refuge again in a fortress, and finally made his escape to Jerusalem, with the view of maintaining his footing there. About this time Pompey received the intelligence that destiny had spared him the necessity of any further struggle with Mithridates, since his son Pharnaces, after despatching his father, volunteered unconditional submission to his will, and surrender of whatever could embellish Pompey's triumph, or evidence to the Romans that the war with which he was charged was completely ended. In recompence for this self-prostration, Pharnaces retained the Bosporan kingdom. The greatest sensation would seem to have been excited in Rome by the enterprises against the Arabs and Jews ; and people were doomed to hear so much about them, that persons of good taste at last ridiculed Pompey's vamping, like Cicero's perpetually recurring mention of Catiline.

CHAPTER VIII.

EVENTS IN ROME.—CONSULSHIP OF CICERO.

WE left Pompey revelling in the East in the plenitude of uncontrolled dominion, deciding on the destiny of kings and empires, founding new cities, and remodelling old ones. The Grecian states were lavish of princely honors to his slaves and freedmen; even in Rome, every one who aimed at acquiring consideration was forced to enlist in the legion of his flatterers. How was he astonished, on his return, to find the state of affairs materially altered,—the aristocratical party of Cato, supported by Crassus, Lucullus, and others, arrayed in opposition to his *v. c.* influence! Cicero, who in the interim had become consul, 690. found it necessary to attach himself to this party, to which he gave great weight by his talents, by his eloquence, and by the fame he had acquired in suppressing the Catilinarian conspiracy.

This conspiracy was not so much a project to change the form of the constitution, and to introduce a new order of things, as an attempt of the most profligate of the Roman aristocracy to re-enact the horrors of the Syllan times, in which they had been busy performers, in order to get rid of their debts, to enrich themselves at the cost of their country, crush their enemies, and save themselves from the infamy which awaited or attached to their vices. Cataline, the author of the plot, had been prætor (*v. c.* 685,) had administered the province of Africa, and contested the consulship with Cicero, not without hope of success. He had already at an earlier period perpetrated the most horrible acts of murder with his own hand, and leagued himself now with the most corrupt and abandoned rabble in Rome and Italy, for the purposes of incendiarism, murder, and plunder. These traits of one of the first men in Rome sufficiently indicate how deplorable must have been the internal state of that aristocracy which externally presented such a brilliant aspect. Other circumstances, however, coincide to make it abundantly evident how absolutely necessary a monarchy had become to the Romans. Eleven Roman senators, and even Cornelius Lentulus Sura, who stood at the head of the college of prætors, were leagued with Catiline: among the number of his fellow conspirators were, of one year's tribunes, Servilius Rullus, Attius Labienus, and L. Cæcilius; of those of the subsequent year, Metellus Nepos, Calpurnius Bestia; of the quæstors, P. Vatinus and Sextus Attilius Seranus. Even Cicero's colleague, C. Antonius Hybrida, though afterwards he hunted down the conspirators sword in hand, was suspected of having been not unwilling to see the success of the project; and C. Julius Cæsar, who became *pontifex maximus* in the year in which

the conspiracy was to break out, was, to say the least, not signally active, either in preventing its outbreak or punishing its authors.

For more than a year's space this peril hung over the city. For more than a year it was known that a part of the highest public functionaries had entered into a league with the most desperate of the rabble; that they held their cut-throat conclaves in the city, and that Catiline even aspired to become consul. It was therefore resolved that Cicero should be raised to the consulship, precisely because he was known to be Catiline's enemy. Crassus was suspected, as also was Cæsar; and Pompey's creatures quietly looked on for the most part, hoping at the worst to find for their patron a new occasion to make himself of importance.

Already had the conspirators commenced negotiations for armed assistance from the Allobroges, whose ambassadors were now in the city. They had gained Sylla's old soldiers, who were settled in Etruria and in other parts of Italy, and had dissipated their ill-won possessions; and they held their meetings in the capital without its being possible to obtain any direct and positive evidence against them. But without evidence neither could the ringleaders be brought to account, nor the progress of the enterprise prevented. This evidence Cicero took a cunning mode of procuring. Through the agency of a lady of easy virtue, who happened to be an acquaintance of his own, he managed to induce one of the plotters to betray his accomplices, and thus procured such accurate intelligence with regard to the particulars of the whole project, that he could openly charge Catiline in the the senate, and convict him. Thereupon he procured for himself and his colleague a commission in the ordinary terms to take every possible means for saving the state.

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The affair was one of difficulty, even after this vote of the senate; for Catiline set the consul at defiance, while Sylla's soldiers, and other desperate men who had joined them, took arms in Etruria, and the conspirators in Rome concerted measures for the murder of Cicero. Under these circumstances, his eloquence worked wonders. One discourse drove Catiline out of the city: and the Allobrogic embassy being stopped on their departure, and the signatures and seals of the most eminent conspirators being found in their portfolios, Cicero, backed by Cato's authority, obtained a vote for the execution of the heads of the conspiracy, without allowing them any appeal to the people. From the 19th of October to the 6th of December, he was incessantly active in following up this affair within its focus and centre in the capital; while others were employed, during this and the following year, in reducing the armed bodies of conspirators elsewhere. In the following year, Cicero, who had meanwhile laid down the consulship, exerted himself with his whole force in the city against the proposal to delegate to Pompey, who was then on his return from Asia, the military command against Catiline and his accomplices. Catiline, at the head of an army partly consisting of old soldiers, fought heroically, and fell after an obstinate resistance, and after inflicting considerable losses on the troops of the republic sent against him. Pompey was at that time on his homeward jour-

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ney; Lucullus stood at the head of the aristocracy, which set itself to undermine the basis of the popular idol. Cato inspired all the Roman souls surviving in the senate with a spirit of a more exalted era, and opposed himself with such courage as well to Crassus and Pompey as to Cæsar, whose star was then ascendant in the political horizon, that he formed in the senate, without intrigue, a party of his own. Cicero exerted himself in every way to maintain the reputation he had already acquired. Cæsar and Crassus had loudly condemned the rigorous measures taken during his consulship against the leading conspirators; and Clodius, who was then beginning his profligate course of faction, was Cicero's declared enemy. Pompey found a sensible diminution in the number of votes which he had formerly been used to command in the senate. A disturbance had taken place in the city just before his arrival. Metellus Nepos, one of the tribunes, in conjunction with C. Julius Cæsar, openly charged as a crime upon Cicero the execution of the prætor Lentulus; and proposed to summon Pompey and his army into the town, to restore the public order disturbed by Cicero. Two other tribunes, Cato and Quinctus Minutius, opposed themselves to this motion. It came to a pitched battle in the forum. The senate, at last, empowered the consuls to meet force with force; and Metellus was forced to flee to Pompey, who was just then on his homeward route.

It had been expected that Pompey would march his army into the city. He now, however, remained true to his character: he disbanded his army in Italy; and only requested the soldiers to present themselves again at his triumph. All Italy flocked to see him and attend his route; an innumerable multitude surrounded him when he entered Rome. His triumph was most splendid; and he even obtained the nomination, as consuls for the following year, of two men whom he believed to be absolutely devoted to his interests. But the main affair, an unqualified confirmation of all his regulations made in the East, met unexpected obstacles. Of his consuls, the one, Afranius, could not aid him: the other, Metellus Celer, became his enemy on personal grounds; the senate, instead of passing an unqualified sanction to all his acts, required that every separate regulation and arrangement should be approved or rejected after a special scrutiny; and he was weak enough to make an appeal from the senate to the people.

Catiline's was not the only conspiracy in these times projected to bring wealth and power into the hands of a few, at the expense of the whole civilised world. Nearly at the same period, and not without connivance of the three men, Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus, who afterwards conspired, by other methods, to possess themselves of sovereign power in the commonwealth, the tribune Rulus brought before the senate and the people the plan of a commission for the division of public lands, which must soon have become a commission of general government. He proposed that all state property, of every description, should be sold; comprising all the landed estates belonging to the republic, all acquisitions of territory which had recently been made, and all spoil taken from any enemy: that the money arising from

such slaves should be employed in purchasing land, to be apportioned out in lots to necessitous citizens; that, for the purpose of these sales and distributions, ten commissioners should be appointed, in the manner in which pontiffs were named, not by the whole people, but by seventeen tribes selected by lot; that these commissioners should be judges, without appeal, of what was or was not public property, and should receive and examine the accounts of every consul or other officer, in whose province any capture had been made or territories acquired. Five years were fixed to be the term of this commission, which aimed to invest ten men with powers even more extensive than were soon afterwards grasped by three, the members of the first triumvirate.

On this occasion we learn from Cicero's speeches, *contra Rullum de lege agraria*, the extent of domain which the Roman people still had to bestow. The lands in question were the Scantian forest in Italy, which Cicero rates at a high value; the sometime Crondomanian estates in Macedonia, which had partly been confiscated by Flamininus, partly by Æmilius Paulus; the highly productive estates of the Corinthian domain, incorporated by Mummius with the demesne lands of the commonwealth; the territory about New Carthage in Spain; the Stellatian and Campanian fields, and all that remained of the Carthaginian territory in Africa undivided by Gracchus and other popular leaders. These districts were now to be placed in the hands of the proposed commission, as was also the inheritance of Ptolemy Appian king of Cyrene. A peculiar and extraordinary provision of the proposed law was, that the territory of which Mithridates had possessed himself in Paphlagonia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, should be included in the general scheme of sale. It was further proposed that the commissioners should have powers perfectly arbitrary, of raising money in all quarters by every means, for the purchase of land, which was afterwards again to be distributed at their discretion. They should be empowered to select new settlers every where, and assign them habitations where they thought fit.

"What a frightful commission!" Cicero might well exclaim. "See you not that this decemviral plague will be dreadfully oppressive for provinces, for empires, for free nations!" He appeals to the example of the so-called free embassies (*liberas legationes*), which have been spoken of in a former place. "These people," he says, notwithstanding the ostensible charge you have given them, continue private persons; they have no such mighty powers, and, indeed, no specific public function; and yet you know how burdensome and oppressive their appearance commonly is to your allies and to the provinces. How then will it be with the decemvirs?" He goes on to predict plainly, that plunder, and a regular trade in the rights and possessions of citizens and subjects, would be the consequence of granting such a commission. He proceeds to state, that the very gold and silver which had been carried in triumphs, the sums which should have been paid into the treasury, had been swindled by the first men in the commonwealth; he, therefore, treats as merely absurd the provision in the proposed law, that the decemvirs should institute

enquiries as to the spoils acquired in warfare. "If the courts of justice," he exclaims, "cannot elicit these facts, how should they be unveiled by the decemvirs?" On the whole, he gave so just an apprehension of the danger of intrusting to ten men absolute power over the treasury, the provinces, and allied states of the Roman world, that the senate and people, although, in the case of Pompey, they had overstepped all constitutional limits in the delegation of authority, and although they were soon about to submit to further usurpations on the part of the men who composed the first triumvirate, had yet sufficient judgment to reject a scheme of private rapacity, so thinly veiled by the plea of public advantage as the plan of Rullus.

If it were possible to give implicit credence to the picture drawn by Sallust of the Roman aristocracy, it would hardly be conceivable how the state, under such guidance, could continue to exist at all. But individual energies, and a certain common sense not so easily extinguished in the mass of the people, have a marvellous conservative force in free states. Unfortunately, the greatest talents of the time were combined, in Cato and Cicero, with defects and foibles which often placed the one in an obnoxious, and the other in a ridiculous point of view. Cato, according to his principles, neither could nor would proceed in his public steps with the requisite caution and foresight; while Cicero gave abundant proof that love of praise was even more his ruling motive than patriotism.

CHAPTER IX.

STATE OF THE TIMES—SOURCES OF WEALTH.—OPPRESSION AND CORRUPTION.

THE Roman aristocracy of these times had a character entirely its own. Birth might inspire pride, but could not impart power or influence. The only road to these objects, in civil pursuits, was either by the reputed knowledge of law, which attracted consultation and clientship, or by eloquence, which rendered its possessor either formidable as an accuser, or indispensable as an advocate. The condemnation or acquittal of an eminent state criminal established the reputation of the orator who had brought about one event or the other; permanent and predominant influence hardly could be reached except by standing at the head of an army, or by possessing immense wealth; for, in all periods of advanced refinement, the main-spring of affairs is command of money.

In considering the influence of wealth, in the times we are now treating of, we are first led to review the system of commerce, as it had grown up since the simpler ages of Rome. Neither Greeks nor Romans ever regarded the operation of commerce any otherwise than as necessary evils, or ever seized the modern and more enlightened view of the subject, which contemplates those operations as the natural correctives of those extreme irregularities in social ranks and conditions which the ancients sought to remedy by agrarian laws and remissions of debt. The degree of disrepute which attached to mercantile occupations in Rome accounts for the fact, that most departments of trade were in foreign hands.

Commercial intercourse with the East was regularly maintained by means of the coasting vessels of Asia Minor and Syria. Sylla was unable to collect a fleet in Greece and the Greek islands, and was obliged to send Lucullus to Phœnicia, Egypt, and Cyrene, for that purpose. Mithridates, too, when he wished to man a fleet, or wanted good naval officers, engaged them in Phœnicia and the adjacent regions. These trading vessels kept up the communications between Mithridates and Sertorius. It cannot, therefore, surprise us, that the pirates of Asia Minor were, in point of fact, more powerful than the king of Pontus himself. The number of these freebooters gave activity to the slave-trade, emphatically the occupation of pirates. Delos, of which the flourishing trade passed into a proverb, was the main depot and emporium of this species of merchandise. Here the Romans supplied themselves with those Asiatics and Syrians, who introduced into their private houses all the refinements of eastern courts. That, in this slave-market, thousands of freeborn and educated men were

brought daily to market, may well excite astonishment in our milder era, even if we suppose the statement exaggerated, that 10,000 civilised human beings were often sold in the slave-market of Delós in one day. Hence were imported those Grecian readers and professors of *belles lettres*, so strongly and briefly characterised by Cicero's father, who was wont to say, "Our countrymen are now-a-days like the Syrian slaves,—the more Greek they know, the less they are good for."

The most important wholesale trade in Rome was, doubtless, the corn trade; and as this was carried on in the smallest vessels, an enormous number of them was of course required. Thus the commerce of grain, which, under any circumstances, is well known to be one of the most hazardous, became yet more precarious through the want of an insurance system, the craziness of the ships, and the unskilfulness of the seamen. What a multitude of little vessels were needed to supply Rome may be inferred from the fact, that from every known region, from the Crimea to Lombardy, 700,000 tonnage freight of grain were annually imported into Rome.* The *Navicularii*, who worked these corn ships, formed a guild of the own. Their craft appear hardly to have been larger than our canal boats, or rather to have resembled Indian canoes; for the name by which they were designated, *caudex*, denotes, properly, the scooped trunk of a tree. These corn ships entered every port duty free. For the rest, we find from Pliny, that, even in his times, the art of baking still remained in a very low state among the Romans; that their wheaten bread was heavy and indigestible; that good bakers were only to be found in Gaul and Spain. The reason of this he explains simply enough. "In Spain and Gaul," he says, "beer being made of grain (*Gallia et Hispania frumento in potum resoluta*), they make use of the yeast to leaven the bread (*spumata concreta pro fermento utuntur*);" whence, he concludes, "*qua de causa levior illis quam cæteris panis est.*"

According to the data presented by Cicero on the price of grain in Sicily at the time of Verres, the provisioning of Rome would have demanded a yearly sum of about 2,500,000*l.* sterling. So early as the last year of the second Punic war, the state by its advances, reduced the price of the Roman modius (somewhat more than a peck English) of wheat to four asses, or one sesterce; afterwards the people were allowed to have grain at a half sesterce. As the as and the half sesterce became continually smaller in process of time, it is clear that the senate and ædiles systematically and continually reduced the price of bread with the increase of population. The case was the same with flesh. Thus the people (that is to say, those who had a corn ticket, *tessera*), got 35 pounds of coarse, or 25 pounds of fine bread for 2 1-2*d.* to 3*d.* Caius Gracchus proposed to go even farther; he would have sold the modius for three quarters of an as, so that the state would have had to supply the people, for not quite 2*d.*, with the grain which cost it 3 sesterces, or about 8 1-2*d.* If, out of the 70,000,000 modii imported, one supposes only the third part distributed at a lower price against tickets for corn, it is still easy to see that the state could not

* Plin. Hist. Nat. l. xviii. c. vii. § 2.

stand the expense. The regulation was of necessity repealed, and afterwards entirely done away with by Sylla.

What immense sums were required for the provisioning of the capital may be inferred from the fact, that the distribution of corn alone, which Cato caused to be granted by the senate to the people at the time of the Catilinarian conspiracy, in order to prevent disturbance at that critical moment, cost the state annually 4,000,000 sesterces. Gracchus's law was afterwards revived; and at length corn was distributed gratuitously by Clodius to a stated number of burghers. The charge of purchase and distribution was left to the lower order of ædiles. That the governors of the provinces from whence corn was imported speculated on the price, and practised very arbitrary methods in order to draw profit from the speculation, may be learned from Cicero's speeches against Verres.

The old Carthaginian territory, under the name of the province of Africa, acquired a degree of importance to the empire which would be inexplicable, but for the consideration that agriculture in Italy had sustained a mortal shock by the extinction of the Samnite and Etruscan confederations. Pasturage, vine cultivation, and timber-growing supplanted tillage as being more lucrative, and of easier superintendence. Sicily and Africa followed agriculture in a systematic and scientific manner. The property of the soil was grasped by the great families of Rome: its cultivation was carried on by multitudes of slaves, and the export trade to the capital was established with complete regularity.

The ordinary method of acquiring wealth was to enter into one of those societies which supported great undertakings with their capital: it was this which rendered the equites so powerful as an order, and procured for them that eminent position in society which was recognized by the motion of Otho, assigning them separate places in the theatre, between those of the nobles and the citizens.

The revenues of the state and private capitals were alike absorbed into the hands of this gigantic monied interest, which exercised, in those times, a tyranny the more galling the less it could be grappled with, or even ascertained distinctly. The revenue of the state had been every where farmed by the equestrian order; which, moreover, contracted to execute all extensive public works, formed various money-lending or stock-jobbing associations, and made advances on mortgage at an usurious rate of interest, to foreign states or private individuals. Owing to the constant oppression of governors in the provinces, the borrowers were seldom in condition to repay these loans; and the landed estates, nay, even public edifices and temples, became the property of these companies or individual capitalists.

The oppressions of these companies of revenue farmers and money-lenders had reached a crying pitch before the Mithridatic war, and the usurers were ordinarily favored by the provincial governors. Rare, indeed, was conduct such as that of the quæstor Rutilius, who leagued himself with his prætor to check these abuses, as far as in him lay. The bloodsuckers became his accusers,—their friends came forward as witnesses against him; and Rutilius, a man distinguished as

an historian and a philosopher, as lieutenant of Metellus in the Numidian war, in short, as the ablest and most upright man of his time, succumbed to the most infamous of cabals.* On his banishment from Rome, however, the Asiatic towns rewarded his noble interference in their favor; they received him with extraordinary honors: Smyrna bestowed the right of citizenship on him; he remained there, and never returned to his native city, not even after his persecutors had lost their judicial powers under Sylla.

When Lucullus came to Asia,† he found the condition of the province so desperate, that he thought himself obliged to make express regulations; and these regulations best prove how dreadful were the oppressions of those people whom Cicero calls the flower of the equestrian order, the ornament of the Roman state, the bulwark of the commonwealth.‡ The exactions of the equestrians in Asia had brought the social machine to a full stop.§ Lucullus ordained, that in all cases where the accumulated interests were greater than the capital, the excess should be remitted to the debtor; he forbade the exaction of more than one per cent. monthly; that is to say, twelve per cent. annually. The creditor should be allowed to distrain only on a fourth part of the debtor's goods; but any one who should exact interest of interest, should lose both capital and interest. In this manner all the debts were cleared off within four years, and the lands of the province restored to their owners free of all incumbrance. It appears from Cicero's speech on the Manilian law, that a cry, sufficient to overthrow Lucullus, was set up by the capitalists against his equitable adjustment.

The provinces were not only drained by the capitalists and revenue farmers, but by the governors, who ought to have protected them. Even ordinary senators, when they went on pleasure excursions, procured a commission (*liberam legationem*) from the senate, which not only entitled them to accommodation on their route, but enabled them to enrich themselves and all whom they took in their suite. Cicero, in his speeches against Verres, which he afterwards committed to writing, has left a record of this provincial tyranny, which does not contain, probably, so much exaggeration as Burke's speeches against Warren Hastings. Yet Cicero has borne as hard on the Roman nabob as Burke on the English. The Turkish or those Persian governors whom Morier, in his second travels in Persia, has depicted in such fearful colors, might have taken lessons from those of Rome,

* "Scævola quæstor Rutilius Rufus damnatus est, quod cum prætore consenserit suo, ne publicani aliquid agerent in provincia sua, quo cognito equites Romani (nam tum ante Sullana tempora judicabant) damnarunt eum."

† Plut. Lucull. c. 22.

‡ "Qui ordo quanto adjumento sit in honore, quis nescit? Flos enim equitum Romanorum, ornamentum civitatis, firmamentum reipublicæ publicanorum ordine continetur."—*Pro. Cn. Plancio. c. ix.*

§ This involvement of cities and states proceeded from the fine of 20,000 talents, exacted by Sylla in Asia, and advanced by the knights. Up to the time of Lucullus's arrival, this capital had swelled, by exorbitant interests, to twenty myriad talents.

who knew much better how to secure their plunder than the Turk or the Persian. The Eastern oppressor has daily to dread punishment; the Roman, on the other hand, was certain of impunity. What enormous wealth a governor of that kind might accumulate by extortion, may be guessed from the sum which Cicero demands as compensation to the Sicilians from Verres. We would not build much upon this document, as the demand of an advocate cannot furnish statistical data of much weight. Yet his estimate might, perhaps, not be exaggerated; as Verres, to the misfortune of his province, continued governor three years in succession. Cicero calculates the amount of compensation due to the province at 100,000,000 sesterces;* it is evident, from this one instance, how little efficacious were the Cornelian laws for the better administration of the provinces. This is evidenced, still more clearly, by Cicero's Epistles, as deeds are recorded there which make us shudder; and recorded, not of robbers and murderers, amongst whom may be reckoned Verres, but of men otherwise wholly unexceptionable. From a letter to Appius, his predecessor in his province,† we find that the inhabitants of the towns were not only annoyed in every possible way by the revenue farmers; that they were not only ground down to the earth by the interests of borrowed capitals; but were compelled besides to tax themselves according to the caprice of the governor, or according to the rapacity of his creatures. The case was the same in other provinces, especially in Sicily. There, shortly before Verres's time, Lepidus had behaved in such a manner, that Cicero says, Verres could be compared with himself only, and with Lepidus. Lepidus was not ashamed to bring the plunder of the province, in a singularly striking manner, before the eyes of men. He built a magnificent palace in Rome, on which the yellow Numidian marble was laid out with extraordinary profusion.‡ The example of extravagance, as of extortion, was infectious. Lucullus, who was consul four years after Lepidus, was resolved to build more splendidly than he had done: accordingly, he procured black marble from Egypt, which, if not more beautiful, at all events was dearer than the Numidian.§ In five-and-thirty years there were more than a hundred palaces in Rome, amongst which that of Lepidus was the humblest. How rapidly the times changed in dwelling houses, eating, and clothing, is evident from Lepidus's example, as a scale of expense was made matter of public accusation against him, which, ten years later, was not at all remarkable. Vel-leius Paterculus relates, that the censor Cassius reprimanded Lepidus

* "All Sicily," he says, "cries out to Verres, 'Quod auri, quod argenti, quod or namentarum in meis urbibus sedibus, delubris fuit, quod in unaquaque re beneficio senatus populi que Romani juris habui, id mihi tu, C. Verres, eripuisti atque abstulisti, quo nomine abs te sestertium milles exlege repeto.'"—*C. Divinat. in Q. Cæcilium*, c. v.

† Cic. Epist. ad Divers. l. iii. ep. 8.

‡ "Limina ex Numidico marmore in domo posuit magna reprehensione Hoc primum inveci Numidici marmoris vestigium invenio, non in columnis tantum crustivæ ut supra Carystii, sed in massa et vilissimo liminum usu."—*Plin. Hist. Nat.* xxxvi. 6.

§ Id. c. 24. § 4.

(apparently before the latter had built his house,) for paying so extravagant a house-rent as 6000 sesterces. At the present day, subjoins Velleius, no senator could with decency inhabit any dwelling at so low a rate; and yet hardly more than 150 years have elapsed since that period. Lucullus's expenditure was on such a scale, that the writers of the imperial period celebrate his gardens even compared with the colossal plans of later times; and his ordinary meals, not to mention his banquets, remained precedents of later prodigality. Lucullus had so regulated his house, that he could always bring three of his friends to supper with him, and, without any previous notice, set before them a banquet of which the expense was reckoned at about 650*l*. Even those men of the aristocracy, who, like Cicero, had neither any particular taste for expense, nor any extraordinary facilities for indulging it, were obliged to make an absurd display of luxury for the sake of appearances. Would they invite their friends to table, they must at least *possess* a proper table; and this would not well, in any respectable house, be of any other wood than, first of the root of certain trees, and afterwards of the wood of a sort of cedar. To such a table a necessary appendage was a foot of Delian bronze, manufactured in Delos. Pliny has devoted a whole chapter to the subject, and brings us acquainted on the occasion with two branches of ancient industry.

The one is the culture of that description of trees, the wood and roots of which fetched so high a price; the other is the art of cabinet-making; since the difference in costliness depended chiefly on the workmanship. Yet even Pliny regards it as incredible, that Cicero should have paid 650*l*. for such a table. We have mentioned the manufacture at Delos, because we can here give new proofs that this island attracted to itself the trade of the world. It has been mentioned above, that the Roman slave trade, and an active trade in goods, had their emporium there; nay, that Rome granted peculiar favors to Delos, and endeavored to transfer thither the commerce of the Rhodians. In this place we shall only add, that Pliny also ascribes the whole manufacturing system to the Delians. He speaks of various kinds of ore, and the works executed in each; he distinguishes the Corinthian, the Æginetan, the Delian, and maintains that the fame of the latter would be preserved and promoted by means of the legs of tables and couches, fabricated at Delos.*

In passing to the topic of public amusements, we have first to remark, that the Servile War caused no diminution in combats and wild beast baitings; nay, that speculators in the cruel training and feeding of the combatants increased daily in numbers, and found people enough ready to pay an exorbitant price for their gladiators, not only at wild beast hunts, but also at public games, and more especially on occasions of intestine disturbance. Catiline and his friends had collected no small number of fighters about them; Clodius and Milo, we shall presently find, both formed a kind of body guard of them. The most impudent and abandoned slaves, so they had but sufficient

* "Antiquissima æris gloria Deliaco fuit, mercatus in Delo concelebrante toto orbe, et ideo cura officinis tricliniorum pedibus fulcrisque!"

bodily powers, were bought for the purpose: men were even found to hire themselves out for the employment, sure of good keep, generous diet, and of making themselves a dear bargain. As they could not have bread weighed to them, nor be let starve like other slaves, the speculators in human flesh kept fighting schools in Ravenna, where the air was healthy, and meat cheap, and in Capua, where the other necessities of life were to be had at an easier rate than in Rome. In earlier times these establishments were carried on by people who were content to engage in a trade that was deemed dishonorable. But, in these times, even freemen were not ashamed to let themselves out: nay, senators themselves did not disdain to conduct their training; and, in Cæsar's life, the circumstance is mentioned with especial praise, that he never gave way to the cruelty of the populace when a gladiator's life was in question. The case was the same with races, which were not, at first, as in Greece, conducted by the men of highest station in the country, but consigned to the management of hirelings. Since Sylla's time senators engaged in them; and, at the public games held by him as dictator, C. Antonius Hybrida, afterwards the colleague of Cicero, and other nobles, took part in the course, though the ordinary charioteers also engaged in it.

The outlay on games, races, gladiatorial combats, &c., was raised to the highest pitch by the part taken by many distinguished men in the training and keep of the people who were employed in them; and enormous sums were requisite to enable any ædile to surpass his predecessors in splendor. Cæsar attempted this, and thereby incurred a load of debt which would seem incredible, if we only possessed the testimony of Appian, who gives a sum of nearly 2,000,000*l.*; but Plutarch says, in like manner, that when Cæsar wished to go to Spain, and was hindered by his debts from doing so, Crassus, in order to satisfy a single urgent creditor, was obliged to give security for 830 talents.

Crassus, like all avaricious and rapacious people of sharp intellect, knew how to show disregard of expense whenever it seemed requisite for displaying himself, or accommodating his friends whom he supplied with loans to a large amount without demanding interest, and thus contrived to keep a part of the senate in dependence on him.

Crassus's whole property was self-acquired, and his life affords materials for elucidating the manner in which wealth might be acquired and augmented at this period. Crassus made his great speculations at the time of the Syllan proscriptions, when he not only bought up, to a large extent, the lots of confiscated property, but had wealthy persons, in different parts of Italy, placed on the list of the proscribed, in order to possess himself of their estates. Cicero taunts him constantly with transactions of this nature. He next determined to take advantage of ruin and conflagration, as he had taken advantage of spoliation, and massacre; and combined this speculation with the slave-trade, which, we have seen before, from Cato's example, was the most lucrative branch of business in Rome, to those who knew how to carry it on, like the elder Cato and Crassus. He began by buying up

slaves in every direction who understood building, and all the arts connected with it. When he had brought together 500 able builders and workmen, he purchased sites for building, which were then extremely low in the market, as few ventured to buy what none could hope to possess in security, and many fled out of the city in dread of being proscribed and murdered. He also contrived to possess himself at a cheap rate, of houses in Rome. In this manner whole streets became his property. He carefully avoided, however, building on his own account, but sold his ground, and hired out the services of his workmen, which thus brought him a clear and certain profit. Moreover, he bought and educated slaves for all employments; readers, scribes, people skilled in trying gold and silver, stewards, waiters, chamberlains, and valets. The education of these slaves he conducted in person. Agriculture and mining he also conducted on a grand scale; but his traffic in slaves he still found the most lucrative branch of business.

The Asiatic triumph of Pompey must have glutted the Roman market with slaves, after all deductions are made for the numbers left to repeople the conquered countries, of those 2,083,000 captives whom he is said to have made. Pliny, though a great admirer of Pompey, states, without disapprobation, that his victories in Asia had introduced the luxury of precious stones and pearls in Rome, in the same manner as the triumph of C. Manlius and of Scipio had before brought in the use of finely-worked silver plate, Pergamenian tapestries and tables, and sofas adorned with bronze; that of Mummius, the taste of exhibiting Corinthian vessels and paintings.

Here it may be remarked, that Græco-Asiatic fashions and usages began to supersede in Rome the arts and manners of Europe. Precious stones, pearl, porcelain, or oriental stone-ware, came instead of those earthen vessels, to the painting of which the Etruscans and Campanians owed their renown; herds of slaves employed to rouse, with voluptuous arts, the torpid senses, or to amuse the languid mind with verbal subtleties, instead of the familiar associates of the rustic hearth; and instead of the simple table of the olden times, came banquets such as those of Lucullus.

What reverence was paid abroad to the mere name of a noble Roman, and with what disdain the Roman oligarchs treated the most polished and civilized foreigners under their empire, is evidenced by an anecdote in Cicero's letters, which deserves to be inserted in this place, though the incident belongs to the period subsequent to Cæsar's consulship. C. Memmius was charged with illegal canvass and intrigue (*crimine ambitus*), and escaped his probable sentence, as the Roman law allowed, by means of voluntary exile to Athens. A banished man, it might be thought, would live as quietly as possible. Not at all. Memmius chose to build, and selected a spot to build on in the neighborhood of one of the most venerable sites of antiquity, the rival of the Academy and Lyceum—the garden of Epicurus. The place, of course, was not to be sold; and the Areopagus was forced to pass a decree, consigning it to Memmius, though Phædrus, who then stood at the head of the sect of Epicureans, had legal claims on the situation in question. Memmius afterwards gave up his plan of build-

ing, and Cicero was entreated to intercede with him, that he should waive his claim to the property of the Epicureans. With this view, Cicero writes* in a style of the most consummate indifference, assuring Memmius, that so long as he had retained his intention of building, he (Cicero) would not for the world have meddled in the matter; but that now, perhaps, he might as well humor the poor people, even though he regarded them with no particular favor, by letting them have their garden ground back again.

With all the ostentation and magnificence of a few families, Rome and its environs were as yet far from the pitch of splendor which Strabo describes as existing in his own days. Cicero compares Rome and Capua, and hesitates not a moment to give preference to the latter town over the metropolis of the world, in its general appearance, streets, and architectural beauties. Rome, he says, is built on uneven ground, with portions of it buried in a valley; has enormously lofty houses, wretched pavements, and narrow streets. On the other hand, Capua occupies a plain, and laughs to scorn, with her wide streets, our narrow alleys.† And then her environs! Who will compare a Vatican and Pupinian field with the exuberant and rich soil about Capua? Only in scorn and derision can the vast number of places in the vicinity of Capua be compared with those about Rome. What are Labici, Fidenæ, Collatia, or even Lanuvium, Aricia, Tusculum, beside Cales, Teanum, Neapolis, Puteoli, Cumæ, Pompeii, Nuceria?

* "Patro cum ad me Romam literas misisset ut te sibi placarem peteremque, ut nescio quid illud Epicuri parietinarum sibi concederes, nihil scripsi ad te ob eam rem, quod ædificationis tuæ consilium mea commendatione, nolebam impediri. Idem ut veni Athenas, cum idem ut ad te scriberem rogasset, ob eam causam impetravit, quod te abjecisse illam ædificationem constabat inter omnes amicos tuos."—*Epist. ad Divers.* xiii. 1.

† "Cœnaculis sublatam atque suspensam, non optimis viis, angustissimis semitis."

CHAPTER X.

INTELLECTUAL AND LITERARY CHARACTER OF THE TIMES.

No deliberative body, with perhaps one exception, the constituent assembly of France, seems to have ever so completely brought together in its members the highest abilities and attainments of the nation represented by it, as the senate of Rome, from the end of the third Punic war to the death of Cæsar. The writings of a Cicero, Cæsar, and Sallust, the epistles of Brutus and Cassius, and the replies addressed by Cicero to a host of correspondents, whose communications have not been handed down to us, evince such fulness of knowledge, such facility of expression, so familiar an acquaintance with the various branches of art and science, as to evince how high a place was given to general acquirements in the estimation of men of rank and station, and how requisite a condition were those acquirements to the attainment of eminence.

This direction of mind in his contemporaries to those studies which were naturalized in Rome by the lessons of Greek captives or fugitives, was early perceived and turned to advantage by Cicero, whose influence, by precept or example, in all branches of study, on the mental frame of his own and of succeeding times, must now claim our principal attention. It is a spectacle quite unique in Roman history, that a man like Cicero, without military fame, without aristocratic connection, without the command of wealth, without the management of a party, simply and solely by the exertion of his talents and his eloquence, could raise himself to the first place in the conduct of affairs.

Cicero was born for an orator. He early felt that his only chance of advancement in the state, and the gratification of a vanity which never entirely left him, and which he himself never pretends to disclaim, lay in the cultivation of his native and peculiar talent. Perhaps he also felt the only mode in which the higher pursuits of philosophy and literature could be really popularized in Rome was by clothing them in rhetorical forms and colors. Accordingly, his efforts took that direction from youth upwards. The poet Archias, Philo, Molon, had great part in his education, and the stoic Diodotus thoroughly exercised him in dialectics.* He next sought Grecian culture at its source, and did not return from Greece till he had mastered all the secrets of its oratory. He visited the renowned schools of political science and eloquence which then flourished in Athens, Rhodes, and

* "Doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, duibus domus nostra semper floruit, et principes illi Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, a quibus institutissimus."—*De. Nat. Deor.* l. i. c. 3.

many towns of Asia Minor. His own writings afford abundant evidence of his proficiency in geometry, philology, music, and every other liberal branch of scientific and literary attainment. He was conversant with all the refinements of dialectic subtlety, and with the whole ideal or practical range of ethics. For he well knew that the power and effect of oratory does not depend, like success in other arts, on any single study, but that he alone deserves the name of an orator who can speak on any subject (*de omni quæstione*) appropriately and persuasively to his audience.

Cicero has himself portrayed the character of the true orator, and his right to be regarded as a director of the public mind; and the author of the Dialogue on the causes of the decline of eloquence has treated the subject with special reference to Cicero himself.* The degree of influence exercised by Cicero over his age and country by means of his extended research in history and philosophy, may partly be collected from his own statements. He says of himself, with justice, that it was he first among all the Romans, who showed himself conversant in the books which contained the genuine sources of wisdom, who first had brought the Roman people acquainted with the leading features and principles of the Greek schools of philosophy. Civil law, the sole science quite congenial to the Romans, lost in his hands, part of the dryness of its distinctions and definitions. He popularized even history, the importance of which had been little understood up to his times, by exciting the attention of his countrymen to its high importance in daily transactions and politics.†

Dramatic spectacles and actors never could obtain in Rome the rank which they had held in Greece. Cicero taught respect for art even in the persons of actors. He showed a degree of honor to the great actor of his times, Roscius, such as had usually been paid in Rome only to statesmen and generals, and, in all his speeches and writings, made so excellent an use of native dramatic works, as well comic as tragic, that his encouragement must have brought forward new laborers in the field of the drama, had it been possible to naturalize that branch of art among the Romans.

Cicero shows himself greatest in political discourses, when these have no premeditated, self-regarding purpose. If the limits of our work admitted of illustrating in detail the degree in which his speeches promoted that political knowledge which was then a prime necessity of his era, we should say, that in his speeches against Verres he not only displays a thorough insight into the prevalent corruption of the aristocracy, which regarded public functions as its property, and the administration of the provinces as a means for its enrichment, but that

* "Ergo hanc primam et præcipuam causam arbitror cur tantum ab eloquentia antiquorum Romanorum recesserimus. Si testes desiderantur, quos potiores nominabo, quam apud Græcos Demosthenem? quem studiosissimum Platonis auditorem fuisse memoriæ proditum est. Et Cicero, his ut opinor, verbis, quidquid in eloquentia effecerit, id se non rhetorum, sed Academiæ spatiis consecutum."—*Dialogus de Oratoribus*, c. 32.

† "Ut ex ea (the orator) quando opus esset, ab inferis locupletissimos testes excitaret."

he also understood how to set forth before the people the true and stable principles of political administration. He describes the nobler lines of policy, the better modes of provincial government, and contrasts them with the perverted and pernicious system followed by such men as Verres and others. With reference to Catiline, his accomplices, and all the people, to whom the state was a secondary matter, and their own advantage the main object in life, the discourse held by Cicero as candidate for the consulship (*in toga candida*,) from separate, and, in part, very imperfect fragments, shows us the contrast between the two parties who then devoted themselves to politics—the old Roman, and the new senatorial party,—and historically illustrates the two descriptions of men, one of which sought the greatness of Rome, and the other only its own interest, careless of the ruin of the state. Through his discourses against Catiline, Cicero's eloquence rekindled, even in hearts where it seemed utterly extinct, some feeling for the honor of their country, so that even those who privately favored Catiline deserted him from dread of appearing partakers in his crime.*

In philosophy, so far as exciting interest in its study, and diffusing its results are claims to honor, more has, perhaps, been done for the world by Cicero than by all the greatest philosophers taken together; since, not only did the whole subsequent Roman era follow his guidance, but even in the scholastic gloom of the middle ages the effect of his writings is strikingly perceptible; and, in the first dawn of philosophy in modern times, the earliest unsophisticated knowledge of the great schools of antiquity was derived from the same source. If we would properly appreciate the influence of Cicero's philosophy on his countrymen, we must constantly keep before our eyes his own declaration with regard to the species of philosophical instruction which was the scope of his efforts.† However little the philosopher, properly so called, can sanction the selection and adaptation of different systems to the necessities of men and of the times, however strange it seems to him that a man, who of all the Romans of his time was best, perhaps exclusively, acquainted with Aristotle, as he himself boasts in his *Logic*, should yet appear to oscillate between the elder Platonism, strict Stoicism, and a better sort of Cyrenæan doctrine, according as life either exalts or depresses him, and as he, therefore, either basks in enjoyment, or requires solace and sedatives; yet to him who views Cicero's philosophical writings historically, without reference to the furtherance of philosophy as a science, it is precisely this eclectic character which makes them of the highest importance. By converting Greek speculation into Roman practical wisdom, he brought philosophy into some esteem amongst a people addicted to warfare, inventive of legal subtleties, and only intent on material utility. He showed what use might be made of Greek philosophy in legal and

* "Non Demosthenem opinor orationes illustrant quas adversus tutores suos composuit. Nec Ciceronem magnum oratorem P. Quinctius defensus aut Licinius Archias faciunt; Catilina, et Milo, et Verres, et Antonius hanc famam illi circumdederunt."—*Dialogus de Orator. c. 37*.

† "Si omnia philosophiæ præcepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea præstitisse quæ ratio et doctrina præscripsit."

political discourses, in common intercourse, in the vicissitudes of life to which all are liable in republics, and which Cicero, like Lucullus and others, so frequently experienced.

Were we asked to compare the influence of his several writings on active life, we should assign less importance to books like that on the Republic, only recently introduced to our acquaintance, or to the book on the Being of the Gods, on Destiny, on Divination, than to those either designed for the public in general, or, at least, for people in Cicero's situation. The books on Age, on Friendship, on Duties, were not only important, at the time of their publication, in the promotion of a more refined and noble mode of thought and life, but became of more especial importance in the middle ages, in the days of the first revival of the study of antiquity. The middle ages were guided by the fathers of the church and by the Latin schools to these books, and excitable minds, which were in danger of being stifled by the prevalent philosophy, its barbarous formulas, locutions, and scholastic disquisitions, were retrieved by Cicero's works to the contemplation of the outward and inward aims and ends of humanity. So long as Latin was the sole language of books, the writings of Cicero served as a manual for all those who would learn, in the easiest manner, the results of ancient philosophy for their own amusement, instruction, or solace.

As a rhetorician, as a teacher of eloquence, or the art of persuasion, Cicero had merit no less eminent than as an orator. In this department his excellence was the greater, as he combined with the knowledge of rules the knowledge how to put them in practice. If we have Cicero to thank for the preservation of whole schools and systems of the old Grecian philosophy, we are even more indebted to him in rhetoric, for not only preserving all that was taught in the Greek schools of his time, but for having enriched the whole with constant reference to the Romans, and with examples from the history of their native eloquence. Cicero's Epistles are precious, not only as models of style, but as opening to our view the living features of familiar intercourse, and enabling us to estimate the treasures of thought and of various knowledge which were then in circulation among the Roman aristocracy. From the fragments belonging to other writers interspersed among those Epistles, it appears that at this period, even in crises the most perilous, the class which composed the refined circles of Rome, took equally vivid interest in intellectual as in political subjects. It is exclusively characteristic of the times which we are treating of, that the talent of speaking, ease of expression, and general cultivation of intellect, were acquirements universally made by persons of consideration. With the utmost elegance of address, with the most flattering forms of politeness, all these eminent personages combine a certain straightforward openness, springing out of the habits of public life and extended intercourse. A state of society fraught with these accomplishments, and exhibiting high individual examples of political eminence, could not lack a tribe of memoirs, biographies, and commentaries. Works of this description were unknown to the Greek literature, as were also (till the Alexandrian era) works of pon-

derous erudition, such as those of Varro. Q. Lutatius Catulus, Rutilius, Æmilius Scaurus, composed memoirs of their life and times; but we know as little of these as of some others, who, in like manner, have written their own lives. Nor is it known whether Sylla can be said to have written his own memoirs. He employed Lucullus to stuff them out with rhetoric, and his freedman Cornelius Epicades also worked at them. To judge from the passages left us, Sylla was far removed from Cæsar's simplicity: he rather sought to color things and acts than to let them speak for themselves, and made pretensions to style and regularity, which are not at all compatible with this description of authorship. Lucullus, too, as he patronised men of letters, and took up literary pursuits as a pleasant pastime, wrote memoirs, from which Plutarch has, perhaps, adopted passages here and there in his Life. Next to Brutus's memoirs, which have unfortunately been lost to us, those of Atticus merit especial mention, as hardly any private man can be named who exercised equal influence in public affairs, and so much enjoyed the confidence of the leading men of his time. The complicated money concerns of Atticus, his incessant studies, his familiar acquaintance with the whole Roman and Grecian literature, his complete impartiality and independence of character, made him equally sought and courted by all parties.* He was on friendly terms with Sylla, yet assisted the younger Marius with money; he was intimate with Cicero, yet withal not ill disposed to Clodius; the friend of Cæsar, familiar with Brutus and Cassius. His historical writings seem to be merely the amusements of a man of rank. They are notices, genealogical and historical, of the most eminent families of Rome and other such fruits of research directed on points of mere curiosity.

Of Cæsar, as it is well known, we have no complete memoirs, but only an account of his campaigns, in which he could not avoid touching upon other matters concerning himself. Xenophon's campaign against Cyrus, the history of his own times by Frederick the Great, and the history of the Seven Years' War, afford some data for comparison betwixt their respective ages and authors. The Greek has in view much rather the matter in hand, the real occurrences, than his own person and personal achievements. The Roman on the other hand, gives the latter point especial prominence; but in so doing he is straightforward, open, and totally free from all pretensions to a morality and delicacy of feeling which he does not possess. Cæsar speaks bluntly out of acts of oppression, plunder, and cruelty, which, he says, he found politically necessary, and speaks of them with edifying composure. Nor did he, like Sylla and Frederick, get his own journals elaborated and polished by foreign *litterateurs* and professors of fine writing. He gave himself out as he was; and is more pleasing in

* "Omnia Catonis, Ciceronum, Marii, Q. Hortensii, Auli Torquati, multorum præterea equitum Romanorum negotia procurabat. ex quo judicari poterat, non inertia sed judicio fugisse reipublicæ procuracionem. Humanitatis vero nullum afferre majus testimonium possum, quam quod adolescens idem seni Sullæ fuerit jucundissimus senex adolescenti M. Bruto; cum æqualibus autem suis Q. Hortensio et M. Cicerone, sic vixerit, ut judicare difficile sit, cui ætati fuerit aptissimus, quamquam eum præcipue dilexit Cicero, ut ne frater quidem ei Quintus carior fuit aut familiarior."—*Corn. Nep. Atticus*, c. xv.

his easy negligence than all the Syllan sophists, and all the French phrasemongers and *philosophes* whom Frederick invoked to his aid. It is remarkable that Cicero and Cæsar should each, at the same time, have furnished examples,—the one how excellence might be reached by the most consummate art; the other by utter renunciation of all art whatsoever.

Sallust was another true-born son of this refined and corrupt aristocratical era. In his histories he imitated the manner of Thucydides; or, in other words, he made an artificial copy of what, in the Greek original, was a natural production. Sallust dwells exclusively on the darker side of life and experience; it would seem that he himself had seen and practised nothing but evil. Like the fashionable French school of the time of Louis XV., he erects into ruling springs of action egotism and love of pleasure, speaks of geniality in corruption, honors talent disjoined from virtue, which he refines into a mere ideal shadow, setting up all the while extremely high pretensions to it, and overstraining the whole scope of philosophy. He regards the life of all men with whom he himself has lived as far apart from his sphere of being, and far beneath his sphere of thought. Thucydides strains his requirements of mankind to a less exalted pitch; recognises an inward life besides that which he sees with his eyes; believes in love, in friendship, in disinterested patriotism; and consequently never becomes bitter and sarcastic. With respect to the philosophy of both, it is at once observable that the views of the world and men entertained by the latter spring from the inmost depths of his soul, and have become his intellectual property. Sallust on the other hand, betrays at every word that he has learned his by rote, or has manufactured them for the market, for display in conversation, speaking, or writing, not for practical use. Accordingly the brevity and obscurity of Thucydides result from his purpose only to write for a highly educated circle, not for the multitude. Sallust is resolved to write with striking effect, in such a manner that his sayings shall have all the effect of epigrams; and that the exercise of unravelling his intricacies shall furnish the reader with the sort of amusement derived from solving charades or riddles.

It coincided exactly with Sallust's whole turn of thought, and with his whole conception of human pursuits and character, to select for the subjects of his narrative two sets of occurrences, of which the whole tissue was corruption and betrayal of the commonweal for the sake of sheer self-interest; and in recounting which, hardly any occasion was presented of bringing into view the nobler features of the times. Even when Sallust resolved to join together the two portions of the history of his own times by a connecting thread of narration, he prudently did not stray beyond the times of corruption. He commenced his general history at the moment of Sylla's abdication, and carried it up to the point of time when Pompey received, through the law of Manilius, those enormous powers in the state which have been already mentioned. At such a period, only, could a man who had been expelled the senate by the censors for his profligate course of life, and who had

the impudence openly to turn this disgrace into a jest,* have taken it into his head to play the moralist, and contrast in his writings ancestral simplicity with present corruption. Morals, however, were not as yet sufficiently sunk, nor refinement ripe enough, to favor the spread of that sarcastic and epigrammatical mode of writing which Sallust had selected, and which came to prevail in the time of the emperors. The Romans of this age required another sort of national history, and the precept and example of Cicero pioneered the way for a performance of the kind required—the work of a skilled rhetorician.

It were vain to ask whether Livy, when he commenced his works, which embraced the whole Roman history, in 142 books, of which thirty-five only are extant, had before his eyes the passage in which Cicero declares his views with regard to Roman history and its treatment.† Thus much, at least, is certain: that at Livy's time Cicero's manner had spread itself over every department of literature, and that no one could hope to please without the use of rhetorical ornament. In order to write popularly, Livy could not go back to the *naïve* unpretending style of Herodotus, but was obliged to seek his models in such writers as Ephorus, Theopompus, and others of the rhetorical school of Isocrates. He was acquainted, of course, with Polybius, and made use of his materials; but he had altogether a different scope, and, therefore, adapted altogether a different procedure. His conception of history seems to have been the rhetorical decoration of what either had, or probably might have happened. In the first sections of his work he uses to the best effect popular faith, traditional usages, and prevalent opinions. He may often, perhaps, disfigure with his rhetoric the poetry of the lays which he made use of; yet he applies them skilfully enough for his purpose. His work is, therefore, to be ranked with the few books which have worked themselves completely into the popular texture of thought, and on which criticism is useless; since whole nations and centuries have received for truth, what is often neither true nor probable.

The formation of a polished and fastidious school of criticism, and the ever increasing prevalence in the higher ranks of the Greek language, completed the division of the nation into two portions; one of which paid almost exclusive attention to Greek literature, while the other paid no attention to literature at all, having received no education, and having, therefore, no intellectual wants,

* He said he would have nothing more to do with the wives of senators, but would cultivate an inferior class of women.

† De Legibus, lib. i. c. 2.

BOOK IV.

THE LAST YEARS OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE TO THE BATTLE OF PHARSALIA.

THERE is much uniformity in the symptoms of national dissolution and ruin. When moral corruption and social inequalities have reached that point at which the promises of popular improvements, put forth, for the most part, solely as the stepping-stone of ambition, to the ears of the multitude signify nothing but hope of relief from ignoble wants, and of release from the restraints of public order, violent changes are inevitable, while reformation is all but hopeless. The highest fame can then be reached only in one of two ways; by setting every scruple at defiance to attain greatness, or by holding every earthly aim in contempt to preserve virtue. The highest force of character is required in such times for good or for evil; the genius of a Cicero and Pompey are rebuked by the crisis; the sovereignty of Cæsar or the death of Cato are the alternatives for towering and resolved spirits in times like these. The fortunate ambition of Cæsar, the unfortunate patriotism of Cato, are still the ideas commonly connected the two names. Yet tranquil enjoyment was the lot of the one as little as of the other; and if ultimate success be with the test of well-directed endeavor, it is difficult to perceive how an usurper slaughtered on the steps of his throne, and leaving his unfinished work to be torn to pieces by struggling factions, can be considered to have ended his career more triumphantly than the patriot whose unconquerable will is to the last exercised, and who gives, in the then unproved form of a voluntary death, the last example of Roman resolution to his unworthy countrymen.

At the point of time at which we have now to resume the thread of events, the defeat of the Catilinarian conspiracy by the vigor of Cicero had thrown an invidious and dangerous lustre around his administration, and gave an appearance of stability to the governing body—namely, the senate. But it was soon found how little lasting reliance could be placed on a luxurious class, who seemed to think, in the

words of Cicero himself, "that even if the republic should perish, they would be able to preserve their fish-ponds." It might soon be foreseen that Cicero would pay dear for saving his party. It is morally certain, in all such cases, that unprincipled mob-leaders will find a pretext to represent a necessary act of severity as a causeless and tyrannical massacre. A momentary triumph of force, however justly exerted, is of no service beyond creating a momentary panic. The day after such a triumph, parties proceed to blacken its authors; and the miserable panders to the fury of a blind populace succeed in bringing impotence on the efforts of statesmen, around whom the moment before had rallied every friend of his country, in the firm and just conviction that their counsels were its last hope.

It is egotism in high places which gives power to the baser sort. It was the leading senators who betrayed the triumphant cause of the senate. Pompey, we have seen, had lately returned from his Asiatic achievements, and in the midst of his magnificent triumph felt that he had returned to a theatre where he was no longer allowed the sole and undisputed ascendancy. Difficulties were thrown in the way of the ratification required from the senate of all the proceedings and measures which he had taken in his eastern province, it being necessary that all the regulations made in a conquered province should receive *v. c.* the formal sanction of that body. This was refused, one of the 693. consuls (Metellus) being his personal enemy. Pompey had married his sister, and had afterwards divorced himself from her. The other consul (Afranius) could afford him no assistance; and Lucullus, whom Pompey had robbed of the honor of terminating the war with Mithridates which he had carried on so long and so successfully, directed all his influence in the senate to oppose the confirmation of his successor's proceedings. Thwarted in the senate, Pompey was weak enough to throw himself into the arms of the popular party—that is, of Cæsar. He was ready to catch at any means for regaining his ascendancy. Cæsar was equally ready to coalesce with him and promote his purpose. Cæsar, in fact, who already had gained a high station in popular favor, saw perfectly well that the same party in the senate which watched to prevent Pompey engrossing its whole powers in his single person, would be likely to oppose his own ambitious projects in like manner. He could not gain means to form an army without Pompey's assistance, and the latter had not the least apprehension of being eclipsed by his rising greatness. The immediate object of Cæsar was the consulship—that of Pompey, the entire ratification of his acts and regulations in Asia. Gold was the principal means for making sure of the popular leaders, and of the neutral herd of senators who merely attended to give their votes. Accordingly, Cæsar wheedled the rich Crassus into reconciliation with Pompey, and won his alliance by holding out the prospect to him of sharing supreme power with himself and Pompey, without occasion for great efforts or extraordinary services.

The league between Pompey, Crassus, and Cæsar, known by the name of the first triumvirate, was by no means of a public nature, or calculated for all contingencies. Nor had Pompey and Crassus, at

the time when they closed this unnatural compact with Cæsar, any design hostile to the existence of the aristocratic party to which they belonged. Cæsar, on his part, never had a serious thought of restoring to the people and their turbulent tribunes the power which was assigned to them by the ancient constitution, but only waited the time, when, having drawn to himself the lion's share of influence, treasure, and military force, he might rid himself with safety of his colleagues.

The first tacit engagement of the triumvirs was to procure the ratification of the whole of Pompey's proceedings in Asia. They resolved to carry Cæsar's election as consul for the next year; and through his agency, in the teeth of the opposition of the senate, to affix the public sanction to the above-mentioned proceedings.

The party of Lucullus, Cato, Cicero, and other friends of the existing constitution, soon, indeed, perceived that it would be impossible to effect the exclusion of Cæsar from the consulship. They were, however, equally convinced that Pompey and Crassus would never concur in violent measures against the established laws and legal authorities. Accordingly, they resolved to couple Cæsar with a colleague implicitly attached to their interest. Instead of Lucceius, therefore, with whom Cæsar had formed a coalition similar to that which often takes place at elections in this country,* Bibulus was raised by the senatorial party to the consulship. On this ensued incessant disputes between the new consuls. The result v. c.
694. was, that the proud grandees, who cared, as Cicero charged them with doing, more about their fish-ponds than their country,† rendered themselves and their consul contemptible by giving him no effective support, and afforded Cæsar golden opportunities to win the favor of every class of citizens. He caused the Asiatic measures of Pompey to be confirmed by the people; he caused a commission of twenty to be appointed for indemnifying out of the public treasury the proprietors of lands to be apportioned amongst the poorer citizens. Moreover, by a concession prejudicial to the state-finance, without being advantageous to the prayers of taxes in the provinces, he gained the equestria order, a body of men who invariably preferred their money interests to the good of the state. This he effected by carrying a measure which had been thrown out, through Cato's opposition, in the senate, to release the revenue farmers from a third of the payments they had to make, under engagements into which they had entered with the public administration for the collection of the taxes in the newly conquered provinces, and in which it would seem their avidity had overshot its mark, by inducing them to bid too high for the contract. The final breach between Cæsar and his aristocratical colleague was

* "Lucceium scito consulatum habere in animo statim petere: duo enim soli dicuntur peturi. Cæsar coire cum eo per Arrium cogitat: et Bibulus cum hoc se putat per C. Pisonem posse conjungi. Rides? Non sunt hæc ridicula, mihi credo."—*Cic. Epist. ad Attic.* lib. i. ep. 17.

† "Nostri autem principes digito se cælum putavit attingere, si nulli barbati in piscinis sunt, qui ad manum accedunt, alia omnia negligunt."—*Epist. ad Attic.* lib. i. ep. 19.

occasioned by the opposition made by the latter, backed by the senate, to his proposition for the above mentioned division of lands to the veteran soldiers of Pompey and other citizens. These allotments were to be carved from the best and richest lands in Campania; and the districts on the Sabbatus and Vulturnus, which had hitherto been appropriated to pious uses, were included in the plans of the commissioners. Against these provisions the senatorial party rallied their whole force. Bibulus proclaimed a solemn cessation of public business. But Cæsar had gained one of the tribunes, Vatinius, who excelled all his colleagues in audacity; and took upon himself, without a shadow of scruple, the odium and the infamy of violent measures. Bibulus was driven from the forum by mob tumult, and kept in a state of siege in his own house. During the rest of his consular year he could only escape outrage by not only avoiding all assemblies of the people, but every solemn and important meeting of the senate. Even Cato was driven awhile into retirement by menace and violence.* Cicero, it was hoped, might be won; and an offer was made him of a place among the twenty commissioners. He hesitated long; and when, at length, he refused his adhesion, his arch-enemy Clodius, as we shall see, was pitted against him, and he was driven, in the following year, entirely out of the city.

Under these circumstances, it cannot appear wonderful that Cæsar fully succeeded in accomplishing his real objects. He severed Pompey completely from the aristocratical party, and rendered him contemptible by that separation;† bestowed on him his daughter Julia in marriage, and appeared to transact every thing with his concurrence. v. c. Cæsar and Pompey nominated consuls for the following year 696. zealously devoted to their interests; and Cicero could not prevent them from raising the profligate Clodius to the tribuneship. In like manner, Cæsar, through the agency of Vatinius, obtained the assignment, for five years, as his province, of all Upper Italy and Illyricum, regardless of the Sempronian law, according to which the provinces could only be voted year by year. To this extensive province, thus illegally obtained from the people, the intimidated senate added Transalpine Gaul (*camatam Galliam*).‡

From this moment the Roman history singularly resembles that of the French republic, during the course of Napoleon's earlier achieve-

* Plut. in Cat. Min. c. xxiii.

† Pompey's false position is thus sharply touched by Cicero (*Epist. ad Attic. xi. 21.*) "Itaque ille amicus noster, insolens infamiae, semper in laude versatus, circumfluens gloria, deformatus corpore, fractus animo quo se conferat nescit: progressum praeipitem, inconstantem reditum videt; bonos inimicos habet, improbos ipsos non amicos. Ac vide mollitiem animi! Non tenui lacrimas, cum illum, ante viii. Kal. Sextil. vidi de edictis Bibuli concionantem, qui antea solitus esset jactare se magnificentissime illo in loco summo cum amore populi, cunctis faventibus, ut ille tum humilis, ut demissus erat! ut ipse etiam sibi, non iis solum qui aderant displicebat! O spectaculum, uni Crasso jucundum, cæteris non item! nam quia deciderat ex astris, lapses quam progressus, potius videbatur, et ut Apelles si Venerem, aut si Protogenes, Jalyæum illum suum cæno oblitum videret, magnum, credo, acciperet dolorem: sic ego hunc omnibus a me pictum et politum artis coloribus subito deformatum non sine magno dolore vidi."

‡ "As if," says Plutarch (in *Cat. Min. c. xxiii.*) "they would vote a citadel to their tyrant"—ὡς εἰς ἀκρόπολιν τὸν τύραννον αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ψήφοις ἰδοῦναι.

ments. In both a feeble republican administration presides in the capital, which is the theatre of incessant agitation, kept up by conflicting parties, who find their account in any state of things rather than peace and quiet. In both, we find a general invested with unprecedented powers; the uncontrolled ruler of provinces, yielding in extent and importance nothing to a powerful empire: we find a man of superior genius, unscrupulous in his resolutions, and, whenever his interest dictates it, remorseless in his cruelties, proceeding in the most monarchical manner, under the cover of the most democratical sentiments, and acquiring absolute power over the soldiery by virtue of his fortune and conquests. Cæsar at first obtained only four legions, and the ordinary complement of auxiliaries, in all a numerical force of about 40,000 men; but he contrived, by degrees, so skilfully to fabricate a necessity for augmenting the effective force of this army, that he succeeded, with the concurrence of the senate, in bringing up his legions to twelve; that is to say, in trebling his force. The whole of this force, enured to constant military service, had the most unbounded confidence in itself and in its general, and had experienced all sorts of hardships and deprivations.

Cæsar obtained the province of Gaul precisely at the most fortunate conjuncture for his military prospects. At that moment, the allies of Rome were threatened with invasion by the German and Helvetian tribes, and compelled to look about them for external assistance. Just as Cæsar appeared in Gaul, the Helvetians were preparing to quit their country, carrying with them their wives and children, and fight for a new settlement in Gaul. The Gallic tribes on the banks of the Saone, whose territory was first threatened by the descent of the Helvetians through the passes of the Jura received the Roman legions as their deliverers, and facilitated their victory over the mountaineers, who fell in great numbers.

Having freed the Gauls from the terrors of this national migration, Cæsar now directed his arms against the Germans, who had been led on a military adventure by their chief, Ariovistus, into Gaul, where their numbers had increased to 120,000 men. These Germans owed their entrance into Gaul to the feuds of the Gauls themselves. The Arverni and Sequani had invoked their aid against Ædui, and were the first to feel the formidable incumbrance of their presence. All the Gauls united implored the aid of Cæsar against the strangers. He did not need to be asked twice. The leader of the German hordes was already known to the Romans by transactions of an earlier date, and a title of honor had been procured him by Cæsar from the senate. He, therefore, attempted negotiation before resorting to force of arms. The German chief, however, was as haughty as the Roman general; negotiation was fruitless, and nothing remained but an appeal to arms. A battle was fought, not far from the modern Besaçon, in which Ariovistus was slain. The Germans were forced to evacuate Gaul, where the Romans made preparations to quarter their troops permanently, under the pretext of protecting the land from the Germans, and keeping the peace amongst the native populations.

This prolonged stay of the Romans in Gaul aroused the apprehensions of the northern tribes, whose origin was probably mixed, between Celtic and German, who were linked in a certain union with each other, and included by the Romans under the common name of Belgæ. They mustered their strength, in order to meet force with force in case of necessity : and Cæsar sought to anticipate their movements. Meanwhile the Gauls after the manner of all half-civilised nations, made repeated, and, for the most part, highly imprudent attempts to expel the Romans,—singly to shake themselves free from the yoke, and surprise the several legions, or to rise in mass, and bury the whole army of Rome under the wreck of their own ruined possessions.

As we have only Cæsar's partial statements respecting these transactions in Gaul, it is impossible for us to decide who was the aggressor on every successive out-breaking of hostilities, or who was at last to blame for the general war. Cæsar himself, however, does not deny the commission of frightful cruelties, and the butchering execution of thousands, the hacking off of heads, the burning of cities, the devastation of whole districts, but excuses them as measures of necessity ; sometimes even gives the numbers of Gauls murdered and enslaved, and does not disguise the use that he made of the plunder of the country, in order to attach his troops to his person. It is, however, certain, that he contrived so to conduct matters as to incorporate with the Roman empire France, as far as the frontiers of the Netherlands, the coasts of Bretagne, and the Pyrenees, and to establish a firm footing among the German tribes, who had driven the Gauls from the left bank of the Rhine, and had formed settlements there.

The reputation of the greatest of Roman generals, the renown of having accomplished things hitherto unheard of, Cæsar sought to attain from two undertakings, from which he expected no advantage either to himself or to the public ; but which were calculated to give his expeditions all the charm of voyages of discovery ; to impart to his campaigns a tinge of the marvellous of knightly adventure ; and to invest his designs with the grandeur belonging to those of Alexander. These undertakings were his invasion of Great Britain,—the prototype of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt,—and his attempt to gain a footing on the right bank of the Rhine. The former adventure at least enriched the Romans with new acquisitions of knowledge : they acquainted themselves with the Northern Ocean, and came in contact with nations who made a nearer approach to the savage state than the Gauls or Germans. Cæsar, however, did not think it advisable, considering the state of affairs at home, to linger amidst barbarian hordes, divided by seas from civilised Europe ; and gave up of his own accord, his conquests in Great Britain. His expeditions across the Rhine were merely short excursions.

Cæsar displayed, in all his military affairs and undertakings, those qualities of a leader, to the praise of which a separate chapter in his biography has been dedicated by Plutarch ; who affirms (we would not vouch for the exactness of his enumeration) that during his Gallic expedition, he took eight hundred towns by storm ; vanquished three

hundred tribes or nations ; and was conqueror in forty pitched battles. In the course of these campaigns he engaged, on the whole, three millions of men ; of whom he succeeded in slaying a million, and capturing a million more. The amount of money which, during his campaigns, he extorted from the conquered countries, or amassed out of the spoils of war, or obtained by confiscation of the possessions of those who deserted from his side, may be estimated from the data preserved of the increase in the public revenues, which he is said to have augmented by more than forty million sesterces ; from the enormous sums which he arbitrarily raised for the pay of his troops in his province ; but, above all, from the payment of his private debts from his share in the plunder.

While Cæsar was incessantly active in reinforcing his army in Gaul, and gaining its attachment to his person ; in contending with revolts of separate districts, or of the whole country : in refitting, by extraordinary efforts, the fleets and armaments shattered by winds and tempests ; or in carrying on war in the most disadvantageous circumstances, and marching over ground such as, perhaps, no leader had ever traversed,—his eye continued steadily fixed on the state of affairs in Rome itself, which now demands a share of our attention. The two chiefs of the old republican or independent party, Cicero and Cato, had rather gained than lost in importance and influence : the motive of their exertions in the senate, and before the people, was suspected of no material alloy from private ends or private passions. It was necessary, therefore, to remove these two.

Here was fit employment for Clodius. The history of this man gives the clearest possible insight into the character of these times, and shows that it was a piece of refined policy in the statesmen at the head of affairs to permit some thoroughly turbulent fellow to make his appearance from time to time, to be used, now as a bugbear, now as a catspaw. Clodius was descended from a good family, and accomplished in all the talents and all the vices of his times. Notwithstanding he was at daggers drawn with Cato, he had supported Cicero in his proceedings against Catiline, though soon afterwards he attached himself to Cæsar, because the zealots for morality in the senate gave no quarter to his vices and extravagances. A love affair with Cæsar's wife had induced him to take the opportunity when the rites of the *Bona Dea* were performed at his house to disguise himself in female clothing, in order to obtain entrance along with the women assisting in the ceremony. His enemies in the senate seized the occasion of his intruding himself at a sacrifice where no male was allowed to be present, to procure a sentence against him as an offender against the Deity. In this they were baffled by the tumult and corruption which attended the trial ; and Clodius, having obtained his adoption into a plebeian family, was, by the underhand aid of Cæsar and Pompey, made one of the tribunes.

The very commencement of Clodius's tribuneship seemed to shake the constitution to its base ; for he carried four laws, every one of which upset some regulation of the former times. First he procured a decree for the gratuitous distribution of corn, which had previously

been distributed for three fourths of an as for each modius, but not gratis; in other words, he attracted into the town and provided subsistence for that part of the population which was most dangerous to tranquility. Next he procured the abolition of that law of Ælius and Fufius, by virtue of which either an augur or magistrate could suspend the deliberations of the people when they were dangerous. A third innovation, however, contained the germs of even greater disturbance than any other of the four laws which we mention here; for its effects survived the repeal of the three others, and the consequent cessation of their operation, immediately after the close of Clodius's tribuneship.

The senate had often prohibited, and by penalties enforced its prohibition of combinations and societies for public festivals, banquets,—for effecting particular objects, common to certain trades and crafts, for elective or other purposes; the most dangerous thing conceivable to an aristocratic state, because the existence of such associations gives free scope to agitators, and organises that opposition to constituted authorities which cannot be maintained by individuals. Clodius by a popular vote restored them. He did not stop here; he not only restored their rights to artisans, tradesmen, sacrificial societies, superstitious and political juntas; he not only took them under his protection against the police regulations of the senate; but even established new associations, partly composed of the lowest rabble, slaves, and runaway peasants; partly, however, of equestrians and respectable traders. These associations and clubs formed a state within a state, and arrogated to themselves a sort of elective jurisdiction, admission by whom conferred honor, as rejection attached ignominy.* The effect of measures of this description failed not to be speedily felt.†

* “*Collegia, non ea solum quæ senatus sustulerat, restituta, sed innumerabilia quædam nova ex omni fæce urbis ac servitio concitata; ab eodem homine, in stupris inauditis nefariisque versato, vetus illa magistra pudoris et modestiæ, severitas censoria sublata est.*”—*Cic. Orat. in L. Pisonem*, c. iv.

Cicero seems to refer to some such *sodalitates* or *collegia*, when he reproaches Flaccus with having been rejected. The passage is as follows:—“*Non prætermittam, ne illud quidem: M. Furium Flaccum, equitem Romanum, hominem nequam, Capitolini et Mercuriales de collegio ejecerunt præsentem, ad pedes uniuscujusque jacentem.*”—*Epist. ad Quint. Fratrem*, lib. ii. ep. 5.

The following general summary of the proceedings of this consular year is given elsewhere also by Cicero:—

“*Sed ut mea causa jam decedam, reliquas illius anni pestes recordamini; sic enim facillime perspicietis, quantam vim omnium remediorum a magistratibus proximis respublica desiderarit; legum multitudinem, cum earum quæ latæ sunt, tum vero quæ promulgatæ fuerent. Nam latæ sunt consulibus illis tacentibus dicam, immo vero approbantibus etiam, ut censoris notio et gravissimum iudicium sanctissimi magistratus de republica tolleretur, ut collegia non modo illa vetera contra senatus consultum restituerentur, sed ab uno gladiatore innumerabilia alia conscriberentur, ut remiscis semissibus, et trientibus quinta prope pars vectigalium tolleretur.*”—*Pro Sextio*, c. xxv.

† “The operation of corporate bodies, in a city so much addicted to faction and tumult, had been the cause of frequent disorders. As persons, affecting to govern the state, endeavored to gain the people by indulging their humor in idleness and dissipation, with games, theatrical entertainments, combats of gladiators, and the baiting of wild beasts; so the head of every corporate body, though upon a smaller scale, had his feasts, his entertainments, and shows, forming to

For Cato a public duty was found, at a distance from the capital. The reigning king of Cyprus, with whom his subjects were highly discontented, had, as it happened, not yet been recognised as the ally of Rome. His disaffected subjects appealed to the popular party there; and Clodius, who had formerly received what he considered as a personal affront from that monarch, brought forward a proposition for the extension of freedom in Cyprus, and for the mission of that steady friend of republican freedom, the younger Cato, as a liberator to these oppressed Greeks. To cut out work at a distance, for a long time, for Cato, another highly invidious commission was imposed upon him. He was deputed to restore to their country certain citizens who had been exiled from Byzantium; in other words, to enforce the law of the strongest in that city, against the vote of the majority of the citizens.

These, however, turned out to be matters of less difficulty than Clodius had hoped, and Cato had expected. Resistance to the will of Rome was, in either case, out of the question. Cato tried negotiation with the miserable monarch of Cyprus, and offered him a pension, and the priesthood of the goddess of Paphos, if he would voluntarily surrender his pretensions to royalty. The king, however, feared the worst from the intervention of Rome; and, dreading death less than the spoliation of his treasures, took poison, and left the Romans the rich heritage of his possessions. The reinstatement of the exiled Byzantians Cato also found easier work than he had anticipated: his public-spirited efforts were, therefore, exclusively directed to the ways and means of bringing back a good round sum to the public treasury; and he extracted an immense amount from the sale of the royal jewels and furniture, to be scrambled for, soon afterwards, by the lawless heads of parties in Rome.

After Cato's removal, Clodius found it easy to accomplish the banishment of Cicero, as he could cite an old law in support of the motion which he now brought forward, declaring every one guilty of a capital offence who caused a citizen to be put to death without regular trial, and without allowing an appeal to the people. Every one at once saw, and Cicero himself gave out, that this motion was aimed exclusively against him. Cæsar afforded him no protection, as, to avoid appearing his protegee, he had before refused the offer of the place of lieutenant under him; while Pompey was resolved to show the aristocratical party that they must steadily and exclusively adhere to him, to avoid wholly succumbing to the populace and their leaders.

The popular faction of Clodius was strong enough to effect the exile of Cicero to the distance of 120 Roman miles from Italy. Cicero showed, on this occasion, so little magnanimity, that Dio Cassius ridicules him, not without reason. So early as October, however (Cicero

himself a party of retainers, on occasion to be employed as his faction might require. The renewal, therefore, of such establishments,--a measure which carried to every ambitious tradesman in his stall the feelings and consequence of a Crassus, a Pompey, and a Cæsar, affecting to govern the world in their respective ways,--was greedily adopted by the town people. And Clodius took occasion, in the first ardour of such corporate meetings, to foment and to direct their zeal to his own purpose.—*Ferguson's Roman Republic*, vol. ii. p. 421.

had been exiled in March,) his friends made an attempt to induce the people to rescind their sentence; but could not carry through their proposition. Thenceforward, perpetual conflicts took place in the streets and on the forum. Milo, the mortal enemy of Clodius had, like the latter, taken a band of gladiators into his service, and armed *u. c.* them like soldiers. In the month of June in the following 669. year, a new motion was brought forward, that Cicero's recall should be insisted on by the senate. Two entire months, however, elapsed amidst the most violent movements; and it was not till Pompey declared himself unreservedly in Cicero's favor that the business was finally settled.

Cicero's return was a rich source of new commotions. He breathed nothing but rage and revenge against every one whose demeanor towards him had even been ambiguous; demanded compensation for his town-house, which Clodius had razed to the ground, and devoted its former site to religious uses,—as well as for injuries to his estates at Formiæ and Tusculum. He insisted that every transaction connected with Clodius's tribuneship (*acta Clodii*) should be struck out of the archives. This last proposal, however, was peculiarly offensive to Cato, who had been sent by the agency of Clodius to Cyprus and Byzantium, and who, therefore, if every transaction which had taken place under that tribune should be cancelled, would loose every testimonial of his active services.

While senate and people remained immersed in quarrels and disorders, Cæsar continued to advance with sure steps to his object. He established his military power throughout Gaul, and along the course of the Rhine, and gained the populace by an artful distribution of the Gallic spoils; while Pompey, by his half measures and vacillating policy, was making himself contemptible, which was worse than if he had made himself hated. However frequently Cicero showed his own weakness in courting petty honors and distinctions, he looked with a compassionate smile at Pompey's little manœuvres. Immediately on his return, it seems that Pompey employed his services to get the people to entrust him with powers wholly unprecedented, merely under the pretext that the dearth which then prevailed in Rome called for extraordinary measures.* Cicero thereupon proposed that Pompey should be invested, during five years, with the superintendence of the supply of grain in all the provinces, with the same powers which had formerly been conferred on him in the pirate-war, and with authority to name fifteen lieutenants, &c. The consuls drew up the law, according to Cicero's proposals, and Pompey declared the measure strictly conformable to his wishes. Messius, one of his creatures, was, however, better advised of his views, and brought forward a measure of a very different nature, conferring on him powers far more extensive. Pompey was charged by this amended bill with the unlimited control of all the public treasures and revenues, provided with fleets and ar-

* "Cum per eos dies senatus de annona haberetur, et ad ejus procurationem sermone non solum pleois, verum etiam bonorum Pompeius vocaretur, *id que ipse cuperet*, multitudo que a me nominatim ut id decernerem postularet, feci," &c.—*Attic.* l. iv. ep. 1.

mies, and invested with authority in the provinces above that of the governors themselves. What hope could remain of preserving the ancient constitution, when even Cicero owns himself swayed by private considerations, to let a measure pass which he thought wholly indefensible?*

Cæsar had extended his conquests as far as the mouth of the Seine, but still required some time to secure his acquisitions. He had shaped his course towards Italy, in order to be near the capital. Just at this time, Pompey was affronted in the senate with a charge of having administered the public funds in a careless manner. Thereupon he hastened with Crassus, by way of Lucca, to meet Cæsar, who engaged to employ his influence in favor of their projects, in order that they might not oppose the extension of his own command for three or four years. How low the Roman nobility had sunk, may be inferred from the degrading concourse of senators to the triumvirs' place of conference, all eager to pay their court to these three potent personages. As Cæsar was in possession of a province and an army, his two friends aspired to be so. The first point was to reach the consulship. Both were strongly seconded in their canvass by the party of Cæsar; notwithstanding which they had to encounter vehement opposition. For many months the elections were hindered by tumults in the city, 698. in which Clodius and Milo figured as usual. During these months one interrex was named after another; and it was not till late in the year that Crassus and Pompey attained a second consulship. Their first exertion of power was an unblushing violation of law, for the sake of excluding Cato from the prætorship. Cato was Cæsar's mortal enemy, Vatinius his devoted friend; the consuls, therefore, pitched on the latter for prætor. But his election was impossible without buying the votes; and this expedient coming within the legal description of the *crimen ambitus*, exposed to a heavy penalty those who practised it. The consuls took the bull by the horns, and were actually shameless enough to move a resolution in the assembly of the people, which passed, that the new prætors should not be proceeded against for illegally obtaining their election; *ne qui præturam per ambitum cepisset ei propterea fraudi esset*.

It had already been agreed upon at the meeting of the sovereign trio, that Cæsar should have permission to increase his army considerably: that Crassus, after his consulship, should receive the province of Syria, and Pompey that of Spain, with adequate forces. The former, at the destined time, left Rome at the head of an army, regardless of the curse which the tribune Ateius Capito launched after him; and shortly afterward lost life, reputation, and a splendid army, in a war with the Parthians, commenced without cause, and carried on without conduct or prudence. Meanwhile, Pompey proceeded to levy four legions, under the pretext that, as governor of Spain, where he

* *Illa nostra lex consularis nunc modesta videtur; hæc Messii non ferenda. Pompeius illam velle se dicit, familiares hanc. Consulares, duce Favorino, fremunt. Nos tacemus; et eo magis, quod de domo nostra nihil adhuc pontifices responderunt.*

never set foot, he should require reinforcements to carry on the war against the Vaccai. Instead of this, he quietly went to live on his estates in the country; superintended the provisioning of the capital; administered the public treasures; and held the command of fleets and armies; while he left Spain to be governed by his deputies, and maintained such friendly relations with Cæsar, even after the death of Julia, that he detached two of his legions to the assistance of the latter, when he was threatened with a general insurrection in Gaul.

u. c. For two successive year the election of consuls was impeded
 700. by tumults, and a dictatorship was talked of merely to keep the
 701. peace for that occasion; an office which could, of course, devolve on no other public man than Pompey. At length, without resorting to this ultimate expedient, Domitius Calvinus and Valerius Messala were chosen consuls. The brief space of five months, during which they held their office, was filled up with incessant strife between Milo and Clodius, the former of whom was canvassing for the consulship, while the other sought the office of prætor. Pompey played a despicable part enough betwixt them. He was the friend of Clodius, and yet would not appear as the enemy of Milo, the latter being powerfully supported by the senate. The longer the canvass was protracted, the better pleased was the populace; and the disorders in the city increased daily.

Milo was, at that time, dictator in Lanvium, and was thither bound, to nominate a high-priest, on the 20th of January. Clodius, who had
 701. been holding a discourse to the magistrates in Africia, was returning from thence; and, not far from Bovillæ, met his arch-enemy, whether accidentally or designedly on either part. Clodius was on horseback, followed by thirty armed attendants, an escort without which he never travelled. Milo was in a carriage, with his wife and a friend, accompanied by a numerous cortege, among whom were a band of gladiators. Two of Milo's people, Birria and Eudmus, well-known prize-fighters, followed the other party, and picked a quarrel with Clodius's attendants. Clodius, turning around in a threatening manner, was stabbed in the shoulder by Birria. The fray now became general, and Clodius was carried, severely wounded, into a public house hard by; and Milo, thinking a crime consummated less dangerous than one merely inchoate, stormed his retreat, despatched him, and left his corps exposed on the public highway, where it was found by Sextus Tediæ, a senator, on his way from his country-house, and brought to Rome in his litter.

The news of the murder excited a great ferment in the capital; and two of the tribunes, Munatius Plancus and Q. Pompeius Rufus, did their best to exasperate the people. They caused the naked corpse, which had lain in state all night in the house of Clodius, to be carried out in the forum, and exposed before the rostra, so that the wounds on it might be visible to the multitude. They next enhanced, by inflammatory harangues, the effect of the spectacle, till the infuriated crowd carried the corpse into the senate-house, made a funeral pile of the benches, scaffoldings, tables, and manuscripts (*codicibus librariorum*) which they could find in the forum and booths around, and, setting

fire to it, burnt down not only the senate-house but part of the adjoining Basilica Porcia. The houses of Lepidus (then interrex) and that of Milo were attacked. Milo himself was absent, but his people repulsed the mob with arrow-shots. The raging multitude next got hold of the consular insignia, proceeded to Pompey's gardens, and hailed him sometimes consul, sometimes dictator.

Milo had meant, at first, to go into voluntary banishment; but now that the excesses of the populace seemed to incline public opinion in his favor, he returned to the city, obtained the support of two among the tribunes, and proceeded with his canvass for the consulship. Meanwhile, one interrex was elected after another, without succeeding in holding the electoral assemblies: the violence of the armed hordes attached to each of the candidates rendered it impossible to take the votes, and every method was tried in vain to restore the public order. The senate at length resolved that the tribunes, the interrex, and Cn. Pompeius, who was near Rome, in the station of proconsul, should, according to the formula employed in such emergencies, *take care that the republic should receive no detriment*; and Pompey was charged to levy troops throughout Italy, to suppress the disorders. He soon made his appearance at the head of an imposing force. The friends and relations of Clodius laid their charges against Milo before him, and commenced proceedings by demanding that Milo's slaves should be given up, that confessions might be obtained from them by torture. Pompey, as usual, took the course which he thought adapted to circumstances; showed himself well disposed to the Clodians; and, at length, being appointed consul, threatened the tribune Cælius who ventured to take Milo's part, if he constrained him to do so, he would defend the republic by force of arms. Pompey at first exercised the consular power without a colleague, and made regulations undoubtedly adapted to restore tranquility, but which were directed, at the same time, distinctly and by name against Milo.*

The affair which mainly occupied the period of Pompey's sole consulship (from March to August,) was Milo's trial. Cicero, who pleaded in his defence, commenced his discourse by complaining of the unaccustomed aspect of the place of trial, and the absence of free citizens and spectators, whose feelings he might affect, and whose judgment might sway that of the judges themselves.† The shops were shut, whole cohorts drawn up on all sides of the forum, and Pompey

* "Facto in M. Bibuli sententiam S. C. Pompeius ab interrege Ser. Sulpicio V. Cal. Mart. mense intercalario consul creatus est statimque consulatum iniit. Deinde post diem tertium de legibus novis ferendis retulit, duas ex S. C. promulgavit. Alteram de si qua nominatim cædem in Appia via factam, et incendium curiæ, et domum M Lepidi interregis oppugnatam comprehendit. Alteram de ambitu; pœnam graviorem et formam judiciorum breviorum. Utraque enim lex prius testes dari per triduum, deinde uno die atque eodem et ab accusatore perorari jubebat et ab reo, ita ut duæ horæ accusatori, tres reo darentur."—*Asc. Pedianus*.

† "Hæc novi judicii nova forma terret oculos, qui, quocunque inciderunt, veterem consuetudinem foriet pristinum morem judiciorum requirunt; non enim corona consessus vester cinctus est, ut solebat; non usitata frequentia stipati sumus."—*Pro T. Annio Milone*, c. i.

sat in the midst of his staff, surrounded by picked troops. The stillness of death reigned in the forum, only interrupted by an occasional yell of impatience from the Clodians, who were well aware that the show of force was not intended against *them*. "Every where," Cicero exclaims, "I behold arms, cohorts, centurions; and did I not confide in Pompey, as in a wise and just man, I should not venture to speak." In effect, he spoke badly; and, when it was too late, committed to writing the oration which he meant and ought to have spoken. Cicero, ashamed that want of courage on his own part should have crippled the exertion of his eloquence in behalf of his friend, bought Milo's estates when they were exposed to public sale; no one bidding against him, as it was known his object was to restore them. It appears, however, from Cicero's letters, that he only reaped from this act of friendship innumerable annoyances in Rome, and even from Milo himself.

Since the death of his wife Julia, Pompey had entered into a second marriage with a daughter of Metellus Scipio; far too young a wife for him. What was worse, he allowed himself to be guided by his father-in-law, a stupid superannuated aristocrat, whom he now took as colleague in his consulship. His new consort combined with the most amiable natural qualities all the refined accomplishments of her times, and completely regained her husband to the senatorial interest. At this period Pompey enjoyed almost unlimited power in Rome; his governorship of Africa and Spain was extended by five years; he gave orders to the generals of the commonwealth, and administered yearly enormous sums, directly or indirectly drawn from the public treasures.

The Gallic insurrections, and the withdrawal of the legions detached by Pompey to aid in their suppression, afforded Cæsar very plausible pretexts for augmenting his forces. He now waited only for a pretext to cut with his sword the knot of domestic politics; while senate, consuls, and censors appeared emulous in hasting by their measures the approach of a contest for the conduct of which they had neither made, nor were making, any provision. In the present year, one of the consuls was Cæsar's bitter enemy; on whose motion it was now proposed to recal a vote in favor of Cæsar, which had been carried by Pompey himself, as consul, with the sanction of all the tribunes, and pursuant to which Cæsar was permitted, without disbanding his army, to come into the city, and to stand for the consulship. Pompey would take no part in these hostile demonstrations, while yet he was well known to be at the bottom of them all: so that even his friends could not but compassionate the weak politician, who levelled such half measures as these at so resolute an antagonist. Of the censors, one was Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law; the other, Appius Claudius, a man whose earlier life did not exactly seem to warrant any extraordinary rigor towards others. This very man, however, prompted by blind animosity towards Cæsar, thought proper to expel from the senate a number of his partizans, amongst others Sallust, the historian, and offered affronts to men of equestrian rank, or otherwise highly respectable; all which measures were very effective in swell-

ing Cæsar's party.* He himself contemplated all extremities with an equal eye, and endeavored to gain over the tribune Curio, who had loaded himself with enormous debts to please the people with games and presents. Curio, who had figured just before as Cæsar's hottest opponent, sold himself at a high rate, but repaid his price by essential services; and Cæsar waited quietly till the imprudence of the opposite party should afford a decent pretence for adopting military measures.

Unfortunately, Cicero, at this conjuncture, was absent as governor of Cilicia; otherwise his influence might possibly have prevented an open and final rupture for some time longer. As a councillor in war, he afterwards proved himself to be good for nothing; and followed Pompey to no end but to satirise his conduct. The strife of parties already threatened to terminate in direct hostilities. It was demanded of Cæsar, that, before he stood for the consulship, he should disband his army; while the same thing was not required of Pompey, though the senate, by a considerable majority, declared it most expedient that both should resign their command of the troops. Cæsar had quartered himself at Ravenna, and from thence despatched a letter to Rome by Curio, in which he offered to give up his army, if Pompey would do the like. For this letter his friends could hardly get a reading in the senate; and the consul and the father-in-law of Pompey declared themselves in terms so explicit, that the senatorial *centre* (to use the language of French modern politic,) indisposed as it was to give itself wholly either to Cæsar or Pompey, saw that aid was not to be hoped for from the latter, save at the price of acquiescence in the most extreme measures, which it gave, as the less perilous alternative. In vain M. Marcellus, who was no friend of Cæsar, endeavored to dissuade the senate from taking any decisive steps, till a general levy of troops had been made, and an army set on foot. With no better success it was moved by Calidius and Rufus that Pompey should depart to his province, in order that his rival might have no pretence for commencing hostilities. The consul would not even take the votes in the latter of these motions; and silence was imposed on every one who was not desirous to pass for a traitor. It was resolved that, before a certain day, Cæsar should disband his army, on pain of being declared a public enemy.† In complaisance towards Pompey, who was close to the city, a meeting of the senate was held outside the walls; and his vote was given, with that of the other senators, for the above proceedings. Every thing was precipitated; a formula was made use of, which had hitherto been only employed in case of the last emer-

* Cælius (*Cic. Epist. ad Div. lib. viii. ep. 14.*) very justly derides Appius Claudius's rage of reformation:—"Scis Appium censorem hic ostenta facere? de signis et tabulis, de agri modo, de ære alieno acerrime agere? Persuasum est ei censuram lomentum aut nitrum esse; errare mihi videtur. Nam sordes eluere vult; venas sibi omnes et viscera aperit."

† The terms of the decree were somewhat gentler;—"Ni ante certam diem dimitteret exercitum, eum contra rempublicam facturum videm." When the two tribunes interceded against it, the senate declared, *eos contra rempublicam fecisse.*

gency. *Dent operam consules, prætores, tribuni plebis, quique consulares sunt ad urbem, ne quid republica detrimenti capiat.* These resolutions passed early in January; but Antonius and Cassius interposed their veto as tribunes. They received a hint from the consul to absent themselves, lest worse should betide them. It was forgotten that no decree of the senate could be valid, while attended by the violation of a right which even Sylla had left to the tribunes.* The tribunes eagerly seized the pretext for taking flight to Ravenna, and summoned Cæsar, in the name of the people, to support the constitution.

Now, at length, appeared the grand difference in the respective composition of the parties. In the one, every design and resolution were subject to interminable cavil and criticism—the wisest counsels often rejected, or carried into execution, at best, very tardily; Pompey obliged to select his officers, military and civil, according to their rank, not their capacity; and no sufficient preparations made for the contest. On the other side, Cæsar judged and acted for himself solely: every measure was taken for striking a blow which should be decisive; and no necessity, as in the opposite party, existed to extort money, munitions, and soldiers from people who took but little interest in the quarrel. Pompey made levies, allotted commands, imposed a column-tax, a door-tax, a poll-tax; put in requisition soldiers, sailor, stores, arms, carriages, nay even military engines, from every one who had them, and collected all contributions by force. Cicero, from whose letters to Atticus we learn the state of things day by day, feels perfectly well that the measures of his party are all thoroughly worthless; that there was not a single man of resolute character amongst them; and that Pompey himself cared less about the republic than about the preservation of his power and influence, which Cicero calls a Syllan military tyranny.

Cæsar had come only with one legion to Ravenna; but a considerable number of cohorts followed him by forced marches. On the intelligence of his approach to Rome, of his favorable reception everywhere, of the dispersion of five cohorts in Iguvium (Gubbio), the whole senate, the consuls, and other functionaries, in short, all the adherents of Pompey, fled from Rome to Capua. Indecision and discouragement prevailed; the new levies had melted away, or had not yet assembled; and Pompey could not place any reliance on the two legions which he had formerly lent to Cæsar, and which now served under his own orders. Domitius was, therefore, instructed to make a demonstration against Cæsar with five and twenty cohorts, and then to fall back step by step. The official correspondence between Pompey and Domitius clearly shows the defect of unity in all the measures of Cæsar's opponents, and how little Pompey's commands were obeyed by his aristocratic officers. Domitius, by his neglect of Pompey's orders, gave the enemy time to shut him up in Corfinium; was made prisoner by his own troops, and delivered up to Cæsar; while his cohorts, in a mass, deserted to the enemy.

* Jus intercedendi.

This incident spread such consternation amongst Pompey's followers, that a hasty resolution was taken to abandon Italy altogether, and cross over to Greece. The naval force of the commonwealth, the whole East, Africa, and Spain, were at the command of Pompey; it was therefore held that Italy might be easily recovered, when attacked at once by his forces from the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean. This had also occurred to Cæsar; who therefore, after vainly attempting to overtake and crush his rival before he could put to sea from Brundisium, directed his first efforts against Spain, in order to have the western half of the empire in entire subjection before he turned his arms on the East.

Sardinia and Sicily could not be maintained after Italy had been lost by the party of Pompey: but Attius Varus kept possession of Africa, by keeping every partisan of Cæsar out of the country. While Cæsar was employed in the regulation of the capital, and in appropriating the public treasures left behind in his haste by Pompey, his soldiers were now quartered throughout the towns of Italy; but had hardly snatched an interval of necessary repose, when Cæsar proceeded across the Alps to invade his rival's province of Spain, where Afranius and Petreius had seven or eight legions under their orders. The lenity and respect for established forms displayed by Cæsar, the forbearance which he evinced even towards those who, like the tribune Metellus, were wild enough to dream of opposition to any thing he thought fit to do, were fruits of a deeply calculated policy. He could show rigor enough when it served his purpose better than lenity.

Marseilles, the oldest and truest ally of Rome, wished to remain neutral pending the decision of the contest: Cæsar had, however, occasion for gold, vessels, and harbors, and scrupled not a moment to lay siege to the town, which was maintained against him during the whole of his long and severe warfare with Afranius and Petreius in Spain, and was not taken till after the dispersion or capture of their legions. The treatment of the town, when at length taken, was so merciless, that from thenceforwards, by Strabo's account, it only preserved vestiges of its former prosperity and opulence.*

It appears to have been not without hesitation that Cæsar on his U.C. return to Rome, assumed the dictatorship; a step which revived 702. ominous reminiscences of Sylla, who was the first in whose hands that office became an unlimited monarchical power. As the very name of dictator was now odious, Cæsar resigned as soon as he could a title which he required at the moment to give a color of law to his proceedings, to warrant him in remaining at the head of the army until he was elected consul, and in making such regulations as the circumstances seemed to demand. It is remarkable that the month in which Cæsar entered upon his consulship, and which, in that year, stood for the month of January, owing to the imperfect state of the Roman calendar, fell in October. It appears, then, that the space between the spring months and September sufficed Cæsar to gain possession of all

* Strab. Geogh. lib. iv.

Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia, drive Pompey to Greece, reduce Marseilles, overthrow Petreius and Afranius, subjugate Spain, regulate matters in Rome, despatch Curio to Africa with an army, and collect his force for a further expedition.

The enemy were less expeditious, though they too gained some advantages. They drove Dolabella from Dalmatia, which he was occupying for Cæsar, and blockaded in an island and took prisoner Antony's brother, who came up to his aid. In this way Pompey maintained his naval superiority. By land, Cæsar encamped before the republican army at Dyrrachium, and endeavored to surround it. On this occasion, Pompey showed the experience of a veteran leader; he met stratagem with stratagem, and at length compelled Cæsar to adopt another plan of operations. He not only showed himself equal to the enemy in the choice and in the change of his positions, but gave him battle six times, mostly with advantage, close to his own lines of fortification; and once might have entirely routed him, had he possessed resolution sufficient to follow up his victory on the instant. Cæsar thought it no longer advisable to stay on the coast: he withdrew himself from the enemy by quick and skilful marches, and directed his march to Thessaly by a difficult route over the mountains. It appeared inconceivable, as Dio Cassius remarks, that Cæsar, who, at that moment, was in possession of a fleet of 500 sail, instead of crossing at once over to Italy, should have run after the enemy in to Thessaly. The two armies encamped in front of each other in the plain of Pharsalus. Pompey would willingly have avoided an engagement: his policy was obviously delay while Cæsar was placed under the necessity of seizing the first opportunity for trying a decisive issue. But Pompey, surrounded by 200 senators, could not act on his own views; and was compelled to hazard an action merely to satisfy the clamor of the noble lords impatient to be in Rome. The result of this feeble and false policy was the overthrow of the Roman constitution: the substance of which did not survive the battle of Pharsalia, though its shadow reappeared from time to time. Pompey must have been marked for destruction by destiny even before the action, or he could not have dreamed of opposing the raw levies of the capital and undisciplined recruits from the country to Cæsar's veteran legions, who had hardened under his own eye, and whom he had informed as with one spirit.* Moreover, Pompey completely lost his brains in the first brunt of the battle; and, if Cæsar's account of the number of fallen on either side is at all to be trusted, seldom has a decisive field been won so easily.† This is the more remarkable, as, immediately after the battle, the victorious general stormed the enemy's camp, and added in his narrative the number of those who fell in that service to the loss which was, strictly speaking, incurred in the action.

* "Ex eo tempore," says Cicero of Pompey, "vir ille summus nullus imperator fuit. Signa tirone et collectitio exercitu cum legionibus robustissimus contulit; victus turpissime, amissis etiam castris solus fugit."

† By Cæsar's account, he lost only 200 soldiers in this action. He lost, however, thirty brave centurions. Of the enemy, he says, 15,000 appear to have fallen. So startling a fact is prudently left doubtful.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE BATTLE OF PHARSALIA TO THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM.

POMPEY does not seem to have recovered the use of his faculties immediately after the action, or he would probably have betaken himself to his fleet, which still kept the seas; or would have gone over to Africa, where his own generals, and his ally, Juba, the king of Mauritania, had brought together very considerable forces. Cæsar had sent his *dearly bought* friend, Curio, to Sicily, with four legions, on learning that Cato had slipped through the fingers of Asinius Pollio, whom he had sent thither. Curio hence proceeded with two legions into Africa, where, at first, he gained some trifling advantages over Attius Varus; which, trifling as they were in themselves, sufficed to lull him in fatal security. He allowed himself to be tricked into the desert by a stratagem of the Moorish king Juba, who made as if he were suddenly recalled into his own country, but unexpectedly turned upon Curio's army, sinking under thirst and heat in the desert, and completely cut it to pieces.

The confusion was so great in Pompey's councils, after the decisive day of Pharsalia, that his friends, who were leagued with Juba, and were actually triumphant, had no advices even of the fate of the action, till the arrival of those fugitives in Africa, who either could not hope for Cæsar's mercy, or disdained to sue for it. Pompey himself turned his course towards Asia; precisely the quarter where his friends had conducted themselves in such a manner, that nobody could well be expected to hazard fortune or life in his service. His father-in-law, Marcellus Scipio, had formerly tyrannised over Asia: all the native princes were involved deeply in debt to Pompey; and, consequently, any means could not but be welcome to them for shaking themselves free from the obligation. Cæsar was well acquainted with the posture of affairs in that quarter; he therefore pursued Pompey in person, persuaded that the latter would find no refuge amongst his shrewd Asiatic and Greek friends. Even Pompey felt it expedient not to approach Asia Minor, where Scipio had practised every species of oppression; in Rhodes his friends could find no admission; in Antioch a public decree had been issued to prohibit, on pain of death, the entrance of any friend of Pompey into the city. Under these circumstances, Pompey took the unfortunate resolution of directing his flight towards Egypt.

Cæsar well perceived that his conflict with the wretched aristocracy, with which he had been, in fact, engaged rather than with Pompey, was at an end the moment he should either have taken or slain the

latter;* he therefore only staid in Pharsalia two days after the action, and hastened from thence to the Hellespont. He took with him, at first, only a single legion; afterwards a second, which he caused Fufius to bring up from Achaia: and 800 knights, with 15 or 20 vessels. He had little fear, however, of the remains of Pompey's fleet, consisting, for the most part, of Egyptian, Phœnician, Cyprian, Cyrenaic, and Greek ship, which, after the defeat of their leader, returned to their respective homes.

Ptolemy Auletes, the late monarch of that kingdom, had left it to his eldest son, and daughter, Cleopatra, on condition of their marrying each other, agreeably to the vile use of the royal race of Egypt. The prince, who was only thirteen years of age, was under the tutelage of three of those sly and subtle politicians who swarmed in the learned court of Alexandria—people who studied to use for their own ends all the attainments of science, and all the arts of refinement, and were not unfrequently caught in the webs spun by their own cunning. Theodotus, the chamberlain of the young king, who was also his tutor, a learned, adroit, and penetrating character; Achillas, who stood at the head of the troops; and Potheinus, of the treasury—however at variance with each other, as such people are wont to be—were nevertheless, whenever their joint interest was concerned, firmly united against any honest man who might appear by miracle; and equally so whenever reasons of state suggested a bad action. They had, shortly before, excluded the queen's sister from all share in the government, and forced her to take refuge in Syria, where she drew together some forces, for the purpose of recovering the guardianship of her brother, whom her father's will had destined her husband. The three usurping ministers despatched an army against her. The two sides were encamped in each other's presence, near Pelusium, when Pompey's flight conducted him to that place, where he threw himself on the doubtful hospitality of the Egyptian ministers. According to the maxims of Oriental and Greek policy, no better proof of amity can be given to a conqueror who aims at the ascent of a throne, than to clear his path of all whose existence thwarts his elevation. The crafty Egyptian rulers, whose position, indeed, was critical, placed, as they were, between two fires, acted on this policy.

The murder of Pompey, directed by the guardians of the Egyptian monarch, has been poetically described by Lucan and Plutarch, each in his own manner, without incurring the charge of having exaggerated its tragic features. It remains doubtful whether Cæsar even wished his feeble antagonist to be put out of the way when he was out of condition to do mischief. But, even had he wished his removal, he took pains to show that he had not wished it by means of assassination. Cæsar had no sooner arrived in Egypt, than he hastened to

* Cæsar himself assigns the following ground for his pursuit of Pompey;—"Cæsar, omnibus rebus relictis, persequendum sibi Pompeium existimavit, quas-cunque in partes se ex fuga recepisset, ne rursus copias comparare alias et bellum renovare posset et quantumcumque itineris equitatu efficere poterat, quotidie progrediebatur, legionemque unam minoribus itineribus subsequi jussit."—*De Bello Civ.* lib. iii. c. 102.

prove to the ministers that they had misunderstood his character in their excess of cunning. All the authors of his rival's murder, during his stay in Alexandria, met with their deserved fate; excepting the learned and worthless sophist, Theodotus, on whom condign punishment was afterwards inflicted by Cassius.

Cleopatra, then in the bloom of youth and beauty, completely won the conqueror, on his first arrival in Alexandria, by whose blandishments which were afterwards no less triumphant over Antony.* The ministers of the young monarch, who vainly had hoped to buy Cæsar's good-will by enacting an unbidden atrocity, had now no other alternative but to sink without a struggle, or to seize the moment to crush him before his army should come up. As, however, Cæsar had got the young king into his hands, the infant princess Arsinoë was placed at the head of the hostile faction; and Cæsar was shut up and besieged in the quarter of Alexandria in which he had selected his quarters. Before it had come to open war, a large part of the Egyptian army had been covertly drawn from Pelusium to Alexandria; and a plot had been laid to despatch the Roman general, by the tried and approved mode of assassination. This design, however, was detected, and Potheinus put to death by Cæsar's orders, Achilles fled to the army; and at its head, backed by the malcontent Alexandrians, fell on the little band of Romans, whom the lateness of the season, and the prevalent contrary winds at sea, deprived of any hope of reinforcement. Of the one and twenty months during which Cæsar was absent from Rome, the war with Pompey only filled up the space between July and October; while the so-called Alexandrian war so sharply engaged him for nine months, that his correspondence with Rome during that period ceased almost entirely. At length he succeeded in drawing legions to his relief from Bithynia; overthrew the Egyptian army, and stormed their encampment on the Nile. The rout was complete; and the enemy fled to their ships in such disorder, that the king himself lost his life in the *melee*. After his death, Cæsar, pleading the wish of his predecessor, administered Egypt wholly at his own discretion. Cleopatra was named regent on condition of wedding her younger brother: the conqueror took Arsinoë with him out of the kingdom.†

During this interregnum, in which no despatches, advices, or orders from Cæsar reached the capital, the most horrible state of confusion prevailed there, and throughout Italy. Rome required a military ruler; and Cæsar named as his lieutenant during his absence M. Antonius, who had commanded a wing of his army in the battle of Pharsalia. Abandoned, brutal, overwhelmed in debts and debaucheries, Antony, who was confessedly endowed with great abilities, was still

* Plut. Cæs. c. 49.

† "Egypto atque Alexandria potitus, reges constituit quos Ptolemæus testamento scipserat atque obtestatus erat populum Romanum, ne mutarentur. Nam majore ex duobus pueris rege amisso, minori transdidit regnum, majorique ex duabus filiis, Cleopatraz, quæ manserat in fide præsidiisque ejus; minorem Arsinoem, cujus nomine diu regnasse impotanter Ganymedem docuimus, deducere ex regno statuit."—*De Bello Alexandrino*, c. 33.

more conspicuous by his vices. All Italy was revolted by his ostentatious indecencies, extravagant banquets, and utter neglect of affairs. In the mean time Dolabella, who was also Cæsar's devoted satellite, as tribune, kept the people in commotion. He proposed the most revolutionary laws during his tribuneship; such as the compulsory diminution of house-rent, and remission of debts. The senate, however implicitly devoted to Cæsar, resisted his measures, and required that no innovations whatever should be attempted till Cæsar's return. Trebellius, who was also tribune, resisted his colleague by actual force. Blood flowed in the streets of Rome, as in former times of infurcate faction: many hundred citizens lost their lives in the frequent conflicts which arose at assemblies of the citizens; and though Antony marched troops into the city, and adopted a decisive tone of control, his aim was assuredly rather to augment than allay the public disorders. Cæsar could not but see the urgent necessity for his return to Rome; but deemed it not less necessary to show himself in Asia the absolute disposer of the powers of the Roman commonwealth, the distributor of empires and of sovereignties, as Pompey had been after his Mithridatic triumphs. These ends he accomplished with extraordinary celerity.

On his return to the metropolis in December, Cæsar found the senate—that is to say, such of its members as had all along been his friends, or had more recently become such—ready to do or to suffer whatever he should demand or should impose upon them. Crowns, statues, privileges, the prerogative of peace and war, every thing he desired, in short, and many things that he did not desire, were granted him by the mean-spirited senate; and he had nothing left to do but to collect treasures, and promote his friends to offices of honor. In this state of things, he could lay down the dictatorship without danger, and content himself for the following year with the consulship. Antony, too, was forced to give up his extraordinary powers, which, indeed, ceased of themselves with the dictatorship; and Cæsar hastened to Africa, where Scipio and Cato kept on foot a Roman, Juba an African, force; while the two sons of Pompey made attempts to collect a fleet, and the adherents of the Pompeian party in Spain regained their ascendancy. In Africa, the army of the enemy was considerably superior in numerical force to that of Cæsar; but generals such as Scipio, Labienus, Afranius, and others, were wholly devoid of talents for command, however valuable their services in subordinate situations. Thus they allowed Cæsar to take a position which left them no alternative than either to abandon Thapsus, in which they had placed a strong garrison, or to hazard a decisive engagement. They chose the latter, and not only lost the day, as at Pharsalia, but lost their camp, and with it every chance of maintaining further resistance.

Whether Cato could have saved the aristocratical cause by assuming the command in chief, which he would not do, as not being of consular rank, is extremely doubtful; and, perhaps, it is well for his fame that it was not put to the proof. For himself, he first awaited the last extremities, and then followed the stoic maxim of dying as he had liv-

ed, which sanctified to the purest minds of antiquity the act of suicide. How infinitely superior was this man to the times in which he lived, may best be judged by comparing his composed inflexibility in defending the established forms of the Roman constitution, with Cicero's court morality, his personal anxieties, and the creeping arts which, according to his own confession, he looked upon as called for by the circumstances. Cicero's fears were especially excited by the rigors which Cæsar held it necessary to exercise in Africa, and which seemed so inconsistent with his ordinary mildness; while, in fact, they sprung from exactly the same deliberate system of policy. He not only caused the soldiers taken prisoners in the action to be cut to pieces under his eyes, but doomed to the same fate Faustus Sylla, for the sake of his wealth, Q. Cæsar, and other captives of superior rank. He spared, however, the poor citizens of Utica, who had ever been true to him; but 300 wealthy Roman merchants, who were resident there, were forced to pay heavy fines and might well be glad to get off so cheaply. Juba's kingdom was swept away entirely; and various towns were visited with heavy contributions.

Every step of Cæsar now exhibited the firm assurance of his own superiority of energy and spirit, and exclusive destination for the attributes of sovereignty. This was confirmed by the overstrained and almost ludicrous marks of distinction which the senate and people forced upon him immediately after the war in Africa. During four months' stay in Rome; he planned improvements and embellishments which do him not less honor than his fortunate campaigns, amongst which may be noticed especially his reform of the Roman calendar.

The struggle with the opposite party seemed already ended, and Cæsar's domination secured, when a new contest arose in Spain more perilous than any former one. Many towns in the south of Spain, during the African war, had received garrisons detached from the Pompeian forces in Africa; and legions which had mutinied against their officers took that side, to escape the punishment due to their offence. At the head of this insurrectionary force were the sons of Pompey: the bravest officers and the best soldiers of the army, dispersed by the battle of Thapsus, had turned their course towards Spain; and Cæsar saw that his personal presence was absolutely necessary. He tore himself, accordingly, from the arms of his Cleopatra, who was living at Rome in his own house with her nominal husband, her younger brother, and, at his bidding, had been received into the friendship and alliance of Rome.

Cæsar's fortune followed him to Spain. He came in presence of the enemy at Munda, where a sharp conflict awaited him with the flower of the Spanish nation, and the best soldiers of Rome, who could have no hope but in desperate measures. His first onset was repulsed; and, in spite of all his subsequent efforts, the field might have been finally lost, had not the enemy abandoned their order of battle to save their baggage, which attracted the cupidity of the Numidian and Mauritanian mercenaries in Cæsar's service. Cnæus, one of Pompey's sons, was caught and slain in his flight; the other, Sextus, re-appeared, immediately after Cæsar's death, at the head of a considerable force by

v. c. sea and land. From March to September Cæsar remained in 709. Spain, and gratified the towns which had adhered to him with the gift of domains, immunity from taxes, and the rights of Roman citizenship, of which, indeed, he was always very liberal; while those which had remained attached to Pompey, on the other hand, were robbed of their demense-lands and charged with extraordinary imposts.

From henceforwards the character of Cæsar seemed to suffer a change. Like Alexander and Napoleon, he had not strength sufficient to sustain the highest favors of destiny. He now caught at the show of monarchy, whereas he had formerly grasped its substance, and launched into wild impracticable schemes of ostentation or empire, encouraged by the slavish Romans, who rushed half-way to meet tyranny. Amongst his gigantic undertakings was the extension of the city, and especially its outskirts (pomœrium.) Under the same rubric must be noted his preparations for a war with the Parthians, which was at once to be an expedition of conquest and discovery. He had avoided as yet any glaring triumph over the republicans; he had made as if his object was to preserve the essential forms of the commonwealth, assuming only a temporary authority to remove abuses, but otherwise letting things go on in their ordinary routine. But now he seemed of another mind; and, according to Plutarch, the triumph which he held for his late success against Romans was viewed as a public humiliation. The assumption of a life-dictatorship, the wreath which he wore around his head, and the military escort which attended him, although he had declined the formal offer of a body-guard, all indicated something like pretensions to royalty.* He even found matter of pride in blazoning descent from Venus, and from the ancient kings of Alba Longa, on his seal. The forms for which he had hitherto shown some respect he now spurned at; and in order to degrade republican dignities into courtly distinctions, he appointed forty quæstors, sixteen prætors, six ædiles, and took into the senate all kinds of people, without wealth or station; whereby he swelled the numbers of that body to nine hundred. Many of them he distinguished above the rest by empty honors; that is to say, converted, as in modern times, the names of public offices into mere titles. People who had never been installed in any seat of authority he dubbed prætors, consulars, ex-censors, and proconsulars. He pushed to a degree of ridicule the fashion afterwards prevalent under the emperors of treating the consulship as a mere decoration or order, as appears from the following example. The consular Fabius Maximus died on the last day v. c. of the year, and Cæsar appointed Caninius Rebilus consul for 709. the rest of the day. Cicero, who saw the rush of congratulation on this appointment, shrewdly remarked, that people must

* Cicero (*Epist. ad Attic.* lib. xiii. ep. 52.) says that Cæsar had proposed to visit him, which had occasioned him extreme uneasiness; for that the evening before he had visited Philippus, whose country-house had been filled with soldiers to such a degree, that even the banquetting-room, where Cæsar was to eat, had not remained vacant. *Quippe hominum duo millia; sane sum commotus, quid postri-die fieret, ac mihi Barbæ Cassius subvenit; custodes dedit.*

make haste, lest the good man should have ceased to be consul before their congratulations reached him.*

Cæsar's mighty projects have, perhaps, been exaggerated by Plutarch; they appear, however, to indicate that he aimed, like the later emperors, to found an elective military despotism. He planned roads across the Apennines; designed to build a theatre, exceeding in size that of Pompey; and to found magnificent libraries. "He intended," says Plutarch, "to march against the Parthians; and, when he had conquered those, to penetrate through Hyrcania by the Caspian, across the range of the Caucasus, to the Euxine, and from thence to the regions of Scythia. He would next attack the territories bordering on Germany, and invade the centre of Germany itself; return again through the lands of the Celt to Italy; and in this way complete the circle of conquests, which, on every side, should be only closed by the ocean. During the course of these campaigns, the Isthmus of Corinth was to be cut through; The Tiber and Anio joined to the sea by a canal near Terracina, that vessels might reach Rome with greater ease and safety. Moreover, the marshes near Pometia and Setia were to be drained, and vast tracts of land thereby reclaimed to cultivation. At Ostia immense piers were to be built, and basins excavated.

These gigantic projects, befitting an Eastern despot, or ruler of castes, combined with his own obvious hankering to revive the royal dignity, awakened, even amongst his friends, the spirit of patriotism, the love of freedom, and the remains of republican pride, which, though it had perished from the souls of the multitude, concentrated itself all the more strongly in those of a small part of the aristocracy. As in all eras of high civilisation and corruption, the mental cultivation and force of a small minority rose the higher, the deeper the degeneracy of the rest of the community. That the flower of the Roman nobility, the sixty eminent personages who leagued themselves against Cæsar, should have dreamed of thus asserting freedom, which had ceased to exist since the days of the Gracchi, is the more to be regretted, as their enterprise afforded occasion to annihilate at a single blow, by the destruction of this little band, whatever remnants of Roman magnanimity had been preserved among the people in these lamentable times.

Both the prætors of the year, Brutus and Cassius, were amongst the conspirators. Antony's imprudence in repeatedly pressing up-
709.
on Cæsar the diadem and the title of king, though the popular voice was so loud against it that Cæsar thought it impolitic to seize the prize which he aimed at, must certainly have hastened the catastrophe; the results of which might probably have been less fatal than they were for the moment, could the conspirators have resolved to despatch Antony at the same time. First among the conspirators ranked Brutus and Cassius, not merely as prætors, but with reference to their talents,

† Cicero made another jest, but in bitterness of feeling, on this consulship:—
"Ita Caninio consule scito neminem prandisse. Nihil tamen eo consule mali factum est, fuit enim mirifica vigilantia, qui suo toto consulatu somnum non viderit. Hæc tibi ridicula videntur, non enim ades; quæ si videres, lacrymas non teneres.—*Epist. ad Divers. lib. ii. ep. 30.*

to their patriotism, and singleness of purpose; and though one followed the doctrines of Zeno, the other of Epicurus, each was equally capable of daring and suffering all extremities. Besides the Pompeians, the following friends of Cæsar were among the conspirators—Decimus Brutus, C. Casca, P. Servilius Casca, Trebonius, Tullius Cimber, Minutius Basillus. The senate itself was selected by the conspirators as the scene of the murder. Foremost among Romans, they were resolved to prove to their fellow citizens that theirs was no deed of assassination done in a corner, but the extraordinary punishment of a public malefactor, who could not be brought to account by any ordinary means, as he held the state and its tribunals captive by his creatures and soldiery.

As the senate was composed of Cæsar's instruments, while the populace expected from a monarchical regimen licentious indulgencies, public shows, and gratuities, the mode of his death diffused a very general consternation: the call to freedom was received with indifference by the people; and it was out of the question to think of passing a formal declaration, that Cæsar had assumed illegal powers, that his property fell to the state, and that his body should be thrown into the Tiber. Indeed, the prætors and their friends were obliged to take post in the capitol, in order to secure themselves against a burst of popular fury. The Jews in Rome were prompted by their vindictive recollections of Pompey, who had conquered their country, and penetrated into their temple, without, however, plundering it, to show especial honor to the memory of Cæsar.* The populace, excited by Antony's speech at Cæsar's funeral, and by the pretended bequest of his gardens for public walks, and of 300 sesterces to every citizen of Rome, which Antony alleged to have been made in the will of the late dictator, threatened to burn the houses of the conspirators. Confusion reached its acme, when Lepidus moved into the city the troops which had been stationed in the island in the Tiber, and declared himself ready to support Antony at their head. The conspirators, on the other hand, formed a sort of regular force out of the numerous body of gladiators which Brutus had collected and put in training for the ensuing games. The city was in a state of total anarchy.

It was now Cicero's turn to make a figure. He was not a man who could have been invited to participate in any scheme involving chances of actual personal hazard. Now, however, a new career was opened to his oratory. He appeared in the senate, which Antony assembled near his own house, in the temple of Tellus, to be safe, as he said, from the gladiators of the conspirators. Cicero enforced pacific councils, in accordance with which an amnesty was proclaimed; Antony's son delivered to the conspirators as a pledge of peace; and arrangements made for distributing the governments of the provinces. Meanwhile Antony travelled about, intrigued with Cæsar's veterans, and drew so many soldiers round the capital, that the prætors and their friends thought themselves no longer in safety. They soon came

* Suetonius (*Cæs. cap. lxxxiv.*) says: "Præcipueque Judæi, qui etiam noctibus continuis bustum frequentarunt."

to declarations and counter-declarations with Antony; and at length demanded formally to be sanctioned in remaining out of the city without ceasing to be prætors. At last, on their reiterated demand for some distinct declaration on what terms Antony would stand with them, he sent a coarse and contemptuous reply in an open letter.*

War now seemed declared between the parties; Cicero was absent, and Antony domineered in Rome at his pleasure. He extorted from the senate a decree that all regulations of Cæsar, whether issued during his life, or left amongst his posthumous relics, should have the force of law; and, on the strength of this decree, made what regulations he chose; giving out that they had been found amongst Cæsar's papers. Through his influence over Cæsar's widow, Calpurnia, who had consoled herself in his company for her late lord's infidelities, he had contrived to secure the whole of Cæsar's papers and correspondence, as well as the large sums which he had deposited in the temple of Ops, and which were his private property, the fruit of Pompeian confiscations. He also employed the hand of Cæsar's secretary in fabricating instruments in the name of the late dictator.

Antony was now all in all: one of his brothers was prætor, another tribune, himself consul—what could withstand him? He caused to be conferred on the Sicilians, collectively, the right of Roman citizenship; passed an agrarian law for dividing the public lands throughout Italy to veteran soldiers and poor citizens; and procured his creatures provinces for four, or even for six, years. Thus confident of having gained the people and the soldiery, he sought, at length to legalise the use of force and of weapons in the popular assemblies, and in the senate; and obtained a law, that when any one was convicted of armed revolt (*de vi*), he should be permitted an appeal to the people. In order to make the courts of justice military tribunals, he mixed subaltern officers of the legions among the judges.

About this time Cicero reappeared in the senate; and Octavius, Cæsar's grand-nephew, and his heir *ex dodrante*, i. e. to three fourths of his property, whom he had adopted, and who was not yet full eighteen, entered the lists against Antony; gained over a part of the soldiery; demanded his inheritance; and especially complained of the removal of the money which was deposited in the temple of Ops, and which, in point of fact, legally belonged to him. Antony at first treated the youth's pretensions with great indifference; but when he found them supported by the senate, and soon afterwards saw him at the head of a rapidly levied army, he too quitted Rome, and recalled four legions from Macedonia into Italy.

The struggle which took place between the consul and the young man who called himself the heir and the avenger of Cæsar, but was, in fact, the instrument of all whose secret wishes pointed towards mon-

* Cicero alludes to this as follows (*Epist. ad Divers. lib. xi. eb. 3.*);—"Litteras tuas legimus, simillimas edicti tui, contumeliosas, minaces, minime dignas, quæ a te nobis mitterentur. Nos, Antoni, te nulla lacessivimus injuria; neque miraturum credidimus, si prætors et ea dignitate homines aliquid edicto postulassemus a consule. Quod si indignaris, ausos esse id facere, concede nobis, ut doleamus, ne hoc quidem abs te Bruto et Cassio tribui."

archy, again gave some degree of weight to the senate; and Cicero brought his eloquence again into action without delay. He had received some affront from Antony as consul; and did not fail to give sufficiently bitter marks of resentment. Antony answered this first attack by a harsh and irritating speech; and Cicero's reply was the renowned second philippic, of which he afterwards distributed a corrected version, which yields nowise in vehemence to his speech against Catiline, and made an immense impression on the Roman public. Under such circumstances, nothing but an appeal to arms could decide the contest. Antony went to Brundisium, to take the command of the four legions which, as we have said, he recalled from Macedonia. These troops, however, treated the donative which he offered them with contempt, and refused to follow him. Upon this, he further exasperated the soldiery by the slaughter of some hundred subaltern officers, sergeants, and privates. In consequence, one legion (quarta) transferred its allegiance to Octavius; another (Marta) encamped separately near Alba.

Antony had hardly left the city when the aristocratical party reared its head again. Though the other consul also was absent from Rome, the tribunes convoked the senate for the 20th of December. Cicero v. c. labored zealously for Octavius when he sued for the tribuneship, 709. and spoke the third philippic in his favor; thus raising the enemy of his friends, in order to destroy his own. The two consuls of 710. the following year, Aulus Hirtius and Vibius Pansa, marched into Upper Italy, at the head of an army, to the relief of Decimus Brutus, who was besieged by Antony in Mutina. Octavius accompanied them, armed with equal powers; Cicero having demanded in his behalf, in the third philippic, that he should at once be high-priest (pontifex), proprætor, and senator; should give his voice with the prætors; and, if he sued for a curule dignity, should be considered in the same manner as if he had held the rank of prætor. The struggle for Mutina was obstinate: but Antony was at length routed by a sally from the town, made simultaneously with a joint attack from Hirtius and Octavius. Antony, already proclaimed an enemy to his country, was forced to seek his safety in flight; and the republic really appeared for once to triumph, as Brutus and Cassius at this time had made themselves masters of the whole East.

Meanwhile Octavius and his friends had a pretty clear perception that a permanent coalition with the republicans was out of the question; and took their measures accordingly. Both consuls had been left dead on the field in the recent engagements; the Roman troops, scattered throughout the West, did not seem much inclined to fight in the defence of the republic; and policy suggested combination against the seventeen legions which served in the East under Cassius and Brutus. Cæsar, before his death, had assigned to his soldiers lands in Italy. Immediately on the landing of Octavius these troops had hastened to his colors: he had besides raised an army of his own, which was reinforced by the two legions which had mutinied against Antony. Moreover, all the scattered limbs of Antony's army, and, soon afterwards, the troops of the late consuls, joined his service, and,

full of disaffection to the senate, felt no scruple in fighting against Rome. At this moment the chief command in Spain was held by Asinius Pollio, who hypocritically complained, in a letter to Cicero, that his services were not put in requisition. This was the same Pollio to whom Cæsar was in a great measure indebted for his success in the African war, and who soon gave further proofs of indisposition towards the aristocrats. Equally ambiguous was the conduct of Plancus, who was stationed in the south of France; though he dealt no less than Asinius Pollio in assurances of his upright intentions. Lepidus had been destined to conduct into Spain a third extremely numerous army; Cæsar having, shortly, before his death, assigned to him Spain and Southern Gaul as his province. Meanwhile he remained in Gaul: and Plancus informed Cicero that Antony relied on this army, consisting, as it did, of Cæsar's veterans, whether Cicero himself were inclined to unite with him or not. Antony took his course towards Gaul; and, however distasteful to Lepidus was his presence there, the army of the latter joined him instantly, and immediately after made its appearance in Italy, where, in a brief space, the state of affairs had undergone a complete change. The further conduct of the war against Antony had been committed by the senate, not to Octavius, but to Decimus Brutus. Mortally offended by this preference, Octavius refused to render Brutus the least assistance, marched straight to Rome, appointed himself consul, and selected Q. Pedius for his colleague.* One of his first public actions was to rescind, by a vote of the people, the resolution which declared Dolabella an enemy of his country. He next proceeded to institute an inquiry into the murder of Cæsar, to summon before him a large number of those who had taken part in it, and, on default of appearance, to pass judgment against them. Of this number were Brutus and Cassius. Already, before his march to Rome, Octavius had formed an alliance with Antony and Lepidus.† When, therefore, he put himself in motion against them in a hostile manner, it was merely for the greater convenience of oral negotiation. Their conference took place on an island in a small stream in the neighborhood of Bologna; and Lepidus assumed the part of mediator. Before this interview between the three friends of the late dictator, the senate, on a hint from Octavius, had rescinded its decrees against Lepidus and Antony; and Pollio, as well as Plancus, had seized the pretext thus afforded for attaching themselves to the party which was strongest in the capital. Decimus Brutus, therefore, was left to struggle single-handed; and, so soon as the state of affairs transpired, was deserted by all his soldiers, though, shortly before, eight legions had been united under his orders.

The articles of union which were agreed upon by the new triumvirate are enumerated by Appian as follows:—Octavius was to abdicate the consulship which he then held, and to deliver it to Ventidius

* Dio Cassius (lib. xlvi. c. 46. init.) says, with a play on the words—*καὶ αὐτῶ καὶ συνάρχων* (εἶπε τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλω μὴ ὑπαρχόν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν) ὁ Πέδιος ὁ Κύντος ἑδούθη.

† Dio Cassius, lib. xlvi. c. 43. Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 80, 81.

for the remainder of the year: a public function of an entirely novel nature, for the new ordering of the disturbed state of the commonwealth (*reipublica constituenda*), was to be devolved on Lepidus, Antony, and Octavius, which was to give them equal power with the consuls, and with which they were invested for a term of five years. "They chose," says Appian, "the title of (*triumviri reipublica constitutenda*), on account of a subsisting law, which had been brought in by Antony himself, prohibiting the appointment of a dictator."* These triumvirs should nominate the annual public functionaries for five years. In the division of their provinces, all Celtic land fell to Antony's share; excepting the districts bordering immediately on the Pyrenees, which were known by the name of the old Celtic land. The remainder, with Iberia, should obey Lepidus. Octavius should have Sicily, Sardinia, Libya, and the neighboring islands.

The main transaction, however, at the conference of the three leaders was not so much the settlement of the conditions of their union, which were made public immediately afterwards, as to concert the manner of commencing hostilities against the republican party. A reconciliation was impossible, as had long been clearly seen by the young Octavius, whose early cunning, by which he was taught never to commit any unnecessary crime, nor to shrink from any which seemed necessary, is an extraordinary phenomenon in history. Extensive confiscations were by this time indispensable, to defray the expenses of the wars, as well as to enrich the soldiery. Extirpation, besides, was the only way of getting rid of enemies, and of many cowardly, weak, ambiguous friends. It was therefore resolved to annihilate the whole aristocratical party by a proscription in the manner of Sylla; and lists were agreed upon of those whose lives, were to be sacrificed, or whose property was to undergo confiscation. In all this, the advanced age and rapacity of Lepidus, whom Antony termed in derision *father*, played a part in the last degree despicable. His name, and whatever influence had been bequeathed him by Cæsar, were made use of; he was allowed to share the odium of the crimes of his colleagues; but they had no disposition to yield him any part of their fruits. Antony, who was always more concerned for the enjoyment of the moment than for the prospect of any future advantage, followed the bent of his unbridled inclinations: and Octavius alone, with craft which a grey-beard might have envied, awaited the issue of the approaching conflict, to suit his measures to circumstances.

The number of senators whose names were placed on the first list of the proscribed is estimated by Plutarch at 300, while other authorities make it a third less. Of the richer class, or equestrians, 2000 fell a sacrifice; and very many even of the lower orders. Moreover, each of the triumvirs, by way of showing straightforward dealing, gave up one of his nearest relations or friends. Octavius might, perhaps, feel no great difficulty in giving up Cicero, as the latter, according to Appian, had played a very ambiguous part when the former

* This appears to be a blunder of Appian, as, at any period, there could not be more than one dictator at a time.

sought, by military aid, to extort the consulship. That species of state-craft, besides, which counselled the suppression of every kind of independent agency, required above all the destruction of Cicero, and some seventeen other senators, who, as upright and impartial men, had latterly possessed an ascendant influence. The proceeds of massacre and plunder, which went on throughout the whole year, sufficed indeed to keep the troops, and keep them attached to the triumvirs, but by no means sufficed to carry on the war with Brutus and Cassius; and the less so, as Antony launched into an ocean of extravagance, that Octavius was obliged to make him advances from his private means. The most scandalous devices were employed to discover hidden treasures: the holiest of sanctuaries, the temple of Vesta, could no longer secure the wealth deposited there; all descriptions of imposts were exhausted; and even the assertors of freedom, Cassius and Brutus, were obliged, like their antagonists, to resort to practices of extortion.

The passage of the republican forces from Asia into Europe compelled the triumvirs, who had divided the West among themselves, to hasten the decision of the contest. They left a portion of their forces behind in Italy under Lepidus, whom with Plancus they had appointed to the consulship of the current year, and marched with the remainder of their force against the republicans. Antony first appeared in Greece, and detached Norbanus in advance, to occupy the passes between Thrace and Macedon on the Nessus. Norbanus would have blocked up the republicans in Thrace, had not a Thracian prince conducted them through the mountains by an unknown route; by which they arrived at Philippi, where they encamped. An engagement was inevitable; Antony having, with great rapidity, come up to the assistance of Norbanus. Octavius joined with his forces ten days afterwards. The destiny of Rome was decided in two successive actions. In the first the republican leaders, on the whole, had the advantage; their numerical force being equal, if not superior, to that of the enemy. Unfortunately, Cassius, in a very premature fit of despair, closed his own career by self-murder. The second battle, which took place about three weeks after the first, was decisive in favor of Antony and Octavius. Brutus, like his colleague, chose a voluntary death: his army was wholly dispersed, destroyed, or incorporated with that of the conqueror.

Antony turned his course towards the east, proceeded to Egypt, and plunged into all the debaucheries, which the Syrian and Egyptian courts had carried to as high a pitch as human invention could go. Cleopatra lavished the wealth and arts of her realm to enchant his senses. He seemed at her side to forget entirely Italy and the affairs of the west, sunk his public character altogether, and did not resume it till the tidings that all Asia was overrun by the Parthians, and that in Italy Octavius was endeavoring to exclude him from any partnership in the general government, forced him again to surround himself with the insignia and instruments of empire.

Antony had at first viewed with indifference the ill success and ill treatment of his relatives and adherents in Italy, and the ravages of

the Parthians in Asia. It was not till matters proceeded to extremities on both sides that he quitted Alexandria for Tyre. On his arrival there, the danger from the desultory incursions of Parthians, which were easily repelled at any time, appeared less urgent than that which arose from the machinations of Octavius. Accordingly he went without delay to Asia Minor, and from thence to Greece. At Athens he met Fulvia, and the meeting does not seem to have been eminently cordial: however, his worthy consort died soon afterwards. Antony at first declined the alliance of Sextus Pompey; but, as Octavius made demonstrations of barring his entrance into Italy, on second thoughts he formed his alliance, and, in concert with his new colleague, held Italy in a state of seige, by preventing all imports of grain into the peninsula. Italy was now threatened with famine, in addition to all the other horrid accompaniments of a civil war, when the mutual friends of Antony and Octavius came forward as mediators, concerted a new division of the Roman world, made up a marriage between Antony and his rival's sister, Octavia; and, on the other hand, persuaded the former to give up his alliance with Sextus Pompey.

U. C. A year and a quarter Antony and Octavius lived together in
 714. Rome. They were soon forced by the clamors of a famine-
 to stricken people to conclude a peace with Sextus Pompey, on
 715. terms securing him five year' possession of Sardinia, Sicily, and even of Peloponnesus. The latter district he never got possession of, as Antony alleged he had many demands on the inhabitants; and these, it should of course be understood, must be defrayed by Pompey. These demands were, in fact, for arrears of taxes and of forced contributions, which had been laid on the inhabitants at the discretion, or rather the pleasure, of Antony, who was revelling now in Athens, as before in Alexandria, living amongst Greeks as a Greek, and honorably striving to deserve the title of *the younger Bacchus*.

Meanwhile his lieutenant, Ventidius, drove the Parthians out of Asia Minor and Syria, retook all the places which they had captured, and levied enormous contributions from all the states and sovereigns who had entered into any friendly relations with them. At this time, new hostilities broke out with Sextus Pompey. Antony found it necessary twice to revisit Italy, first from Athens, afterwards from Syria. On the second occasion he fell in with Octavius at Tarentum, and consented that he should carry on the war with Sextus Pompey; he even transferred to him part of his own fleet, and in return received a reinforcement of two legions from Octavius for the Parthian war.

Before his second above-mentioned reappearance in Italy, Antony had earned but little glory in Syria; and, after his return to the East, he sacrificed his honor as a soldier, and his troops, in two successive expeditions, exactly at the epoch when Octavius was completing his preparations to deprive him of his share in the empire of the world. On his return to the East, his project was to penetrate, by the aid of the king of Armenia, into the mountainous regions of Media, where a native Median empire, of which he meant to besiege the capital, existed in close alliance with the Parthians. The king of Armenia desert-

ed him, however, in the moment of danger; his baggage was captured; an army of 10,000 men, which he had left behind to cover it, was totally cut to pieces; the Parthians kept him closely blockaded, and cut off all his supplies. Praaspa, which he was laying siege to, was situated in the mountains, near which is the site of the present capital town of Tehran. Even Antony's confidence was dashed by the disheartening incidents of a siege in the elevated and chilly mountain ranges of these regions.* Finding himself in danger, with his whole army, of perishing as ignominiously as Crassus had done before him, he finally raised the siege, and directed his march through the higher parts of Armenia, a land which Dio Cassius terms with justice one of perpetual ice. During this march, his army was continually on the point of disbanding; and had not the Parthians slaughtered all deserters ostentatiously in the sight of the Roman ranks, whole troops would have gone over *en masse* to the enemy. Octavius, in 718. the mean time, was collecting an immense force; which was the more to be depended upon, as he either disbanded, or settled on lands, or put to the sword, mutinous spirits.† He found occupation for the rest in regions inhabited by the most formidable enemies of the Roman name, in the mountains of Spain, in Gaul, in Pannonia, and Dalmatia, while Antony was engaged in a fresh enterprize on the Euphrates against his ex-ally the king of Armenia, to whom he mainly ascribed the loss of his Parthian expedition. As he durst not at once commence open hostilities on his ancient ally, he gave invitations to the Armenian monarch to meet him, first in Egypt, afterwards, having commenced his march on his dominions, in Nicopolis, that is to say, not far from the frontiers of his territory. As Antony approached the Armenian capital, Artaxata, the king, durst not provoke his enmity by showing unabated want of confidence in his protestations of friendship; he accordingly appeared in the camp; but was instantly made prisoner, and the fortresses in his dominions summoned in his name to surrender. However, the Roman general's expectations of getting possession of the treasures and the castles of Armenia, by virtue of the commands of the entrapped monarch, were baffled. But what he failed in compassing by fraud, he wrung by force. He occupied with his troops the whole of Armenia, dividing them in different stations; betrothed his son by Cleopatra with a Median princess; and, in alliance with the sovereign of Media, was about to attack the Parthians, when the enmity which Octavius had long nourished in secret against him burst out into overt acts of hostility.

The two rivals, Octavius and Antony, who, to a certain point, had pursued the same route, were at this time committed in widely different courses, which led to destinations as different—the one to destruction, the other to the sovereignty of the Roman world. Conscious of his own deficiencies, Octavius had raised Agrippa, a man of the lowest origin, from step to step to the highest public dignities, used his

* *Τό τε σίμπαν* says Appian, "*πολιορκεῖν δοκῶν τὰ τῶν πολιορκουμένων ἔπασχεν.*"
—Lib. xlix. c. 32.

† Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v. c. 128—130. Dio Cass. lib. xlix. c. 34—38.

services in the most difficult situations, and entrusted to him the chief command in the war with Sextus, although he was himself present. It was planned to attack Sicily from Italy, by sea and land, on two sides at once; on the third Lepidus was to land with the numerous African legions, and the main attack was conducted by Agrippa. Assailed at once on both sides, and equally incapable of daring resolution and timid prudence, Pompey was overthrown in a single engagement, fled to Asia, and met his death in Phrygia. Lepidus had hoped to share in the spoil, as he had shared in the victory: he was not only deceived in that hope, but lost what was already in his possession. No sooner had Octavius learned that Lepidus, without consulting him, had closed a treaty with the Pompeians, taken them under his protection, and even taken possession of Messina, than he went to his camp, regarding him as so utterly insignificant that his soldiers would desert him without ceremony. He deceived himself, it is true, in that point, and narrowly escaped the shots and swords of the soldiers, indignant at his audacity. As it soon, however, appeared that Lepidus durst not meet a decisive conflict, his troops were easily gained by Octavius, and deserted to the enemy with their standards and eagles. Lepidus was so truly insignificant that Octavius spared him, and did not even deprive him of the priestly office with which he had been invested; it being a Roman usage that the three chief sacerdotal dignities only expired with the life of him to whom they had been given.

To justify a predetermined rupture with Antony, Octavius took advantage of his levities in conduct. He refused to receive his noble consort, Octavia, who had travelled as far as Athens to join him with valuable presents, and quitted Armenia with no other aim than to visit Cleopatra in Egypt. Octavius had long and vainly endeavored to move the Roman senate, where Antony had many friends, to violent measures against him, till Antony himself declared war, and proceeded, still accompanied by Cleopatra, to Ephesus. Even then the senate declared war with Cleopatra, not with her paramour, and only recalled Antony from his Asiatic sovereignty.

The cause of this declaration of war, and of Antony's final ruin, was, in fact, Cleopatra, whose influence estranged his truest Roman friends from him. It was at her instigation he had formed that alliance with the Median prince, which Octavius put forward as a main charge against him. Antony's land force was in a very feeble condition: the better troops unquestionably were those of his antagonist. Cleopatra and her courtly circle wasted his whole time, and kept soberer councils at a distance. However, at length he resolved to confide chiefly in his fleet, that, after a naval victory, he might lead his army direct to Italy, where he was well assured of an amicable reception. The presumption which on all occasions inebriated his mind did not desert him in the last decisive moments of his destiny, in which, to all appearance, he might have anticipated the enemy. He loitered and trifled at Ephesus; spent farther time in revels at Samos; held processions and feasts in Cleopatra's honor at Athens; and having, in

spite of these delays, reached the coast of Epirus with his land army and fleet before the autumn, instead of making any attempt to land on the coast of Italy, he let his fleet and army starve out the winter on the shores of Greece, delaying till the following year the issue of the contest, when that issue came to be tried under most unfavorable circumstances. Octavius landed in Epirus without meeting resistance; the armies were confronted with each other on the bay of Ambracia, and the hostile fleets came in sight near Actium.

CHAPTER III.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM TO THE REIGN OF TIBERIUS.

IN the engagement at Actium, Cleopatra had taken a separate station in a vessel easy to be distinguished by its royal ensigns. According to the commonly received account of the action, she took to flight so soon as its event appeared doubtful, and long before it really could be decided. Sixty ships followed her; and Antony no sooner perceived it, than he hastened after her, probably in hopes of bringing her back, but let himself be persuaded to enter her ship, and to accompany her flight before the day was hopeless. A very slight alteration of this story improves it probability, while it spoils its romance. Cleopatra, it would seem, took flight the moment it was visible that the fortune of the day turned against Antony; and was followed by the Egyptian division of the fleet. Upon this Antony, seeing that the remainder of his fleet, which had principally depended on its Egyptian auxiliaries, could no longer maintain the conflict, lost his presence of mind, and fled in like manner. The greater part of his fleet was destroyed; the legions, which he had not even informed of his movements, in part deserted to Octavius, and were in part dispersed by his forces. Octavius crossed over into Asia, where he found no resistance and no difficulty in crowning and deposing monarchs, taking possession of provinces, and laying towns under contribution;* while his friends Mæcenas and Agrippa, whom he had sent to Italy to pacify the soldiers, found considerable obstacles to executing this commission. Disturbances in the neighborhood of Brundisium among the troops, whose rewards Agrippa had been instructed to put off to another time, recalled the victor from Asia. But the disturbances in Italy having been stilled in less than a month, he hastened back to the east, expecting to find in Egypt more resistance than he afterwards met with. Cleopatra had just returned to Egypt, while Antony had betaken himself to the army assembled at Paratonium under Pinarius Scarpus. Here, however, neither he nor his emissaries found reception; he therefore hastened back to his paramour. Cleopatra intended to build a fleet on the Red Sea; but the Arabs, incited by Octavius's officers in Syria, burned the docks erected by her orders, while Octavius, with two armies, threatened the invasion of Egypt both on the side of Africa and Syria. The army destined to guard the African frontier against Octavius revolted: Antony and Cleopatra at one time gave themselves up to stupefying indulgences, at another treated with Octavius, who protracted the negotiations, to lull them into per-

* Dio Cass. Hist. Rom. lib. i. c. 2.

fect security. At length after long dallying and just at the moment when Octavius's army approached Alexandria from two sides, Antony rallied his faculties, and resolved to sell his life dear. His first attack on the advancing enemy turned out advantageously. He therefore resolved to make a fresh attempt by sea and land to repulse them; but the Egyptian fleet surrendered to the enemy without resistance, and his cavalry treacherously deserted just when their aid was wanting. Antony, apparently not without reason, suspected himself betrayed by Cleopatra. Nevertheless he wounded himself mortally on the intelligence that the queen had slain herself; and, discovering that the intelligence was premature, caused himself to be brought dying into her presence. Cleopatra was herself possessed of a sure poison, but would not use it till she had ascertained, on a personal interview with Octavius, what impression her charms had power to make on him. She soon, however, perceived that no strong passion could be aroused in Octavius, and observed that his orders indicated her destination to grace his triumph: she frustrated his plan, therefore by suicide.

In like manner as Octavius, immediately on the death of the only two persons who could still offer him any resistance in any part of the Roman world, proceeded to arrange the affairs of Egypt, and of the whole east, as seemed best to himself and to those of whom he commonly asked council, in the same way it would have been desirable that he should have immediately given a new constitution or form of government to the empire, at whose head he now stood, instead of adhering scrupulously to old institutions and usages, the spirit of which had long fled. But his object was to veil the frightful novelty in the form of the empire, which must henceforth be a military monarchy. This, however, could be done only so long as the character of the ruler was as quiet and forbearing as his own. The moving principle of the new government will be presently seen to come prominently forward under his successor.

The administration of Egypt seems to have called forth the especial attention of Octavius; and he gave directions concerning it which differed altogether from his general provincial regulations. He prohibited Roman senators from visiting the country without special permission. This regulation, indeed, was in force with respect to all the provinces. But he also forbade the higher class of Egyptians from making any long sojourn in Rome. The motive of these restrictive measures, as well as of the abolition of all the rights of a free Grecian town, which had previously been enjoyed by Alexandria, including all assemblies of the people, of the council, and the freely elected public officers, may be found in the restless character of the Greek population of Lower Egypt, and especially of Alexandria; a city which, under the last Ptolemies, had been accustomed to give laws to its rulers, and which possessed immense wealth, and an enormous population.

From Egypt, Octavius travelled through Judea into Syria, and appointed the murderer of the last branch of the Asmonæan or Maccabæan house independent prince over part of Judæa. This was done, as appeared in the sequel, partly to reward Herod for the aid which

he had afforded him, but more especially to inure the Jews by degrees to Roman government, as Herod was little more than a Roman officer with a royal title. The presence of Octavius in Syria gave him opportunity to mix in the most prudent manner in Parthian affairs; and in this manner he afterwards obtained, as a voluntary concession, the delivery of the captured spoil and officers of Crassus, which Antony had vainly sought to extort by force of arms. Two Parthian princes contested with each other the throne. Octavius took the part of the one without attacking the other; and secured himself an influence in the Parthian kingdom doubly—first, by granting the pretender to the crown an asylum and protection in the Roman empire, without giving him aid for the attainment of the throne; secondly, by retaining as an hostage a prince of the reigning house, whom the pretender to the throne had placed in his hands.

In Rome, and throughout Italy, all preparations were made to receive Octavius. He had brought sufficient sums with him to satisfy the soldiery from the treasures of Egypt, and the tributes which he had levied in Alexandria. But the Roman people and the senate, whose resolutions were prompted by those who are ever ready with their homage to the rising sun, loaded him with prerogatives, distinctions, and honors, which even he regarded as overstrained. Amongst these was the new-coined title of *AUGUSTUS*, or the Awful, which he professed to accept merely as a name of respect, not importing the odious attributes of royalty, or those of dictatorship, abolished since the death of Cæsar. It would, indeed, be absurd to attach any importance to the circumstance that the new ruler would not accept any but civic honors, and these only for a specified term of years; or that he spoke in his cabinet and the senate of laying down his rank in the state, and, pursuant to Agrippa's counsel, restoring the republic. It never could have entered his mind to do so in good earnest. The Roman world, moreover, would have gained nothing by it, since *Republic* and *Universal Empire* are ideas irreconcilable. In effect, his aim was directed from the outset to disguise the reality of military monarchy under the forms of the old constitution. He made donatives to his army, purged it of slaves, bandits, and rabble of all sorts, who had been mixed with it of late years, and distributed the main divisions on the Euphrates, on the Rhine, and on the Danube; while in other parts of the empire, and especially in Italy, only single divisions were stationed, and Rome was at first left free from soldiery. This policy is easily conceivable, as the city populace, loaded with donatives, crammed with food, and entertained with spectacles, had no disposition whatever for rebellion; while the new senate, selected by Augustus out of the mixed mass, which from time to time had been thrust into that body, consisted partly of his own creatures, and the rest was so contemptible that no danger whatever was to be feared from it.

From this moment every thing depended on the personal qualities of the ruler. As imperator, he was generalissimo in war; as *præfectus morum*, he was more than ever the censor had been in time of peace; as *pontifex maximus* (since the death of Lepidus), he had power to suit to his purposes ceremonial rites and usages. Through the

consular powers conferred upon him, even when he was not consul, he had the executive; and as permanent tribune, he represented the people, and united its collective powers in his person.* The tribunate was thus, indeed, completely changed in its character, the more so as its authority now extended beyond the walls of the city, which had formerly circumscribed its jurisdiction. The senate, which Augustus reduced from 1000 to 600 members, retained in appearance all its former attributes, but in effect was modified, so as to be merely a machine for giving a show of legality to certain regulations, and at the same time to assemble a sort of peerage of the realm around the head of the state, who at first had neither court nor representative ministry. The whole senate was to assemble only twice a month (on the first days of the month, and on the ides), and was prorogued during September and October. It is obvious that the government of a great empire could not be conducted by so otiose an assembly. A committee, re-elected every half year (*consilia semestria*), took the place of the collective body. This committee thus served the prince as a privy council—a nursery where the talents of public men might be formed and put to the test. The popular assemblies were mere shadows of old times: the remains of practical freedom, which existed even under the Cæsars, exclusively resided in the populous towns and those districts comprised within the circuit of the empire, which enjoyed such freedom as could consist with the requisitions of general policy; for the caprice of subordinate functionaries was now submitted to strict control.

In a military empire, girt around with warlike nations, from time to time occasions could not be wanting (even under a government which acted on the principle that the bounds of the empire should not be extended) to call into use against external enemies the army which Augustus kept under strict discipline. But, except the expeditions on the left bank of the Rhine, these wars are all so trifling that they scarcely deserve mention. As Cæsar had before subdued Britain, Augustus constantly made as if he would turn his arms against that island. Nothing, however, came of these demonstrations. Under the pretext of discipline, he now ceased to employ the appellation of *commiliones*, and addressed his soldiers as *milites*.

Augustus aimed entirely to incorporate the left bank of the Rhine with the empire by means of colonies, and by the diffusion of the Roman manners and habits. But this scheme led him further than he originally intended, and drew upon the Romans the second overthrow which they had suffered from barbarians in the open field since the wars with the Cimbri.

It is remarkable, that just at the time when the old constitution of Rome had fallen, those nations which afterwards overthrew the empire first showed themselves in a formidable manner. Since the days of Cæsar, particular German tribes, the most considerable of whom were the Ubii, in the neighborhood of Cologne, and the Vangiones, Triboci, Nemeti, between Schlettstadt and Oppenheim, had formed

* Mem. de l'Academie des Inscript. et Belles Letters, t. xxvii. p. 438. et seq.

settlements on the left bank of the Rhine, and had gradually adopted Roman habits. The Romans called the district from Schlettstadt to Cleves, where the last permanent stations of their legions (*castra vetera*) appear to have been placed, *the first and second Germany*, maintained relations of commerce with the inhabitants on the nearer side, and fortified several places on the Rhine. However, as yet they durst not venture across the river. Even the bold and high-minded Agrippa, who for some time held the chief command in Gaul, shrunk from a war with the nations on the right bank of the Rhine, and preferred to give his allies the Ubii settlements on Roman ground. Since Agrippa's removal, certain tribes of the barbarians made excursions over the left bank, after having first cruelly murdered the Roman traders who had ventured amongst them. Lollius, a man of consular rank, but of contemptible character, was then at the head of the legions on the left bank of the Rhine, and hastened up to cut off the retreat of the invaders, or at all events deprive them of their booty. However, before he expected an attack, they came upon him, and he was slain with the loss of the eagle of one of the legions which he commanded. Augustus was at that time on a journey to Gaul: his arrival restored confidence to the Gauls, and repressed the marauding parties of the Germans. He thought it necessary, for the honor of the Roman arms, to act on the offensive: and appointed one of his stepsons to execute the measures required for that purpose.

Drusus and Tiberius, stepsons of Augustus by his wife Livia, had about this time obtained successes over the German and Sarmatian tribes southwards of the Danube. The latter had penetrated into the interior of Hungary. Drusus had not only conquered, together with his brother Tiberius, the German or Celtic inhabitants of Rhætia and Vindelicia, who would not submit to the Roman yoke, but had also founded colonies on the Danube, and in Passau, Augsburg, and Memmingen, which afterwards grew to important towns. Augustus placed the latter at the head of the legions on the Rhine, which he led into the interior of Germany; while his brother Tiberius conquered the Sarmatian tribes in Dalmatia.

The campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius threw so bright a lustre on the reign of Augustus, that the overthrow which Varus suffered afterwards in Germany, and the resistless pressure of the tribes on the north-east frontier of the empire, spread a double terror amongst the Romans. In the fifth year of his command, Drusus had terrified by repeated attacks the populations which did not belong to the great league of the Suevi, and had fortified a whole chain of military posts on the right bank of the Rhine. The principal results of these campaigns was the erection of some forts on the Taunus, the number of which was augmented at a later period; the fortification of a town named Aliso, near Elsen, in the district of Paderborn; some advanced works on the Ems and beyond it; and, finally, a line of petty fortresses on the Rhine. Another plan failed. Drusus attempted with miserable vessels to reconnoitre from the mouth of the river the north-eastern coast of Ger-

U. C.
741.
to
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13
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9.

many, and establish his power between the Ems and the Weser. But his crews had neither adroitness nor experience, nor science enough for the dangerous navigation along the coasts of the Northern ocean.

Immediately after the death of Drusus, the Romans very zealously embraced this part of his plan, and allied themselves with the northern populations of Germany, which were held together by no great league, or subjugated them singly, so that they even laid down roads towards the embouchures of the Rhine and over the marshes on the Ems.* Tiberius and other officers penetrated farther and farther into the interior of Germany; inured the inhabitants of the countries betwixt the Rhine and Weser to Roman habits, luxuries, and laws; and treated the several populations as the Romans were every where accustomed to treat those whom they called their allies.

Unfortunately for the Romans, Augustus appointed Quinctilius Varus, a man who had commanded in Syria leader of the powerful armies now stationed in the interior of Germany. This officer gave himself up to a besotted security, and plumed himself on seeing barbarians stand like Romans before his tribunal, while at the same time he treated those barbarians with Roman arrogance. Arminius, or Hermann, prince of the Cherusci, had learned in Roman society and service Roman wisdom or cunning. Hermann aimed, by means of a general league of all the nations in the north-west of Germany, to put an end at once to the power of the Roman invaders east of the Rhine. Quinctilius Varus, blinded by his own arrogance, deceived himself as to the purpose of these movements, and allowed himself to be taken in a snare which was laid with more cunning than he had expected of the rude and simple people he had to contend with. Five years long Quinctilius had exercised uncontrolled power from the Rhine as far as the Elbe and East Friesland, and had taken up his ordinary residence at Cassel or Munden, when hostilities in the north of Westphalia seemed to require his presence. Incited and accompanied by the ring-leader of the native league, he marched with his whole force to quell these disturbances; and his German friends guided him into defiles, wholly impassable, in the district of Detmold. In this situation, the Romans being unable to move either back or forwards, and their march being besides impeded by rain and tempest, the Germans deserted *en masse* from the Roman army, which was now attacked on all sides by the combined tribes. In this engagement an army of above 24,000 men, three legions, and as many squadrons of horse, with the other troops attached to them, perished with their ill-fated general; all the forts and posts on the right bank of the Rhine were taken; and all the Roman writers agreed that since the defeat of Crassus, no severer blow had ever struck the Roman people.

Augustus and the whole metropolis were plunged in such consternation by the news of this defeat, that any one might have supposed the Germans already at the gates of Rome. The severest measures were taken to complete with the utmost expedition the numbers of the legions in the neighborhood. It was on this emergency strikingly apparent, that the citizens of Rome, and even of Italy, had already

* Tacit. Annal. lib. iv. c. 44.

ceased to constitute the main strength of the armies which bore their name, and defended their dominions. Dio Cassius* thus describes the utter decay of the Roman spirit:—"There was now no vigorous youth left in the city; and even the Italian allies were no longer servicable.† Nevertheless Augustus levied a new force as well as he could, out of such materials as existed; and as none of those who had reached the age of military service volunteered to serve, he drew conscripts by lot. Of those who had not yet attained the age of thirty-five, every fifth—of those who were older, every tenth—man was enlisted: whoever practiced any evasion, lost his possessions and was dishonored. At last, even these rigors having failed to force many into the service, some were ordered for execution. Many whose term of service had expired were included in the conscription; and as many freedmen as could be found were enrolled in the troops destined for Germany. When Tiberius appeared on the Rhine with the reinforcements thus provided, he did not find it advisable again to take possession of the posts in central Germany which had been held before the defeat of Varus. He crossed the Rhine, indeed, to show that the Romans were not utterly crushed, but remained only a short time, and even gave up the new forts on the Taunus.

If these disasters in Germany and Pannonia for a while disturbed the tranquility of Augustus, the vices and misfortunes of those whom he loved with greatest tenderness embittered the whole course of his life. He perceived that every reasonable man had long recognised, that the Roman empire could not subsist otherwise than as a monarchy. He saw no possibility of making a compact whole of a body politic composed of parts so heterogeneous; and must therefore have felt the more solicitude whom he should appoint to succeed him at the head of the military monarchy of which he was the founder. He was without male heirs: his sister's son appeared to him more fitted, and also better entitled to succeed him, than two step-sons whom Livia had brought into his house. He therefore married Octavia's son (Marcellus) to his daughter Julia, and treated him as his future successor. Macellus's character seems to have resembled that of his mother: like her, he was loved by all who knew him, as well as by the people. But he was snatched away by an early death. Livia now used every artifice to introduce her sons into all public affairs, and to set them at the head of the armies. She possessed the art, without appearing to mix in public business, of leading her husband in all things; she tolerated his frequent infidelities, and even stooped to assist his designs on the fair sex: in short, she knew his weak points, and how to take advantage of them. Her sons learned to dissemble from their youth upwards; and their mother contrived that their names should early be mentioned before all others in every important military enterprise or public transaction. Notwithstanding, however, all that is told of the power of Livia over Augustus, the latter appears to have guessed very correctly at the character of his step-sons, and only in the last resort to have resolved on yielding them the succession. After the death of

* Lib. lvi. c. 23.

† *ἐκκακῶτο*.

Marcellus, he preferred to them Agrippa, to whom he was indebted for his victories, and whom he had already favored in every possible manner, married him to Marcellus's widow, and treated him as heir to the throne. Agrippa too died, and, after his death, Tiberius again appeared wherever the presence of an extraordinary imperial plenipotentiary seemed necessary; but he was again forced into the background so soon as Caius and Lucius, the two sons of Agrippa, were of an age fitted for public employment. Sons of a worthless and shameless mother, corrupted by bad education and flattery, both of these youths were utterly incapable of taking a lead in public affairs; and had no turn, moreover, for martial enterprise. Their early death, however, was a loss to the world, as it imposed upon Augustus the necessity of transmitting to Tiberius unlimited dominion over the whole of the then known and civilised world.

CHAPTER IV.

VIEW OF LIFE AND MANNERS FROM THE FIRST CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS TO THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE.

THE gradual introduction, during the latter years of the republic, of the order of things which permanently took place under the empire, will appear on closer inspection of the character and manners displayed in the occurrences of those years. The external forms only of the ancient constitution survived up to the times immediately previous and subsequent to the battle of Pharsalia; and even these were destined to sink in horrible convulsions, in order to make room for a new regimen, which, formed as it was out of elements supplied by an enfeebled generation, as might be supposed, was not of a very pure or sound description.

The circumstances attendant on the banishment and return of Cicero remarkably show the distracted state of the social and political system. On this occasion, too, we are supplied with data for estimating the wealth and outlay necessary to support the rank of a Roman senator, not of the most opulent class. Cicero's house in Rome, and his two houses in the country, had been pulled down. His friends subscribed to indemnify him for these losses. His town-house was valued at H. S. vicies (about 16,000*l.*) This valuation he did not so much complain of, though he affirmed that the house had cost him nearly twice the amount (H. S. 35 ies.) On the other hand, he taxed with unfairness the price set on his country-houses, of which the Tusculan was valued *quingentis millibus* (about 4000*l.*) and the Formian at only half that amount.

"This last valuation," he says,* "was blamed extremely, not only *ab optimo quoque*, but even by the common people. You will ask, then, how it could take place. They ascribe it to my modesty, in neither refusing what was offered, nor urgently demanding more. But that is not it; for that would rather have told for me. The truth is, my Pomponius, those same people, those, I say, with whom you are not unacquainted, who cut my wings, do not wish them to grow again."

The reign of open violence was also that of prevailing corruption. The multitude were more and more worked as a mere machine against the senate. The heads of parties stationed men at tables or counters, similar to money changers on the forum, not only publicly to bid for the suffrage of the citizens, but to hire for their principals willing tools of murder and of plunder. "The people," says Plutarch,†

* Ep. ad Attic. l. iv. ep. 3.

† Plut. in Cæs. c. 28.

"went away from the pay-tables, after engaging not only to prostitute their votes, but to do battle with bow, sword, or sling for those who took them in pay. Often they did not disperse till they had stained the rostra with blood, and thrown the town, like a vessel without steersman, into such total anarchy, that men of understanding would have been satisfied with nothing better than transition from these tempests and mockeries to a monarchy. This description does not seem exaggerated when compared with a passage which occurs in Cicero's letters to Atticus,*

These operations had much the same effect on the Roman money-market that political news have on our exchanges; and the rate of interest fluctuated exactly as the state of the poll. We find from Cicero's letters that money was sometimes so abundant in Rome, as to be lent at the low rate of 4 per cent.† It rose to 8 per cent. at the contested election for consul, when Cæsar exerted himself for Memmius, Pompey for Domitius. Nor is this rise to be wondered at, when Cicero has recorded that the first tribe, of which the vote was commonly decisive, often received for it *centies* (about 75,000l.‡)

In order rightly to estimate the effects of these abandoned proceedings, it must be remembered that the men who habitually indulged in them could forge decrees of the senate and resolutions of the people at pleasure, either because the requisite number to form assemblies was undefined, or because, where a decision had taken place, it was easily falsified.

If, however, the state was falling to pieces, the ruling families degenerate, morals almost wholly destroyed, it has already been seen, in a former chapter of this work, that public talents and personal accomplishments never were more abundant than precisely in these last years of the commonwealth. The source of these distinguishing qualities is not so much to be sought in the diffusion of Greek literature and book learning, as in the practical view of human life, from one end of the earth to the other, afforded to the Roman in the course of his pursuit of fortune. We find Romans spread over all countries. Men of every rank and condition were freed by the easy purchase of slaves from attention to the commonest employments; contracted in the provinces a natural sense of superiority; and brought from thence to the capital the arts and inventions of all countries.

From Asia Minor, where the confluence took place of the primitive Asiatic with the Greek culture, where nigh to the cradle of humanity Grecian states bloomed forth, and the barbarians were not so much coerced by force of arms as constrained by the resistless power of civilisation, the Roman grandees, even before a new fount of fertile contemplations was opened to them in Egypt, derived the branches of knowledge, which, from the time of Augustus downwards, were applied variously in public transactions as well as in private life. From

* "Nummis ante comitia tributum uno loco divisus."—Ep. lib. x. ep. 17.

† *Trientes usuræ.*

‡ *Ad Quint. Fratr. l. ii. ep. 15. Ad Attic. l. iv. ep. 15.*

these regions Lucullus brought our best fruits, the staple products of the warmer parts of Europe. From thence, too, lemons were brought, at a somewhat later period, and became renowned by the name of Median apples. In Alexandria Cæsar learned the divisions of time which served as his model in converting the Roman lunar into a solar year. This alteration, which was introduced pursuant to the directions of Cæsar, and under the conduct of the astronomer Sosigenes, whom he had brought with him from Alexandria, consisted principally in abolishing the reckoning by lunar months, and consequently the arbitrary intercalation of whole months into the Roman year. How necessary was this reform of the calendar may be judged from the fact, that it required the insertion of three entire months, and the year to be lengthened to 444 days, to restore coincidence between the civic and astronomical year. The arts of the East diffused themselves with wonderful rapidity from Rome into Spain, Gaul, and the left bank of the Rhine. The pasturage, husbandry, fishery, of whole provinces in Spain and Gaul entirely depended on the demand of Rome in the latter part of this period. Commerce, therefore, became, from the time of Cæsar downwards, more active than ever; the products of all parts of the world flowed into Rome: but even through this affluence, the character which we admire in the ancients, the genuine national culture, vanished.

If it be remembered that men of influence were enabled during the brief term of office to make use of public money as their own, under all sorts of pretexts; as it was difficult to bring them to account, so long as the people, the real sovereign, called for spectacles, shows, and bounties, the soldiers for donations, increase of pay, and allotments of land, on the expiry of their term of service, it cannot be matter of surprise that the enormous masses of treasure which were carried in triumphs vanished with such celerity. The victories of Lucullus and Pompey, and Cæsar's campaigns, brought all the hoards of the east and of the west into the Roman treasury. Cæsar boasted that he had added one third to the annual public revenues. However, it is clear from his own declarations to the senate and citizens, that the public display and deposit of immense treasures had, in his time at least, become a mere farce. He acknowledges that, in order to avoid the imposition of oppressive burdens after the wars on the citizens themselves, he had been forced to levy violent contributions in the provinces, to extort heavy taxes, and to sacrifice his private property.*

What a scourge the civil wars were for the provinces, is evidenced in particular by the demands which Cæsar made after the African war on single towns and districts. Thapsus alone was forced to pay between 400,000*l.* and 500,000*l.*; Adrumetum, a third more; Tisdra and Leptis, large contributions in grain and oil; and the last-named city alone, 300,000 pounds of oil. In this way Cæsar contrived, like the later emperors, to favor sloth or violence at the expense of peaceful industry.

None of Cæsar's administrative improvements could compensate

* Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.* lib. xliii. c. 18.

the prejudicial effects of the general rise which he had made in the pay of the soldiery. Before his time, the pay of a Roman soldier had amounted to somewhat less than 5*l.* yearly; provisions were distributed only in fixed rations; and the soldier had himself to provide great part of his arms and accoutrements. Double pay and honorable mention, crowns, wreaths, and chains, were the rewards of distinguished bravery. But all these things were altered now. Old honorary distinctions lost their meaning; the soldiers who had fought at Philippi openly declared to the commissioners of Augustus at Brundisium that they looked on the old honors as a farce, and expected a recompence the value of which should not depend merely on opinion. Cæsar raised the ordinary pay to double its former amount, while he added largely to the numbers of those who were to receive it: he seized every occasion to confer especial marks of favor; made distributions of wine, oil, and salt; and was lavish of the grain wrung from the provinces.*

The consequences of this profuse liberality of Cæsar, and the military rapacity which it fomented, displayed themselves immediately after his death. According to Plutarch, Brutus spent his whole property on the army; and, according to Appian, laid that of his friends also under contribution for the same purpose. He had in Greece, before he joined with Crassus, nearly a million and a half sterling in his military chest; nevertheless he found himself obliged to resort to Crassus, and unite with him in extorting treasures in Asia, ruining Lycia, plundering public, and levying forced contributions on private funds in Rhodes. Antony, Lepidus, and Octavius were in still greater embarrassment than the leaders of the opposite party. The confiscated possessions of 200 rich and respectable citizens, whom they proscribed at their first entrance on their unprecedented office, hardly sufficed to the luxuries of Antony. To pay the troops, they were forced to practise extreme oppression in Rome and Italy; and, after all, they found themselves in urgent want of money immediately after the battle of Philippi. A tax of one per cent. was now laid on every description of property; even the Roman senators were forced to pay about three halfpence for every tile on their houses; the rich were subjected to special burdens; arms and stores were levied from towns and particular houses without compensation; and even the public festivals, which required a certain public outlay, could not be held.† It may easily be conceived that oppression went still farther in the provinces.

The power of gold, and the force of arms, were the means employed in this period to maintain a few in the lap of boundless luxury, and to keep the many in misery and abasement. Individual characters, however, deserve our admiration the more, the greater the gulf between them and their contemporaries. The recorded judgment of Bonaparte on the characters of Brutus and Cassius only shows how wofully he was wanting in acquaintance with the ancients, or in any inter-

* "Frumentum, quoties copia esset, sine modo et mensura præbuit, et singula interdum mancipia ex præda viritim dedit."—*Sueton. in Cæs. c. xxvi.*

† Dio Cassius, lib. xlv. c. 31. in fine.

nal standard of rectitude.* In his letters to Cicero which are extant, Brutus clearly expresses his stoical principles, but as far from misapplying those principles in favor of aristocratic or oligarchical rigors, and declares himself as follows against Cicero, who at that time led the senate, and had censured him for his mildness and clemency:†—"I hold it for a nobler and more sacred duty in every citizen of a free state to refrain from oppressing and persecuting his opponents when they are overthrown or unfortunate, than, on all occasions, to grant his powerful friends their unmeasured demands, and thereby but inflame their rapacity." In another part of this letter, which is written under excited feelings, and without a trace of reserve or declamation, he demands: "Is not the highest point in life attained when a man, filled with the consciousness that he has acted with uprightness, and loved freedom for its own sake, disdains all other earthly good?"‡ That this was not a mere flourish of speech, and that Brutus himself well knew how to distinguish words from deeds, appears from another passage in his writings:—"For my part, I have ceased to assign any value to all these acquirements, with which I know Cicero is so well furnished. He applies to himself none of all those admirable maxims about love of country, noble self-consciousness, death, exile, and poverty.§ Cassius, professedly a follower of Epicurus, is led by his philosophy to precisely the same point to which the doctrines of Zeno guided Brutus. He jests very cleverly with Cicero on philosophical systems; points out how remote from life was the wisdom of the schools; proves that the true conception of pleasure coincides with that of pure and practicable virtue, and that the great authors of philosophical systems must not be confounded with their wretched crew of literal disciples.||

The aristocratical temper which Bonaparte falsely ascribes to Brutus and Cassius is shown, by the author of the book "*De Bello Africano*, to have generally prevailed amongst the party of the senate; while the sentiments of Cæsar's adherents were not unlike those of Bonaparte's guards. Cæsar's troops, however, at least were personally attached to their leader; but the soldiers of Antony and Octavius

* "Le premier consul, repondant a Berthier, et surtout a ceux qui avaient cite les peuples anciens. . . . Eh bien. Brutus n'était qu'un aristocrate; il ne tau Cesar que parceque Cesar voulait diminuer l'autorite du senat pour accroitre celle du peuple. Voila comme l'ignorance ou l'esprit de parti cite l'histoire."—*Thibaudeau. Memoires sur le Consulat*, p. 18.

† Cicero had written to Brutus as follows, on hearing that he had spared the life of Antony's brother, and many others:—"Sed illam tuam distinctionem nullo pacto probo. Scribis enim acrius prohibenda bella civilia esse, quam in superatos iracundiam exercendam. Vehementer a te, Brute, dissentio, nec clementiæ tuæ concedo, sed salutaris severitas vincit inanem speciem clementiæ."

‡ "Quid enim est melius quam memoria recte factorum et libertate contentum negligere humana?"—*Epist. ad Brutum*, ep. 16.

§ "Ego vero jam omnibus illis artibus nihil tribuo, quibus scio Ciceronem instructissimum asse," &c. &c.

|| *Cic. Ep. ad Diversos*, lib. xv. ep. 19.

served, like those of the later emperors, for nothing but their pay, and cared for nothing but their own interest. Appian, speaking of the difficulty of maintaining discipline, strikingly describes the composition of these armies. "Most of the soldiers," he says, "were not selected from the mass of the citizens, as in the civil war; armies are not formed according to ancient usage, by levying the *elite* of the Roman youth; nor are they formed for the service of their country. They serve, not the republic, but their leaders; and they do not even serve them from obedience to the laws, but because they are moved by tempting offers and promises, not against the public enemies, but their own—not against strangers, but countrymen and citizens. They consider themselves as serving, not in the armies of their country, but rather on their own account, as volunteers in the ranks of their general, who cannot gain his ends without their assistance. Formerly, desertion to an enemy was a thing unheard of: in these times deserters were richly rewarded; whole troops of soldiers, and many men of the highest rank, went from one to the other party, and maintained there was no treason in doing so—they changed but a leader whose cause was good for another whose cause was no worse. The leaders looked on these things in the same point of view, and felt the necessity of tolerance; conscious that their own command depended not on the laws, but on the promise of donatives to their armies."

The extravagance of Antony, his senseless and abandoned excesses, his audacious contempt of all morals and usages, made it impossible for him to take the rank in the state which his talents merited, so long as a trace remained of the old discipline. He was forced to yield to Octavius, whose dissimulation and mediocrity were much better suited to the circumstances. We must not, indeed, take as authentic history all the sallies of Cicero against Antony's manner of life. The main points, however, are neither invented nor exaggerated. Cicero has painted in the liveliest colors the profligate excesses which he obtruded on the public view; the tyranny which the fury Fulvia exercised, in Antony's name and in her own, throughout the Roman empire; while Antony himself carried about with him, in an open litter, a dancer of notorious character.* Cicero has also described, in another place, the manner in which Antony made regulations at pleasure in Cæsar's name, and held arbitrary sway over whole provinces and districts. At first, like Philip of Macedon, Antony gained, by his unbounded expense and lavish hospitality, the very men of most use to his purposes; that is to say, those who combined extreme corruption with high talents. Afterwards, he only drew round him flatterers and parasites: debauchery ceased to be a means, and became the end of his being. As the Greeks of these times, especially the Athenians, understood the arts of flattery to a miracle, Antony in Athens played the part of a Greek surrounded by Greeks; keeping at a distance the

* "Vehebatur in essedo tribunus plebis; lictores laureati antecedeabant; inter quos, aperta lectica, mima portabatur; quam ex oppidis municipales, homines honesti, obviam necessario prodeuntes, non noto illo et mimico nomine sed Volumnium consalutabant."—*Philipp.* ii. 24.

Romans, and neglecting the state of a Roman public personage. "He affected," says Appian,* "the simplicity suitable to a private man (*ἀφέλειαν ἰδιώτικην*;) wore the square-cut Grecian mantle (*σχήμα τετράγωνον*), and the Attic shoe. At his doors there were no lictors, apparitors, and officers (*καὶ θύρας ἡγεμόνας*. He commonly went out quite unattended. Without military insignia, with only two friends and two servants, he went to the place where the public teachers held forth, and attended their lectures. His table too, was kept quite in the Greek fashion, and (the historian adds) *μεθ' Ἑλλήνων ἢ χειμασία*.

As Greek debauchery, coupled with oriental splendor, had reached its highest pitch at the court of Egypt, he finally renounced at Alexandria every thing that was Roman, and plainly showed that no respect for others, or regard for usage—nothing but boundless arbitrary caprice—was to be looked for from him. Even immediately after Cæsar's death, in his tours through Italy, he rioted in his inner apartments with strumpets,† while the counsellors or delegates of the allied towns were ignominiously obliged to wait in his ante-chambers, and finally, without being admitted, remanded to the following day. The anecdotes which Plutarch has related of his manner of life had been taken by his grandfather, Lamprias, from the lips of Philotas of Amphissa, who was engaged in the study of medicine at Alexandria while Antony was rioting in that city with Cleopatra. These anecdotes may in many points be exaggerated, but it is evident, from their whole tenor, that Antony had adopted the mode of life of the most profligate courts. Philotas declares himself to have seen, and ascertained from Antony's cook, that a scandalous and useless expense was regularly incurred in order that the table might be instantly served at any time. Philotas himself received, in Antony's absence, from his son, a mere boy, a present which sufficiently shows the reckless profusion with which the most contemptible adulation was rewarded. Philotas had contrived to gain a place in the good graces of this boy and of Fulvia. He was supping, with other guests, at Antony's table during his absence; and, according to Greek custom, time was beguiled with discussion. The physician drove the rest into a corner by his logical arts, till this little boy met him with a syllogism that brought him to silence‡—the sly flatterer. The boy made him a present of all the gold and silver plate on the table; and the steward was quite surprised that Philotas could

* Bell. civ. lib. v. c. 76.

† In Cicero's Epistles to Atticus, lib. x. ep. 10—13., Antony's oriental manners and habits are delineated. It is then added, "Hic tamen Cytheridem secum lectica aperta portat, altera uxorem; septem præterea conjunctæ lecticæ amicarum sunt unum amicum?" It must be observed, that two descriptions of litters were in use. Those of one kind were nothing but a sort of ottoman, on which one could be stretched at full length: the others were covered with leather, like our modern close carriages, and had apertures or windows with curtains, which could be drawn aside or together.

‡ The following was the boy's victorious syllogism:—

"Cold drink ought to be given to one who has a certain fever:

Every one who has a fever, has a certain fever:

Therefore cold drink ought to be given to every one who has a fever."

entertain a doubt whether Antony's son could dispose of the most costly articles without asking his father.

As Antony mocked, on principle, every feeling of humanity, he was prime mover in all the acts of cruelty which were perpetrated after the death of Cæsar. All the horrors of military tyranny were exercised as formerly under Sylla; and the despotism of later times was but the legitimate offspring of the last degenerate days of the republic. The corpses of the murdered were strewed every where—in their houses—on the streets; in short, wherever the assassin had struck them. The heads of the noblest citizens were fixed up on the Roman forum, and the atmosphere was poisoned by their bodies. Extortion, besides, was pushed to such a length, that a provision was promised the widows of the murdered as an act of grace; the sons were allotted a tenth, the daughters a twentieth, of the paternal property. When, however, the division came to be made, only a few received the pittance thus extolled as favor and clemency. The plunder of the triumvirs proved, however, insufficient to cover their outlay, or even Antony's single prodigality. New imposts were laid on, and a contribution exacted of one year's rent from every house in Italy. Cruelties were practised with the most perfect deliberation: every one knew, long beforehand, when his turn would come. Each of the triumvirs had to sacrifice his best friends to the jealousy of the others; as often the best friend of the one was the most formidable obstacle to the projects of the other. Octavius, however, saved many: Lepidus, at least, helped his brother off, whom he had been obliged to place on the list to please the other two. Antony alone persecuted not the proscribed only, but all who showed any disposition to assist them; and enjoyed even at table the sight of the severed heads which were brought him. Moreover, his wife Fulvia proscribed many on her own score, whom her husband often knew nothing about—partly for money, partly for revenge. It needed many prayers from his mother Julia before Antony would accord her brother his life. In general there was no pardon, except for those who could prove to him that he never would be able to squeeze so much of their property after their death as they were ready to pay him for life. That the treasures in the temples throughout Italy, and even the precious metals which were deposited in the Capitoline temple, were spared under such circumstances, is a fact which must excite surprise. It is ascertained, however, by the circumstance, that at a later period these sacred treasures were laid under contribution as a loan from the gods.

The state of Italy was dreadful. The citizens of the towns whose treasures were plundered, whose lands were measured out for distribution to the soldiery, took up arms. The mass of peaceful citizens, whose property was exposed to like perils in future, rose to their aid. On the other hand, the soldiery, with their friends and connections, stood for Octavius.* Every where the soldiers stationed in towns and hamlets committed the most brutal excesses; slaves escaped from their

* Appian. lib. v. c. 27.

masters, and found harbor with the opposite party ; fields and harvests were laid waste ; agriculture brought to a stand, and a dreadful dearth was the very natural consequence. The revenue farmers, and soldiers employed to back them, were engaged in open hostilities with the people ; and disorder in all transactions, confusion in all ranks, were unavoidable, as the old official dignities began to be viewed as titles and orders which the most contemptible creatures might participate. On the whole, the ancient manners and constitution were so totally lost, that the legal introduction of a new form of government was essential to the general good of the empire.

CHAPTER V.

LIFE AND MANNERS DURING THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.

BEFORE the times of Augustus, ready-made clothing, since his times, wool, was imported, and manufactured in Italy. Spanish wool had a high reputation; and, in Strabo's times, the Spanish breed of sheep had already acquired celebrity. Even Gaul no sooner became a Roman acquisition, than it experienced the effect of the immense demand for the prime articles of subsistence in the metropolis. Rome was supplied with salt provisions from the same districts of France, of which the *petits sales* are renowned in Paris at this day. It may here be remarked, that one of the reasons why salted provisions, fish, and pork, formed such prominent articles of commerce and consumption, may be found in the constant occasion for provisioning large bodies of troops. Besides the large importations from southern Russia, Spain, and Gaul, whole districts of Italy were famous for the feeding of swine. This occupation was followed on a large scale in the neighborhood of the Po and the Adriatic, as well as in Samnium. Fine wool was imported from Asia Minor and the South of Italy, where it went through some of the processes of manufacture. In upper Italy, on the Po, in Liguria, and in Umbria, only coarse wool was produced, and manufactured into articles for common or winter use, particularly in Mantau and Padua, where there were large manufactures.

The main point in the policy of Augustus was to satisfy the troops and the populace; how sedulously soever he might veil the true scope of his government. The revival of the old form of democracy in the popular assemblies, as of aristocracy in the senate, could not impose save on the most superficial observation. The senate, which met but twice, at most thrice often but once a month, served no other purpose than to screen the really absolute sovereign. Assemblies of the people, elections, and canvassings he could safely tolerate; as the candidates on such occasions well knew that he kept an eye on them. For the rest, Augustus was tolerably sure of the mass of Roman citizens, having planted in Italy eight colonies, chiefly composed of disbanded soldiers; and having found means to secure to these new citizens the right of suffrage. It was impossible for the citizen of a colony or provincial town, even if he possessed the entire rights of Roman citizenship, to go to Rome on all occasions to profit by their exercise. Augustus accordingly introduced a plan by which their votes were recorded and transmitted to Rome on the day of the comitia.* He

* "Excogitato genere suffragiorum quæ de magistratibus urbicis decuriones

may thus be said to have labored to spread Rome all over Italy; and his successors, pushing the same policy farther, made into Romans successively the Spaniards and the natives of other provinces; augmented the number of colonies out of Italy, and, moreover, took many foreigners into the senate. Julius Cæsar had settled above eighty thousand men in colonies out of Italy, repeopled Carthage and Corinth, and sent colonies to Spain, Gaul, Macedon, Asia Minor, and Syria. The colonies planted by Augustus need not be enumerated: from the time of his reign downwards, they were placed along the frontiers as fortified posts for defence against the barbarians.

It had already been a part of Cæsar's policy to impress upon the laws a direction favorable to monarchy, to aggravate the rigor of penal inflictions, and to provide against the escape from justice by voluntary exile, which lay open to every Roman citizen, by annexing to it the confiscation of the property of the accused. The same monarchical policy had prompted him to project the revision of Roman legislation, and the enactment of a regular code. Augustus, however, contented himself with rescinding the laws passed in the preceding revolutionary times, modifying old regulations, enacting new, and establishing regular courts of appeal, that the sovereign might be the source of all things. In the metropolis, appeals lay to the city prætor (*prætor urbanus*;) in the provinces, to the provincial officers appointed for that specific function. Though, in general, Augustus abolished the laws made in the times of disturbance, he allowed, however, those to subsist which favored the monarchical principle. Amongst these the Falcidian law deserves especial notice, as it imposed on the Roman citizens restrictions with relation to property, in the same way as a subsequent law (*lex Ælia Sentia*) restricted the manumission of slaves, and their reception into the rank of citizens. To the last days of the republic thus much remained still in force of the old family law, and the powers of parents over their children and relatives, that every one might dispose of his property wholly at discretion, and might either will or prohibit its transmission to his offspring. Thus the clientage of a wealthy patron might be greatly increased by the hopes of legacies, and he might thus attach crowds of his fellow citizens to his interests. And this took place: to be named in many wills was held an honor, and bequests from persons wholly unconnected by relationship were no unfrequent means of rising to affluence. But these links of connection between rich and poor suited not monarchy: it was accordingly enacted by the Falcidian law that the fourth part of an inheritance must be left to the natural heir; and, by consequence, the testator could dispose only of three fourths.

Much better had it been for the Romans to adopt a monarchical constitution without dissimulation or pretext. The mode of proceeding followed by Augustus rendered deception and hypocrisy duties, and distorted all the relations of civil life. On the other hand, the provinces gained by the new regimen: a stop was put to extortions and oppressions; the outfit of the governors was provided at the pub-

colonici in sua quisque colonia ferrent, et sub diem comitiorum obsignata Romam mitterent."

lic charge; and Augustus, during his travels, inquired into local grievances personally. He deprived of municipal franchises several towns which had abused them; but, on the other hand, bestowed new charters on many others, paid their debts, restored their public buildings when ruined by earthquakes, and gave them the Latin or Roman right of citizenship. Those princes whom he did not chase entirely from their dominions, he reduced under a sort of feudal dependence.

At three stations, Ravenna, Forum Julii, and off the promontory of Misenum, lay squadrons of the Roman fleet. The uselessness of those enormous vessels, which were built in the east, had been sufficiently apparent at the battle of Actium. Accordingly no more of them were built; against pirates only light craft were of service; and it was not till later times that use was again made of the war-marine. Thus the naval establishment did not occasion much trouble or expense. With the land force, indeed, it was otherwise. Three legions were stationed in Spain; eight on the Rhine, to intimidate the Gauls and the Germans; two in Africa; the same number in Egypt and Syria; and on the Euphrates four; three in Pannonia and on the Danube; two in Mœsia; two in Dalmatia. Besides there were three urban, nine prætorian, cohorts, chiefly levied in Umbria and Etruria, or in ancient Latium.

It is impossible to calculate with any exactness the amount of the public revenues under Augustus, as we do not possess any exact and consistent accounts of those revenues, but only here and there scattered notices.

Great improvements were made by Augustus in public roads and edifices. It is true that all undertakings of a public nature were conducted in a wholly different spirit from that of older times. The sentiment of unity in the government, of absolute dependence on a single head, was thenceforth paramount from one end of the empire to the other, and was studiously suggested at every step in life, and by every object. From thenceforwards all things referred to the person of the ruler, instead of having reference, as formerly, to the general government. This is obvious even in the matter of public roads and posts. On the monument erected to commemorate the improvement of the Flaminian way, Augustus is represented as if he had been the founder and beginner of the work. It has been said that his sole motive for so zealously promoting the extension of public roads throughout the empire, was to enable the governors of provinces and other civil officers more conveniently to visit particular towns, and hold provincial councils.* This may be left matter of conjecture: what is certain is, that the senators and their sons were forbidden from visiting without special permission, their estates in the provinces. Under Augustus, Sicily alone was excepted from this prohibition. Claudius added Narbonensian Gaul.†

* "*Ornamento viarum munitarum princeps Augustus provincias affecit, ut præsidet, et qui pro consulibus eo munere fungerentur, facilius provinciarum urbes atque conventus obirent.*"

† "*Galliæ Narbonensi, ob egregiam in patres reverentiam, datum, ut senatori-*

The regulations out of which sprung the imperial establishment of posts, were made by Augustus at first merely for the purpose of forwarding his orders, and receiving intelligence from the provinces. They consisted in the erection of houses at certain distances on the highways, where young and active persons were posted, to forward the despatches from one station to another. This description of *estafette* continued till the time of Nerva, when mail carriages and horses were substituted for these messengers; and a sort of government post was established for the transport of state functionaries, and emissaries to them from the central authorities.

The whole system of police and of general administration was remodelled upon similar principles. A new watch (ostensibly to guard against fires) was formed. Tranquillity and security were provided for by measures of this kind, while new scope was given to the Italian love of the *far niente*. Previously to the new police regulations, highway robberies in Italy had increased to such a degree, that the honorable title of *grassator*, or highway robber, was as common as that of bandit at the commencement of the seventeenth century: and that persons of the highest rank were no more ashamed to kidnap citizens through the instrumentality of these robbers, and to consign them to the workhouses, or out-door toils of their slaves, than the Italian of later days to hire the assassin's poniard.

Amongst the number of new offices and dignities which Augustus created, the prefect of the watch was a sort of commandant of *gens-d'armes*, the prefect of the body-guard an important court of functionary, who became, under Tiberius, the person of second rank in the empire. Augustus and his councillors, on the other hand, had endeavored to prevent the military power from showing itself too prominently, and therefore conferred the post of commandant of the guard, not on a senator, nor, indeed, on any one individual, but divided it between two equestrians, and annexed to the military command no civil authority. The prefect of the city soon took on himself all affairs which had previously been transacted by the republican authorities, to whom nothing was left of their old splendor but empty titles and honors. This functionary appeared in public attended by six lictors, acted in the emperor's name, and drew within his jurisdiction not merely the department of police, but the most important part of criminal justice. The superintendence of money changers, usurers, butcher's meat, the regulation of the police force in the city, and in a circuit of 100 Roman miles round it, was under his charge; he was empowered, at his discretion, to pronounce the sentence of banishment; and those who had been banished by the emperor it was his duty to transport to their assigned place of exile.

Private life, as well as public, took a new shape. To get through the world in Rome, it became necessary for those who could not get access to the person of the sovereign, which was of course a matter

bus ejus provinciæ non exquisita principis sententia jure quo Sicilia haberetur res suas invisere liceret.

of great and increasing difficulty, to attach themselves to some one of the great men of the day. These grandees had a regular court about them, and employed persons of the rank of a modern colonel as chamberlains or companions. Those who had not the means of seeking wealth and respectability, by dancing attendance on some grandee, were fain to take up one or other of those pursuits, which Horace describes as the royal roads to opulence. Contracts for the works performed for a small, enormously wealthy class, for the building of temples, the draining of marshes, sepulchral monuments, or processions, were, as Horace says, the way to get rich. Others, he says, coax ancient and wealthy widows with sweetmeats, like children, or snatch at the rich heritage of old curmudgeons, or, in secret, drive the forbidden trade of usury.*

Clientship was, indeed, an institution subsisting from time immemorial; but it was one thing to attend a patron and senator of the olden time, and another thing to wait on some punctilious Mæcenas, who narrowly spied whether the upper garment fitted the lower; how the beard was shaven; whether the clothes retained their nap, or were threadbare; whether the toga hung awry, or whether any particle of the under garments peeped from beneath the tunic. It must, however, be owned, that no trace had as yet appeared of the later oriental ceremonial. Even the country client, who carried his sandals under his arm to save them, was admitted to a place at the patron's table.

As money was the master-key to every sort of enjoyment, it became the sole object of pursuit; and, as honor was no longer to be otherwise had than by chance or favor, the education of youth, and the efforts of age, were exclusively bent on gain. This might have admitted of apology, had it served to promote industry, invention, art, and every species of useful enterprise; but unfortunately, the spirit of traffic took that direction in those times which it takes at this day, so far as it deals in stockjobbing and agiotage, and in jointstock undertakings of delusive remoteness and extent. The most grinding usury followed the most measureless extravagance; boys were bred up from early youth to the mysteries of money-dealing; and Horace ascribes it to his father as matter of especial merit, that he caused him to be instructed, not in usurious calculations, but in liberal arts after the Greek model.† The length which usury went may be conjectured, from the circumstance that one of the most famous of the wholesale dealers in this line received an interest on his loans monthly, which, in twenty months, amounted to an equal sum with the capital. It

* Epist. lib. i. v. 77. See also Juvenal.

"Edem conducere, flumina, portus,
Siccandam eluvium, portandum ad busta cadaver."

† "Noluit in Flavi ludum me mittere; magni
Quo pueri, magnis e centurionibus orti,
Lævo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto,
Ibant, octonis referentes Idibus æra."

Serm. lib. i. Sat. vi. v. 72.

seems, therefore, that usury offered the easiest means of amassing wealth : for the patronage of the great could only be earned by painful and irksome services ; and even a man like Horace, in his intimate friendship with Mæcenas, was exposed to the contumelies of those who thought their birth an exclusive title to the humiliating privilege of domestic attendance on greatness. Even Horace himself remained long at a humble distance, made as if he scarce durst open his lips at his first audience, acknowledges that he only received a laconic and lofty answer, and that it was nine months before the great man honored him with his notice. The importance still attached to birth and family must, however, be viewed as a relic of less servile times. After the accession of Tiberius, old nobility was no longer fawned upon, but homage was transferred wherever chance had transferred wealth or power.

The consequence of this altered state of things, as regarded the richer class, was a general tedium of life, and passion for variety. The taste for travel, so prevalent in modern times, became general, from a feeling of discontent with home, and disgust of ordinary impressions.* Instead of state affairs, as in former times, the pleasures of the table and the cares of the kitchen now supplied the only topics of polite conversation.

We shall have occasion to observe, with regard to Roman cookery, that, from Augustus to Vitellius, and from the reign of the latter emperor down to that of Heliogabalus, prodigious advances were made in this department of human knowledge. Horace has many happy traits of humor on the fashionable dainties of his own times : he does due honor to mosses grown in meadows, fowl stewed in Falernian wine, mussels and oyster from the Lucrine lake and Circeian promontory, black-game from the Umbrian forests, &c. &c. But he ridicules with justice, in his second satire, the rarity which alone recommended roast peacock of which the flesh was no less tough than its plumage was diversified ; the notion that an enormous pike was better than one of middling size, and that the taste of the fish would indicate the spot where it was caught. It would seem, he says, as if every cheap article of food, however palatable were banished from the table of our great lords (*regum*,) excepting that a corner is left for humble eggs and olives.†

Under Tiberius, on the gradual extinction of all public life, when military rule and sombre constraint drove men to sensual pleasures, commenced that species of systematic excess depicted by the satirists who flourished in the subsequent period. In the earlier and better part of his reign, Tiberius vainly endeavored to set bounds to the

* "Quid tibi visa Chios, Bullati, notaque Lesbos?
Quid concinna Samos? quid Cræsi regia Sardis?"

Horat. Epist. lib. i. Ep. xi.

† "——Necdum omnis abacta
Pauperies epulis regum: nam vilibus ovis
Nigrisque est oleis hodie locus."

Horat. Serm. lib. ii. Sat. ii. v. 44.

spreading rage for indulgence; but, considering the mode of life to which he became himself addicted at an age to which the tyranny of passion seldom extends, no very happy result could be expected from his censorial efforts. In fact, it was impossible for mere precepts and edicts to alter the bias once given to the Roman life by manifold causes. How could mere regulations, effect any thing in times when it had come to this,—that ladies of easy virtue, in order to evade the legal penalties for their conduct, formally enrolled their names in the lists of licensed prostitutes?—when youths of the two superior orders purposely committed offences to which the punishment annexed was loss of honor as citizens, that they might figure with impunity as actors or as gladiators?

Even under Augustus, the old religion had been brought into contempt with the old manners. The Egyptian, and especially the Jewish religion, had gained so many adherents, that Horace repeatedly jests at the taste for Judaism; and the Jewish sabbath was observed very extensively, though not quite with Judaical preciseness.* Under Tiberius, foreign ceremonies and doctrines spread so generally, that the jealous emperor ordered the Jewish and Egyptian sacerdotal vestments, which were found in Rome, to be taken away and burnt, despatched the able-bodied proselytes (4000 in number) to Sardinia, or to more distant regions, as soldiers, and expelled the Jews in a body from the city.

Many minor arrangements for the convenience of life remained in a backward state under Augustus and Tiberius. In particular, the travelling comforts of great men like Mæcnas appear to have been indifferently provided for in Italy. Miry roads, wretched fare, and still more wretched lodging, appear to have been of no rare occurrence on a journey; and Mæcnas, whose arrival in Fundi, as related by Horace, was a highly important event for the chief magistrate of that little town, was often forced to content himself with sleeping quarters such as the modern traveller would scarce find anywhere but in Spain. Accordingly, the later emperors hit upon a plan for stopping nowhere on a journey but at their own houses or mansions. This arrangement was already carried so far in the days of Titus, that the stages from Rome to the most remote parts were marked by imperial mansions, which the neighboring inhabitants were bound on occasion to supply with all necessary articles.† The contributions levied in this way soon became at least as burdensome as the *liberæ legationes* had been in the republican times.

* Sueton. in Tiberio, c. 31. 36. See also Casubon's note to c. 31.

† "Litteræ mittebantur de instruendis mansionibus, de invectione ornamentorum regalium, quæ ingressurum imperatorem significarent."

CHAPTER VI.

SCIENCE AND LITERATURE IN THE AUGUSTAN AGE.

THE state of intellectual and literary culture, shortly before the contests between Cæsar and Pompey, and the direction given by Cicero to the mind of his own and future times, have been described in a preceding part of our history.

In the latter times of the republic a closer acquaintance took place with Alexandria, and the schools which flourished in that city. Literature, in Rome as in Alexandria, became a mere artificial want of fashionable life, in such circles as those of Mæcenas, Messala, Asinius Pollio, and others. It cannot be denied, that this was of service, in a certain point of view, to Roman literature: and that the leading men of that age did themselves no less honor by the encouragement of letters and science, than was earned by Louis XIV, in times nearer our own. However, Roman literature thereby contracted a tincture somewhat similar to that which distinguished the age of Louis XIV. Cicero already found occasion to deride the taste of the literary coteries of his times, in which the later corrupted productions of Greek literature were extolled to the skies, and a sentimental flow of words passed current for feeling and poetry. Under Augustus, this style came still more into fashion. Tiberius was brought up in the same taste, and took much delight in mythic tales, and in extraordinary Græco-oriental dreams of primitive history. He was in the habit of proposing to the grammarians whom he kept about him as table companions and toad-eaters, such questions as the following: "Who was the mother of Hecuba?" "What was the name of Achilles while he stayed among the virgins at Scyros?" "What tunes did the Syrens sing?" &c.

Virgil's earliest friend and protector, the accomplished Asinius Pollio, devoted his mind wholly to the sciences, when he saw the aristocracy lost irrecoverably. He held lectures in person, assisted the exercises of younger friends, and sought success, as a writer, in the most various departments. He anticipated Augustus in the establishment of a public library, restored a wing in the temple of Freedom, and placed a second library there, which he adorned with works of art. Augustus followed his example. In the neighborhood of the temple of Apollo, which he had built on the Palatine, he erected a hall, in which was placed a Greek and Latin library,* which is often mentioned, like that in Alexandria, as a sort of academy. He established

* Sueton. Octav. cap. xxix.

a second library in the building entitled the Hall of Octavia. From the rules laid down by Vitruvius* for the building of private and public libraries, it is evident that, in the times of Augustus, a library was regarded as no less indispensable in a great house than a bath-room; and that a public building of that description was held equally necessary in large towns with courts of justice, and other such institutions.

The transplantation of Greek science to Roman soil was not undertaken merely as an abstract amusement of speculative minds, but as a practical occupation of life, and a ready way of advancement. The division of the day by hours had been adopted but of late from the Greeks, as also had been the use of dials and water-clocks. Greek astronomers from Alexandria reformed the Roman calendar, under the directions of Cæsar. The case was the same with the various branches of practical mathematics, and especially with architectural science. Vitruvius names but a few Roman with dozens of Greek architects. The case too was the same with medical science. Even in the times of Cato the Elder, Greek medical practice came into vogue, though the stern old Roman maintained that it was better to keep foreign physicians at a distance, as Rome had done without them for centuries, yet had not wanted the art of healing.† A medical school was established at Rome, in which the teachers were mostly Greeks. Even in the imperial times, this science remained in the hands of Greeks, though Augustus persuaded Antonius Musa, his celebrated body physician, to write on the subject in Latin.

Geography, the whole range of statistical and ethnographical science, remained the property of the Greeks, who, in the Augustan age, labored to erect a complete structure of mathematical and historical geography. Strabo, of whose works only the seventeen books of geography have come down to us, combines the merit of Grecian accomplishments with those advantages which only such times as those of which we are treating could have afforded him, and displays an accurate acquaintance with all that was known of the ancient world, a clear conception of what a work such as he undertook ought to be, and total exemption from any proneness to marvellous narrations.

In turning our view to the works of elegant literature, it must first be remarked, that in these times, as at every period when poetry and science have been a pastime and toy of fastidious indolence, some displayed a rage no less irrational for Greek frivolities‡ than others for old Italian and Roman literary relics. As the taste of the refined cir-

* Vitruvius, in the 4th (or 7th) chapter of his 6th book, treats of private libraries, as to how they should be lighted, and how the books should be protected from damp. In the 5th (or 8th) chapter are the following expressions:—" *Præterea bibliothecæ, pinacothecæ basilicæ non dissimili modo quam publicorum operum magnificentia comparatæ, quod.*" &c.

† "Fuisse sine medicis, nec tamen sine medicina."

‡ "Atque ego, cum Græcos facerem, natus mare citra,
Versiculos; vetuit me tali voce Quirinus,
Post mediam noctem visus, cum somnia vera;
In silvam non ligna feras insanius, ac si
Magnas Græcorum malis implere catervas."

Horat. Serm. lib. i. Sat. x. v. 31.

cles gave the tone to works of literature, not the national demand, nor the natural taste of writers themselves, most of the Roman poets took the latter Greeks as their models. Catullus was distinguished by his contemporaries, in the sense of eulogy, by the addition of *the learned poet*; and was justly regarded as having introduced into the Latin language the erudite refinements of Callimachus and others. Propertius, in his elegies, seems to move somewhat more freely; nevertheless, he has always Grecian models before his eyes, as well in the whole composition of his elegies, as in single passages; and Tibullus, who, more than any other poet of antiquity, betrays the modern tendency to sentimental melancholy, might probably, were all the Grecian works of poetry extant which were in those times studied by the Romans, be detected in making copies and centos of various, especially later, Greek poets. This is true not of particular passages only, which have been remarked by critics, but of the whole manner and character of his writings.

We leave the mention of minor poets to literary history, and pass to the three best known, and most read, of the Roman poets:—Ovid, Horace, and Virgil.

During the life of Ovid, those of his works on which posterity has placed the least value—his complaints about his banishment from the capital, and the melancholy descriptions of his exile on the banks of the Danube, were those which were the most read. The morbid and effeminate refinement of the age—the idea entertained by the spoiled children of the capital, that life out of Rome hardly deserved the name—the deficiency in natural taste and feeling, which can only describe even genuine grief in artificial language, characterise the “*Tristia*” in a degree revolting to manlier ears, but grateful to those who found in it the expression of their own feelings, as well as the excitement and satisfaction of their own curiosity.

In the circles from which Ovid bewailed his exile, he had found favor as a light, agreeable, and witty poet, very much on a similar footing to that of Gresset and many of the lighter class of French poets. It was not until far later times that he rose to higher consideration. In the middle ages Ovid was the most read of the Latin poets till Virgil was restored by Dante and Petrarch to the rank which belonged to him; and even then Ovid still maintained his place in the schools. In the era of revival of the study of antiquity, Ovid’s “*Art of Love*,” and his “*Remedies of Love*,” were found quite as congenial to Italian polished society as they had been in the times of Augustus and Tiberius; were easier understood and higher valued by the many, than works produced by deeper meditation and feeling, and displaying greater art, elaboration, and knowledge. His heroic epistles are a production, as might be supposed, of mere school learning, put together with pleasing rhetorical artifice; their charm must be attributed to the pleasure of seeing knotty poetical problems well and wittily solved. The “*Fasti*” are a work of more importance than would be imagined on a superficial view, as giving, in the familiar garb of light versification, a complete view of the connection of Roman state-religion and history with daily life. They show us how in

ancient Rome every citizen of the republic was reminded in every public amusement and festal rite of the national history; how the forms of worship were linked with the duties of patriotism. Ovid himself claims for his work the merit of giving the old traditions a new dress, freshening their remembrances, and rendering no unimportant service to the new imperial family, by connecting their names with those already hallowed by tradition, with the oldest festal rites and historical records of the Roman people, by verses in the mouths of every one.* The "Metamorphoses," a species of epic, made up of mythological narratives, strung together only by the slenderest thread, had no great popularity with the contemporaries of the poet; but has exercised a highly important influence on the arts and cultivation of more recent times, extending from the fall of the Roman empire to the middle of the eighteenth century.

The odes of Horace are composed for the most part upon Greek models. He often reproduced in Latin whole pieces of Greek poetry, and the Greek origin of his odes has sufficiently been shown by the labors of his scholiasts and annotators. Horace, unlike Catullus and Propertius, who were imitators mostly of the later poets, kept the elder Greeks, fraught with the genuine inspiration, before his eyes, and performed for the higher poetry what Cicero had already done for the philosophy and eloquence of Greece. Horace himself felt his pinions unequal to the higher lyric flights in a prosaic age; hence he does not seek to imitate the boldness of Pindar,† but communicates lessons of exalted wisdom, equally removed from the asperity of the blunt stoic as from the enervate sensuality of the school of Epicurus in Rome, in his own and in the subsequent times.

If, in his odes, Horace has anxiously followed the footsteps of the Greeks, he has on the other hand created a species of poetry entirely his own, essentially distinct from the bitter character of Greek satire. He has struck out a path betwixt prose and poetry, which none have adventured to tread after him, and has fitted to that end the negligent beauties, the measure and the cadence of his verse. His satires and epistles converse with external and internal life, delineate man and human nature, and, while seeming to teach only the arts of luxurious living and courtly flattery, gently guide to a self-dependent life, adorned with arts and sciences. In his own and in every subsequent age in which the social relations have reached the highest and most diversified stage of advancement, Horace has ever been the manual of statesmen and of all those persons who have sought enhanced enjoyment of life in the genuine pleasures of science.

* "Sacra recognosces annalibus eruta priscis,
Et quo sit merito quæque notata dies.
Invenies illic et festa domestica vobis,
Sæpe tibi pater est, sæpe legendus avus.
Quoque ferunt illi pios signantia fastos,
Tu quoque cum Druso præmia fratre feres."

Fast. lib. i. v. 7.

† "Pindarum quisquis studet æmulari,
Iule, ceratis ope Dædalea
Nititur pennis, vitreo daturus
Nomina ponto."

Virgil's influence is far more comprehensive and general in its character; so momentous indeed to the whole of Roman literature, that it might almost be said that Roman poetry received no less injury from undiscerning admiration and imitations of Virgil, than Roman eloquence from a similar worship of Cicero. Even the first attempts of Virgil indeed evidenced a mastery of the language and of the music of Latin versification such as none other could boast, before or since. The idyllic form, however, which he selected was an unsuitable one. He selected it, if we are to believe his elder critics and commentators, not of his own impulse, but by counsel of Pollio, who ever preferred the artificial to the natural. His manner was the more incongruous with this form of composition, in that he does not delineate an ideal and pastoral mode of existence, like Gessner, but merely follows nature and Theocritus. He followed shrewd guides. The Sicilian poet had his Doric dialect at command, and was under no necessity to imitate the language of the fashionable world, and the easy flow of diction of a public spoilt by rhetorical models. Amidst the ornate polish and artificial rhythm of Roman poetry, the contrast between substance and form could not but be sensible; it was however readily overlooked in admiration of the adroitness with which Virgil, after the example of his prototype, insinuated compliments to his patrons and protectors.

The Georgics are the triumph of the art of Virgil. He succeeded in giving life and animation to didactic poetry, of which the very idea involves something of a prosaic character; and composed a truly national poem, having chosen as his subject the ancient Roman manner of life, and the single art, besides that of war, that was really loved and valued by the Romans and Sabines. By this poem, a generation far removed from nature and its pure enjoyments were guided back to the memory of the old manner of life; and that life embellished by all the charms of description compatible with studied simplicity. The magic of versification, the inimitable melodies for which our vocal organs have no tone, and our ear no sensibility, but which animated and entranced a Dante and Petrarch, are here all in their place; here, in a congenial Roman element, the movement is easy; art appears throughout, artifice nowhere.

If in Virgil's heroic work, the "*Æneid*," any such object had been aimed at as to emulate or to equal Homer, the aim would have been all but ludicrous in times so far remote from heroic. His real scope was a new modification of the epos, adapted to the age when he lived. In that epic form in which description and vivid setting forth of his subject often take the place of tranquil narrative, and in which the poet visibly stands forth amidst his own creations, Appollonius of Rhodes had preceded Virgil; from the former, therefore, who had already modified Homeric forms to the tone of his monarchical times, Virgil borrowed whole situations and pictures. Virgil, however, totally eclipsed his cold artificial prototype, by clothing in Greek forms matter essentially Roman; familiarising to all men's mouths their country's early legends and history, and diffusing over his whole work a genuine national interest.

The poets of the times immediately subsequent to the Virgilian era,

of whom we shall name but one or two, evinced, by the very choice of their subjects, that nature and poetry had become in a manner out of the question in the mere superfetation of books and libraries. The public libraries, as we learn from Ovid, even under Augustus, being subjected to strict police inspection, whatever was energetic or in the spirit of the olden time, was indifferently encouraged, while, on the other hand, the harmless diversities of sportive or erudite literature were conspicuously promoted.

Of the names distinguished in these branches of literature, amongst others must be mentioned that of Phædrus, who wrote in the time of Claudius, and is unique in his way. The species of fable which Phædrus contrived to render attractive to polished society, by wit, finesse, prettiness, and terseness of expression, was raised by La Fontaine in similar times, those of Louis XIV., to a station equal with that bestowed by Phædrus on the transformed Æsopian fable,* in the ranks of Roman literature. The pure Latinity of Phædrus, his facile flow of verse, his epigrammatic succinctness, his minor moralities, fitted so nicely to social intercourse, could hardly miss to make him as great a favorite in an age of refinement, as La Fontaine for his sly simplicity.

Since Cæsar's time a wholly new description of literature came into vogue, since the Oscan and Atellan drolleries became so degraded that Tiberius was at length compelled to suppress them wholly by rigid measures.† This new form of diverting productions first took the shape of the so-called *mimes*, and, since the Augustan era, of *patomimes*, which had never before been seen in Rome. This species of drama, which finally became a mere dumb show, or ballet, maintained its ground, even after the total fall of dramatic art, in the eastern empire, and tended not a little to the destruction of morals. In general these pieces consist of humorous, often indecent fancies, plays upon words, or even saws of morality. In the latter Publius Syrus is especially rich; or rather the greater number of these maxims which have reached our times happen to be his. After previously having made a circuit of all the towns in Italy, he challenged all professed composers of mimes to contest the palm with him. Two other names of celebrity in this description of composition were Mattius and the ill fated Roman knight Desimus Laberius, whom Cæsar compelled to disgrace himself and his order by a public theatrical appearance.

* Seneca, in the reign of Claudius, terms the real Æsopian fable a species of composition unknown to the Romans, or rather, uncultivated by them. In the "Consolatio ad Polybium," c. xxvii., he says, "Non audeo te usque eo producere, ut fabellas quoque et Æsopæos logos, intentatum. Romanis ingeniis opus, solita tibi venustate connectas; difficile est quidem ut ad hæc hilariora studia tam vehementer percussus animus, tam cito possit occidere; hoc tamen argumentum habeto jam corroborati ejus, et redditi sibi, si poteret se a soverioribus scriptis ad hæc salutiora producere."

† Tacit. Annal. lib. iv. c. 14.

BOOK V.

THE EMPIRE FROM TIBERIUS TO THE ANTONINES.

CHAPTER I.

REIGN OF TIBERIUS.

ON his stepfather's death at Nola, fourteen years after the birth of Christ, Tiberius assumed the reins of government over the Roman empire, without the interposition of a pause between the death of the late ruler and the accession of the next. Dissimulation, envy, cruelty, formed the leading traits of a character which has been admirably drawn by Dio Cassius as well as by Tacitus. "He never," says the former,* "plainly manifested what was his wish; he never expressed his meaning with explicitness: his words were ever utterly opposed to his real purpose; he ever wholly denied what he wished, and seemed to wish what he abhorred. He stormed on occasions which in reality excited no strong emotion in him; and seemed perfectly tranquil precisely in moments of the most vehement wrath. He expressed the utmost sympathy towards those whom he intended to punish, and the utmost wrath towards those whom he forgave. Those the most hateful to him he often seemed to regard as his truest friends; and his best friends he treated as though they were utterly indifferent to him. On the whole, he held that a ruler must never betray his intimate thoughts: as, by so doing, he often may suffer many and great mischiefs, while by the opposite method he may gain many and great advantages. He was irritated withal when any seemed to have penetrated his character, and caused to be put to death many against whom he had no complaint, except that they had found him out. So that on the one hand it was perilous not to make out his meaning, (for many a time and oft it was an offence to attend to what he said instead of to what he meant,) while on the other hand, to apprehend him fully was more perilous still, for he suspected those who penetrated his designs of abhorring them. The darkness of this character soon overshadowed the whole empire. Augustus had retained,

for the security of his person, only three cohorts of the numerous guards, and a handful of Spaniards, who formed his body guard. Afterwards he dismissed the Spaniards, supplying their place with Germans. After the overflow of Varus, when all the Germans then in the city received immediate orders to leave it, even the German guard was disbanded, but soon afterwards formed again; and, as it appears, again reinforced with Spaniards and Illyrians.

These precautions were not enough for Tiberius, who could not think himself in safety without a numerous guard; and accordingly drew to the neighborhood of the city the Prætorians, whom Augustus A. D. had distributed throughout Italy.* This measure proved decisive for the destiny of the Roman empire, as from this moment the emperor became dependent on his guards, and the commander of those guards became the second personage in the state. The Roman public, according to Tacitus, were malicious enough to affirm that Augustus had only chosen, Tiberius for his successor, in order that the mildness of his own rule might be brought out in the strongest possible contrast by the subsequent tyranny. Impartial eyes will rather see in Tiberius's appointment a mere device of Livia, who also succeeded in moving her husband to require of him the adoption of the son of Drusus, named Germanicus, although he had himself a son and heir.

Tiberius began his reign with the murder of his benefactor's unfortunate grandson, Agrippa Posthumus; and continued it for some time with hypocrisy and dissimulation too gross to pass current with any one. However, while Germanicus remained at his side, he felt compelled to keep his natural character within certain bounds. His whole efforts were therefore employed to effect the removal of his rival from the head of the eight legions, where Augustus had placed him, and from the war, which he conducted with distinguished honor in Germany. Removed from the army of the Rhine, Germanicus was sent to Armenia, and finally put out of the way, as was supposed, by poison.

The general course of administration continued mild and equitable, notwithstanding several instances of capital charges and executions, till the ninth year of the government of Tiberius, which Tacitus assigns as the epoch at which began the influence of Sejanus, and at which the Prætorian guard was encamped in the neighborhood of the city. The family of Sejanus was of equestrian rank, and sprung from Volsinii. His father, in the days of Augustus, had held command of the guard. The son appears to have captivated the favor of Tiberius by the skill and vigor with which he quelled a revolt of the legions in Pannonia. He had no sooner succeeded to his father's place at the head of the guards, than, under the pretext that the soldiers were in danger of being corrupted in the provincial towns, and in Rome itself, by mixing with the citizens, besides being scattered in case of any emergency, he collected them into a permanent encampment on the

* Suetonius says (Aug. c. 1.) of Augustus in this particular, "*Neque unquam plures quam tres cohortes in urbe esse passus, est, cacque sine castris; reliquas in hiberna et æstiva circa finitima oppida dimittere assueverat.*"

Viminal hill, in the neighborhood of a mound known by the name of *Agger Tarquinii*.

The first years of the reign of Tiberius, even according to the testimony of Tacitus, to whom human actions and characters often seem blacker than they are, or can be, considering the mediocrity and weakness of the bulk of mankind, were, if not exactly admirable, yet at least deserving of no such charges as those which can with justice be brought against his subsequent government. In general cases the senators, up to this period, could still express with freedom their opinion in the senate; and in certain cases Tiberius indulged the murmurs of that body, and even gave way to their wishes on particular occasions.* When the base crew composing the majority of the senate pushed adulation too far, Tiberius struggled against the stream. No new public burthens were imposed, but rather the old were lightened. Slaves and freedmen were suffered to have no considerable influence. Tiberius visited those who had visited him; accepted private feasts and hospitalities; visited the sick; attended funerals; and held discourses in honor of the deceased. Fear of his nephew, and even of his own son, kept the tyrant for some time within bounds; but after their death, the baseness of the people about him gave him boldness to dare whatever evil lay within the scope of his will or power, and which Sejanus, a ready and able tool, lent himself to execute. A tribe of wretched creatures now assumed the part of informers, and Sejanus, who had consummate skill in stimulating the fears of the tyrant, finally succeeded in persuading him to quit the capital. Another motive of this step was to shroud from public curiosity the ignominious lusts of an advanced age, and to leave the execution of his merciless policy to Sejanus. Of that favorite, Tacitus says, that by every species of artifice he had contrived to attach Tiberius so firmly to him, as to render one impenetrably guarded against others towards him alone incautious and unmuffled.† On the departure of Tiberius that minister remained behind to represent the imperial person. The emperor took along with him a jurisconsult, a sort of minister of justice (the consular senator Cocceius Nerva,) and Curtius Atticus, known by one of Ovid's elegies being addressed to him. His other attendants, with few exceptions, were Greeks, whose conversation was selected to beguile the time in the intervals of sensual pleasure. He spent some time in a circuit of Campania: till at last he was attracted by the agreeable site of the island of Capreæ, which offered a mild climate in winter, as well as in summer a cool retreat. The treasures of the empire were employed to make a delightful residence of this place, which seemed to secure the tyrant against all suspicious approach;‡ and here Tiberius gave himself up to shameless and unnatural lusts, while his worthy lieutenant Sejanus carried on a series of persecutions against all who stood in any degree of relationship to the reign-

* Tacit. Annal. lib. ii. c. 38.

† Annal. lib. iv. c. 1.

‡ "Solitudinem ejus placuisse maxime crediderim, quoniam importuosum circa mare, et vix modicis navigiis pauca subsidia, æque appulerit quisquam nisi gnato custode."—*Tacit. Annal. lib. iv. c. 67.*

ing family, or excited the suspicions of the tyrant by freedom of speech, independence of position, or popularity of character.

It were needless to enumerate the cruelties which were exercised in Rome and throughout Italy, (for the provinces were exempt from the caprices of the tyrant.) Suffice it to say that the family and nearest relations of Tiberius fell a sacrifice to his suspicions and to the calumnies of Sejanus. The latter surrounded every man of any note with spies, plied the women of the house with seductions and promises, and from Tiberius, whom he kept in effect prisoner, received every possible public demonstration of honor.

Already Sejanus felt himself so powerful that he nourished thoughts of himself usurping the government. Already were his statues set up by the Romans in their private houses, in public places, in temples, along with those of the reigning family, when Tiberius, in an interval of sobriety (he was commonly drunk,) either of himself perceived the pass to which matters had come, or was made aware of the real views of Sejanus by his own suit for the hand of an imperial princess, or finally, as Josephus states, was made acquainted with his plans by a billet from Antonia, the widow of his brother Drusus.

The whole demeanor and management of Tiberius, when he had formed the resolution of destroying the man who had hitherto been his all entrusted confidant and all powerful minister, is admirably described by Dio Cassius, who has hit off in a few words the description of the part played at that time by Sejanus in the empire. "Sejanus," he says, "in the fulness of his power, and exaltation of his pride was so distinguished, that, to express it in a single word, it would seem that he was emperor, and Tiberius only chief of the isle of Capreæ."* Sometimes he affected cordiality, held out hopes of consenting to the proposed matrimonial alliance, and thereby kept the formidable favorite from suddenly putting into execution his plans of usurpation, which would probably have been seconded by the soldiery. Sometimes he pretended mortal sickness; at other times he made as if he would come to Rome without delay; now favored the creatures of Sejanus, now refused his proposals, and let slip indications of displeasure. Thus he withheld his victim from proceeding to extremities; and even when at last he conferred full powers upon Macro to arrest Sejanus, put him to death, and take his place, it was done so cautiously, that no oriental despot would have proceeded with more subtilty in getting rid of a too powerful vizier. When Macro, after reading in the senate the decree of arrest against Sejanus, next was to put it in execution, the *vigiles* were ordered to do duty for the guards; and the latter received, on this occasion, for the first and for the only time, a donative from Tiberius. Sejanus was enticed into the senate-house by the pretext that Macro was the bearer of a letter to that body, by virtue of which he was to receive the dignity of tribune. Even this letter to the senate was couched in such artificial terms, that Macro, on the slightest movement in favor of Sejanus, could have left out the concluding part altogether, or given a totally different turn to its import.

* *Νησιάρχον τινα εἶναι δοκεῖν.*—Dio Cass. *Histor. lib. lviii. c. 6—9.*

The execution of Sejanus, who was succeeded by Macro as præfect of the body guard, was followed by that of his innocent children, relations, and even distant connections. The numerous persons crowded into the prisons as friends of Sejanus were, without any judicial proceeding, massacred *en masse*,* and even their bodies subjected to indignities.

A government like that of Tiberius could rest alone upon brute force, that is to say, on the guards and on the soldiery. This was openly recognised in the senate. One of the members of that body, now degraded into a tool of every species of cruelty and violence, thought to flatter Tiberius by making the proposal to assign a place of honor at the public games to the guards, along with the equestrian order. Meanwhile Tiberius, who, at his advanced age, 78, was addicted to intemperance in drinking and the other vices of reckless youth, was visibly approaching his end. However, he attempted to dissemble his condition, affected health and vigor, made excursions in Campania and along the coast, and seemed again to meditate return to Rome. He sank during his journey near the promontory of Misenum, and fell into a deathlike slumber. Caius, the inseparable attendant of his uncle, the companion of his lusts, the grovelling slave of his caprices, who had been as a child the favorite of the Gallic legions under the jesting *soubriquet* of Caligula,† was his declared successor, and was greeted on the instant with the homage of Macro and of the whole court. But now came the astounding news that Tiberius yet breathed, and had called for food. Caius was lost, if a rapid decision were not taken. Macro's counsel prevailed, and the old tyrant was smothered under his pillows.

V. C.
790.
A. D.
37.

* "Inritatusque (Tiberius) suppliciis cunctos qui carcere attinebantur, accusati societatis cum Sejano necari jubet cet."

† He had received from the soldiers the surname of Caligula in jest (castrensi joco,) because he had been brought up amongst them in the garb of the camp (manipulario habitu.)

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF CALIGULA TO THE ACCESSION OF VESPASIAN.

THE first weeks and months of the new reign, like the beginnings of so many reigns, were wholly opposite to the preceding. A stop was put to the course of cruel measures and of penal proceedings; but two things might have served to indicate, even from the outset, that the new ruler scarcely would be better than the old one. First, he cancelled the will of Tiberius, in order to exclude his grandson from that share in the government which was assigned to him by that instrument. Secondly, he showed an ardent passion for sports and spectacles, expended immense sums on those objects, and thus threw away the sole advantage conferred upon the empire by Tiberius, through his frugal disposition and strict superintendence of the finances. Caius, according to Suetonius, dissipated in one year the enormous hoards amassed by his predecessor. Even during the life of that predecessor, all reflecting men had foreboded the worst of the next reign, from the recreation alternately found by the future successor to empire in the song, the dance, and the sights of executions and of tortures. These forebodings were only too soon justified by his conduct as emperor. From the very first he ran into the most senseless extravagance, in giving entertainments to the people, to the knights, to the senate, and exhibiting shows, wild beast baitings, sea fights, and races, in Rome, from morning to night. He built a bridge over the bay of Baiæ, for no earthly purpose, the length of which exceeded three and a half Roman miles, and which was strewed with gravel and paved with stone in the manner of the Appian way. Moreover, he caused splendid public amusements and festivities to be held in Lyons and Syraeuse at his expense. Montesquieu shows, incidentally, that the relief which was apparently given to the people under the reign of Caligula, by taking off the tax of the twentieth penny on the sale of goods, was indeed only apparent, and was shifted from one class on another. The publication of the resources and exigencies of the state, which had been commenced and interrupted under Tiberius, was quite useless, as Caius nevertheless pursued his senseless course of extravagance. Corrupted in his very childhood: sunken deeper still in his youth; as a ruler, utterly lost in senseless projects, boundless extravagances, sports, and unbridled debaucheries; the longer Caius reigned, the blinder obedience was paid his caprices, the more utterly he lost all command of understanding. It cannot, therefore, be worth while to enumerate the individual acts of government under an emperor who was all but a maniac. The most remarkable circumstance is, that such a ruler could hold sway over the whole of the

Roman world during four years ; and that even after the lapse of that time no one would have risen against him, if he had not outraged at last, in his madness, the very tools of his tyranny. At his accession, indeed, he had restored independence to the tribunals ; but it was not long before he assumed a criminal jurisdiction, and enacted it in person in the most revolting manner : this too not only in Rome, but in Gaul, and on the Rhine, whither one of his fits of craziness had carried him.

The caprices and cruelties incident to the government of a madman might have been transient, had not Caligula and his instruments unfortunately brought them into connection with the public administration, and with the ways and means of oppression which served as a model to his successors, when once the example had been given of measureless extravagance, and donatives to the soldiery and the people. Murder became a matter of calculation, not an indulgence of cruelty—a compendious method of sweeping the wealth of the murdered into the treasury. Accordingly, when the wealth of Junius Pennus, one of Caligula's victims, proved not so considerable as he had expected, he exclaimed : “ That man has cheated me ; he might as well have lived.” Even those whom he mocked with his forgiveness, he plunged in distress and wretchedness ; while he snatched from those whom he threatened with death, the last resource by which they might hitherto have secured their possessions to their posterity. Suicide had hitherto been a method of evading confiscations of property. Caligula annulled this mournful privilege ; and his successors took very good care not to restore it to the family of the suicide. Besides, he not only held sales, at which he was himself present, and forced his wares and furniture at the most exorbitant prices on wealthy individuals, senators, and even Gallic provincials, but on the days on which it was customary at Rome to give presents, demanded of the terrified citizens gifts for himself, and constrained them to lay their money and jewels at his feet. As the public games, which were held with mad profusion, had drained the public treasury to its last ebb, he forced private individuals to hold them at their own charge ; and compelled the rich, unless they wished the destruction of their relatives, to make him large bequests in their testaments. Even the contractors for improving public roads in Italy, and the government commissioners who presided over that department (*curatores viarum*,) were ruined by capricious exactions ; and on this occasion, as on so many others, it appeared that the most ruthless tyrants every where with the utmost ease find men, who not only are ready to be employed as their servants and instruments, but even to anticipate their orders.

A league was at length formed against Caligula, not dissimilar to that which despatched the Russian emperor Paul. The only names delivered down to us are those of Cassius Chærea and Cornelius Sabinus, the actual instruments in this conspiracy. The prime movers cunningly kept in the background, and accordingly escaped with their lives ; while certain innocent persons, who came in the way by mere chance, were murdered by the German guard of the emperor. The first personages in Caius's court, the consuls of the year, several for-

mer prætors and consuls. Valerius Asiaticus, one of the most opulent proprietors in the south of France, and who had enjoyed an eminent place in the emperor's favor, had knowledge of the conspiracy and hopes of saving the state by the murder of the tyrant. The execution was assigned to Chærea and Sabinus, as the tyrant had affronted the honor of both, while he employed their services daily as the instruments of his cruelties. We further learn from Seneca, that the death of the tyrant seemed to a part of the senate indispensable, as the city was threatened with a famine, ominous of destruction to thousands.

A. D. 41. After the murder of Caius, the consuls thought they must crown their work. They convoked the senate in the capitol, resolved on the restoration of the republic, and had already gained a part of the soldiers in favor of this new republic. But by this time, the soldiers of the guard had ferreted out the imbecile Claudius, a brother of Germanicus and uncle of the murdered emperor, and offered the imperial dignity to him. At first he endeavored to escape from them, and sent excuses to the senate, saying that he was detained by force by the soldiers in their quarters. But soon being encouraged by his friends, he promised a considerable donative, not only to the guards but to the whole army, on condition of their raising and maintaining him on the throne. The amount of the present which was promised to each individual soldier, according to Josephus, as well as Suetonius, seems exaggerated. The example however, once having been given, no emperor ascended the throne, since Claudius, without exhausting the public treasures by lavish donatives to the soldiery. The Jewish prince Agrippa, whom the senate had sent to Claudius to negotiate, confirmed the imbecile prince in the intention of maintaining his station; and as the people also, accustomed as it was to games and donatives, desired a monarch, the senate on the third day was compelled to recognise the emperor whom the soldiery had elected by acclamation.

The commencement of his reign was in a similar style to that of Caius. All the cruelties and caprices of his predecessor were disavowed, imposts repealed, bribes prohibited, exiles recalled, proceedings quashed on charges of high treason. But all this was only for the moment; and even in the first year, this government combined all the evils incident to the sway of a merciless imbecile, with the rigor of a military—the cabals of a female government—and the caprices of a cabinet which was guided by people without birth, character, or principles. The military nature of the government of Claudius was manifested, first, in the manner in which he attained the imperial dignity, and ever afterwards in the manner in which, spite of the public scorn, he maintained his ground against the hatred of the people and the senate. Of the female domination during this reign we shall have to speak more particularly in the sequel, as the different epochs of his government, and the history of his successor, are closely connected with the career of the two women who ruled him.

The eunuch Posides was his first object of preference. Felix, another of the freedmen who were favored by him, was made governor of Judea, and loaded with honors. Callistus, already powerful under Caligula, became under Claudius still more powerful and wealthy, so

that the most respected men of the first families were forced to give him precedence.

Three of the freedmen favored by Claudius above all deserve notice, as having governed the empire under him, and in part under his successor,—Polybius, Narcissus, and Pallas. These three divided amongst themselves the departments of public business. One of them was the inseparable attendant of the absurd old man in his antiquarian studies, in which he was incessantly occupied. Another was at once his private secretary and secretary of state: a third had entire control of the financial department.

The importance of Polybius is chiefly known to us from a letter of condolence which Seneca, who was then living in banishment, addressed to him, and in which he showers such despicable flattery on him and Claudius, that this one document must inspire the most supreme contempt for a philosopher and man of letters, capable of so abusing his talents and acquirements, as well as a vast notion of the favorite's power and influence.

The two wives of Claudius, Messalina and Agrippina, have been exhibited by poets and historians to posterity as a terrifying example of the most abandoned profligacy. Messalina's conduct however was guided by lust, more than ambition; and the cruelties to which, in league with the freedmen, she incited her husband, were prompted for the most part by her own boundless debaucheries. Claudius is represented by Suetonius as naturally cruel; and for the most part, he was moved, like a child or idiot, by some sudden panic, to give his assent to the acts of murder constantly required of him. It deserves to be recorded, that, amongst the victims of these cruelties, have been handed down the names of several men, and of one female, who well may be deemed worthy of better, nay, of the best times. Appius Silanus had courage to give public marks of his adhorrence of the unnatural excesses of Messalina. Arria, whose husband, the senator Pætus had taken part in one of the innumerable conspiracies of this reign, set him an undaunted example of voluntary death. Valerius Asiaticus, whom Messalina had devoted to death for the sake of the gardens of Lucullus, which he had extended and beautified, made by the noble manliness of his defence a deep impression even upon her and the stupid emperor. His eloquence however could not rescue him from the doom of death.

While even the capital thus presented relics of the old Roman character, on all the frontiers the armies maintained their established superiority. Parthians and Armenians were compelled to receive commands from Rome, and Claudius himself made a short expedition to Britain, to reap the harvest of glory which his generals had sown.

The character of Roman greatness was also maintained by the public works commenced and executed under the reign of Claudius. An aqueduct began under the former reign was completed, and neighboring springs, by the name of *Aqua Claudia*, were converted to the use of the city. In like manner the brook Anio was conducted to Rome by a stone channel; the theatre of Pompey, after having been burnt down was rebuilt, and the opening of it solemnised by the celebration

of splendid games. But the reign of Claudius was distinguished especially by two undertakings. These were, first, the draining of the lake Fucinus (*Lago di Celano*,) which had often been proposed, but always negatived by Augustus, as an enterprise too arduous; and, secondly, the excavation and construction of a harbor at Ostia, with a lighthouse for the security of navigation, after the model of the Pharos at Alexandria; a work which Julius Cæsar, on account of its expensiveness, had never accomplished, however inclined to attempt it. The canal (*emissarium*,) dug to draw off the waters of the lake, and thereby drain a considerable tract, was carried through a hill by a tunnel half a league in length; and the labor of thirty thousand men was bestowed on it for eleven years.

While Claudius lavished the treasures of the empire on buildings and on monuments which a wiser prince would never have undertaken, Messalina conspired with the freedmen to put every one to death whose habits did not chime in her own, or whose wealth she wished to appropriate, till at length she caused Polybius himself to be executed. The ease with which she compassed the downfall of her husband's confidential fellow student aroused the apprehensions of the three other freedmen, who had hitherto been content to share her empire over Claudius. Accordingly, lest they might also share the destiny of their colleague, they determined to anticipate the empress; and Messalina herself gave them an opportunity of bringing into play against her the excitable fears of Claudius, of which she had so often taken advantage against others. She no longer contented herself with pushing disregard of all propriety and dignity so far as to prostitute herself, with women of the lowest class, to the lusts of the first comer; but at last, while her husband was absent for a short time from the capital, she solemnised regular nuptials there with a youth of respectable family, who was at that time consul elect. C. Silius, the new spouse of Messalina, who read his own fate in that of all who had before spurned the abandoned woman's favors, durst not refuse a leading part in this melancholy farce; and the authorities of the town, the priests and auspices, nay, the gods themselves, were called to witness the nuptials of the empress with the consul elect, without the slightest rumor having reached the ears of Claudius, who might have remained for ever ignorant of the festive celebration, had not Callistus, Narcissus, and Pallas taken advantage of the opportunity to rid themselves of the power of Messalina. By artfully exciting and fomenting the terrors of Claudius, his commands for the death of his wife were extorted, and put in execution. Without a wife, however, the weak monarch could not exist: having long been inured to let himself be blindly led by a woman. Every thing therefore seemed to turn on the union of the freedmen in the selection of a spouse for their emperor. Unluckily they could not agree. A second Agrippina, niece of Claudius, the daughter of his brother Germanicus, intruded herself upon her uncle; and Narcissus, who dreaded her dispositions, vainly sought, by appealing to the paternal love of Claudius, to induce him to choose another wife, and to dissuade him from espousing a widow, who would bring into his family a son by her first marriage; while Claudius himself

had offspring of his first marriage, a son and daughter. Agrippina, from the moment of her accession to the throne, devoted all her efforts to procure for her son the succession to the empire, (in place of the young Britannicus, son of Claudius, and to marry him to the emperor's daughter, Octavia. She obtained her end without much trouble. Seneca, the most eminent philosopher of his times, in concert with Burrhus, a man who put in practical operation what his instructor only knew and taught theoretically, helped Agrippina to pave the way to empire for a tyrant. Her first husband, Domitius Ahenobarbus, had been notorious for extravagance, debauchery, and cruelty: Agrippina herself was endowed with all the vices of which a woman is capable; and her husband had avowed that from such a marriage only monsters could spring.

NERO, the offspring of this marriage, had risen to boyhood without any sort of superintendence. His father's heritage had not even descended to him. A dancer and a barber had been his tutors and companions up to his twelfth year, in the house of his aunt Lepida. No sooner was Agrippina married to Claudius than she contrived to get Seneca the philosopher admitted to the prætorship, and appointed as head tutor to her son. Lucius Silanus had been destined for the husband of the emperor's daughter Octavia; but, so soon as Agrippina had entrapped the feeble Claudius in her toils, the intended son-in-law was supplanted, and thenceforth felt himself doomed to destruction. He therefore put an end to himself on Agrippina's marriage day. Nero was adopted as a son immediately afterwards, and married to Octavia; while Britannicus sank down from the first to the second station at court. Agrippina herself showed, from this time, openly, that she aimed at quite another sort of empire than had already been enjoyed by Messalina. At a military festival, when the captives from Britain, and amongst them Caractacus, were brought forward in public, Agrippina, in the view of the whole multitude, took her seat upon an elevated throne beside the emperor, and received equally with himself the homage of the Britons.

The marriage of Octavia with Nero gave fresh aliment to the pride of Agrippina. Burrhus superseded, in the chief command of the guards, the officers of the times of Messalina. Narcissus alone maintained his influence over the old emperor, and assumed to protect the children of Messalina from the arts of their step-mother. Claudius was capable, at any moment, of giving orders of Agrippina's death, as he had for Messalina's. She determined to anticipate him therefore, and the more so, as she hoped to rule with freer and more absolute sway in the name of her son. Poisoning is the native art of Italy. A female monster, Locusta, who had been legally convicted of the most atrocious murders by these means, had nevertheless been spared for occasions of this sort, in which the use of force seemed inadvisable. Agrippina now made use of this artist to put her husband out of the way; and it is stated, not without plausible grounds, by some writers, that Nero had guilty knowledge of the deed.

A. D.
54.

After the death of Claudius Britannicus was no more thought of. Nero alone was led by Burrhus to the division of the guard which

was just then on duty, and from thence to the Prætorian camp. The empire was purchased from the guards with the same sum which had before been given by Claudius; and which, from thenceforwards, was in some measure a tax. The new reign, from the very first, was bloody; and would have been yet more so, had not Agrippina been kept in check by Burrhus and by Seneca. Nero himself could not save Narcissus, though he would gladly have done so; and the brother of that Silanus who had formerly, as the betrothed of Octavia, been driven to self murder, was executed. The neglect of the young emperor's education was betrayed by his very first speech in the senate; the more strikingly, as, in ancient times, even under a monarchy, all that is now transacted in writing was done orally. All the predecessors of Nero, not excepting the idiot Claudius, had themselves composed their addresses to the senate; and Nero was the first who provoked ridicule by delivering the artificial periods and philosophy of Seneca in an oration learnt by rote. Not that the young emperor was devoid of all accomplishments; but he had not got exactly the right ones. His lively spirit had disdained the study of dialectics and rhetoric, from which he might have learned to express himself freely, and to speak in public, and had turned to other things. In painting, sculpture, singing, driving, riding, he was no mean proficient; and in versifying he gave proofs of having received scholastic training.

It was impossible that mother and son should long live upon good terms. Both were eager to reign alone; and both, besides, were surrounded by people whose maxims of conduct were totally opposed to those of each other. Agrippina, namely, was guided by Pallas; while Nero gave ear to Burrhus and Seneca, so long at least as he needed their assistance.

As Agrippina ventured no equivocal indications of drawing forth Britannicus from the background, his death appeared a necessary crime, a measure of state policy. The circumstances of the murder were horrible. Britannicus was poisoned at table, under the eyes of the emperor and his guests; and the poison worked so rapidly that he instantly fell dead on tasting it.

From this moment Agrippina's influence was at an end. She was deprived of the guard of German and Roman soldiers, hitherto assigned to her; and forced to quit the palace. The empress-mother, hitherto accustomed to a splendid cortege, found herself at once forsaken by all. Her pride was so sensibly wounded, her wrath so excited, that Nero thought nothing but her death could secure his government. Burrhus and Seneca shrunk back from the deed of horror: the former, even after its commission was resolved upon, firmly refused the services of the guard under his command. Anicetus, however, one of the freedmen in Nero's confidence, answered at once for the execution, and was nowise embarrassed in finding instruments. Against poison Agrippina was on her guard; open force could not be employed against her in the capital: the celebration of the feast of Minerva was therefore made use of to inveigle her to Baiæ, under the pretext of a reconciliation with her son. There she was at first received with distinction; and thence she was to be taken back to her country seat by

water. The vessel was so contrived as to fall to pieces and sink at a given signal. The plot failed; Agrippina was saved from drowning; but murdered in a horrible manner immediately on landing.

Nero's wife, the unfortunate Octavia, even had her union with him been more than a merely political marriage, after her brother's murder, followed by that of the emperor's own mother, could hardly have continued united with him. She had, besides, long been supplanted by a rival, in the person of Poppæa Sabina, who yielded nothing in effrontery even to common strumpets; and never rested till Octavia, after having been hunted down with the most humiliating indignities, unjust and improbable accusations, was at length put to death.

After such horrors towards his own family, Nero could have no scruple in exercising every species of arbitrary cruelty on his subjects. For a time, Burrhus thwarted his proceedings; and it therefore seems not wholly improbable that he hastened the death of this truest of his servants. Tacitus, however, does not venture to state this positively. Even during the lifetime of Burrhus, he not merely commenced the train of juvenile follies and abominable outrages towards women and virgins, boys, youths, and unoffending citizens, in his nightly excursions in company with his boon companions in Rome; but he exhibited himself, even at this period, publicly as a racer, singer, and harp-player. Even on his first appearance, he conducted himself exactly in the manner of the classes so much despised in Rome; of jugglers, singers, and players. For it must be remarked, that, according to Roman manners, the class of artists who showed themselves in public, who amongst the Greeks had stood in high esteem, were viewed with no greater respect than jackpuddings and mountebanks. On these occasions Nero appeared attended by his guards, whose officers were posted at his side. Even Burrhus, though grieved to his inmost soul, was compelled, on Nero's first appearance, to acknowledge by loud plaudits the performance of his emperor. Seneca soon lost all influence after the death of Burrhus; he was forced to retire wholly from the court; and, from thenceforwards, the young ruler was altogether abandoned a prey to the scum of profligates, some of whom we must notice more particularly.

Tigellinus and Fenius Rufus, who stepped into the place of Burrhus, might very fitly contend with each other which of them was entitled to pre-eminence as the more thorough, merciless, and hardened slave of tyranny. The banquets of Tigellinus combined all that could have been imagined in the shape of overstrained and inordinate luxury by the Syrian or Egyptian rulers of old times. Petronius was in this court the superintendent, or *maitre de plaisirs*, and ennobled the extravagances of lust by a philosophy which would have done honor even to Aristippus, by a mixture of wit and lewdness, jest and argument, cynic principles and voluptuous practice.

Till Nero's times, the provinces at least had not been witnesses of imperial folly, wantonness, and debauchery. Caligula and Claudius had never been long absent from Rome; and Tiberius had buried himself in an island, where access to him was difficult. Nero, on the contrary, alternately sang at Rome and Naples. He even travelled to

Greece ; appeared there publicly at the most solemn festivals and antique games ; squandered in the most reckless manner the treasures of the empire, and exercised the most revolting and unprovoked barbarities. He did not dare to seek initiation into the Mysteries ; these ceremonies had terrors for a soul conscious of being stained with every species of crime and of impurity. Conspiracies he feared not, so long as he felt sure of his guards ; but took advantage of every appearance or pretext of conspiracy, to give his daily atrocities the air of necessary severities.

Nero, however, does not seem to have become the object of general hatred till after the great fire in Rome. Up to that period, the armies had been content with his bounties, and the people had adored him for his daily celebration of games and spectacles of hitherto unparalleled magnificence. He lavished besides unheard of sums in public banquets and distributions. After the fire, he was often forced to keep back the pay of the troops, to delay the hard-earned recompense of the veterans. The inhabitants of the capital were deprived of the sites of their old abodes, that the emperor might have the satisfaction of building a palace of enormous extent, broad new streets and splendid houses and colonnades. By this tremendous conflagration, three of the fourteen districts of the city were utterly consumed, and isolated fragments only of seven others were left standing, only three divisions of the old city were left untouched. This fire had broken out while Nero was at Antium, in farm buildings belonging to Tigellinus, extended rapidly to the circus, caught the booths where oil and other combustible materials lay, and spread in the direction of the Palatine and Cælian hills. Nero delayed long before he thought fit to return to the city, and not only hindered measures being taken to extinguish the flames, but even caused those who attempted to stop the fire or to save their property to be forcibly held back, that room might be cleared for his plans by the conflagration. Afterwards, indeed, he did all he could to free himself from the suspicion of having been the incendiary, and to throw it on the Christians, who were accused of hatred of all mankind, and were generally viewed with detestation for their aversion from every known description of worship, heathenish or Jewish ; for their refusing to perform, after the usual fashion, the public transactions which were closely connected with religion ; and finally for the singularity of their lives, and of their social relations. However, Nero did not succeed any better in clearing himself by persecuting Christians than in regaining popularity by his ostentatious provisions for supplying the poor with temporary shelter and subsistence. Nero appropriated the sites which had been cleared by the conflagration ; employed two architects, Severus and Celer, to plan an immense imperial palace, where thousands of poor citizens had formerly had their humble dwellings, and proposed to obviate the danger of future conflagrations, by means of spacious streets and colonnades around the houses. Enormous halls, lakes, extensive prospects, nay, whole forests and parks, were designed to be included in the new domain, and to embellish Nero's *Golden House*—the title of the intended palace ; and the most unheard-of oppressions and extortions were put in practice to afford the means for extravagances equally unheard of.

About this time the number of conspiracies was augmented, amongst which the most remarkable was that of C. Piso,—partly because Fenius Rufus, one of the commanders of the guard, was induced to join it merely by his enmity to Tigellinus, and partly on account of the remorseless murders and cruelties for which it was employed as a pretext. Even Seneca, who shortly before, immediately after the fire, had voluntarily sacrificed his eagerly gained and hoarded riches, was involved in this conspiracy, and reduced to regard as a favor the permission to die by his own hand, instead of by that of the executioner. Nero was himself amazed at the weakness of the race which he ruled, and proudly exclaimed, that he was the only prince who had ever fully conceived how far the license of arbitrary power might be carried. Had he reflected on the limits set to all human powers and energies, he might long have maintained his seat, by the aid of his guards and his German mercenaries, against the degenerate race he had to deal with. But he pushed to such a length the indulgence of his wild caprices, as to threaten a stop to the whole machine of state; and the discontent of the troops and of their officers broke out at once on different points of the frontier. This was provoked by Nero's thoughtless conduct, in bestowing profuse donatives and gratuitous distributions of corn on the guards, while the troops on the frontiers were long kept in arrear of their regular pay.

Symptoms of a general fermentation were soon visible. Nero alone did not perceive the popular discontent. He took a journey to Greece; and during a year which he spent in that province, not only spent enormous sums, and exposed himself in his usual manner, but left the freedmen Helius and Polycletus to domineer at pleasure over the capital and the whole west. While Nero loitered in Greece, disaffection arrived at such a pitch, that Helius joined him there, expressly to work on his fears, and urge his return. Nero returned, indeed, in haste, but never deemed of anticipating the outbreaking of popular discontent by a mild and cautious policy. He rather commenced a new series of crimes; and thus may be said himself to have excited the disturbances which broke out at the same moment on different points of his vast empire.

Galba, one of the most energetic characters of those times, but unfortunately neither of an age, nor favored by circumstances, which could make him either loved or feared by the soldiery, on whom depended the destinies of the empire, was at this time governor of Hither Spain. He learned that Nero had sentenced him to death without a hearing; found himself supported by the troops in his province, and threw off allegiance, without himself assuming the title of emperor. His aim was to stand forth as the defender of the senate against the persecution of Nero. The south of France had already become disgusted with the existing tyranny. Vindex, a native of Aquitania, had assembled around him a force of more than 100,000 men, and, unambitious himself of the imperial dignity, formed a coalition with Galba, who was besides reinforced by Otho, a former partner of Nero's lusts and excesses, who at that time governed Lusitania by the title of imperial legate. For Otho, as appeared in the sequel, hoped to pave his

3d way to the empire, under cover of the aged Galba's feeble
 April administration. A number of other generals and governors
 A. D. also declared for Galba, so soon as he took the title of lieutenant-general of the senate and of the Roman people.
 68.

Nero received the first news of revolt in the south of France, but did not interrupt the course of his pleasures, or his presence and superintendence at the public games, for a moment. He was rather pleased with having a fair pretext to wreak his rage on the province, and to confiscate the wealth of its rich inhabitants. Even Galba's revolt gave him no alarm; but when, on his return to Rome, he imposed oppressive extra taxes, on pretence of defraying the charges of the war department, as no one would enrol himself at the levy of troops which he set on foot, his position became more and more alarming. Moreover Nymphidius, who commanded the guards jointly with Tigellinus, so soon as he was finally aware of Nero's indecision, his intentions of flight, his utter incapacity for decisive measures, in the name of Galba promised every soldier of the guard a donative of somewhat more than 25*l.*, on condition of deserting Nero, and recognising Galba as emperor. Thereupon the guards deserted Nero, the senate assembled, declared him a tyrant, and recognised Galba as emperor. Nero to escape the rage of the pussillanimous senate, which
 A. D. he had bitterly provoked and affronted, caused his remaining
 68. adherents to put him to death; and Galba came from Spain, where he remained while his success was doubtful, on learning the recognition of the senate.

A man of sixty-three years of age, who, during the latter period of his Spanish administration, had betrayed significant marks of failing energy, was ill fitted to maintain himself at the head of a military state. The infirmities attendant on age, accompanied by a degree of frugality which even in a private man would have seemed sordid, soon gave opportunities for popular derision. His weaknesses, however, were unperceived, till he came to reside in Rome. His accession was at first welcomed with eagerness.

Before Galba's arrival Nymphidius had conducted himself in the capital as an absolute lord and master. He alone stood surety for the donative which he had promised the troops, and which had not been confirmed by the new emperor. He had taken it upon himself to supersede Tigellinus in his former joint command of the guards; he gave entertainment in Galba's name to persons of prætorian and consular rank, received the assembled senate in his antichamber, seized all means of gaining popularity, and interfered in every transaction between the senate or consuls at Galba. At length it came into his head to trace his descent from the line of the Cæsars, and to found upon this hereditary pretensions to the succession. He learned therefore with terror from the delegates whom he had sent to Galba, that Titius Vinius, placed by the new emperor as his vicegerent in Spain, possessed unlimited influence with his master, and that Cornelius Laco was appointed præfect of the guards; by consequence that, whenever the emperor made his appearance, his game was up. Upon this, he re-

solved to venture all extremities. He intended to visit the camp at midnight, and there to be proclaimed emperor: but Antonius Honoratus, one of his officers, had already estranged the troops from their commander, and when Nymphidius hastened amongst them to regain their suffrages, he fell by their hands. It appears from all the circumstances that Antonius Honoratus must have received powers from Galba or his friends to act as he did; for immediately after the slaughter of Nymphidius, all his friends were put to death as by order of the emperor.

These executions, and the too visible influence of Vinus, excited no advantageous prepossession for the new reign. What was still more unlucky was, that he found himself compelled to withhold the gratuities which had been promised by Nymphidius, and to cut to pieces one of the legions which had fiercely demanded the bargained amount. Several other, partly indeed unavoidable, executions, the unpopular demeanor of the favorites, the emperor's avarice, the discontent of the guards, and the other troops collected by Nero round the metropolis on the first alarm of revolt, foreboded a brief term to the reign of Galba. It required but a signal to reunite the scattered elements of discord.

The signal was first given by the legions in Upper Germany, then eagerly hailed by the friends, companions, and proteges of the late emperor, whose number was in Rome very considerable, and finally caught up by the mass of the populace, who in Rome, as everywhere have more turn for diversion and debauchery than for patriotism. In January, A. D. 69, Galba received the intelligence from his commissary (procurator) in Belgic Gaul, that the legions in Upper Germany demanded of the senate a younger and more enterprising emperor. Deprived by gout of the use of his hands and feet, Galba at length made up his mind to elect a colleague and successor, who might be capable of acting for him on all occasions; and consulted his three favorites, Vinus, Laco, and Icelus, respecting the choice of a person whom he was thus to adopt in the place of a son. Vinus counselled him to choose Otho, the favorite of the guards of Nero, and the partaker of his excesses. Laco and Icelus, however opposed this appointment, knowing that Vinus was closely leagued with Otho, and had promised him his daughter in marriage. Galba accordingly made choice, not of Otho, but of Piso Licinianus, a man of respectable birth, and of unspotted reputation. The chosen successor was presented, according to custom, first to the soldiery; but unfortunately Galba neglected the usage observed since the days of Caligula,—that of making a donative to the troops on such occasions, although he was forced to confess, in the very speech in which he announced his successor, that two of the legions had thrown off his authority.

Otho had long courted the favor of the soldiery and the people. He had made profuse donatives, had given away whole estates, had forwarded individual applications to the emperor; and on every occasion when Galba had been entertained at his house, had distributed gratuities to the companies of the guards on duty. These arts had been overlooked by the emperor, in consequence of the good under-

standing betwixt Otho and Vinus. Otho, indeed, who was deeply in debt, found himself at a loss for the sum which was requisite for the attainment of his objects; he risked, however, some tentative steps with a handful of people who had been gained by him. Within a week after Piso's adoption all was prepared for a first attempt. Otho appointed a meeting with the conspirators in the forum, at the moment when Galba should be engaged in performing a solemn sacrifice. Only twenty-three of the conspirators assembled; Otho seemed irresolute, but his comrades forced him to stand to his purpose. They carried him across the forum, where about thirty soldiers joined their ranks, and from thence to the head-quarters of the prætorians; where the malcontents seized the opportunity of bringing about a long-desired revolution. After receiving salutations as emperor from the soldiers, and from all the old companions and friends of Nero, Otho again presented himself in the city. Of all the troops by which Galba was surrounded, one man alone steadfastly defended him; of all the remoter divisions of the army, only the German guards, whom Nero had ordered to Alexandria, and afterwards recalled, showed any alacrity in coming up to his aid, out of gratitude, it is said, for the care which Galba had shown for their good treatment after the hardships of a long voyage from which they returned in bad health. Galba was first despatched, and then Piso. Spain, Mauritania, Carthage, and the province of Africa, with the legions in Dalmatia, Pannonia, and A. D. 69. Mœsia, gave in their adhesion to Otho; who was recognised also by Mucianus, the governor of Syria, by Vespasian in Palestine, and by all Egypt. Unfortunately, however, he had to contend with an enemy nearer home, who brought the affair to a decision before his eastern forces could join him.

This enemy was Vitellius, his rival and successor in the empire, or rather, the German army which had called its general to the throne. Vitellius, who was not wanting in talents, acquirements, and good qualities, had, however, brought himself into favor exclusively by his vices in the reigns of Caligula, Claudius, and Nero. Every one therefore was astonished when Galba sent him to Lower Germany, to take the command of the legions stationed there. However, his gross familiarity instantly gained him the hearts of his troops, and he had even made a good impression, during his passage through Upper Germany, on the soldiers in that district, who were discontented with Galba, because they had from the first espoused his part without getting any reward for it. Accordingly, as soon as they learned that the legions on the Lower Rhine had proclaimed Vitellius emperor, they confirmed the choice by their suffrage; and the principal towns of Gaul, particularly Trier and Langres, both of which had been harshly treated by Galba, also declared in his favor. Vitellius was proclaimed emperor at Cologne at the same moment; when the statues of Galba were thrown down by the troops in Upper Germany, and a new ruler demanded from the senate.

But Vitellius was in no condition to take the command of an army. He was deficient in activity and celerity, as well as decision, and incapable of imposing even a brief restraint on his groveling passion

for excess in the pleasures of the table. Fabius Valens took his place at the head of the legions, and won all France. A. Cæcina found the same success in Upper Germany. The legions in England and in Spain proclaimed Vitellius emperor, and their example was followed by the troops in Grisons, Tyrol, and Upper Bavaria; and the whole country north of the Po, Milan, and Turin, espoused his cause; when Cæcina and Fabbius Valens both directed their march upon Italy.

Otho was now at last compelled to go and meet the enemy. Fabius Valens and Cæcina were united more than a match for him; but he expected reinforcements so considerable from Mæsia, Pannonia, and Dalmatia, that his hopes of success visibly turned on delaying any decisive collision. He did the reverse; and showed himself during the whole expedition worthy to have been the companion of Nero. Tacitus extols him indeed on account of the last act of his life, by which he put an end to the civil war. But it clearly appears from the whole account of the last three months of his life, that his effeminate soul was wholly unable for any sustained effort. He was no general; he was even no soldier: his troops indeed were heartily devoted to him and full of ardor, but utterly without confidence in or subordination to their leaders. The feeling that his own adherents were likely to fail him at any moment, induced Otho to provoke a speedy decision of the contest. Nevertheless, he was neither present in person at the slight previous skirmishes, nor at the general engagement which was about to be decisive of his fate, nor even made the slightest exertion to aid the success of his own cause. In the neighborhood of Cremona, Cæcina and Valens came into presence of the army of Otho, and inflicted on it a defeat and considerable losses. Still however nothing would have been easier than to protract the war. 13th
Even were Italy lost, the East and Africa stood open to Otho; April, but he felt himself no "worthier of the empire than his rival," A. D. 6.
and chose rather to decide his own destiny, than to allow it to depend upon the variable faith of his soldiery. The prætorians, however, preserved a steady adherence to Otho, and encouraged him as well as themselves, with the prospect of the approaching legions of Mæsia and Pannonia. But he lost self-confidence; stabbed himself with his own hand to the heart, with a degree of firmness greater than could be expected of an effeminate lusting; and won from afterwards the renown of having purchased with life the blessings of peace and tranquility for his country.

Vitellius learned in Gaul, where he still sluggishly remained, the victory of his legions and the death of his rival. The senate did not content itself with acknowledging him as emperor, but decreed the solemn expression of the public thanks to the German army. In the mean time the new emperor made no haste to seat himself in his throne; but took his ease in Lyons, and afterwards in Cremona and Bologna, where he revelled at feasts, and attended gladiatorial games. Though the issue of the contest was decided in April, it was not till July that the new emperor entered Rome, at the head of a force of

sixty thousand men. Nero himself had not run a more shameless course of waste and riot. His golden palace seemed not even sufficiently splendid to Vitellius, whose table alone swallowed up sums so immense, that Josephus doubts if the whole Roman empire would in the long run have been rich enough to bear the load of the emperor's table expenses. Happily, the experiment was not tried; for while Vitellius was revelling in the capital, a rival chief arose in the east more worthy of the empire than had been Galba, or Otho, or Vitellius. The legions stationed in Palestine exalted Vespasian to the imperial dignity.

CHAPTER III.

VESPASIAN, TITUS, DOMITIAN, NERVA, TRAJAN.

VESPASIAN had fought with distinction in Britain; he had restored with surprising expedition the discipline of the troops in Syria, where the Jewish war engaged him for three years; he had subjugated and laid waste the greater part of the country, the sea-ports of Galilee, and invested Jerusalem itself, when the imperial dignity was unexpectedly offered him. The third legion which had served under him, was amongst those troops which marched from the Danube to aid Otho against Vitellius, and learned his death upon their route. This legion persuaded their fellow soldiers to unite their votes in favor of Vespasian. Vespasian himself had given his allegiance to Galba, Otho, and even Vitellius; but the stern silence of his troops on the occasion of his taking the oath to the last-named of these fleeting powers, had betrayed their dispositions; and the first opportunity for revolt was taken with alacrity. He himself hesitated long before he could be induced to leave the prosecution of the siege of Jerusalem to his son Titus; and to adopt, in conjunction with Mucianus, measures for taking the reins of empire. No great efforts were required to overthrow Vitellius; who was sunk so low, that his own mother, a highly respectable matron, despaired of him, and hastened her own end, to avoid surviving his.* The soldiers of the German army, who had raised him to the empire, retained indeed their fidelity to him, but solely for their own sake. All the other armies and provinces fell off on the first intelligence that Vespasian had been proclaimed by the legions of Syria and Egypt. The third legion, in Mæsia, and those in Pannonia and Illyricum, made a descent upon Italy, under Antonius Primus, and conquered Rome for Vespasian before he even made his appearance. The western provinces, Spain and Gaul, soon followed the lead of the east, and the forces which had elevated Vitellius now deserted him.

The capitol alone made demonstrations of resistance. Sabinus, the brother of Vespasian, happened to be there: Vitellius was too pusillanimous to contemplate any sort of defence; and Antonius Primus wishing to treat the city with forbearance, negotiations took place, and Vitellius readily abdicated the government. But these transactions were rendered void by the soldiery and the populace, who had shared the low debaucheries of the self-degraded ruler; and who now placed him, against his will, at the head of their disorderly bands, attacked

* "Erat illi et fessa ætate parens, quæ tamen, paucis ante diebus, opportuna morte excidium domus prævenit, nihil principatu filii assecuta nisi luctum et bonam famam."—*Tacit. Hist.* l. iii. c. 67.

the opposite party in the capital with the utmost fury, and forced Sabinus to fly with his little band of adherents into the capitol. For the struggle which now commenced in the city Vitellius was entirely blameless, as he would willingly have acquiesced in any terms which left him but life. His partisans, however, stormed the capitol, where design or negligence gave rise to a frightful conflagration, in which part of the historical monuments kept there were destroyed. Sabinus lost his life in these disorders; while Domitian, the second son of Vespasian, who was with him in the capitol, unfortunately preserved his. Antonius Primus took measures to revenge the breach of the treaty, and the slaughter of the adherents of his emperor, immediately after the above scene of conflagration and massacre. He forced an entrance into the city, occupied it with his troops, and cut down the riotous mob and soldiery without mercy. Vitellius died as he had lived. Vespasian was still absent in Egypt: Mucianus was, however, despatched to act as his representative and arrived in the metropolis on the very day after its capture. His arrival, however, had no effect in stopping the course of bloodshed: executions and forced requisitions only ceased on the coming of the emperor.

It is probable that Vespasian would have experienced all the difficulties in possessing himself of imperial power which at first he had apprehended, if Vitellius had displayed the slightest talent or manliness of character. This may be inferred from the fact, that though almost all of the troops and even officers of Vitellius revolted, yet, from October, when the first decisive actions took place, it was not till December that the capitol was taken. Immediately after that event, the senate, by a formal decree, which is still in part extant, transferred to the new emperor all the rights which had belonged to the people and to the senate during the continuance of the republican constitution.*

The first act of the new prince was to rescind, by a single ordinance, all the senseless laws, decrees, and regulations of Nero; and the scope of his whole efforts was to heal the wounds which that tyrant had inflicted on the empire. Unfortunately, Vespasian had been a soldier before he ascended the throne, and had imbibed the common soldier-like ideas of renown and greatness. He was thus led to the policy of annihilating a number of petty states and governments, hitherto independent; such as Cilicia, Lesser Armenia, Comagene, Emesa, Chalcis, Judea, Rhodes, and Samos.

A rapid glance at the relations of the Roman empire to its neighbors, and to the petty states which retained the name of allies, will enable us to estimate the policy of Vespasian in this respect. In the times of the republic Rome was surrounded by a number of states, which were either, like the Asiatic kingdoms, in a condition of over-refinement and

* The Latin text, and a French translation of this remarkable instrument which gives a very good view of the Roman constitution, such as it still existed, *in these*, will be found in Beaufort, Rep. Rom. tom. ii. p. 345—347. Nicolas Rienzi, in 1347, took, as a text for his appeal to the Roman people to vindicate their ancient rights, the declaratory parts of the tables on which this decree was engraved.

degeneracy, or, like Gaul and the mountainous tracts of Spain, in the earliest stage of civilisation. The Asiatic states were constantly disunited in their interior, and with their neighbors; those of Europe were so various in their character, and distinct in their interests, that permanent leagues against a common enemy were out of the question. These states, however, served Rome as a line of outposts against the attacks of the barbarous tribes of Asia and of Europe; who pursued war, like the chase, for occupation and for pastime; and combined only for one object—warfare against every one who had rich booty to yield as the reward of a sanguinary contest. In the latter times of the republic, but still more under the first emperors, the nominally allied but really subject states, which had hitherto served as a barrier against the immediate pressure of the warlike tribes beyond them, were dissolved, and merged into provinces, under various pretences. Henceforward the empire was brought into direct contact with hardy tribes, many of which were hostile to civilisation in every form. The consequences were soon visible. The Germans showed, by the overthrow of Varus, and, in Vespasian's own reign, by a revolt led by Claudius Civilis, who had served with distinction in Britain, how much was to be dreaded from their martial dispositions; and the tribes which were spread thickly over the regions north of the Danube became the more formidable the more the Romans obtained a firm footing in Bavaria and Suabia—from Ratisbon to Strasburg.

The first care of Vespasian, when at length he had arrived from Alexandria in Italy, was directed to the restoration of order in the finances, and of discipline in the army. He partly disbanded the profligate mob of soldiery which had been transferred from the legions of Vitellius into his, and kept the rest, like his former troops, under the strictest discipline. He rebuilt the streets of Rome, which Nero, who only thought of his own enormous palace, had left in ruins; and caused the thousands of tables, on which the decrees of the senate and people had been engraved,* and which had been melted in the last conflagration, to be restored from such copies as could be procured in the provincial towns, or were in the possession of private persons. The senate, to which he restored its ancient rights, he formed into a regular imperial council; and raised the body in repute by augmenting the number of members, after expelling all the wretches who had crept in during the late governments, or had expressly been intruded into the senate to degrade its character. The new prince himself gave an example of the strictest morality; presided in person in courts of justice, suffered nothing like luxury or effeminacy about him, and permitted every citizen free access to his presence. In public he maintained a demeanor of seriousness and dignity; in private intercourse he was friendly; and constantly solicitous to present himself to the Romans as the first among the senators only, and never as an absolute ruler. Accordingly, he neither dreaded calumnies nor conspiracies, relying on the popular attachment. The gravest charge against his reign was the influence of his concubine Cænis, who was said to drive

* "Pæne ab exordio urbis senatusconsulta, plebiscitia."

a regular traffic in places, public offices, and privileges; at which Vespasian was accused not merely of conniving, but of actually participating its profits. However, his connection with Cænis gave the Romans so little offence, that they viewed it as an instance of intolerable haughtiness when his son Domitian, on his return from a journey, drew back from her embrace, holding his hand out for her to kiss. Many anecdotes of Vespasian's avarice had been preserved, which prove, however, little but his humor in familiar intercourse; or at most show, like the similar anecdotes circulated respecting Galba, the lamentable state of an empire, even under the best rulers, which has no other dependence than on its treasures and its armies. One of the common anecdotes which are said to show Vespasian's avarice is, that when his son Titus offered some remonstrances on the tax which he had laid on urine, he put under his nose a gold piece which had been derived from that impost, and asked him whether it smelt ill. Another is of a mule-driver, who, on pretence of his mule having lost a shoe, kept the emperor's litter waiting at a place where a person, who had some representation to make to him, could address him most conveniently. He asked the muleteer, jestingly, *how much he had got for the shoe?* and demanded half.

Notwithstanding the Stigma of avarice, Vespasian showed the utmost munificence in promoting every object of utility; patronised arts and sciences; and was the first prince who assigned regular salaries to the teachers of those branches of art and science which are essential to statesmen and men of business.

A. D. 79. On the death of Vespasian the government descended to his eldest son Titus, who had distinguished himself as a general by the taking of Jerusalem, but of whose character not the most advantageous impressions had been formed.

Titus had already shared with his father the glory of annihilating the Jewish state, and the general cares of public administration. On the election of Vespasian as emperor, he had left his son Titus at the head of the army in Judea, and added a fourth to the three legions which he had had under his orders there. With four legions of Romans, highly incensed against the Jewish name, and a considerable number of auxiliaries, who had been furnished by the province and the neighboring princes, a triumph over the wretched Jews, pent up in Jerusalem, and who soon became so destitute of provisions as to devour each other, could not be a matter of much difficulty. Nevertheless, the conquest of Jerusalem was ranked by the Romans with the deeds of Mummius and the younger Scipio. The obstinate fanaticism of the besieged exceeded belief. The site of the town favored their resistance: all the overtures made by the Roman general were rejected; and he was forced to storm one fortified height after another, and at last to take successively each enclosure of the temple. Willingly would Titus have preserved at least the temple; but a soldier had hurled a firebrand into the building, and to save it became impossible in the confusion. Even after the taking and burning of the temple, the Jews continued to defend the quarter called the Lower Town, and, when driven out of that quarter by storm and conflagration, the

Upper Town and the castles or towers of Hippicus, Phasæl, and Mariamne. At last these two were stormed; and thus was quelled the Jewish revolt against the Roman dominion, in the fifth year after its first outbreking. Josephus affirms that in these five years 1,100,000 Jews perished, 97,000 were taken captive. The fate of those shut up in Jerusalem was wretched beyond conception. After the capture 11,000 voluntarily died by hunger, or were carelessly left so to die by the Romans. Only 700 persons above the age of seventeen were reserved for the triumphal procession of Titus; the rest were sent in chains to the Egyptian mines and quarries, or were left to fight with each other, with other gladiators, or with wild beasts. Youths under seventeen were sold for slaves, and the remains of the city and temple rased to the ground; yet the Jews again gathered by degrees about Mount Zion; and in Adrian's times Jerusalem was in part newly inhabited. Titus and Vespasian held their triumph over the Jews together; yet neither of them thought fit to assume the honorary surname of *Jewish*, and there was something odious even then in the sound of that appellation.

After his triumph, Titus assumed the post of prefect of the guard, without apparently considering the perilous importance of such an office vested in the hands of the heir to the throne. Before the reign of Vespasian, this office had never been entrusted to any man of higher than equestrian rank. As prefect and lieutenant of his father, he conducted the whole business of the government; and almost led the people to expect in him a second Nero, from the rigors of his public administration, combined with the licentiousness of his private conduct. No sooner, however, had he assumed the reins of government, than even the appearance of a scandalous life vanished; and, instead of a second Nero, who, it seems, had been expected in him, a prince was found, who made benignity harmonise with justice, in a degree, perhaps, unequalled by any man, before or since. The first proof of his resolution to sacrifice, as emperor, every private passion and pleasure to the weal of the world entrusted to him, he afforded by repudiating Berenice, who already behaved and regarded herself as empress. Immediately after Titus's accession, she was removed from Rome, the people having given unequivocal signs of discontent on being called to obey an Asiatic mistress. Berenice was the daughter of Herod Agrippa, who had ruled all Judea; the sister of another Herod Agrippa, ruler of Ituræa; and wife of Herod of Chalcis. Titus had made her acquaintance on his expedition against Jerusalem; she had followed him to Rome, and he had probably promised her marriage. She returned indeed to Rome at a later period, after her banishment, but her influence was never traced in affairs.

The Romans only enjoyed a very short time the blessing of their wisest and best ruler. Titus appears to have been sickly even before his accession; but perhaps his brother Domitian, who maintained that his father's will had appointed him joint ruler of the empire, may have hastened his removal by poison.

Titus died A. D. 81, two years and three months after his father.

He was succeeded by Domitian, who revived the regimen of Nero. The capital faults of this prince were inordinate and ludicrous pride, childish vanity, and measureless extravagance. His very demeanor, voice, and accent, announced a despotic and arrogant nature. He was not however deficient in capacity; and, in particular, had cultivated poetry with some success. No sooner had he succeeded to the government, than he seemed to think it beneath his dignity farther to busy himself with science. He now studied only the memorials (*commentaria*) and the journals (*acta*) of Tiberius; while his own letters, edicts, and speeches were framed by others. At length he hated and fled mankind, like Tiberius; and combined his gloomy misanthropy with the mental unsoundness of Caligula. If we may place reliance on Suetonius's collection of anecdotes, Domitian was corrupted by early excesses, and led into extravagances, which drew oppressions and cruelties after them, by an unbridled taste for public amusements, wild beast batings, gladiatorial games, and races; in short, all the sports of the amphitheatre and the circus, accompanied with an absurd passion for building. The whole tenor and incidents of his reign are strongly and briefly characterised by the same writer, when he says that Domitian was *inopia rapax, metu savus*,—was impelled to cruelty by his fears, and to plunder by his necessities.

The first years of the government of Domitian were however better than could have been expected from his well-known character. He kept in such control the higher class of official personages, of whom the senate principally consisted, that no one, either in Rome or in the provinces, dared to neglect his duty; and functionaries never were more incorrupt than under his government.* He cleared away the nuisance of informers and calumniators, forwarded the course of justice, and, during the first years of his reign, was not only free from all imputation of avarice, but splendid and generous. During these years he issued a number of excellent regulations. When at length he perceived how few friends he had in the senate and higher orders, he redoubled his donatives, distributions, entertainments, and games, to win the populace; and granted to the soldiery so considerable an increase of pay (one fourth,) that he himself soon acknowledged the utter impossibility of meeting the enormous demands thus brought upon the public treasury. In this embarrassment he thought of reducing the number of troops; but this was out of the question, without giving rise to disturbances, and exposing the empire to the attacks of barbarians.

The danger already experienced from the warlike populations on the right bank of the Rhine, and on the left of the Danube, increased in magnitude and urgency with every extension of Roman dominions. The more the Romans came in contact with the inland tribes of the continent, the more they drove them, by meddling with their internal affairs, to league with each other. Accordingly, under the reign of

* "Magistratibus quoque urbicis provinciarumque præsidibus coercendis tantum curæ adhibuit, ut neque modestiores unquam, neque justiores extiterint."
—*Sueton. Domitian*, c. xiii.

Domitian, the Marcomanni and Suevi made their appearance; two formidable confederations of German origin, combined with the Sarmatians, who, proceeding from Asia, took possession of whole tracts formerly occupied by Scythian nations. The German league of the Chatti also acquired importance in these times, and extended itself at the expense of the once powerful Cherusci. In the districts of Moldavia and Wallachia, a wholly new confederation of immigrant tribes made its appearance under the name of Dacians, with whom Domitian was in constant warfare during the last years of his reign: so that, according to the testimony of Tacitus, the new province on the Danube was continually exposed to their ravages, and legions stationed there, or single posts and fortified places, from time to time were attacked, and often wholly destroyed. The prince who finally stood at the head of this Dacian league (and who is called by the Romans Decebalus,) presumed to offer them peace on the terms of paying him a sort of tribute. Domitian reached at last such a pitch of tyrannous distrust, that he dared not intrust any important command to a leader of tried ability. Under his government Agrippa had made conquests in Britain, which extended the Roman dominions to Edinburgh and Dunbarton. Agrippa was recalled from the scene of his triumphs by the suspicious despot, who never could be induced to employ him against the Dacians on the Danube, where his presence was precisely the most necessary.

To enumerate the cruelties of Domitian during his latter years, or to describe the diabolical malice evinced by him in inventing tortures, and tormenting the individuals who surrounded him, would be a task no less fatiguing to the writer than to the reader. He hastened on the last act of the tragedy, by keeping the whole senate in a continual state of mortal terror; and showed no more forbearance towards the tools of his own cruelties than if they had been Christians, philosophers, or *fies*, or had shown some symptoms of independence in sentiment or action. At the moment of Domitian's death, Apollonius of Tyana, who was at that time playing his part in Asia Minor, is said to have announced the event to his auditory at Ephesus. "Apollonius, at Ephesus," says his biographer,* "saw the whole as it passed at Rome, while he was lecturing in the colonnade, surrounded by trees, about mid-day. First he appeared to be struck dumb by some object of terror; then he pursued his discourse in a lower tone than he was wont, exactly like a person who sees something while he is speaking. Then he came to a full stop. At length he cast an earnest look (*θεῖνόν*) on the ground, went three or four steps forwards, and exclaimed, 'Strike the tyrant! pierce him!' not as one who sees in a mirror the reflection of a deed, but as one who is present, and strikes in, as it were, at the performance." The soldiery were no less attached to Domitian than they had been to Nero; the citizens were helpless, the senate destitute of influence. None could approach the tyrant but his confidential servants, and those employed in receiving or executing his merciless commands. These tools of his caprice became the instruments of his ruin; and the animating soul of the con-

* Philostr. in vit. Apoll. Tyana. lib. viii. c. 26.

spiracy was his wife, Domitia, who found her name inscribed in the intended list of victims, which by accident had fallen into the hands of the conspirators. The chamberlain Parthenius, and his colleague Sigerus, inseparable companions of the tyrant, his private secretary Entellus, had leagued themselves with Domitia; and Stephanus, the most favored of his freedmen, with the two prefects, Norbanus and Petronius Secundus, undertook the executive part of the conspiracy. This was by no means easy, notwithstanding all the caution with which the measures of the conspirators had been taken, for the tyrant himself was not deficient in bodily strength and activity, and the prætorian guards were devoted to his person; so much so, that they afterwards inflicted the penalty of death on all those who had taken part in the murder of Domitian. The joy of the senate and better class of the citizens, on this event, was proportionate to the sorrow of the soldiers and the populace.

A. D. 96. Nerva, whom the prefects proclaimed emperor after the death of Domitian, like his successor Trajan, aimed to concentrate the powers of government in the senate, and to create a new description of aristocracy. Uespasian and Titus seem to have kept the same object in view, when they transferred from the provinces to the senate the richest and most influential persons: but a plan of this kind only could be put in execution when a military leader sat on the throne. Nerva soon learned this by experience. The prætorians and the populace, discontented with the government of an aged and strict ruler, stirred up continual disorders during the whole of the first year of his reign. Their discontent with the new emperor reached its highest point, when, to restore the ruined finances of the empire, he curtailed the splendor of public spectacles, games, and combats of gladiators, and sold the costly furniture and collections which had been heaped up by the vanity of Domitian. The officers of the treasury and finance were no longer licensed, as formerly, to augment the revenue by every means; and the senators' lives were secured from their rapacity, Nerva having solemnly promised that no senator should suffer capital punishment. The fate of Galba was now impending visibly over the new emperor; his commands were defied, his authority disregarded. He resolved, therefore, like Galba, to adopt a respected and vigorous colleague; and had more judgment and fortune in his choice.

At the moment when anarchy raged in the metropolis, Nerva surprised the people by nominating a colleague and successor, selected not from the senate but the army, and one who possessed in the highest degree the affections of the soldiery. The time and manner of the appointment could not have been more happily chosen. Ulpius Trajan, who stood at the head of the legions on the Maas, on the Scheldt and Lower Rhine, was proclaimed at the very moment when he was solemnly bearing to the capitol a branch of laurel, to celebrate his victories in Pannonia, and when the people had hailed him already as a god, on account of his kingly mien and heroic bearing.* The

* "Siquidem omnis turba, quæ limen insederat, ad ingressum tuum foribus reclusis, jam quidem, ut tunc arbitrabatur deum, ceterum, ut docuit eventus, te consalutavit imperatorem."

disorders in Rome ceased so soon as Trajan's election was known; and even the proud prætorians obeyed his commands without hesitation, when he ordered them out of the city and drafted them into the other legions.

Trajan was a Spaniard by birth, though his father had held the highest Roman offices.† At any former period, however, the Romans would not have borne to yield obedience to a stranger. Above a year after his election (Oct. A. D. 97,) and almost a year after the death of Nerva (Jan. 98,) Trajan first fixed his residence in Rome; and by the choice of his friends and of his servants, amongst whom were found a Pliny and a Tacitus; by his reverence for justice and the laws, for equal rights and public-spirited actions, old usages, and the dignity of the senate, he showed what could be done by sheer straightforward sense and goodness of heart, an uncorrupted and hardy course of life without artificial culture. He was, however, led by his military habits to admit the unfortunate error of imagining, that the defence of the empire could be promoted by farther extension of its limits, and that manners could be improved by exciting a passion for military glory.

Trajan's first campaign was against the Dacian monarch, Decebalus, whose incursions had been latterly bought off by Domitian with yearly presents, which too much resembled an ignominious tribute, being extorted by threats, and levied on the inhabitants of the province by means of a most burthensome impost. Trajan stopped the payment of this impost; and fresh inroads being made by the Dacians on the territories of Rome, the emperor, the best soldier and officer in his own dominions, proceeded to the Danube in person, crossed it, and avenged the trifling injuries done by the Dacians to the province south of the Danube by carrying devastation and slaughter along the opposite shores. So early as the third year of this war, the barbarian monarch was compelled to humble himself before the conqueror, and accept such terms of peace as he should prescribe.

Trajan grossly abused the right of conquest. He retained possession of part of the country (the present Bannat); placed a Roman garrison in the pass of the iron gate; and it seemed as though he were resolved to possess himself of the hill country, and of the tracts around the Dacian capital, Sarmizegethosa or Varhely. The Dacians and their king were greatly irritated by these demonstrations. Decebalus, according to the indications given by Roman writers, was by no means a barbarian of the sort which we might have expected to find, in those times, in the southern regions of Russia. He had many persons in his pay who had served in the Roman armies, and ordered his troops and their mode of arming after the Roman model. He had also attracted into his service, or kidnapped from the neighboring province, a number of skilful workpeople, whom he employed in constructing war-machines. These preparations, and the invitations addressed by the Dacian monarch to a neighboring nation to join in his alliance,

† "Credent ne posterī," says Pliny, "patricio, consulari et triumphali patre genitum, quum fortissimum amplissimum, amantissimum sui exercitum regeret, imperatorem non ab exercitu factum?"

Trajan declared a breach of the peace which had recently been concluded; and caused Decebalus to be again declared an enemy of Rome by the senate. Hereupon he again marched to the Danube, and showed on his arrival, that his intention was to extend the domain of Rome beyond the boundary of that river; the unhappiest project that ever entered the head of a Roman emperor. Near Severin he built the renowned bridge over the Danube, which exceeded 4500 feet in length, and which was thrown across the river by a Greek architect from Damascus, at a place where the stream was particularly rapid.

In the districts of Wallachia and Moldavia military operations are embarrassed by peculiar obstacles. This was felt by Trajan, who conducted the war with extreme caution. He levelled roads, and turned streams from their course; hunted his enemy from wood to wood, from morass to morass, till at length Decebalus, in order not to fall into the hands of the Romans, died by his own. After his death, Trajan formed the determination to plant colonies in the land which he had occupied on the other side of the river, and to humanise the barbarians by the arts of civilisation. He transported from all parts of the Roman empire great numbers of people into these uncultured but fruitful regions; founded towns and villages, and succeeded in establishing the Latin as the language of the country, so that traces of its use are found there even at the present day. These settlements, however, tempted fresh attacks from the populous tribes who had a permanent or precarious abode in Poland and southern Russia. Thrace and Mæsia gained important advantages by this expedition, and rose to a flourishing condition since that period as Roman provinces; new cities received the name of the emperor, his spouse, or his victories; and the best troops for recruiting the legions were levied from these provinces.

The victories of Trajan, and the sensation which they made in the empire, appear to have estranged him from the former sobriety of his views on civil and judicial administration. Neither the public spectacles and festivities which he caused to be held after his return from Dacia, nor his eastern expeditions, accord with the character of wise moderation, and aversion from unnecessary expense, which had been expected of him. He caused a column a hundred and ten feet in height to be erected to celebrate his victories, which presented, in spiral reliefs, his martial achievements, in particular the Dacian expeditions, and on which was placed his statue, of colossal dimensions. He built a grand triumphal arch in Beneventum, and carried a road across the Pontine marshes, which was called by his name, and in one respect excelled the ancient highways, as it was furnished, at certain intervals, with houses of entertainment for travellers. Works like these were worthy of a great prince; but the splendor of Trajan's public games and festivals swallowed up enormous sums, and only served to corrupt the people. These sports were continued a hundred and twenty-three successive days; and it was sought to surpass all preceding emperors in the rarity and number of the wild beasts brought on the theatre. The number of wild beasts which were exhibited on this occasion is given by Xiphilinus, in an extract from Dio Cassius,

at eleven thousand ; the number of gladiators, at ten thousand ; so that we must confess with horror, that one of the best emperors was one of the chief patrons of the cruel and unnatural diversions of the dissolute inhabitants of the capital.

The eastern expedition, which Trajan commenced immediately after the celebration of his last Dacian victories, must be viewed in the same light as his other acts of ostentatious extravagance. The first stage of his expedition was Antioch, as a point of observation from whence he might view how the land lay, or, in other words, how he might accomplish a triumph over the Parthians. From Antioch he proceeded to Armenia, where he found Exedarus, a dependant of the Parthians, on the throne. Trajan would not recognise this prince, on account of his Parthian connection ; and required of the Parthian king Chosroes to withdraw his troops from Armenia, and abandon Exedarus to his destiny. Chosroes endeavored to avert the impending storm, and sent an embassy to Trajan with presents and the most friendly overtures. Trajan received this embassy in Athens, but his plans being made up he refused to entertain any proposals. Chosroes, before he despatched the embassy, had already removed Exedarus from the Armenian throne, and had transferred it to a Parthian prince, Parthemasiris. The latter seemed disposed to yield his allegiance to the Romans ; but Trajan, in commencing his descent on Armenia, expressly declared that he would never suffer a Parthian vassal to reign there. He even picked a quarrel with the sovereign of the petty realm of Osrhoene or Edessa, though the latter only desired to live in friendship alike with Romans and Parthians, agreeable to the situation and interests of his little domain. Parthemasiris sought at first to appease the emperor by submission ; but seeing that the Romans were resolved never to recognise him, he dared every extremity, and met his death in the open field. Armenia became a Roman province.

The sequel of Trajan's first expedition into the East is unknown, and is frequently confounded with the second. We only know with certainty, that he marched from Armenia into Mesopotamia, took cities on the Tigris and Euphrates, and supported the king of Parthia against his own people. The period of his return from this first expedition cannot be fixed with accuracy ; but it is well ascertained, that afterwards he spent some years in Rome. It is not easy to assign the date of his separate undertakings commemorated by medals and historians. His attempt to clear and restore the navigation of the canal of the Babylonian kings, which joined the Euphrates with the Tigris, probably fell within the period of his first expedition in the East.

In his second expedition, on which he spent nearly three years, he marched through Mesopotamia, conquered the Grecian state of Seleucia, and took the Parthian capital of Ctesiphon, made a Roman province of Assyria, diverged towards Arabia, and reached at last the Persian Gulf. Medals, and romantic tales devised by the spirit of adulation, exaggerated, even to a ludicrous degree, the results of this most pernicious expedition to the Roman empire. The plan of an Indian expedition was even ascribed to Trajan ; who is also represented on a medal as giving a king to the Parthians. The latter occurrence, re-

duced to the plain facts, amounted merely to this, that Trajan caused one of the many pretenders to the Parthian throne to be proclaimed king in Ctesiphon, which the Parthians held a sufficient cause for refusing to accept him as their sovereign. Trajan found the East less prone to subjection than he had found the Dacians; and even the Grecian states which still existed in Upper Asia chose to obey the Parthians rather than the Romans. While Trajan remained with his forces at the Arabian Schaul, all the nations and towns in his rear revolted from the Romans. The Jews rebelled against persecutions which fell upon them alike with the Christians. The little state of Edessa, and the commonwealth of Seleucia, strove to recover their freedom and their former constitution. The conqueror of the Mardians, Lusius Quintus, was commissioned to reduce Nisibis. He stormed and wasted with fire and sword the flourishing town of Edessa. Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander took forcible possession of Seleucia: all Assyria had revolted, and was again reduced to subjection.

Latterly Trajan reaped the fruits of his ill-judged rage for conquest. A fortified place in the desert, called by the Greeks Atra, resisted all his attacks, and those of his general Severnus. Here he fell sick, probably by reason of the privations and hardships which he had to endure during the course of the seige. He provided himself with a decent pretext for giving up his undertakings by procuring his recall from the senate, leaving his army and the administration of Syria to his relation Hadrian. Death however surprised him before he could even embark for Italy, and, if Dio Cassius is to be trusted, before he had named his successor. Plotina, the wife of Trajan, who had always espoused Hadrian's interests, most probably forged the act of adoption in Trajan's name, after his death: however, Hadrian, who was then at Antioch, received the notification of his appointment to the imperial succession on the 9th of August, and the intelligence

A. D. 117. of Trajan's death on the 11th.

CHAPTER IV.

HADRIAN.

A SINGLE glance at the general state of the empire, and the posture of affairs in the East at the time of the death of Trajan, is sufficient to show the injustice of the imputation cast on his successor, that envy alone prompted him to abandon Trajan's conquests, and again to fix the Euphrates as the boundary of the empire. The new emperor remained in the East in person till the following year, but could not prevent the Parthians, with Chosroes at their head, from reappearing on the Tigris. Armenia revolted from Rome, and disturbances still prevailed in Palestine. Hadrian could not fail to see the utter impossibility of keeping possession of provinces and kingdoms widely removed by distance, and cut off by seas and deserts from the central seat of government, and moreover in a state of open revolt at the death of Trajan. On his accession Hadrian declined all extraordinary distinctions, testified the deepest veneration for the senate, and declared that he regarded his powers as solely derived from that body. His character and government were a singular compound of good and evil, of wise administration and irrational caprices, of acts of signal clemency and unjustifiable rigor, of zeal for taste and science, and persecution of men of real merit, while favors were lavished on pedantry and frivolous research. He at first appointed his former tutor, Atianus or Tatianus, and Similis, a statesman worthy of better times, as prefects, in order to throw on the first the odium of all the rigors which he might exercise, and to appropriate the honor due to the virtues of the second. The noble Similis could not long endure the atmosphere of a court, where hypocrisy and dissimulation flourished, where mean-souled pedants and flatterers swarmed where all virtues were talked of and all petty passions indulged. Nearly at the same time with his colleague Tatianus was compelled to resign his office, as Hadrian attempted to throw upon him the obloquy of the executions done by his own orders. About the third year of his reign, Hadrian rid himself by death of almost all who might put forth rival pretensions to the imperial dignity. It may suffice to notice a few of the more distinguished heads, among many. Lusius Quintus, a native of Mauritania, who had performed distinguished services at the head of his countrymen in the Dacian, and even more in the Parthian, wars, had been placed by Trajan in the office of governor of Palestine. From this office he was removed by Hadrian's jealousy, and afterwards put to death. Cornelius Palma had enjoyed the particular favor of Trajan, had been promoted to the governorship of Syria, and had conducted a

successful campaign against the Petræan Arabs. He, too, seemed to Hadrian too formidably eminent to remain a faithful subject; and his fate was sealed. In like manner Celsus had been one of Trajan's truest friends, and statues had been raised to him and Palma by the late emperor. This was ground sufficient for the fatal umbrage of Hadrian. Nigrinus had been tribune of the people under Trajan, and supported in the senate what he deemed the popular interests. Through his representations to the emperor it was decreed that those eminent men who, according to old usage, were accustomed to plead in behalf of their fellow-citizens in courts of justice, should be prohibited from making a trade of this honorable duty, although they were allowed to receive a present from those whose suit they had won. He too seemed a man of too much consequence to be suffered to live in the reign of a prince resolved to shine alone. Many men of letters, whose vanity classed with his, had the same fate; and Trajan's renowned architect, Artemidorus of Damascus, who had built the bridge across the Danube, and many other magnificent works, was first banished and finally despatched out of the world by Hadrian, for having shown dissatisfaction with his temple of Appollo, and for having ventured to criticise it, unfortunately with too much justice.

Hadrian seldom resided in Rome, but travelled for the most part from one province to another. Under his reign, however, as under that of Trajan, the emperor's absence was less perceived than under other princes, as the senate enjoyed the highest consideration, and included the richest and most respected families in the empire. To the provinces, on the other hand, the presence of the emperor was the more advantageous, as Hadrian maintained a strict surveillance over the armies and their generals, the governors and officers of finance, and seemed to take a personal and peculiar pride in embellishing the provincial capitals with public works and monuments.

Immediately on his arrival from the East, where he had lingered for a whole year after the death of Trajan, he travelled to the Rhine, to Gaul, to Spain, to Britain, and afterwards he visited the coast of Africa. At a later period he visited all Asia Minor, Cilicia, Lycia, Pamphylia, proceeded to Trebizond, and sojourned for some time in Capadocia. He next spent an entire winter in Athens; visited all the islands of the Grecian archipelago, together with Achaia and Eubœa, and finally returned to Rome by Sicily. His second grand tour led him through Athens to the East, where he endeavored to keep by means of treaties and presents what Trajan had acquired by force of arms. From the borders of Armenia he proceeded to Egypt, through Syria and Palestine. In Egypt he remained a year; and his residence in that country, as well as in Athens, formed an epoch in the moral history of the times. It is evident that the glozing arts of the priests, mystagogues, and pedants, who surrounded him in Athens and in Egypt, rendered his temper still more harsh, intolerant, envious, and hostile to all indications of freedom of thought than ever. Under his reign Judea was again the theatre of dreadful devastations and cruelties; and the Jews who had returned to their native country were again scattered.

In the former reign the Jews, as well as the Christians, who were regarded as a Jewish sect, had been greatly oppressed and persecuted in almost every division of the empire; especially, however, in the eastern provinces. Accordingly, every year brought with it widely spread disturbances in some province, or tumults at least in particular towns and districts. Strong measures continually created occasion for strong measures; till, after the last revolt of the Jews in Palestine and on the Euphrates, Trajan committed the military and civil power over Palestine to the Mauritanian, Lusius Quintus, who had put down the revolt by the sword, and kept the Jews under the yoke by truly African measures. We have already seen that Lusius did not hold his government long under Hadrian. It would seem that a milder policy was pursued for some time towards the Jews, for the population of Palestine increased under the new reign; and we hear of no disturbances till towards its termination, when Hadrian took a fancy to plant a Roman colony in Jerusalem. The news of the pollution of Zion by the building of a new town (*Ælia*), the name of which should henceforth supersede that of the holy city, exasperated the whole Jewish nation, who flocked together from all quarters to Palestine, and rallied round a Messiah who was declared to be the true one by one of their most eminent rabbins. The new Messiah, who was called by his countrymen Barchocheba, or Bar Chozba, spirited up the Jews to the most furious resistance, which was maintained almost as obstinately as formerly against Titus, and involved the remaining towns and population in the same ruin. A new town was, indeed, founded on the ancient site of Jerusalem and was known at the first by the new name of *Ælia Capitolina*; but the old appellation soon became the only one in use. Julius Severus, one of the bravest of those officers to whom the envy and jealousy of the emperor had not proved fatal, was recalled from Britain to bring the war to a close; and it was three years before even he could crush the Jewish insurgents.

Hadrian was by no means ambitious of military glory. In Britain he built a wall against the incursions of the Picts and Scots, and sometimes was not ashamed to purchase peace of the barbarians. The brightest side of his government was the administration of justice; as his decrees not only rendered the forms and principles of procedure uniform, but awarded to the great jurists a seat and vote in the highest matters which came before his own tribunal; whereas, previously, the emperor's assessors had been chosen, without any sort of reference to legal knowledge, from amongst their personal friends, or their connections. The weaknesses, and the cruelties of Hadrian, like many of his virtues, were the offspring of his vanity. He was determined to know every thing, conduct every thing, shine in every thing; and thus often combined the defects of a pedant in his closet with the foibles contracted amidst the dissipations of the great world. Few men of talent could keep their footing about him. His favor was given either to mere courtiers, or, at best, to persons not above mediocrity, who exalted his merits that theirs might be exalted by him in turn.

Even in the election of a successor, he was blindly led by personal

inclination to adopt as a son Cesonius Commodus Verus. Knowing well, however, that the better class were displeased with his choice, he strove to gain the populace by gratuities, the soldiers by a liberal donative; and as Verus happened to die immediately afterwards, he loudly complained that he had spent enormous sums to no purpose. After the death of Verus, chance guided his second choice more happily. Arrius Antoninus, afterwards surnamed Pius, was a man especially fitted for the duties of government. He was, however, only adopted on condition of declaring as his successors Antoninus Verus and Marcus Aurelius, two persons of totally opposite character.

In his latter years Hadrian was infirm, and rendered morose by infirmity, cruel by his moroseness, and detested for his cruelties. His bodily ailments he partly brought on himself by aping Trajan's hardihood, without possessing his strength of constitution. He thought proper to expose himself, as Trajan had done, with uncovered head to every inclemency of the weather. Immediately upon Hadrian's death the senate declared null and void all the regulations (*acta*) of the latter years of his reign, and would even have deprived his shade of the ordinary divine honors, had not Antoninus earned for himself the surname of the Pious, by inducing them to renounce all such derogatory measures.

The influence of Stoicism, of Platonism, and of that mysticism which took rise in the East, became, since the time of Hadrian, so perceptible, his successors were so visibly led by the maxims of the schools to which they or their instructors belonged, that before we detail the events of their reigns, it may be well to take a view of the influence exercised by men of learning, such as Favorinus, Plutarch, and Arrian, in the time of Hadrian. Favorinus, master alike of Greek and Latin, an author in both languages, himself versed in all the learning of his times, and connected with men of learning in all the various departments of literature, was Hadrian's inseparable companion, and recommended those whom he deemed worthy to the imperial liberalities and favors. Favorinus, like his emperor, had a rage for encyclopedic acquirement, for antique mysteries, for strange interpretations of the most natural things in the world, for mysteries, initiations, magical arts, &c. &c. It is easy to imagine what sort of persons and sciences he would patronise. Plutarch, a man of learning of the same stamp, who played a part in the state under this government, had already withdrawn from the occupation of public teaching in Rome, before the accession of Hadrian to the imperial dignity. He was employed by that emperor, especially in the land of his birth, and did the choice of the emperor, and the philosophy which he professed, much honor. It was he who chiefly nourished the taste of Hadrian for occult science, and the mysterious interpretation of ancient art and poetry; and he afterwards exerted very considerable influence in the mental cultivation of his successor. Men like Plutarch, useful in the practical affairs of life, highly influential as authors, and still more so as friends of the emperor, directing his choice of teachers and writers worthy of his imperial favor, had every opportunity of commending their views of life and mankind to the languid approbation of a refined and ener-

vated community, opposite as they were, in many respects, to those which had led old Rome to greatness.

It is honorable to Hadrian, it was fortunate for the empire, that while he patronised inquiries of a less solid description, he promoted the introduction of the maxims of the Stoic philosophy, and even paved the way for their approach to the throne. We shall find the first of the Antonines preferring the Stoic to all other teachers; we shall find the second regulating his whole life and administration according to the stoical system. That system, which had almost become obsolete, was indebted for its fresh renown to Epictetus and Arrian. The former never acquired any personal influence over Hadrian. Arrian had conceived an admiration of Epictetus, from the proofs afforded by his life, not less than by his precepts, that the doctrine of Zeno concerning the insignificance of external ills, while a consciousness exists of the inward dignity of human nature, was no dream, no empty speculation. Arrian was thus induced to assume the task of interpreting the doctrines of his master, the restorer and reformer of Stoicism. He did not, however, merely teach the principles of Stoic philosophy, but brought these principles into practice, and applied them to the public service with equal judgment in military and civil administration. His philosophy taught him the duty of action; of taking a vigorous part in life; of self-denial and self-sacrifice; and his example showed that philosophy does not render her pupils unfit for affairs. Arrian was conversant with military matters; his writings on these subjects are the result of his personal experience in the expeditions against the Alani, the conduct of which was intrusted to him. Having shown, in his history of Alexander, acquaintance with administrative details, Hadrian installed him in the government of Cappadocia and the provinces on the Euxine.

The administration of the state, and the practical applications of science, had never been carried to greater perfection than under the reign of Hadrian; who, though he shunned the extension of the empire, failed not to guard its limits from the inroads of the rude northern and eastern populations, who pressed closer and closer on the frontiers, and looked on the flourishing provinces of Rome with eyes of fierce avidity. Hadrian marched in person to meet the inroads of the Roxolani and other Samaritan tribes on the Roman province of Mœsia; while he devolved the duty of quelling the Caucasian Alania on Arrian.

CHAPTER V.

VIEW OF LIFE AND MANNERS FROM TIBERIUS TO ANTONIUS PIUS.

THE colors with which satirists and historians have overlaid their pictures of life and government during the period before us are darker than in justice they should be. Most of them exhibit deep disgust of their contemporaries, and erect, as their sole standard for the estimation of human dealings, the times of primitive Roman simplicity and poetical Grecian heroism. We must therefore adopt with extreme caution the representations of such writers. There is, however, a broad line of distinction, which cannot be mistaken, between the corruption of the higher and oppression of the lower classes in times of which we are treating, and similar states of things at other times. Rome had enjoyed a free constitution: the cities and states which formed her provinces had franchises and immunities of their own; a national religion existed, the influence of which upon the constitution, administration, and social life has been mentioned elsewhere. All this was existing still in external form and aspect, but was practically nullified by the realities of absolute monarchy, which equally disregarded law and charter. The old religion had lost its social influence, and Christianity had not yet acquired political importance. This extraordinary mixture of republican forms with despotic practices, of republican simplicity with oriental courtiership, gives features wholly peculiar to the system of life in these times.

It is true that, under the empire, checks were given to the capricious tyranny which had been exercised in republican times by the governors of the provinces; yet the higher posts of provincial administration still remained the source of immense revenues to a few families, and the capital still drained the wealth of the provinces as formerly. It was one of the greatest merits of Vespasian, Trajan, and Hadrian, that they set bounds to subordinate oppressions. We learn from Pliny's letters to what a pitch that oppression was carried, and how difficult it was to call a powerful transgressor to account. Juvenal, mentions in many places the plunder of the provinces; and while he admits that now and then a prefect met with condign punishment, he states that ten escaped for every one that was brought to justice.*

Tacitus has shown, in his "Life of Agricola," to what a pitch these functionaries carried their oppressions in districts which were not as

*

—"Quam fulmine justo
Et Capito et Tutor ruerint damnante senatu
Piratæ Cilicum. Sed quid damnatio confert,
Cum Pansa eripiat quicquid tibi Natta reliquit."

Juv. Sat. viii.

yet accustomed to the Roman yoke, and in which therefore prudence alone might have recommended the utmost caution. The mode of administration introduced by the biographer's hero stands out in striking contrast from the customary and hacknied practice.* First of all, Agricola kept his own house and people in order, which most men find a harder task than to regulate whole provinces. He suffered none but domestic matters to be transacted by slaves or freedmen, and never allowed those whom he employed in state affairs to be thrust upon him by family connections, requests, or recommendations. We learn from the same authority, that the emperors applied to their prefects, and the latter to their subordinate officers, similar rules of policy to those which are observed by Turkish sovereigns towards their pachas; that is to say, they gave full swing to their extortions, and then swept the amount into their own treasury. Tacitus says, that Agricola preferred to employ persons in the department of collecting the revenue, of whom he could be confident they would commit no malversation, than persons whose transgressions he could afterwards punish. He endeavored to alleviate the pressure of extraordinary requisitions, whether of money or grain, by providing for their equal distribution, and especially by tolerating none of the tricks which enriched subordinates, and which were much more oppressive even than the requisitions themselves. As an example of such tricks, it may be mentioned, that in Britain deliveries of grain were required to be made at great distances; and people who were forced to sell their own corn cheap at home were compelled to pay dear for the same commodity in another place, in order to comply with the terms of the public requisition.

We must not, however, lose sight of the better side of monarchical government, especially when a good prince happened to be on the throne, and delegated powers were held by upright men in the provinces. The strict superintendence and decisive will of a monarch had become indispensably necessary everywhere, since patriotism had yielded to petty, personal, and family interests. Thus, for example, the towns of Asia Minor enjoyed many immunities, which had been granted and confirmed at different times. Against the violation of these the emperors generally provided, and committed the decision of doubtful cases to the senate. That body, advised of abuses which had arisen from these privileges, and especially from the right of sanctuary,† instituted a legal investigation of the original documents on which the claim to these privileges was founded. The consuls were commissioned to examine the archives of the towns included in this inquiry, and on finding any flaw in legality (*si qua iniquitas involveretur*,) to submit the case to the judgment of the senate. The necessity of some superintendence of the towns, and the present unfitness of regulations which once might have been excellent, are abundantly displayed by Pliny, who, as prefect, and as a personal friend of his emperor, had particularly attended to the internal affairs of the towns in Bithynia.

* Tacit. Agric. c. 19.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. iii. c. 60.

In Prusa he found that the revenues of the town were shamefully squandered, owing to an understanding between those who conducted the expenditure and those who audited the accounts.* In Nicomedia, the monies which had been destined to construct an aqueduct had been fraudulently diverted from public uses†: in Nicæa and Claudiopolis, large sums had been unwarrantably lavished on theatres, wrestling schools, and baths. Strict surveillance of authority was obviously necessary to keep in order the magistrates of such towns, or the families which monopolised their local administration; but such surveillance sometimes might be dangerous, and was always troublesome; and particular towns had obtained for themselves the privilege that their accounts should be submitted to no inspection. We learn this from the remonstrance of the city of Apamea against the interference of Pliny; to which Trajan replied, that the mere inspection of their accounts could not possibly intrench on, or be contrary to, their privileges. These privileges very much resembled those of our own corporations, and only so far exceeded them as the Roman senate had less power to deal with vested rights than the English parliament.

The whole administration of the Roman empire would have taken an oriental aspect almost from the outset, had not republican forms been from time to time resumed, and the newly adopted courtly etiquette and ceremonial disused by individual emperors. Under Augustus no trace of court-regulations yet existed: many of the great people around him adopted in their houses far greater formality than he did. Under Tiberius little alteration was made in that respect, though he himself chose to be inaccessible. But the freedmen into whose hands under Caligula and Claudius fell all the transactions, of the cabinet, and who monopolised the confidence of the sovereign, presided over a regular court, which acquired by degrees a fixed order. Under the last-named emperor and his successor Nero, first appeared indications of the oriental regimen of a later period. We find subordinate officers stationed to bar the entrance of the palace to all except certain privileged persons; and even these had to undergo a search for concealed weapons. In the interior we find chamberlains, and a high chamberlain, who permitted access to the sovereign only to their own friends, or to persons of a certain rank.‡ A similar invention to our modern orders and decorations was devised, in order to gratify the vain by outward distinctions; whereas merit had been formerly distinguished by promotion to public offices termed honorary (*honores*.) The new decoration consisted in a gold medallion of the emperor set in a ring, and worn upon the finger. The above-mentioned court-functionaries took special care that no one should be allowed to wear this badge of distinction who was not strictly entitled to it; and every one who presumed without special permission to wear it was punish-

* Plin. Epist. lib. x. ep. 28. et. 34.

† Ibid. ep. 46.

‡ The slaves or freedmen who exercised this function Seneca calls *cohorte interioris admissionis*. The office we have distinguished by the title of high chamberlain was designated in later times *magister admissionum*. The thing was introduced in the times of Claudius and Nero; the title is of later invention.

ed severely.* Vespasian checked the progress of these frivolous innovations; and he and his successor strove, so far as the circumstances permitted, to restore the form of the ancient constitution. Domitian, indeed, re-enacted the Claudian and Neronian follies; but Trajan and his immediate successors trod anew in Vespasian's footsteps.

The elevated sentiments and simple mode of life of the emperors who followed Domitian might have restored the ancient order of things, not only in form but in substance, were re-establishment in such cases as easy as destruction. But a total change of relations had taken place between the ranks of society, as well as in the discipline and order of domestic life. The facility of life which had existed in former times was gone. Every one who aimed at the distinctions of society must be prepared with the means of satisfying certain artificial wants, and of following certain artificial fashions. The man of wealth and power stood far remote from his poorer client; and, as in modern times, every other consideration was merged in anxious care for the means of respectable existence. In former times, and even under Tiberius, the different styles of dress, of fare, of furniture, and domestic establishment, created no distinctions of rank; it was even esteemed more honorable, in all these arrangements, to cultivate the old Roman simplicity, than to make an ostentatious display; and in this respect Tiberius himself, as Tacitus remarks, adhered to the ancient usages: however he might swerve from them in other respects, he was frugal at least. In Martial's representations of his own times, the Roman mode of living had more resemblance to that of modern times. Whether the toga was made of Laconian, or Parmesan, or of coarser wool;† whether the dye of the cloak was genuine purple, or some cheap imitation; are treated of as points of high importance. The case was the same with household furniture—a table of the thuja root, with a claw of silver or ivory, marked the man of correct breeding; he whose table was beech or oak could have no admittance to good society.‡ In the same mannner cookery and plate were matters of great moment: sea-fish could only be served up to a man of rank on golden dishes, set with precious stones; and his banqueting halls were filled with troops of attendants.§

All the families of the first rank, says Tacitus, during the reigns of the first Cæsars, ruined themselves by the extravagant expense of their table and general mode of living, because it was still permitted, under those reigns, to cultivate popularity at home, and establish connections with foreign princes and whole provinces by largesses and lavish hospitalities. This required a princely expenditure; the great man's whole establishment must be placed upon a footing to excite the ad-

† Plin. Hist. Nat. lib. xxxiii. c. 12.

† Mart. Epigr. lib. ii. ep. 43

‡ The poet adds, that his wretched table does not even stand fast;—

“Tu Libycos Indis suspendis dentibus orbes,
Fulcitur testa fagina mensa mihi.”

§ “Grex tuus Iliaco poterat certare cinædo,
At mihi succurrit pro Ganymede manus.”—*Mart. l. c. v. 14.*

miration of clients and foreigners. When the reign of terror and massacre commenced, when high repute and celebrity became suspicious qualities, the line of moderation (*sapientia*) was adopted; and retrenchments were made in the former scale of expenditure. Moreover, since that period, persons obtained admission into the senate who in point of fact were not Romans, but citizens of the free towns, of the colonies, or even of the provinces; and who brought the prudent habits which they had practised at home into the capital. Though many of these senators acquired wealth in their later years, yet, on the whole, they still adhered to their old customs. Vespasian, in particular, says Tacitus, in these respects gave an improved tone to Roman society. His whole external arrangements, his table, and mode of living, were adapted to the sobriety of strict and ancient usage; and, since Domitian was followed by a long succession of princes, who in this respect resembled Vespasian, the reformation of manners which he had commenced continued its progress.

It has already been mentioned, that rank lost its importance since freedmen came to amass enormous riches, to take the supreme conduct of the government, and to look upon the senators as their creatures. The wealth of a Pallas, Callistus, Narcissus, says Pliny,* was beyond comparison, greater than that of Crassus, whose opulence had in earlier times passed into a proverb. A person who had only the amount of property which qualified, of old, for equestrian rank, must have stood in a somewhat similar relation to a man like Caius Claudius Isodorus, of whom Pliny has made particular mention, as a Russian noble of moderate possessions to a Demidoff. The number of equestrians who actually did not possess the legal qualification, but were smuggled in as it were by trick, or kept their place on the roll by favor, or had received from imperial bounty the necessary sum to support their title, was extremely great. Accordingly, the equestrian order, or inferior nobility, entirely lost its ancient importance. It appears, from the writers of those times, that the lowered value of money reduced to an insignificant sum the equestrian qualification; that the great men raised their dependants to that rank; and that many forced themselves into it by sheer begging. Martial, in particular, begged and sued in the most degrading manner, with the shameless importunity of a Peter Aretin, and railed at those who did not give with sufficient liberality in almost every book of his epigrams. Juvenal, in a passage where he complains that prostitution alone received rewards from the great men of his age, twits them with having no scruple to elevate any trumpeter or horn-blower to equestrian rank, if he had but served their infamous lusts.† Pliny's letters afford an example of elevation to that rank from less dishonorable motives, but still as an instance of lordly patronage.‡

* Hist. Nat. lib. xxxiii. c. 47.

† "Quadringenta dedit Gracchus sestertia dotem
Cornicini, sive hic recto cantaverat ære."

Juv. Sat. ii. v. 117.

‡ This person was one Romanus Firmus, an old acquaintance and fellow townsman of Pliny, who writes to him as follows with regard to the conduct which he

Petronius has delineated the mode of life of the Roman grandees. We learn also from Juvenal, that the arrangements of the table, and the art of carving, were taught in Rome in celebrated schools, and practised on wooden imitations of different sorts of viands.* Petronius describes the carvers as a sort of pantomimic performers, who entertained the society with motions of their hands and arms, in time to a musical accompaniment, and astonished them by the dexterity with which they performed their work of dissection.† The expenses incurred in building country-houses, paths, and palaces, kept pace with those of the table, and of the general establishment;‡ and none of the minor arts were wanting, by which life is embellished in times when civilisation musters all its vices and virtues, and encourages all the departments of art and industry through which wealth spreads downwards, from the higher to the middling, and even to the lower classes, raising the latter to far higher importance in the social scale than belonged to them in earlier times.

The stimulus given to other occupations by a luxurious capital extended, in an especial manner, to those connected with architecture. The edifices of older times were designed less for the uses of private life than for the service of the gods, or of the commonwealth. Temples, monuments, halls, aqueducts, and theatres, were then erected, instead of piles for private splendor and luxury. Times were, however, altered now. Palaces resembling towns, a description which especially applies to the *golden house* of Nero, country-houses of vast extent, baths, and other structures destined for personal and direct utility, were erected in greater numbers than at any former period. Meanwhile public works, highways, bridges, canals, and harbors, if no longer projected by the civic spirit of former times, as offerings to the glory of the commonwealth, were actively promoted by the better class of provincial governors; and still more by the zeal for improvement or vanity of successive emperors. Passing over the public works undertaken by earlier emperors (some of the more important of which have been mentioned in the foregoing pages,) we would pause to notice the great undertakings accomplished under the reign of Trajan; especially the magnificent highway, extending from the farthest extremity of the provinces on the Black Sea into Gaul; and the library which bore

expects of him in acknowledgement of benefit received:—"Te memorem hujus muneris amicitiae nostrae diuturnitas spondet. Ego ne illud quidem admoneo, quod admonere deberem, nisi te scirem sponte facturum, ut dignitate a me data quam modestissime, ut a me data, utare," &c. &c.

* "Sed nec structor erit, cui cedere debeat omnis
Pergula, discipulus Tripheri doctoris, apud quem
Lumine cum magno lepus atque aper et pygargus,
Et Scythicæ volucres et phœnicopterus ingens,
Et Gætulus oryx, hebeti lautissima ferro
Cæditur, et tota sonat ulmea cœna Suburra."

Juv. Sat. xi. v. 136

† "Processit statim scissor et ad symphoniam ita gesticulatus laceravit obsonium, ut putares Darium hydraule cantante pugnare."—Petr. Sat. p. 63.

‡ Juv. Sat. xiv. v. 8. et seq.

his name, and remained, till the age of Constantine, the principal public library in Rome. In Mœsia and Dacia, in Bithynia, Spain, and Lusitania, Trajan either himself directed the execution of public works, such as bridges, roads, and canals, or at least encouraged provinces and cities to conduct such undertakings on their own account. Hadrian built at a furious rate. Temples, aqueducts, bridges, libraries, were reared by his directions in Rome, in Athens; in every place, to be brief, which he delighted to honor. Even Egypt, where there were almost too many old buildings, he loaded with new; founded a new city; and favored with new endowments and new buildings the museum of Alexandria, already an opulent institution. He chose the site for his own monument by the bridge which he built over the Tiber, and there erected a pile which from the first resembled a fortress, and which serves the purpose of one at the present day. Imperial magnificence was emulated; and many splendid piles were reared by wealthy individuals: so that Juvenal, apparently with reason, refers to the rage for building (especially country-houses) the ruin of great families. How far fools were likely to push extravagance in point of building, may best be inferred from the celebrated description which has been given of his country-house by Pliny, one of the wisest and best men to be found in the whole imperial annals.

The whole system of social life, in these times, became dependent on the emperor's "high personality;" and even the more enlightened class of rulers could restore nothing like freedom of movement or action in a population which was ready to flatter every tyrant, and every vice of every tyrant, in order to obtain the means of luxurious enjoyment. The centralisation of all power in the courtly focus was farther promoted by all the monarchical establishments, even those of prime celebrity, which were founded from the times of Vespasian down to those of the Antonies. Of this a few may be cited, out of innumerable examples. Salaried officers, properly, so called, were rare in earlier times. Indemnification, indeed, was given for time and expense in public business; but a profession and a maintenance could only be sought in private pursuits. A total change took place in this respect since the times of Vespasian. That even superior officers received salaries since those times, clearly appears from a passage in Pliny's epistles, where he refers a case, relating to the payment of an officer's salary, to the decision of the emperor and the senate. The functionary, concerning whose pay the question had arisen, was the principal law officer of the quæstor of a province, who was designated only by the humble title of *scriba*. That officer died before the expiration of the term at which his annual salary, payable by the quæstor, became due; and the quæstor was uncertain to whom he should pay the amount, which was claimed at once by the heir and the public treasury. The senate decided in favor of the treasury.*

As public men, so professors of science, became dependent on government. Teachers received salaries, scholars stipends, and endowments were founded by the emperors and by wealthy individuals. Not

* Plin. Epist. lib. iv. ep. 12.

only individual men of learning received pensions; not only institutions like the learned academies of our times, such as the museum of Alexandria, were supported by public grants; but even common private schools were dependent for their permanence on payments from the treasury. Thus education ceased to be the concern of individuals, and became a matter of public regulation. This change was undoubtedly advantageous in some points of view, and harmonised completely with the genius of an absolute monarchy: but, on the other hand, it naturalised, for the first time, in the schools of antiquity, that formal and mechanical routine, the curse of modern establishments. A single instance may serve to show the nature of the evils which arose from the endowment of public schools and the payment of public teachers. Pliny came to Como, where he played a somewhat similar part to that which is assumed by a petty prince or noble in modern times in the village or town which belongs to him, or in whose neighborhood he has large estates. His fellow-townsmen wait upon him, and amongst them a youth who had studied at Milan, because there was no institution for the higher branches of science at Como. Hereupon Pliny urges the town of Como to establish and pay teachers of their own; offers himself to contribute a considerable sum for the endowment of an institution of the kind which was deficient, and writes to devolve on Tacitus the commission of looking out for teachers; declaring that he would willingly advance the whole amount required, if he were not afraid that an institution thus richly endowed by him, might turn out like other foundations of the same kind, to the support of which those for whose advantage they existed were not called on to pay any direct contribution.* It appears that many endowments existed in which the teachers received salaries, but that these funds were too frequently diverted to the uses of the relations and dependants of the patrons or the magistracy. Consequently, Pliny's intention was, that his fellow townsmen should subscribe to the new institution, and in return elect their own professors; as then they would be sure to take care that a proper use was made of their money.

The support of libraries, orphan asylums, and other charitable endowments, even before Christianity enforced it as a religious duty, engaged in the times of which we treat the attention of the government, as well as of private persons who aimed at a nobler immortality than such as could be bought by the establishment of public games. Pliny himself states the amount of his bounty to an orphan establishment; he assigned for its support the rents of a highly productive property,† considering that he thus made the best possible provision for the maintenance of the charity and the due cultivation of the estate.

It is obvious that the intestine commotions, impoverishment of the towns, barbarian inroads, and all the other evils which shortly beset

* "Totum enim pollicerer nisi timerem, ne hoc munus meum quandoque ambitu corrumpetur, ut accidere multis in locis video, in quibus præceptores publici conducuntur."—*Plin. Ep. lib. iv. ep. 13.*

† "Pro quingentis millibus nummum, quæ in alimenta ingenuorum promiseram, agrum ex meis, longe pluris, actori publico mancipavi."—*Plin. Epist. lib. iii. ep. 8.*

the empire, were of necessity the more ruinous in their consequences the more individuals gradually accustomed themselves to look for the supply of their private wants to public sources, and that a moment's failure of these sources might stop the whole machine. Augustus had begun by greatly diminishing the number of citizens to whom corn was gratuitously distributed; but he afterwards allowed them to increase again to 200,000, as he thought it better policy to conciliate stout *lazzaroni* at the expense of the respectable citizens, than to surround himself with guards, and play the military despot unmasked. On no occasion, however, did he distribute for life those tablets which entitled the holder to receive a certain portion of bread or grain, but a new one must be applied for once a month, or at least thrice a year. Nevertheless, these excessive largesses attracted from all parts people into the city, who renounced labor and relied on the public granaries for subsistence. Philo states, in the account of his embassy to Caligula, that even his Jewish countrymen had a share of these gratuities; and that when the *pay-day* fell upon the Sabbath, it was held to be the duty of the officers charged with the distribution to pay the Jews their quota on the following day.

Trajan, with the best intentions, introduced a fresh nuisance; the effect of which must have resembled that of the English poor laws. He added 5000 children to the numbers to whom grain was distributed, and had their names inscribed in books or on copper plates, in order that the distributors might know them. This conduct found imitators, as we have seen in the instance of Pliny. Hadrian immediately on his accession increased the amount of the distribution and the numbers of those entitled to it.* Antoninus and L. Verus gave still farther extension to these burthensome liberalities; and permitted to partake in them, not only the sons, but also the daughters, of citizens, including those who had only recently gained their manumission.†

If Hadrian and the first Antoninus exercised a strenuous control over the administration of justice, the crying abuses which had crept in justified their interference. Fees and perquisites of all sorts had sprouted up under various pretexts, of which nothing was known in ancient Rome. Juvenal paints advocates at once rapacious and ostentatious, who pleaded for pay, not as before for honor, and sought to make a great appearance of opulence and station, in order to get higher fees from their clients. "The best speaker," says Juvenal, "if he appears with modest exterior, will be fobbed off with a present of fruit or vegetables, or fish, or perhaps with a few bottles of wine; or if he ever gets gold, he has to divide it with notaries and attorneys."‡

* "Pueris ac puellis, quibus etiam Trajanus alimenta detulerat, incrementum liberalitatis adjecit."—*Æl. Spart. Adrian.* c. vi.

† "Ob hanc conjunctionem pueros et puellas novorum hominum frumentariæ perceptioni adscribi præceperunt."—*Jul. Capitolin. in M. Anton. Philos.* c. vii.

‡ "Rumpe miser tensum jecur, ut tibi lasso
Figantur virides, scalarum gloria, palmæ
Quid vocis pretium? Siccus petasunculus et vas
Pelamydum, aut veteres Afrorum epimenia, bulbi,
Aut vinum Tiberi devectum, quinque lagenæ.

Rich presents and high fees he only receives who makes figure beyond his means, whose ancestors and their triumphal trophies stand him in the stead of personal merit, and who turns into a trade that which those ancestors viewed as a civic duty.*

With regard to other public burthens, the forced labor on the roads, the requisitions of the imperial posts, the exactions of the subordinate officers, the passage of troops, and the journies of the emperors, grew more and more onerous. We learn from medals, that Nerva relieved the inhabitants of Italy from the burthensome service of forwarding the imperial treasures, despatches, baggage, and persons who were privileged to travel free. Hadrian even intended, what however he never executed, to take the whole expense of the imperial post on the treasury. The journies of former princes had been worse than a new tax to the districts which they passed through: every thing they stood in need of was put in requisition, so that their stay in any particular place ruined the whole neighborhood. Of Domitian's journies, Pliny says expressly that they were viewed as a regular public scourge and pestilence, and justly so; for he every where ousted the tenants of the principal houses, where he thought proper to quarter himself and his suite, and carried off, or at least allowed his followers to carry off, the furniture, slaves, and cattle of the owners.† Trajan and Hadrian, indeed, travelled after a different fashion; yet the emperor Antoninus affirmed that even their journies oppressed the provinces.‡

The progressive increase in public expenditure, even under the best princes, rendered a new and oppressive scheme of taxation unavoidable. Public games, such as were held by Nero and Domitian, continued to be held, as required for the glory of their administration, by the soberest and most economical emperors: such exhibitions, however, called for extraordinary resources, and swallowed up all previous savings.

The system of taxation, which we have mentioned in a former chap-

Si quater egisti, si contigit anreus unus,
Inde cadunt partes in fœdere pragmaticorum."

Juv. Sat. vii. v. 117.

- * "Emturus pueros, argentum, myrrhina, villas,
Spondet enim Tyrio stalaria purpura filo.
Et tamen hoc ipsis est utile, purpura vendit
Caussidicum, vendunt amethystina, convenit illis
Et strepitu et facie majoris vivere census.
Sed finem impensæ non servat prodiga Roma.
Ut redeant veteres; Ciceroni nemo ducentos
Nunc dederit nummos, nisi fulserit annulas ingens."

Juv. Sat. v. 133.

† "Quam dissimilis nuper alterius principis transitus, si tamen transitus ille, non populatio fuit, quum abactus hospitum exerceret, omniaque dextra lævaque perusta et atria, ut si vis aliqua, vel ipsi illi barbari. quos fugiebat, inciderent."
—*Plin. Panegyric. c. xx.*

‡ "Nec ullas expeditiones obiit (Antoninus,) nisi quod ad agros suos provectus est, et ad Campaniam, dicens, gravem esse provincialibus comitatum principis etiam nimis parci."—*Jul. Capitol. Antonin. Pius, c. 7.*

ter as originally adopted by Caligula was too convenient not to be persisted in by subsequent rulers, even though particular imposts were taken off from time to time. The taxes on law proceedings, for instance, which Caius had imposed, were abolished in the next reign; while the tax of the fortieth penny on every purchase and sale, or other conveyance of property, was retained. Nero took it off, but soon reimposed it; Galba again relinquished it; but Vespasian found it could not be dispensed with, and levied it once more. The case was the same with the tax upon successions, and on the sale of slaves. The former tax was limited by Trajan to such transmissions of property as were made not to the nearest in blood; new modifications of it were introduced by Antoninus, who was surnamed the Philosopher. In a state where every thing had to be cared for and regulated by government, where no individual viewed the public interests as his own, it was impossible for the best prince, with the best disposition to do so, to raise an adequate revenue except by the most tyrannical means. Extraordinary commissions for the reduction of public expenditure, such as Trajan appointed (*quinqueviri ad minuendos sumtus*,) availed not much. The provinces not only suffered from the ever increasing pressure of taxes, but from the loans which they were forced to receive from wealthy Romans or banking companies, who had at any time the power of calling in capital and interest.

It has already been observed, that the increased circulation of money, with the increased demand for the luxuries and conveniences of life, encouraged the branches of art and trade connected with these objects, and gave employment to numerous hands which would otherwise have been idle. Carriages and litters were roofed in, and had glass windows; the manufacture of silver mirrors, of glass, and especially of crystal, were carried to high perfection, as clearly appears even from the fragments of ancient vessels made of that material. The increased employment of silver in plate and all descriptions of utensils, augmented the number and skill of the workmen in that metal; and the fashion of founding libraries, and of thinking them indispensable to any pretensions to style in private houses, gave importance to the manufacture of paper, and to the book trade.

On the manufacture of paper, of which more frequent use was made than of parchment in the reigns of the later emperors, Pliny (in the thirteenth book of his Natural History) has afforded very circumstantial details. He tells us that up to the time of Augustus the Romans were in the habit of using, without any farther preparation, the paper made of papyrus by the Egyptians, which was chiefly manufactured at Alexandria. Under Augustus two new sorts of paper were made in Rome out of the paper called *hieratic*, imported from Egypt. Afterwards, the grammarian Rhemnius Fannius Palæmon established in Rome a very extensive paper manufactory, where the inferior paper made at the amphitheatre in Alexandria, and thence named, was worked up into paper of the finest quality. Under Claudius new manufacturing processes were adopted, in all which, however, the Egyptian raw material was made use of.

Of the book trade, we have already remarked that it flourished in

Rome in the time of Augustus: since the reign of Vespasian it also became extended over the provinces. Not indigent poets alone, like Martial, who speaks frequently of the price of works, but men of rank and station, were not ashamed to receive remuneration for their writings. The elder Pliny was procurator of Spain when one of his countrymen offered him a considerable sum for his immense collection of extracts from the books he had read at different times. The diffusion of the book trade more particularly took place in Gaul, where Roman studies were pursued with extraordinary diligence. At Marseilles there was an institution for Greek education and literature, which was visited even in preference to Athens by men of the highest rank. A large institution existed of the same kind at Autun; and Tacitus calls that city the principal seat of Latin culture. With regard to the book trade of Lyons, we have the younger Pliny's testimony; for he states that he learned with some surprise from a friend, that his own discourses and writings were publicly sold there.

Taste for art was intimately connected with taste for literature; and most of the works which have served as models to later artists, belong to the times of which we are now treating. Works of art, especially busts, were essential decorations in libraries. In this, indeed, as in every thing else, luxury ruled paramount, and costliness was often valued far higher than art. Fashion, however, rendered works of art as indispensable as ordinary furniture. Nero carried everywhere about with him in his travels the "Amazon" of the artist Strongylion; and Caius Cestius, who was consul under the reign of Tiberius, dragged a favorite statue with him on his campaigns, and into battle.

The progress of luxury in building may be gathered from Pliny's description of his renowned Laurentine villa; as Pliny certainly did not belong to the number of those lordly spendthrifts who ruined themselves by enormous architectural undertakings. We find from a passage in Pliny's letters, that numerous works of art which had formerly been the ornament of public places and temples, were now buried in private houses and gardens, as many a masterpiece is at this day in the mansions of the English nobility. According to the uniform testimony of the wisest and best men who adorned the period from Augustus to Hadrian, a principal source of depravation in taste as well as in morals was, the spectacles and games of the circus. The influence of these sanguinary conflicts on the state of manners has been spoken of in a former part of our work: it remains to be mentioned in this place, that all the emperors since Tiberius seemed to take an interest, not only in satisfying the popular taste for these shows, but in encouraging a numerous attendance. The corrupting effect of these games on the female sex is what is chiefly deplored by the writers of these times; and this is very conceivable when we reflect on the nature of the pantomimes, and on the sort of musical strains which were imported into Rome from Asia, and, as Juvenal says, especially from Spain. The effect of such amusements on the higher class of females is depicted, in one point of view, by Juvenal in his sixth satire; in another, by Cæcina, as reported by Tacitus.

Here, however, we must not rely too far upon Tacitus or the satirists, whose vocation is to dwell upon the dark side of things. The times of which we are treating afford instances of the fairest fruits of the general aim at mental cultivation; only, unluckily, we find the better spirits of those times on the false scent which leads to so many pernicious errors in our own days. A relaxed tone of mind, conceit, and unprofitable reveries, originated partly in the imperial times, as in our own, from the over anxious and sedulous superintendence of accomplished mothers. We learn from scattered passages in Pliny's epistles, that mothers in these times, as well as their counsellors and friends, entertained a settled persuasion that every thing may be drilled into every human being by cultivation; and that childhood may be moulded at will, and guided in leading-strings up to youth, without losing a jot of original energy, and without being made sick of all intellectual exertion. Examples of success attending this method of culture will scarcely be found in the male sex; it is otherwise with females. We find in Pliny an instance of the excellent effects produced by careful training of this sort, which the femal sex undoubtedly needs.

It must however be acknowledged, that the ancient education and energies, sincere and heartfelt interest in science and art for their own sake, modes of living simple, yet embellished by all real refinements, had not entirely vanished in the times of which we are treating. We find individual specimens of the old-fashioned activity of pursuits closed by the old-fashioned retirement in advanced age. These traits are the more striking, as they come out quite incidentally, like commonplace and every-day things; while ill examples are carefully culled by satirists and historians.

In this view should be read Pliny's account of the country life of Spurinna. The old man (of seventy-seven) is represented as dividing his time betwixt the free enjoyment of nature in moderate out-door exercise, reading, writing, composing, and instructive conversation with his friends on scientific subjects. His country estate is tastefully laid out, but not overloaded with the apparatus of luxury: his house stands ever open to a well-selected society; his table handsomely covered, but at no extravagant cost; his plate and furniture finished with art, and valuable without ostentation.

Martial gives another example of active life, conducted mainly after the old manner, and reckons, hour by hour, the distribution of time observed by his patron. The first and second hours of the morning are given to the reception of clients; in the third, he appears either in the seat or at the bar of justice; in the fifth, he transacts economical or other affairs in the city; the sixth is sacred to mid-day repose; in the seventh he despatches any remaining city business; the eighth is spent in the bath, and in those corporeal exercises which are considered to be healthful after bathing. About nine o'clock in the evening is the set time for the principal meal; ten is the hour for hearing recitation or reading and Martial hopes at this hour to find audience for his epigrams.

While corruption was diffused from Rome to the farthest ends of

the ancient world, her literature and language, on the other hand, became objects of universal interest. In Gaul, Britain, and Africa, educational institutions were founded, which disputed the palm with those of Rome and Italy. The disadvantages of general and superficial mental culture, the dissipation of mind, and disinclination for deep study in learners, the vanity and mercenary motives of teachers, are closely linked with the reigning state of literature in those times, and will come again under review in the course of the remarks which we have now to make on the literary character of this period.

CHAPTER VI.

LITERATURE.

BEFORE proceeding to treat of the general character, or of the more remarkable performances, of literature in these times, or to estimate the taste then prevalent, indicated by these performances, it may be requisite to cast a glance on the modes of instruction and education, that we may be better able to infer the qualities of the fruit from the seed and from the manner of sowing. We might begin with the delineation made by Juvenal (who has devoted the whole of his seventh satire to this subject) and Persius of the school masters, rhetoricians, and advocates then most in repute, and should find in that delineation a striking resemblance to similar classes daily to be met with in our capitals. But, as the traits might seem too cutting, and the whole too much a caricature, we prefer taking our information from two other works of different dates, and written with a different design. To these we shall add the evidence of a third author, who is for several reasons quite an unexceptionable witness.

In the first place, then, Petronius, a man of the world, and a man of fashion, in the fragment of his work which is extant, introduces his *Encolpius* expatiating in colloquy, with not less bitter contempt than Juvenal, on the empty declamation of the rhetoricians and their schools, in which the most out-of-the-way subjects are treated without the slightest regard to nature or probability.* His account of the scholastic training of those times coincides exactly with the indications given by Persius, with Quintilian's more detailed evidence, and with what is made out by historical examples from his own times by the author of the admirable dialogue, *De Oratoribus*, frequently attributed to Tacitus. Persius derides the forensic eloquence, which diffuses itself in lengthy antithetical excursions, when the case turns on some simple matter of fact. Seneca tells Cestius, the most popular teacher of his times, to his face, in his own school, that he will prove to him before all his scholars how void of taste is his whole system of rhetoric.† Quintilian expressly contrasts with the method of Cestius his

* Juvenal describes these puerile exercises in his seventh satire :

“Declamare doces ? O ferrea pectora, Vecti,
Cum perimit sævos classis numerosa tyrannos.
Nam quæcunque sedens modo legerat, eadem stans
Proferet, atque eadem cantabit versibus isdem ;
Occidit miseros crambe repetita magistros.”

† Wolf has made use of this anecdote, as illustrative of these times, in the preface to his edition of the four discourses ascribed to Cicero, published in Berlin, 1801.

own advice, that the orator should form himself by practising on real cases after existing models.*

The author of the dialogue *De Oratoribus*, who examines the individual characteristics of false eloquence, and sets forth the method of older times in contrast with the new, corroborates the foregoing representations.† He investigates historically the labors of his own times, mentions by name distinguished individuals, and lastly, describes the exercises generally prescribed to youth.‡ Here we find the same causes at work which, in our own times produce the same effects under similar circumstances. Parents are eager to see their sons placed as early as possible in some employment of profit and of honor; science and knowledge in their eyes are quite secondary matters; they only want their ears tickled with sonorous declamation; instruction for themselves or their sons is the last thing they care about. The students, on their part, misled by early indulged presumption and arrogance, impose as if were the law of a false taste upon their teachers; and the latter grasping at money and at momentary applauses, surrender depth and soundness at the call of profit or vanity. Might not this contemporary description of the times we are treating of equally suit the state of things which is daily observable around us?—As the matter is of high import, we will hear the statements of two witnesses of wholly different characters, and who lived in different times. Petronius shall speak first, as he traces these evils step by step in the answer to the above-mentioned observations of Encolpius; and no one will question his knowledge of mankind and of his own times. He begins the above-mentioned answer by congratulating the youth who had spoken on being exempt from the infection of the taste prevailing in these times, and showing a very unfashionable soundness of understanding.|| “And therefore,” he says, “you deserve that I should open to you the the internal sources and ramifications of this matter. The teachers are not to blame for the setting of these absurd exercises; *they* are compelled to follow fools in their folly. Did they not deliver prelections such as the young folks liked to hear, they might remain,

* “Et quod in gladiatoribus fieri videmus, in rebus actis exerceatur: ut fecisse Brutum diximus pro Milone. Melius hoc quam rescribere veteribus orationibus, ut fecit Cestius contra Ciceronis actionem habitam pro eodem, cum alteram partem satis nosse non posset ex sola defensione.”—*Instit. Orator.* l. x. c. v. in fin.

† “Neque enim oratorius iste, imo hercle ne virilis quidem cultus est, quo plerique temporum nostrorum actores ita utuntur, ut lascivia verborum et levitate sententiarum et licentia compositionis histrionales modos expriment; quodque vix auditu fas esse debeat, laudis et gloriæ et ingenii loco plerique jactant, cantari saltarique commentarios suos. Unde oritur fœda illa et præpostera, sed tamen frequens quibusdam exclamatio, ut oratores nostri lenere dicere, histriones diserte saltare dicantur.”—*Dialog. de Orator* c. xxvi.

‡ “..... Suasoriæ materiæ pueris controversiæ robustioribus assignantur. Sic fit, ut tyrannicidarum præmia, aut vitiatarum electiones (marriages of the seduced by the seducers,) aut pestilentia remedia, aut incesta matrum, aut quidquid in schola quotidie agitur, in foro vel raro vel nunquam, ingentibus verbis, persequantur.”—*Dialog. de Orator.* c. xxxv. in fin.

|| “Quoniam sermonem habes non publici saporis, et, quod rarissimum est amas bonam mentem, non fraudabo te arte secreta.”

as Cicero says, alone in their schools. Even as the parasites who are asked to table by great people can have no other thought than how to recommend themselves to their entertainers, and can have no other way of doing this than by tickling their ears as adroitly as possible; even so, in our days, the teacher of rhetoric may sit like a fisher on his rock, without hope of a bite, if he does not fasten a bait to his hook attractive to his intended victims. After all, then, where lies the evil? The PARENTS merit the whole blame; they do not wish their children to receive instruction according to the true though severe method. If they would allow time for the studies of their children to be prosecuted in regular succession; for the minds of the students to be formed, and the lessons of wisdom impressed upon them by the careful and thorough perusal of great writers; for their powers of composition to be matured and improved in proportion as they learned to select good models for imitation; in short, if they knew any better than their children how to estimate the true value of the tinsel which imposes on a childish taste, these empty declamations must assuredly gain more solidity. Now-a-days our orators trifle like striplings in the schools; like striplings excite laughter in the forum; and what is worse, in their old age they cannot be brought to acknowledge, that the perverse training given them in youth was as perverse as it is.

These strictures of a very competent judge are confirmed in every point by Quintilian the contemporary of Domitian and of Trajan. He speaks first of Cestius and his compeers, and of the false taste introduced by them in oratory; relates how Seneca took up arms against the inflation and extravagance displayed by rhetoricians of that school, and introduced a new description of eloquence, diametrically opposed to that of Cestius. He censures the studied brevity, and enigmatical obscurities, and love of point and antithesis in Seneca, but immediately adds, that he has not ventured to wage war to extremity with the false and corrupt taste of the times, and that Seneca being in every one's hands, he could not snatch him at once from students, and has therefore labored to substitute better models by degrees in his stead.*

LUCAN preserves the character of a better era in taste and feeling. He belonged to the number of Nero's early friends and companions; but the Stoic philosophy, which Vespasian discouraged for its republican tendency, taught him fortitude, and superiority to external glitter and vicious enjoyments. The *Pharsalia*, the only work of Lucan which has come down to us, is of greater value as history than as poetry; for he has there depicted, with at least as much of historical truth as poetic vividness, the scenes of civil warfare, and the characters of the distinguished leaders. The structure, the rhetorical graces, and music of his versification, are not, as in later writers, mere mechanical imitations of Virgil; his merits, like his faults, are his own. It is in the nature of historical poems, which, in truth, are but attempts to

* "Quod accidit mihi dum corruptum et omnibus vitiis fractum genus dicendi ad severiora revocare judicia contendo. Tum autem solus hic fere in manibus adolescentium fuit. Quem non equidem conabar excutere omnino, sed potioribus præferri non sinebam."

unite contradictions, that only particular passages and episodes in them can be poetical. But the Roman spirit, the noble contempt of all grovelling motives, the elevated sentiments which Lucan expressed in degraded times, impart a higher character to his poem than perhaps could have been given it by a greater force of imagination; and have stamped it, as we have said above, with historical importance, as most of the contemporary and native writers of those times have perished. Silius Italicus, who chose as a theme for heroic poetry the history of the second Punic war, and Valerius Flaccus, who made a better selection for an epic in the fabulous expedition of the Argonauts, are neither of them equal in renown to STATIUS, who has been designated justly by Dante as one who aimed not only at a happy imitation of Virgil, but at excelling him in certain characteristic beauties, and by approaching and appropriating Christian ideas. The five books of miscellaneous poetry, entitled *Sylvæ*, have, in later times, always been considered the best and most original part of his works; though in his own day, the *Achilleis*, in which he seeks to emulate Virgil, and the twelve books of the *Thebais*, in which Euripides haunts him throughout, were higher rated by the prevailing canons of artificial criticism.

Before making more particular mention of Seneca, as the founder and the model of the new school of rhetoric, who sought to substitute studied conciseness, dialectic subtleties, and periods built up of studied antitheses, for swelling phrase and high-sounding but empty declamation, we must briefly note the relation held by two other historians to the intellectual state of the times from Tiberius to Trajan. Velleius Paterculus naturally claims the first notice, as a pupil of the Augustan age, and court-historian under Tiberius. The purpose which is apparent in all his writings, and the artful combination of republicanism with creeping servility, are characteristic of times when truth went for nothing, art for every thing. He wrote to supply a demand, renewed in our own days in certain quarters, to present in a condensed, sententious, and highly polished style, a superficial survey of Roman history, so contrived as to throw an air of expediency, and even of necessity, on all the despotic measures of the existing government. To captivate the favor of the sombre tyrant, is in reality the aim of the aspiring historian; but in this aim he could only succeed, by succeeding at the same time in pleasing (not offending at least) a certain part of the Roman public. The history of Velleius, therefore, naturally divides itself into two unequal parts the one containing the pompous *Oraison Funèbre* of the past; the other, the courtly chronicle of the present. To execute a task like this required the easy mastery of style of the times of Horace and Asinius Pollio, as well as the brazen front of those of Sejanus. The narrative of the death of Cæsar furnishes the connecting link between the two sections of the work,—the first, which favors republics, and the second, which flatters despotism. Cæsar is blamed for not having maintained, by force of arms, the dominion which he reached by violence; by consequence, Tiberius is justified in defending his supreme power by prætorian guards. It is curious to be made acquainted how they viewed those matters at court, which a

statesman and stoic philosopher, like Tacitus, regarded under so different an aspect. The second work above referred to, which was written during the reign of Trajan, and adapted to the transitory enthusiasm for ancient Rome then re-awakened, is Florus's outline of history (*Epitome Rerum Romanarum*.) This work, of which the intention was to give a bird's eye view of the achievements of the Romans in the spirit which was just then popular, deserves no better the title of purely historical than the one first mentioned being written with an equally determinate (though different) aim as the history of Velleius Paterculus. It is evidently written for a public, whose intellectual habits resembled those which have encouraged historical abridgements in France. Ancient or modern, this manner of writing may be termed an attempt to cut up history into epigrams suited to readers of slender appetite. Florus expressly confined himself to the period which afforded the most eligible material for his fashionable tissue, and abstains, with caution and good heed, from overstepping the times of Augustus. His brevity, which often runs into absolute obscurity, alternates here and there with a pomp of words perfectly ludicrous. As, however, he only treats of things in the mass, and shuns particulars, or at most lumps them together in the manner of a summary, he has ample scope for exciting our astonishment by his gigantic groupings, or blinding our judgment with the flash of his sharp decisive sentences.

SENECA, though himself trained as a rhetorician, and skilled in all the arts of the schools, none of which he disdained the use of, nevertheless, as we learn from Quintilian, combated the prevailing taste with eminent success. His example, however, like that of so many others, shows that a people which once has lost all relish for truth and simplicity, never can again recover a just medium in taste, but is thenceforth doomed perpetually to oscillate betwixt extremes. Besides, how could a pure taste be expected of a man like Seneca, who, with all his merits, assumed at once the opposite parts of Stoic and courtier—a man who displayed the highest talent linked with deplorable littlenesses, and dishonored his own virtues by compliance with the vices of others. If the tragedies which are commonly ascribed to Seneca were written by the M. Annæus Seneca of whom we are now speaking, it must be owned, that the same man, who waged such vehement war with inflation in prose, has left us an extraordinary sample of bombast in poetry. The chorusses of these pieces are not devoid of beauty, and the dialogue contains many fine passages and exalted thoughts; but the bulk is made up of tumid and unnatural declamation, affected phrase, and everlasting anthesis. The poet's heroes speak like absurd braggarts,* and his gods are the mere crea-

* One example may be cited from amongst numberless others. In the "*Hercules Œtæus*" (v. 1376.,) the hero thus expresses himself:—

"Si me catenis horridus vinctum suis
Præberet avidæ Cancasus volucris dapem,
Scythia gemente, flebilis gemitus mihi
Non excidisset. Si vagæ Symplegades
Utraque premerent rupe, redeuntis minas
Ferrem ruinæ. Pindus incumbat mihi.

tures of his own imagination, not beings of poetical tradition endued with distinct characters, to which the poet owes faithful observance. However, the effect (indeed, the authorship) of Seneca's poetry cannot be so well traced as the influence of his prose writings. Here he stood forth the Cicero of his times, and exercised on style and taste an influence no less than that of Cicero himself. That the one was a rhetorician, while the other had been an orator; and that Cicero had figured as a statesman through his talents and virtues, while Seneca climbed to eminence as a courtier by adroitness and suppleness, mainly resulted from the difference of the men and times which they had to deal with. Seneca knew the world and mankind. His style, in which he was a master, was admirably suited to the philosophy which he taught; both were equally out of nature, but so was the whole spirit of his times, especially in the class of men to whom he addressed his writings.

The style chosen by Seneca is admirably suited to the Stoic dialectics and philosophy. The striking contrast of that system with the ordinary deportment of men, with Seneca's own conduct in life, and with all the fashionable pursuits of the classes for which his writings were intended, the graces of style, studied obscurities, and epigrammatic turns, like similar qualities in some of the French writers of the eighteenth century, kept the lazy reader in a passive yet pleasing state of excitement. The times were exactly fit to receive Seneca's instructions, as appears from the consideration acquired by the Stoic philosophy—as farther appears from the rapid propagation of Christianity, which in its doctrines and effects much coincided with the Stoic system. Under Hadrian, Epictetus obtained the all but entire predominance of the system for which Seneca had pioneered the way: under Marcus Aurelius, that system governed the empire. The only option left by the times to men of vigorous faculties, was, either to learn the lessons of resistance and endurance, or to snatch at all the means of enjoyment, and drown thought in wild dissipation.

TACITUS, who admired Seneca's eloquence and espoused his philosophy, whose sublime delineation of the last scenes of his life saved the honor of his master, and secured his immortality as the martyr of philosophy and virtue, shows in its best light the effect really produced by Seneca on the more exalted minds of his age. A noble spirit, instinct with the feeling of human virtue and dignity, full of admiration of older and better times could not hope, surrounded by baseness, and overshadowed by absolute power, to instruct the many. He stood, like Thucydides, too much above his age to be a popular writer; he only sought to instruct and strengthen the few minds which could comprehend him; and for this purpose Seneca's philosophy, and the style

Atque Hæmus, et qui Thracios fluctus Athos
Frangit, Jovisque fulmen excipiens Mimas.
Non, ipse si in me, mater, hic mundus ruat,
Superque nostros flagret incensus rogos
Phœbeus axis, degener mentem Herculis
Clamor domaret. Mille decurrant feræ,
Pariterque lacerent: hinc feris clangoribus
Ætherea me Stymphalis, hinc taurus minax," &c. &c.

which he had formed on Seneca's model, served him admirably. He narrated the course of events from the death of Augustus to that of Nero under the title of annals, of which there are lost the books between the seventh and tenth inclusive. The transactions of the period from Galba to Domitian, he wrote under the title of History. Of this history four books only are extant with part of the fifth.

A large part of the transactions treated of by Tacitus had come within his own eye-sight and knowledge: research, therefore, was less required than acuteness to seize, and skill to communicate, the characteristic features of his times. His task required a vigorous philosophy, in opposition to the loose sentimental sophistries of the time—a firm and dignified character standing out from the common baseness and slavishness. Tacitus was not born and bred, like his friend the younger Pliny, for a courtier of the better sort; nor would he practise forensic eloquence. Standing alone, his whole being became concentrated inwardly; and his writings, even against his will, betrayed the bitter feelings of a spirit forced to brood on itself, and sick of the universal corruption. Tacitus saw around him nothing but perfidy and profligacy, and was naturally led to derive all variations in human affairs from a premeditated plan, or the peculiar character of the actors. Yet he never forgets to signalise his generous disgust at the change of the whole course of administration into private transactions. The picture he has drawn of the last incidents of Seneca's life sufficiently shows what description of practical philosophy he alone deems worthy of elevated minds in these deplorable times.

Next to Tacitus in elevation and dignity, we place the poet PERSIUS, whose satires apparently flowed from a very different impulse, and deserve a very different place, from Juvenal's. Persius stands, like Tacitus, above his age, and sees plainly to what point its moral state is tending. He takes no pleasure, like Juvenal, in the delineation of vices; does not jest, like Petronius, now on the failings of men, now on their virtues; but makes use of the scourge of satire, as Tacitus of that of history, to warn the few who read and understand him, and to steel them against the evils of the times by an energetic philosophy.* He aims to unveil the sources of corruption, to administer warnings, suggest means for stemming farther corruption; not, like Juvenal, to drag vices and deeds of shame to light, merely to give aliment to malignity. He does not, therefore, like Juvenal, and after him, Boileau, devote whole satires separately to particular vices, or prevalent modes or caprices; but all the perversions of a perverted time pass in review before him. He understands better than Juvenal how to select his subject, and point his censure at matters neither above nor below philosophical animadversion. The satire of Persius strikes objects inherent in human nature; vices which, in the most different times, amongst nations the most different, never fail to reappear again and again.

* Persius depicts his own character in his fifth satire;—

“Verba togæ sequeris, junctura callidis acri,
Ore teres modico, pallentes radere mores
Doctus, et ingenuo culpam defigere ludo.”

As Tacitus displays the Stoic philosophy in all its nobleness in the life, and, even more, in the death and sufferings of exalted persons, so Persius also teaches that the consciousness of a virtuous and upright life affords higher beatitude than all the arts and luxuries of corrupted revellers, and that the consciousness of self-degradation is the most severe torture of a generation such as his own.

Before passing to other writers in whom the accomplishments of the times appear on their more favorable side, we must touch upon a class to be found everywhere, in the neighborhood of a court, or in the haunts of an immense capital, which bring together a multitude of idlers. We allude to the style of bitter satire, scurrilous and malignant mockery, low wit, levity, and impudence; with their usual concomitants, rage for anecdote, transformation of history into tittle-tattle, and the habit of tracing all that happens, or has ever happened, to the personal relations of the parties concerned.

All the bitterness of satire, and all the malignity of ridicule, are exemplified in Juvenal, Petronius, and Martial; and it was evinced by all three in their lives, and by two of them even in their writings, that their bitter animadversions on others were far from incompatible with venal adulation and sneaking servility to the worst of those of whom they had given the worst representation. Juvenal does not merely, like Horace, draw to light the ludicrous side of human perverseness and folly, or show himself, like Persius, deeply grieved by a prevailing corruption, which he indicates merely without downright description but rather lingers with visible complacency on scenes which even Tiberius concealed in Capræ. He inveighs against monsters of crime, cruelty, and wantonness, in verses which exhibit an artificial polish and smoothness which Horace appears purposely to avoid. Juvenal waxes ornate and rhetorical in places where, if his aim had really been to amend mankind, rhetorical ornament would have been among the last things attended to.

This is even more the case in the writings of Petronius Arbitr. Petronius, in the fragment of his book of satires still extant, shows, better than any historical description, the height of mental training, the refinement of tone and style, the exhaustless wit, the union of all art and science with all lusts and vices, which in Nero's time prevailed in the upper classes of society. Similar features have appeared amongst different nations at different times: in the bloom of Italian art and poetry, we only need mention Peter Aretin; in the brilliant French literary period, the Pucelle, and some of the works of Diderot, Bachaumont, and La Chapelle. Persius saw, with the feelings of an honest man, the consequences of all the vicious levities of his times, and vehemently gives vent to his long-smothered disgust at a pitiful race. Petronius, a principal partner in Nero's scandalous revels, or at all events an actor of that part to the life, takes every thing on the ludicrous side. He only laughs at the comic scenes and situations occasioned by the indulgence of passions: comic effect is the main point with him, as earnest instruction with Persius. Petronius is a perfect master of manner, wit, and raillery, and makes use of the Latin tongue with marvellous adroitness; as Voltaire, in similar

works, does of the French. The transition from prose to verse is easy in delineating the courtier's life, whose every aim and expression is directed to nothing but dissipation and self-indulgence; and episodes of seriousness are introduced with no other end than to avoid fatiguing the reader by monotony, and surprise him agreeably by the *piquant* contrast of philosophic gravity with the wildest merriment.

Martial does not rank with the satirists; but his epigrammatic poems express, as fully as those of Juvenal and Petronius, the miserable character of times in which poetry regularly went a begging. Like the latter, Martial is ornate, witty, versatile; now flattering Domitian in the most despicable manner; now extolling virtue and magnanimity, and scouting the people whom he had just before been extolling to the highest pitch with mendicant adulation. Among many other persons praised by Martial may be named Regulus, whom we know, from Pliny's letters, in the character of one of the most malignant informers, in the deplorable times of the persecution of all men of high character, and moreover, as a very middling orator. And yet the same man is not ashamed to celebrate also Nerva and Trajan, and supplicate them for presents. The foulest things are hitched into short couplets, and in this shape are easier retained; the most loathsome vices and shameful wants are uttered without reserve; and the poet expressly declares, that he cares little for being read from one end of the Roman world to the other, if no gold flowed into his purse for it.*

The rage for anecdote, and the transformation of history into a mere collection of notices of the private life of one or another person of importance, stands in the closest manner connected with the above-mentioned description of writings; for it arises out of the same prevailing corruption, the same lust for prying into every thing bad that took place anywhere, and the strong impulse to give a full career to every species of malice and evil-speaking. In Rome, as under the regent and Louis XV. in France, and especially in Paris, a school of writers had formed itself, which sought profit and pleasure in the quest and chase, perhaps in the invention, of revolting details and scenes of private scandal. Whole collections were formed of stories and anecdotes of that kind, many of which we find preserved in Suetonius, and especially in the lives of the later emperors.

In the times of these emperors public journals of news were in circulation, which were read with extreme eagerness in the provinces and the armies, and which, innocent as they might be, proved occasionally dangerous to their readers, and the personages mentioned in them; as we see from the speeches put into the mouths of the informers, in Tacitus. If even in Cicero's time budgets of city news were collected, anecdotes of all kinds, marriages, deaths, law-suits, and town-talk, at high price for transmission to friends in the provinces—as we learn from the circumstance that Cicero took it extremely ill of his

* "Sed meus in Geticis ad Martia signa pruinis
A rigido teritur centurione liber,
Dicitur et nostros cantare Britannia versus.
Quid prodest? nescit sacculus ista meus."

friend that he sends him purchased novelties which he never had any wish to know—it may easily be conceived that in subsequent times, when freedom of speech grew dangerous, when less and less of anything like public life came to exist, stolen intelligence of the prince, his favorites, his court, his amusements, and daily occupations, became more and more objects of curiosity. Even in the city, as we learn from writers of later times, news of the emperor's travelling plans and routes were bought with solid coin from the courtiers. The Greeks in the palace took a leading share in this traffic, and spread, by written news-letters, those scandalous stories respecting the private lives of their rulers, such as a certain class of writers circulate in our modern capitals. That shoals of secret histories of this sort were in circulation, we learn from Lampridius, Vopiscus, and similar authors, who, in speaking of their original sources, commonly cite three kinds of them. First, they mention the commentaries of the senate or the emperor, communicated to them from the public libraries, especially the Ulpian; secondly, the journals of public transactions in Rome (*acta publica populi*;) and thirdly, the Greek memoirs of the private lives of the Emperors. This last description of writings they designate with extreme distinctness, so that we cannot doubt that a mass of collections of anecdotes were extant; and that an altogether peculiar sort of biography had formed itself, holding a middle station between memoirs and regular biography; and drawing from all sources all sorts of particulars, to gratify the taste of the times for the secret and the scandalous. In this description may be included Suetonius's lives of the emperors; for in these the purely personal appears already predominant; public and private matters stand side by side; the former, indeed, subordinate to the latter. Instead of forming a whole from varied materials, articles of news, historical incidents, and individual traits are merely strung one after the other.

We willingly turn to the fairer aspects of literature in these times, in which learning and the exact sciences, jurisprudence, agriculture, domestic economy, natural philosophy, rhetoric; in brief, an encyclopædic range of acquirement, were pursued with greater zeal than ever. The style and manner of Columella introduced into the schools, and exalted to the rank of a classic, a work in which the subjects of husbandry, household economy, and finance are handled with rhetorical elegance. It may here be observed, that jurisprudence and husbandry were the only sciences which can really be termed indigenous and peculiar to the Italians. It was not until the period we are treating of, that both these sciences attained their full and complete development.

Amongst the writers of these times whose efforts acquired for husbandry a place in the scholastic circle of science, in connection with natural and political economy, we should have named the elder Pliny, were it not that he more properly belongs to another class, in which he takes the first place. For a public which felt the same want which has since been felt in modern times, first in France, and afterwards in other countries of Europe, in the eighteenth century, he singly undertook a work which, in our times, is shared amongst societies of litera-

ry persons; if he has failed, therefore, to realise much that might have been expected of him, the magnitude of his undertaking may well plead his excuse. His aim was to comprise in a single work all the branches of knowledge, the aggregate of which it was requisite for any one to acquire, who wished to possess the sum of the accomplishments of his times. He called this work an history of nature; we should rather give it the name of an encyclopædia. It was a truly gigantic labor to form, from 2500 authors, a compilation adapted to the tastes of general readers, designed to save the learned the trouble of references, and to bring into intimate union, by aid of rhetoric and philosophy, things which were widely separate in their nature. It has often, indeed, happened to him, as to all compilers, to introduce amidst passages of the best and the most trustworthy writers, others of the worst and most apocryphal; not, however, in the department of botany; for there he exclusively follows Dioscorides, as the latter writers Galen, Oribasius, and Serapion. To pass judgment on the details of so extensive a work, would require an insight into every branch of science there treated of. Buffon may be deemed to have been the best judge of its merits; and according to Buffon, it contains an infinity of knowledge of every department of human occupation and action, conveyed in a dress of brilliant and ornate description.

The immediate effect of Pliny's work on his contemporaries, and on times immediately subsequent, we have not, indeed, data to exhibit; but its effect on human improvement in the middle ages is clearly traceable; for it contained the substance of many hundred works, lost, or in part wholly inaccessible to the middle ages, and is written in a style precisely suited to attract to its study the learned men of an age fond of affected studied sharpness of manner. Accordingly Pliny, and still more his abbreviator Solinus, are the sole source and authority of Vincent de Beauvais and others, who attempted in the middle ages to produce similar encyclopædias. These models they follow almost exclusively; and even the Italians, when they based the modern sciences on the ancient, started from Pliny, who still remains an authority on art and its history.

The name of the younger Pliny would be distinguished in the intellectual history of his times, for this, if for no other reason, that, enjoying the first dignities in the state, and the full confidence of his sovereign, he devoted the whole of his influence, and no small part of his property, to the encouragement and extension of general mental cultivation. His correspondence is a monument no less characteristic of the tone of the leading families of the empire, than Cicero's epistles of the last years of the republic. In both we find the cultivated and leading class of the nation expressing themselves familiarly on state affairs and private occurrences; we gain, as it were, views into their inmost relations. As no convenient journals then existed, in which our governments now communicate all they wish to make known, it is certain that many of Cicero's epistles, and those of his friends, as well as many of those of Pliny (for instance, the description of his Laurentian villa, the narrative of the death of his uncle, &c.) were intended for circulation, nay, for sale, by some speculative bookseller.

The comparison of Cicero's with Pliny's correspondence enables us to contrast the tone of aristocratical and monarchical times, when each had attained the point of highest perfection. The style of the writer, in that collection which bears Cicero's name, has more of vigor, solidity, and scientific tincture than Pliny's; which on the other hand, has more art, finesse, and elaboration. In the former, the tone, with all reciprocation of senatorial courtesies, is nevertheless open, straightforward, and free from courtly regards and disguises. In Pliny, on the other hand, the rank of the writer and correspondent may easily be traced through every turn of expression. Trajan, to whom the whole book of these letters is directed, is not, indeed, loaded with forms and titles of servility, as in later times, when even the first men in the nation had lost all feeling of personal dignity; but he receives far higher honor from the tone of consideration, and the pervading expression of the sense of distance betwixt him and the consular writing to him. Cicero, with all his art, awards nature her rights; in Pliny, manner is all in all, and even simplicity is artful; that circumspection, so indispensable where every one has a fixed position, where every thing flows from one man, is visible throughout.

It may be gathered incidentally from Pliny's letters, though it could not readily be made out from the history of the period, that in Pliny's, as in Cicero's times, there were to be found in the leading orders many men of the most admirable qualities, who kept free from the general corruption, and counteracted, in the most vigorous manner, the downward tendencies of their times, personified in the crowd of vile informers and rapacious pettifoggers; who promoted, with distinguished self-devotion, schools, and scientific and learned undertakings in general, and did not think it unbecoming the dignity of their lofty station to instruct their fellow-citizens by their literary example and efforts.

Pliny's epistles approach the modern manner far more than Cicero's, especially his correspondence with Trajan. His official letters, and Trajan's answers, in brevity and neatness of style, are a model of good official correspondence. In his private letters there is no mistaking something of premeditation, of effort at ingenious turns of phrase and delicate compliments. The style resembles that of polite conversation; in which every one does not so much aim at expressing his own thoughts and feelings, as at showing himself on the side most advantageous to his own pretensions. The same solicitude for the credit of having turned an ingenious phrase, of having selected a happy mode of expression, shows itself in the only one of Pliny's many discourses extant—the panegyric on the emperor Trajan. That panegyric is to us very valuable, as containing many traits of Trajan's life, of which we should be otherwise ignorant; but, as addressed to his contemporaries, the panegyric of a prince promulgated during his life time, is assuredly not calculated to elevate and invigorate the souls of the subjects of an empire.

BOOK VI.

THE EMPIRE FROM THE ANTONINES DOWNWARDS.

CHAPTER I.

THE ANTONINES.

UNDER the reign of Hadrian's successors, the time seemed to have arrived when philosophy and science, according to Plato's wish, should rule the world. Unfortunately, no complete history of the life or of the government of the first Antoninus has descended to our time. All that we know is put together from general, hasty, mutilated, fragmentary notices; and these notices chiefly concern his private life, and his measures of police and internal administration. Of military matters we learn little. Insurrections in Britain, Mauritania, and Judea were quelled by his legates; and a new wall was erected in Scotland against the inroads of the Highland Scots: a war with the Germans and Dacians was speedily brought to a termination; revolts of the Greeks and Egyptians were suppressed without useless barbarities. The petty princes, besides, on the Euphrates and Caucasus, spontaneously offered him marks of submission or dependence; the Parthians durst not provoke him; and in southern Russia he was recognised in the character of an arbiter and protector. The franchises of such towns as still retained their independence were respected by so well-disposed a prince as Antoninus. He aided, also, those free towns from his treasury with less ostentation than Hadrian; partly, indeed, from his large private property. He not only assisted the public works with contributions, but also supported the leading functionaries and senators of the free towns by grants, which might enable them to administer their functions advantageously to their fellow citizens. He devoted the same sedulous attention to the civil law which Hadrian had given it, and allowed those judges who had given proof of capacity and integrity to retain their judicial seats for life, in opposition to the former usages. The city prefect, and the prefect of the imperial guard, had then a supreme judicial jurisdiction: the first he left twenty years in office, and nominated a successor to the second, when he expressly desired it. The new judicial regulations made by Antoninus were framed, under his inspection, by Vindius Verus, Salvius

Valens, Volusius Metianus, Ulpius Marcellus, and Diabolenus; whose advice he asked as juris-consults. Of the two men whom Antoninus, on Hadrian's recommendation, had found it necessary to adopt as his heirs and successors, the one, Annius Verus, afterwards known as Marcus Aurelius, and finally as Antoninus the Wise, trod faithfully in his own steps; the other, L. Verus, preferred the pleasures of life to the arduous duties of the government, which he willingly left to his active colleague and brother by adoption, Marcus. Antoninus Pius seems to have very early perceived that L. Verus would be unfit for a ruler, but had too great a respect for Hadrian's will to think of entirely removing him; and fortunately, L. Verus was so much younger than Marcus Aurelius, that he naturally and necessarily yielded him precedence in all things. The latter afterwards took him as colleague, and they lived in brotherly union, as the former cared less about power and dominion than about his private pleasures; and Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand, endured with stoic composure the errors of his wife, the daughter of the first Antoninus, as well as those of his colleague. While under the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, the empire enjoyed the advantages of a mild monarchical government, administered by republican laws, which, as well as the judicial forms, were gradually adapted to the imperial constitution, and the altered state of social relations; while love of the arts and sciences were diffused through all the towns, and, confiding in the government, men devoted themselves to the occupations congenial with tranquility and leisure; the storm clouds were gathering in the distance, which from the commencement of Marcus Aurelius's government almost uninterruptedly devastated the empire. The true origin of the mighty national movements, which from this time forwards chiefly appear on the Danube, cannot be traced with certainty. The previous wars of the Romans with the nations of German and Sarmatian origin on the Danube and the Rhine, have been already adverted to. Tranquility had followed the suppression of the revolt of Civilis. The Dacians first showed themselves in force under Domitian: and, with other bordering tribes, ravaged from time to time the Romain domain. Sarmatian tribes also made their appearance, with those of German origin, on the lower Danube; and amongst these, the Jazyges are principally named. Under Domitian, the Marcomanni, who were first heard of in the wars of Cæsar, and appear to have belonged to the Suevian league, and to have bordered upon Helvetia, are again named as a formidable league. During the wars with the Dacians, they were freed from the burthensome obligation of reinforcing the Romans with their armies. Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus took such excellent measures for the protection of the frontiers, that Hadrian's personal presence was only once required against the Sarmatian Roxolani: all other inroads were repulsed by his lieutenants. Under Marcus Aurelius, Suevian bands fell upon Rhætia, and afterwards the Chatti occupied part of the left bank of the Rhine. The Chatti were driven back by Aufidius Victorinus across the Rhine: the Chauci, who threatened Belgium, were successfully met by Didius Julian. It was after the close of these wars that war-

commenced with the Marcomanni, who were leagued with other tribes, partly of German, partly Sarmatian origin; and took the opportunity of many of the legions being withdrawn from the line of the Danube into the East (to be used in wars with the Parthians,) to commit tremendous ravages in the Roman provinces.

The Parthians during four years engrossed the attention of both emperors. At the same time that the provinces of Rome were invaded by the Suevi, Chatti, and Chauci, the Parthians fell upon and routed two Roman armies, took possession of Armenia and the passes of the Taurus, and ravaged Syria and Cappadocia. The best legions, the most distinguished generals, were therefore despatched to the East; and it was thought expedient that one of the emperors should take the immediate conduct of the war. Lucius Verus undertook it, at the desire of Marcus Aurelius. Probably his colleague hoped that distance from Rome, and from the associates of his pleasures, would reclaim the young man from the effeminacy and luxury to which he had resigned himself; while the prospect of glory and easy victory would stimulate his activity. What happened, however, was precisely the reverse. Lucius Verus turned over to its lieutenant the glories and the toils of the war; and during the four years which he remained in the East, it was by much persuasion only he could be brought to show himself twice to the army. The rest of the time he spent in three places, which, since the time of the Seleucidian kings, were second in repute to Alexandria only, and superior to Rome, in the arts of pleasure and luxury, in the most incredible inventions to gratify the senses, and to rekindle the dying embers of sensuality. These places were Daphne, then proverbial, as Capua had been, for luxury; amidst whose woods and grottoes, brooks and fountains, L. Verus spent the summer; Laodicea, where he resorted in winter; and Antioch, which from time to time he visited for the sake of public feasts and spectacles. In the latter place his extravagancies were ridiculed on the stage.

Of the Parthian war we know little; and even did we know more, the narrative of every incident and action would probably not be eminently attractive. After its termination a triumph was solemnised, on the return of L. Verus. U. C. 166.

Unfortunately, we also know very little of the history of Marcus Aurelius; and what little we know it is not easy to place in chronological order. There is nothing left for us, therefore, but to give a general account, without attending to the order of time. War, pestilence, and revolt ravaged the provinces under his reign; the vices of his colleague and his wife: nevertheless Marcus during his whole life remained true to the principles of his sect. Before the Parthian war, the reverence felt for him, even by Lucius Verus, had kept him and his minions within some bounds; but after his return, as his biographers expressed it, he lived like a Caius, Tiberius and Nero. He kept open house for all the revellers in Rome, and gave banquets, distinguished at least in one point, that one of them cost above 40,000*l.* sterling. Marcus sighed when he learned these excesses: sometimes lamented the

destiny of the state, but avoided every semblance of dispute or rupture. By his patience with the riot and extravagance of his colleague, he succeeded, indeed, in maintaining undisputed ascendancy in the empire, but durst not leave Verus in the capital, when the war with the nations on the Danube required his own presence. Both emperors afterwards travelled together to Aquileia. It seemed requisite for them to join the legions on the other side of the Alps; but it was long before Verus could be induced to undertake the journey; and when at length he joined the army, nothing could prevail with him to remain there; the debaucheries of the capital attracted him too irresistibly thitherwards. Fortunately, he died on the home journey; and Antoninus was freed at least from this source of uneasiness.

Another was his wife Faustina, the daughter of the first Antoninus, as dissimilar to her husband as his colleague had been. She often interfered in public affairs; and in spite of her scandalous course of life retained great influence over her husband, who was accused not without reason, of immersing himself in contemplations, while every thing went wrong around him. The education of the successor to the throne was wholly left to the empress; the misfortunes of the times and the study of philosophy left the emperor but little spare time for such an object; and his own nature and mode of life, from twelve years upwards, had been so grave and severe, that he knew too little the consequences of indulgence and of false tenderness.

The inroads of the barbarians on the provinces south of the Danube, their incursions to the borders of Italy, the plunder and desolation of whole districts occasioned and recommended the transplantation of whole tribes of barbarians to Roman ground. This was partly the consequence of the ravages of a pestilence which L. Verus had brought with him from the East. The Parthian war had already thinned the ranks of the legions which defended Pannonia, Noricum, Dacia, and Mœsia. The pestilence next weakened them so greatly, that all the lands betwixt the Danube and Aquileia were ravaged: that predatory tribes found their way from the Rhine, even into Italy; and hundreds and thousands of people were kidnapped and carried off from the provinces. The prefect of the imperial guard had perished, with his army; there was no resource but to gain over the several tribes singly. A separate treaty was first made with the Quadi, a German tribe, which had captured above 50,000 people. They obtained important advantages by this treaty; and engaged to restore all the Roman prisoners, but kept as many as they wanted to work for them or could sell to advantage. The Jazyges, a Samartian people, had carried off 100,000 persons, and still pursued their hostilities against the Romans, even after the peace which had been concluded with the Quadi; and the latter, notwithstanding that peace, did not scruple to aid them; as in like manner, contrary to the terms of the articles of the peace, they gave the Marcommanni free passage through their territory, when the former had been at length repulsed by the Romans.

Three times, and each time for several years, was Marcus Aurelius detained by war on the other side of the Alps. Twice he tried to procure peace by negotiations, and to gain over the barbarians by gentle

means; but he was soon forced to acknowledge that nothing was to be accomplished except by consistent thorough-going vigor. The resolution to exercise such vigor he carried into effect on the occasion of his third expedition to the Danube; but, unfortunately for the empire, death had surprised him before he had finished the war.

In the first of the above-mentioned expeditions, during which Verus died, Marcus Aurelius had made grants of land to several tribes in Dacia and Mœsia, and even in Italy. Peace, however, did not endure long; masses of barbarians were embodied into the Roman army; a number of others settled in the Roman territory; the attraction was too strong for the rest. In his second expedition, Marcus Aurelius was detained three years in Upper Pannonia, or the region of Sirmium, in order to direct on the spot the military operations. It was probably before he set out on this second expedition, that he put up to the public sale all the splendors which were accumulated in the imperial palaces and treasuries; all the superfluous embellishments, curiosities, and rarities, which Verus had collected together. The account given by Julius Capitolinus of this auction of imperial property, which lasted for two months, leads us to suspect that, under the pretext of a sale, the emperor was in fact only obtaining a voluntary loan from the richer classes, on the deposit of pledges. For it is said, that when his finances were restored to a better condition, he allowed the buyers the privilege of returning the articles purchased, and receiving back the purchase-money; but did not take it ill of any one, who chose to retain what he had purchased. The main point was probably to rid himself, under a fair pretext, and without any extraordinary noise, of the quantity of valuables, household apparatus, and furniture, which L. Verus, like Nero, had amassed in the imperial palace. It was probably on this occasion, and in order to facilitate the use of these commodities to the purchasers, that he allowed senatorial families (*claris viris*) to be waited upon by servants clothed like those of the imperial house, in white clothing trimmed with gold, and to be served from silver and gold dishes.

The second war with the nations on the Danube ended pretty much as the first. The emperor chastised the Quadi for their faithlessness; extirpated almost totally two petty tribes, whom he had previously given leave to settle on the Roman territory, but who had taken the first opportunity to league themselves with his enemies. The war on the Danube had not yet been brought to a close, when Avidius Cassius threw off his allegiance in Syria, and assumed the title of emperor. This leader had formerly marched with L. Verus into the East, and had the greatest share in the successes obtained over the Parthians. Afterwards he was again employed on the Danube, where, in like manner, he gained important advantages; finally, M. Aurelius despatched him back to the East, where he restored the declining discipline of the Syrian legions by merciless rigors. It is probable that, during a dangerous illness of the emperor, or on false intelligence of his death, he had advanced pretensions to the succession, and then found he had gone too far to retreat. Many affirmed, what is given out for indisputable truth in the portion of Dio Cassius's history

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which is extant, that he had been secretly incited by Faustina, and promised her hand in the event of the death of Marcus Aurelius. It has however been established by Vulcatius Gallicanus, by extracts from the correspondence between the emperor and his wife, that the latter viewed the revolt as far more dangerous, and was far more eager than her husband for the punishment of all concerned in it. The suppression of this insurrection did not even require the emperor's presence; he despatched troops for the purpose; one of his generals occupied Asia Minor. These preparations however proved unnecessary, as Avidius Cassius was killed by two of his officers. The letters of that chief which are extant exhibit a harsh judgment of his times; and contain not undeserved blame of the emperor's over indulgent character; but only increase our admiration of Marcus Aurelius, as a prince whom neither ingratitude nor revolt could ever excite to anger; and who would not resort, even for the punishment of flagrant treason, to other means than regular trial, and the judgment of the senate.

It was not till after Cassius's death, and after having lost his own wife shortly before, that Marcus Aurelius himself proceeded to Syria. On this journey, which carried the emperor through Judea to Egypt, from thence through Asia Minor to Athens, he gave encouragement and assistance everywhere to the learned class, without betraying anywhere vanity and arrogance like Hadrian's. From this period the appointments of the public teachers in Athens were settled at a fixed rate, and a head teacher appointed to every philosophical sect. In Athens, Marcus Aurelius did homage to the prejudices of his times, by submitting to the ceremony of initiation to the mysteries, the butt of Lucian and Apuleius. Meanwhile, war continued to rage on the Danube; and though many successes had been obtained by his generals, the emperor considered it advisable to proceed to the scene of action in person; the Quadi as well as the Marcomanni having violated the recent treaties. In conjunction with the Hermunduri and the Sarmatian tribes, they came in the following year to a decisive engagement with the emperor, in which victory remained on the side of the Romans; without, however, effecting the subjection of these barbarian tribes. In the following year the emperor fell ill, and was taken off before the termination of the war.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF COMMODUS TO THE ACCESSION OF CLAUDIUS.

THE same malignant malady which had carried off Marcus conspired with the assaults of the barbarians to bewilder the inexperience of his son and successor, Commodus, who was with difficulty persuaded to remain at the head of the army. At first he yielded implicitly to the guidance of his father's friends, who exerted their influence to prevent him leaving the army until he had closed an advantageous treaty of peace with the barbarians. The terms were in every respect in favor of Rome. He accorded his protection to the Sarmatian tribes of the Jazyges, Buri, and likewise to the Vandals, against the Quadi and the Marcomanni; and made it an express stipulation that the latter should not make war with the former without consent of the Romans. The Marcomanni and Quadi were compelled to promise not to approach their settlements within a league of the Danube, on the banks of which the Roman forts were situated. They were allowed to hold their popular assemblies only once a month, and that, too, in the presence of a Roman officer. On the other hand, the Romans razed their forts on the farther bank of the Danube, and withdrew their garrisons.

The terms of this treaty with the barbarians were observed for many years with fidelity, not to reckon the desultory irruptions of scattered bands, which were scarcely to be guarded against, considering the habits and internal organisation of these warlike tribes.

One article of the conditions of peace shows the sad situation of the empire, and prognosticates its hastening ruin. It was stipulated by Commodus, that 13,000 Quadi, and a somewhat smaller number of Marcomanni, should enlist in his legions. In this way the barbarians acquired knowledge of the art of war, which they could afterwards communicate to their countrymen; while the Roman armies, by holding out encouragement to these new recruits, fostered traitors and enemies in their own ranks. This policy became however still more ruinous, when, afterwards, a yearly contingent came to be required, instead of the number of soldiers at first specified, whereby the proportion of foreign recruits yearly increased in the Roman armies, the citizens of the empire finding it more and more convenient to transfer the burthen of frontier service to mercenary strangers, who viewed the weal of the empire with indifference.

The natural disposition of the new emperor appears to have been very rightly apprehended by Dio Cassius, who calls him a weak, but well-natured youth of nineteen. His character, easy, simple, and timid, was soon observed by the men who got round him, and lured

him from the public affairs to dissolute amusements. In process of time, cowardice and custom made him vicious and merciless.

Two years after the accession of Commodus, a rupture took place with his family, as well as an occasion for distrust of the whole body of the senate, highly conducive to the ends of those who studiously set themselves to work him up to cruel and tyrannical measures. His own sister Lucilla had formed a conspiracy against him, in which her husband and son-in-law were implicated. The conspirator whose dagger was employed in the work missed his stroke; but in aiming at the emperor's person, exclaimed, "The senate sends thee this." These words were enough to inflame a suspicious temper against the senate; it appeared, indeed, that many of the senators had been privy to the plot: the young emperor was rescued solely by his guard; and after having sent his wife and sister into exile, and wreaked his rage on all the other members of his family, he continued to regard the senate with fixed distrust, and reposed his confidence solely in the creatures whose profit lay in his crimes.

As the unhappy prince now thought he could trust none but his guard, the commander of that guard, resumed naturally the station he had held under Tiberius and Claudius; and the history of the prefects of the imperial guard again became the history of the empire. At its head stood one after the other Tarrutenus, Paternus, Perennis, Niger, Cleander, and the fall of each of these leaders successively was equivalent to a revolution in government. The first of them appears to have been one of those men who were brought forward by Marcus Aurelius, and advanced to the highest public functions. Authors disagree about his character; but it appears certain that Perennis, who succeeded him as prefect, attracted on his head the fatal suspicions of the timid tyrant, and thereby paved the way to his ruin. Perennis had already taken advantage of the conspiracy of Lucilla and Quadratus to ruin or remove from about him all the relations of Commodus. Having then succeeded in engrossing all power in his own hands, he sought to divert the emperor's mind with races, fights, and feats or archery, so that he and his friends should rule almost alone. As the unhappy Commodus sunk lower and lower, as he hunted down and cut off all the distinguished men of his father's times, it does not seem improbable that Perennis had conceived the project of ultimately dethroning his prince, to make room for his own family.

Perennis and his emperor pursued together their course of cruelties: extravagance in sports and in wild-beast-baitings was practised by Commodus alone, while the public administration was conducted not amiss by his favorite. The soldiery were however highly dissatisfied with him, as he did not think it necessary to win their hearts by relaxing their discipline; and the disaffection of these profligate bands, together with his misplaced confidence in Cleander, who supplanted him in the tyrant's favor proved his ruin. The discontent of the army in Britain was made a handle of by Cleander to terrify the emperor into giving up Perennis and his whole family. That army, which had fought bravely against the active barbarians, who had made a formidable irruption into the Roman province, found some occasion of discon-

tent with the administration of Perennis, and sent a deputation of not less than 1500 men to Rome. This detachment of picked troops was not only suffered to land in Gaul, but to march, without impediment, direct to Rome, where they clamorously charged Perennis with aiming to raise his family by the overthrow of that of the emperor. Commodus abandoned in terror his favorite to their threatening cries. Cleander, however, did not immediately reap the succession of all his powers, as, after the death of Perennis, two prefects were again appointed. None, however, to whom the prefecture was intrusted after Perennis, maintained their footing more than a short time; and Cleander soon became far more powerful and formidable than Perennis had ever been.

Cleander enjoyed but for three years the power he had thus seized for himself. In like manner as he had employed the soldiery against Perennis, the populace were employed against himself. In Rome, as in all despotic states, despotic cruelty and caprice reached only the higher and middle ranks, from whom there was little to fear; while the populace and the soldiery made themselves dreaded by the government. The soldiers had overthrown Perennis: the populace rose against Cleander, or were set in motion against him like a machine. Commodus, who from youth upwards had shown taste and talent for all good-for-nothing pursuits, and utter incapacity for every liberal art and science, distinguished himself as an archer and a gladiator, especially after taking regular instructions from the Parthian and Moorish professors of that art. Whole herds of the rarest animals—ostriches, rhinoceroses, giraffes, lions—were collected together, that the emperor might slaughter them by hundreds at the first shot. While famine and pestilence desolated the land, the games and combats were still celebrated with even augmenting extravagance. Cleander put to death one distinguished person after another, and even sold the corn-trade to Papirius Dionysius. The dearth which ensued on this speculation drove the populace to despair; and an insurrection arose against the prefect, who had also given some offence to the infantry of the guards. At that time the emperor and the prefect were staying out of the city on account of the plague. The populace sallied forth, and stormed the dwelling of the prefect, who charged them with the cavalry of the guards, and drove the people back to the city. Here, however, the infantry joined the populace: a regular engagement took place, in which the cavalry had the worst; and the movement became so general, that the life of the emperor seemed in danger. Lucilla, the sister of Commodus, and Marcia, the most favored of his concubines, and the protectress of the Christians, seized the opportunity of urgently entreating him to save himself by the sacrifice of the prefect. Accordingly Cleander was put to death, and thereby the uproar pacified.

From thenceforth the half-frantic emperor raged worse than the plague, which still continued its ravages. He no longer confided in any one; and no prefect could long maintain his footing in his office. The whole senate were in constant risk of their lives, and, to save them, were compelled to adore the emperor in the characters of Hercules

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and Mercury in the amphitheatre. His extravagant expenses in public spectacles and profuse gratuities (he would sometimes distribute sums of about five pounds to every applicant,) not only drained the emperor's private exchequer, but the public treasury, so completely, that the resource of indiscriminate confiscation, even that of the enormous wealth of Cleander himself, no longer sufficed to fill up the deficit. All sorts of charges were trumped up against persons of all ranks and condition, merely for the purpose of extorting money. At last he hit on the device of claiming on his birthday a piece of gold, by way of present, from every citizen of Rome; five drachmas, or somewhat above three shillings of our money, from persons of senatorial rank in the other towns of the Roman empire. In the whole body of senators there was only one who would not stoop to conform to the caprices of the despot, held himself free from those humiliations to which his compeers slavishly submitted, and preferred the vindication of his dignity as a man, and of his well-won reputation, to his life. Claudius Pompeianus, one of Marcus's friends, though he suffered his sons to be present at the public games, and to vie with the other senators in applauses of the emperor, on his own part declared he would rather die than see the son of Marcus Aurelius, the ruler of the Roman empire, dishonor himself thus publicly.

All historians are agreed, that the tyranny and cruelty of the emperor at length arrived at a pitch of frenzy approaching to madness; that he meditated adding to the list of his victims his favorite concubine, his prefect Lætus, and the highest officer in the imperial household, Eclectus; and that these individuals, who of course were nearest to his person, took his life, without any concerted plan or settled arrangement, simply to preserve their own. Of the immediate occasions of the catastrophe, different versions are extant; but all accounts agree that his above three confidential servants, the partners of all his pleasures, were the authors of his death. It is said they first administered poison, and, as that failed of effect, got in a public wrestler to strangle him. It is not ascertained that the then city prefect, Pertinax, knew of the murder: it seems probable that the conspirators selected him as emperor, in order to justify their deed by the choice of a man of unimpeached character, popular with the senate. It looks suspicious, however, that, immediately after his election, Pertinax justified Lætus in the senate, and appeared in public, attended by him, together with Marcia and Eclectus.

A. D. 192. At the epoch when the slayers of Commodus proclaimed Helvius Pertinax his successor, he was a man of eight or nine and sixty, had been one of Marcus's old friends, and had been spared by Commodus chiefly because, with all activity and frugality, he had only acquired a very moderate property. The greater was the virtue of Pertinax, the greater favorite he was with the senate and its individual members, the more he was inevitably hated by the guards, who, like the guards of all tyrants, adhered much more firmly to a Nero, a Domitian, or a Commodus, who favored and needed them, than to the best and noblest of men, when such an one happened to ascend the throne. Pertinax had shown distinguished merits in the

field, and in the peaceable functions of public administration. Perennis left him three years on his estates in Liguria; and, after his death, Pertinax was employed in Britain, where he re-established the discipline of the armies, and fought bravely at their head. Finally he became city prefect. He himself felt that he should hardly be able to keep his footing long at the head of the government, though he began by a measure popular with the real sovereigns of the empire, by promising every private of the guard the enormous sum of three thousand drachmas, which he afterwards paid from the proceeds of the sale of the late emperor's valuables. Accordingly, he begged the senate to choose another ruler, and neither proclaimed his son Cæsar, nor permitted his wife imperial honors. The senate contributed not a little to irritate the soldiery, whose idol Commodus had been, against the new emperor, by passing a string of decrees to annul all the regulations and all the grants made by the late government. Commodus was proclaimed to have been an enemy to his country; his statues were overthrown, his name erased from inscriptions, and even his corpse would have ignominiously been thrown into the Tiber, if this had not been prevented by Pertinax. In these measures may be easily detected the cowardice and meanness of the very same people who had previously submitted to indignities of every kind, and now, that it was too late, besides being superfluous, as no one undertook the defence of Commodus, raged against his memory like the meanest of the populace.

Capitolinus has inserted, in his motely collection of anecdotes, a variety of stories in disparagement of Pertinax. There, however, seems to be only one valid ground of reproach against him,—that he showed too soon the seriousness and severity of advanced age, while the people and the soldiery had so lately been accustomed to the levity and pleasures of a youthful prince. The friendship of the senate could be of little use to the new emperor. Followers and family connections he had none. Even Lætus, who had hoped to govern under his name, was untrue to him; and Eclectus alone remained at his side, even in the instant of danger. It is not to be wondered at, then, if his reign was of brief duration.

Soon after his entrance on his government, Pertinax had felt himself compelled to secure to the soldiery all the favors which had been granted them under that of his predecessors. This concession, however, like his above mentioned lavish donation, was fruitless, as he showed inexorable rigor in checking the violence and licentiousness, the drunken and dissolute habits in which the soldiery had been permitted to indulge by the late government. Dio Cassius, who, as being himself a senator, must have been best acquainted with transactions to which he was a party and witness, expressly says, what other writers only suspect, that Lætus himself incited the guards to mutiny. Two or three hundred of their number, probably foreign or barbarian recruits, marched out of their camp against the imperial residence unopposed. The whole camp broke out in open mutiny; and Lætus, whom Pertinax sent to appease them, faithlessly withdrew from the tumult, without having made the slightest attempt to calm it. At

length Pertinax himself came out to meet the soldiery, and, at first, inspired them with awe by word and gesture, till a soldier from the neighborhood of Liege, seeing his comrades hesitate, rushed fiercely with his drawn sword on the emperor, and drew the others after him by his example. The only person who remained true to him in the last moment, Eclectus, also fell by the side of his emperor.

Mar. The general consternation in Rome, created by the sight of
193. the head of Pertinax, paraded by the soldiers as a public spectacle, gave the Prætorians the absolute disposal of the empire; and Sulpician, the father-in-law of Pertinax whom he had sent into the camp to appease them, was not ashamed to make formal proposals to purchase the empire from the soldiery. This suggested the scandalous and ignominious resolution of putting the Roman empire up to auction to the highest bidder. According to Herodian, this sale of the Roman empire was formally and deliberately transacted. Dio Cassius affirms, with more probability, that the soldiers feared Sulpician might meditate to revenge the death of Commodus on his murderers; and that, consequently, they listened to the proposals of another senator, Didius Julian, who had formerly assured them of pardon and oblivion of their mutiny. Julian hastened to the camp, in the interior of which was Sulpician; the gates were closed; a soldier on the walls made proclamation of the offers of the candidates; and thus was an example afforded of a regular sale, by auction, of the empire. Finally, Julian having promised to double what Pertinax had given (6250 drachmas,) the empire was knocked down to him. But this was too revolting a mode of attaining the imperial dignity; and Julian was himself too insignificant to maintain his footing. His person, besides, was indifferent to the soldiery, despised by the senate; and the legions declared themselves against him in three places at once. Septimius Severus in Pannonia, Spurius Albinus in Britain, and Pescenninus Niger in Syria, were called upon by the army to march to Rome, and revenge the murder of Pertinax. Severus and Niger were instantly proclaimed emperors by their respective legions. As the latter was the favorite of the senate, and had received a direct invitation from Rome, to aid against Julian and the guards, Severus endeavored to gain over the third candidate, Sp. Albinus, and nominated him Cæsar, when himself on the point of marching on Rome.

In the meanwhile, it is said that Julian, having discovered that his own enormous private wealth was insufficient, even with the aid of the public treasury, to pay the extravagant sum which he had promised to the soldiery, resolved, at any rate, to enjoy the benefits of his purchase as long as he could, and gave himself up to the pleasures of the table. However, on the intelligence of the advance of the Illyrian troops, he neglected no measures of defence; he found means to pay the guards, not the promised donative only, but even larger sums than he had promised; sent a deputation of the senate to Severus's legions; caused great preparations to be made for fortifying the palace, and a fortified encampment to be pitched in the neighborhood of the city. All these preparations, however, were fruitless, as he had neglected to occupy the passes of the Alps, and could place no dependence on

the senate, or even on the guards. Severus, with 600 picked troops, hastened up by forced marches before the rest of his army; the troops posted in the passes of the Apennines went over to him; and even the Prætorians deserted their emperor, on assurances of pardon and oblivion. The senate, which had deferred to the last moment distinctly declaring itself, had no sooner learned the revolt of the Prætorians, than it declared for Severus, sent a deputation to him, and caused the unfortunate Julian to be secretly decapitated, and the head to be exposed publicly. July
1.
193.

In this manner even the semblance of a constitution vanished in the Roman empire. The rigors of Severus, however, though they may here and there have been overstrained, were yet eminently conducive to the preservation of that empire. He did not lay his arms down for a moment; even before he arrived in Rome, he caused those to be executed who had taken part in the murder of Pertinax; caused the Prætorians to be marched from the city to his camp; surrounded them with his troops; disarmed and dismissed them ignominiously, with the order not to show themselves within the distance of thirty leagues from Rome.

Immediately after his entrance into Rome, Severus issued orders to his land and sea forces to put themselves in motion against Pescenninus Niger, who had let pass the most favorable moments; had abandoned himself at the most unsuitable time to his amusements at Antioch, and delayed the fortification of Byzantium, and the supply of that place with all the necessary munitions of war, to serve him as a *point d'appui*, and check Severus in his advance, until he learned that his enemy's march against him was actually commenced. Byzantium held out, indeed, against the enemy to the third year; but the generals of Severus beat the enemy thrice, at Cyzicus, Nicæa, and Issus; and Pescenninus himself was slain in his flight after the loss of the third battle. Severus commanded in person in some of the battles which he won; Pescenninus Niger only in the last, in which he had opposed to him Valerianus and Anulinus.

Dio Cassius's description of Byzantium, as it existed at that period, compared with what it became after rising again out of its ruins, and becoming one of the capitals of the eastern world, is of high interest. In the desperate defence which was maintained by its burghers against Severus, from whom they could hope no mercy, the historian's countryman, Priscus, eminently distinguished himself as an engineer; and, after its capture, he alone, who, of all its defenders, had most deserved the emperor's anger, was spared; for Severus meant to make use of him in the siege of the fort of Atra, the citadel of an independent tribe near the Euphrates, whose chief had been a friend of his defeated rival. This fort had before cost Trajan a great part of his army, without his having, after all, been able to take it. Severus's intended undertaking against Atra, and another against the Parthians, were however, interrupted by the intelligence which he received from Rome.

Mutual causes of complaint had arisen between Severus and his colleague in the empire, Spurius Albinus, who had by this time dis-

covered that he had only ostensibly been associated in the government, and that, since the defeat of Pescenninus Niger, little more remained for him to hope. Albinus charged Severus with having sent him friendly letters by people commissioned to get rid of him by means of assassination.

The decisive engagement between the two pretenders to the throne took place in the neighborhood of Lyons, and the forces on either side amounted to about 150,000 men. This battle cost the Roman empire the sinews of its strength, the best of its fighters, whose place could afterwards only be supplied with barbarians.

After his victory over Spurius Albinus, Severus treated the followers of his late rival in Gaul and Rome as he had before the friends of Pescenninus Niger in the east. He had sent the head of the latter to Rome, and now also publicly exposed that of the former. Britain he divided into two provinces, as a single representative, in an island so remote, seemed to him too dangerous. Towards the senate he displayed his ill-will in every possible manner. Two-and-forty senators, most of them men who had held the highest dignities of the empire, were executed soon after his return. He said openly, that people like the Roman senators of his times deserved no better emperor than Commodus; that he now perceived how wholesome had the sway of that prince been as a scourge of God to the first ranks in Rome, who had neither faith, truth, nor morality; that he now, for the first time, knew how to appreciate his merits; acknowledged him as a brother: and held him worthy of divine honors.

In Rome Severus devoted his whole time to correcting the irruption of abuses, and to the cares of legislation and government. The severity and violence, the restlessness and cruelties with which he is charged, as well as his dread of plots, are to be viewed less as personal faults of Severus, than as general characteristics of the natives of Africa, where the emperor had been born and brought up. He had already destined to the succession, and nominated as joint colleagues, his two sons, Bassianus,—whom he named Antoninus, but who was afterwards better known by the nickname of Caracalla—and Geta. Next in rank to them he raised his friend and countryman Plautianus, whom he employed in affairs of every description, appointed prefect of his guards, and favored to a pitch of absurdity. This prefect was more honored and feared, indulged in greater expense, and ventured on acts more arbitrary, than even Severus himself, or his sons. No less arrogant than Plautianus himself was his daughter, whom he begirt with more than royal pomp and retinue. Eunuchs formed an essential part of oriental splendor; it was necessary that his daughter should have them in great numbers; and to procure them for her, he allowed himself revolting acts of violence. Next, when he assumed to play the preceptor to the young emperors, he rendered himself hated by both. Both had remained in Rome while their father pursued his eastern expeditions; and both had been corrupted by the bad company, public sports, and combats of the capital; had inured themselves to no sort of activity, whether mental or bodily; and had fallen into inveterate hostility with each other, from a childish dispute about

some cock-fight, or gladiatorial game. Caracalla, in particular, was in the highest degree exasperated against Plautianus, whose haughty and aspiring daughter he had been forced to marry, and treated her invariably with marked contempt. He lived in constant strife, with his father-in law, which throws an air of great improbability on the conspiracy of Plautianus against the life of Severus, which Caracalla pretended to discover and disclose to his father. Caracalla surprised his father suddenly with the news of his plot. Severus called the accused person before him, gently reproached him, and, at first, listened complacently to his defence; which Caracalla, however, soon interrupted; cut him down on the spot, and caused the severed head to be presented to his mother and wife. This one act sufficiently showed the Romans what they had to expect of their future ruler.

Whatever weakness Severus showed towards his son, his favorite, and his soldiers, he evinced himself, at least in the administration of justice, worthy of empire. He had himself, in his youth, been a jurist and a practical lawyer; presided, therefore, personally in the tribunals, and gave judgment with inexorable rigor; corrected all abuses which had crept in, in the course of time, and surrounded himself with the greatest names in jurisprudence known in history, to aid him in judicial decisions, and in legal reforms. Since the death of Plautianus, Papinian became the first of the two prefects of the guard, who, in these times, also held the administration of Justice; the one taking cognizance of judicial, the other of military matters. Papinian took as assessors Paulus and Ulpian; and all three distinguished themselves in so brilliant a manner by knowledge of law and administration of justice, that in later times Valentinian III. gave the authority of a legislative decision to the opinions of Papinian. Severus displayed equal wisdom in every other branch of administration as in that of justice; and so many cordial instances of goodness are preserved of him, that one is inclined to excuse his rigor and harshness towards those whom he deemed it necessary to punish. During his last sojourn in Rome, the city and the empire had the advantage to be governed by a man of stern and serious temper, who, as a private subject, had made himself acquainted with the various branches of law and administration, civil and military, from the business of life, not solely from books and abstract studies.

It is impossible exactly to say what tempted the emperor, at an advanced period of life, and in an infirm state of health, to undertake an expedition to Britain, merely to chastise the Scottish Highlanders for their in-roads in the Roman province. It certainly cannot have been the rage for military glory. It is supposed by some writers that Severus wished to cut out occupation for his troops; by others, that he wished to withdraw his sons from the pleasures and temptations of the capital. The latter motive seems not improbable, and is confirmed by the accounts of the exasperation shown by the elder against his father, and the attempt he is said to have made upon his life.

Severus remained three years in Britain. He penetrated into the remotest Highland fastnesses; cleared woods made bridges over rivers; made roads over morasses; turned the courses of streams. By the severities of these campaigns and the

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to
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ambuscades of the barbarous enemy above 40,000 men perished: in in one year, however, Severus saw the loss of all he had won: and, suitably to his vehement temper, shortly before his death conceived the thought of wholly extirpating the native population.

However boundless and blinded was the love of Severus towards his sons, he nevertheless perceived at length, during his stay in Britain, that both of them, but especially the eldest, were wholly incorrigible. He could not, however, make up his mind on taking strong measures towards him, though he himself often had accused Marcus Aurelius of not having preferred his duty towards the empire, and towards humanity, to his love for his son, and excluded him from the empire. Caracalla, it seems, had openly attempted his father's life, and had been bitterly upbraided by him for it, in presence of the prefects and of the whole court; had in no respect reformed his conduct; and yet it was in vain that the prefects exerted themselves to work up Severus to exemplary rigor. Often he resolved to order his son to execution; but paternal love always held him back. The unfinished war in Scotland; the disunion of his sons; their cruel and base disposition; his own penitence for many cruelties, probably aided a painful disease in troubling the last hours of Severus. He is even said to have asked for poison, to bring his life to an end more quickly. He died at York (A. D. 211.) The succession of the empire having been previously secured jointly to the two brothers, Caracalla and Geta, and the soldiery equally well inclined towards both, the former was compelled, however unwilling to hold divided sway, to recognise his brother as his colleague. Geta would seem not to have been much better than his brother, though his character had a fairer side; and, perhaps, he was not so hard and merciless. Dio Cassius relates of both, that they were used to debauch married women, and corrupt youths to the instruments of their pleasure; that they practised every means of extorting money; made fellowship with gladiators and charioteers in the public races; and sought, in short, to excel each other in feats of folly and madness, living, meanwhile, in unintermitting enmity. This hostility between the brothers brought on a proposal for the partition of the empire, which would, perhaps, have been mutually acceded to, if the empress mother had not been opposed to it. Caracalla over-matched his brother in cunning as in energy; and if Geta did not sooner fall a victim to his repeated plans of assassination, he was principally indebted for it to the watchful care of his mother, Julia Domna; in whose arms, however, he was at length surprised and murdered by his brother's satellites. Severus plumed himself much on having enormously augmented the numbers of the soldiery, having increased the guards fourfold, and having amassed very considerable treasures. All this, however, only proved destructive to the empire under Caracalla's government, as every other order of men was sacrificed to the soldiery. The guards were now not only encamped in the stations at first assigned to them near the capital, but another fortified camp was besides established on the heights of Alba. Neither of these divisions of the guards approved the murder of Geta: those near Alba long refused to admit the imperial assassin within their

gates; and he was obliged to purchase the others by a large donative—2500 drachmas for each individual soldier.

The sequel was in perfect accordance with this beginning, and with the character of the new emperor. At first, indeed, he spared the former friends of his brother; but it was not long before all who had even had the slightest connection with him atoned for the offence with their lives. Dio Cassius reckons at 20,000 the number of those who were executed, one after another, as having been friends of Geta, or in some manner attached to his court—men, women, and children. Among the victims were Papinianus, to whose guardianship his father had commended him, and Cilo, who had brought him up.

All the tyrants by whom the Roman empire was cursed were also spendthrifts. Caracalla likewise squandered, in a short time, all the savings of the preceeding administration. He openly acknowledged to the soldiery that he himself and the whole empire depended on them: to satiate their rapacity, and procure the means for his own prodigalities, the emperor was forced to resort to the ways of a Nero, Domitian, and Commodus. He caused the rich to be executed, in order to confiscate their property; and changed the constitution of the empire, in order to enrich his treasury. Heretofore the Italians, and especially the citizens of Rome, had been the principal victims when the emperors aimed at enriching themselves by means of confiscations; but, as Italy by degrees lost its wealth, Caracalla scoured the provinces, and there perpetrated all that his predecessors had perpetrated in Rome. He surrounded himself with Sarmatian and German barbarians, and neglected no means of attaching them to his person. He accompanied the soldiers in their marches, occupations, amusements, toils, privations, and hardships. He took into his service whole hordes of the Germans, aped them in their habits and manners; and even wore false hair, in order to resemble them in the very hue of their flaxen locks; all this to protect himself against the peaceful citizens whom he ill-treated by means of rude soldiers and barbarians; at whose hands, during all this time, he was purchasing peace with immense sums of money, and thereby only encouraging the encroachments, which became more and more threatening of the tribes on the northern and western frontier.

After a fruitless expedition against the Chatti and Alemanni, Caracalla proceeded down the Danube to Thrace, where he played the same part which he had played in Germany. He provoked, without subjugating, the Getæ, but did not dare to march into Dacia, which suffered from the inroads of the Lombards. As a common soldier, indeed, he did his duty; but as a general and an emperor, he made himself contemptible. In Alexandria he assembled the citizens, who had received him with the utmost possible honor and solemnity; treacherously surrounded the place of meeting with his soldiers; and gave orders for the indiscriminate slaughter of all present. The number of the victims was increased by the precipitating of a number of men alive into enormous pits, which had been dug for the bodies of the murdered, and by many of the soldiers themselves being dragged down along with them into these pits by the victims of imperial fury.

No other known cause can be assigned for these frightful outrages than that, at an earlier period, before the emperor visited their city, the Alexandrians had indulged in bitter scoffs at him. It seems certain that the scene of slaughter continued several days and nights: but the variations in the narratives of its two principal historians are so considerable, that we cannot help suspecting the very turbulent population of Alexandria had not behaved quite so peaceably as some writers would have us believe, and that the measure had not altogether been without provocation. This might also be concluded from the facts, contained in the narrative, that Caracalla expelled from the city all strangers and sojourners excepting tradespeople; prohibited all numerous assemblies, and even public games and spectacles; and even divided from each other by walls the several quarters of that immense city, to cut off all communications between them. However, these arrangements had no permanence.

The accounts of Caracalla's expeditions into the Parthian territory; his betrothing with a Parthian princess; his treachery on occasion of a splendid banquet given him as the betrothed of the princess royal; the massacre and plunder which he committed on the unarmed assemblage, are known to us from Herodian only, whose narratives are so wild and romantic, that we cannot feel assured of their truth. The whole recital sounds far more probable as given by Xipholinus from Dio Cassius. According to this account Caracalla, after returning from Egypt, made an unexpected inroad on Media, and perpetrated infinite ravages before the Parthians had time to prepare for their defence, enfeebled as they were by intestine discords and a disputed succession. The winter after his desolating inroad on Media Caracalla spent in Edessa, with the intention, in the following summer, of marching against the Parthians, who had prepared meanwhile to take the field; but was assassinated during his march by a plot of the prefect of his Prætorians.

A. D. 217. Historians are fully agreed as to the facts, that some of the officers of the guard, and a captain of the name of Martial, gained by Macrinus, perpetrated the murder of the emperor, and that the murderers were themselves slaughtered immediately after the execution: on the immediate occasion of the act, however, they differ. According to the version most probable, Maternianus, who not only commanded the troops in the city, but also was prefect of the city and head of the police, had obtained intelligence that Macrinus had been questioning astrologers and other soothsayers about his own and the emperor's destiny; perhaps he had discovered, also, that he had accomplices in the capital, and thereupon communicated what he had made out to the emperor. Some intimation reached Macrinus that he was marked for destruction, and he risked nothing in attempting to anticipate the intentions of the emperor. The soldiery, however, had been latterly so highly favored, and kept the senate in Rome and their own generals in the provinces in such terror, that no one dared to insult Caracalla's memory, as they cut to pieces all supposed to have taken the slightest part in his murder. Accordingly Macrinus and his colleagues carefully concealed all knowledge of the fatal transaction.

Four days after the death of Caracalla, the Roman empire remained without a head. It was not till the fifth, that the officers who had leagued themselves with Macrinus succeeded in gaining over to him the guards who were in Edessa, and procuring his election as emperor. Their choice was of course ratified by the senate; and Macrinus, as a pretext for a second donative to the soldiery, declared his son Diadumenianus, who was only nine years old, as his successor.

About this time the Parthians had already invaded the Roman territory, and threatened to repay Caracalla's ravages in ample measure. Macrinus hastened to meet them, but seems not to have been fortunate in the two successive engagements which took place: at all events he soon engaged in negotiations with them, restored the preceeding year's plunder, and paid so considerable a sum (Dio Cassius states it at fifty million drachmas) as an indemnity for the costs of the war, that the accuracy of the account may well be called into some doubt, as it is not easy to conceive how he could bring such an amount together.

With ordinary prudence Macrinus perhaps might have kept his footing, though it gradually became notorious that he had caused Caracalla's murder. However, he was too secure; and, instead of hastening to Rome, protracted his stay too long in Syria, where neither his personal bearing nor conduct were such as to conciliate to him the suffrage of the wise and well-intentioned. His answers to those who approached him were abrupt and unfriendly; his dress repugnant to Roman ideas, blazing with gems, and flowing with eastern drapery; his former application in the affairs of administration and justice slackened; he became voluptuous, lazy, and effeminate. Add to this, that he kept together an army discontented with the manner in which the Parthian war had been terminated, and he even attempted unseasonably to introduce a stricter discipline. That the provincials might no longer be harassed by the quartering of soldiers upon them, the soldiery were consigned to separate barracks or encampments; military offences punished with rigor, and attempts to resist the regulations visited by decimating the ranks. The emperor himself lived luxuriously in Antioch; while the army, with whom his predecessor had shared every extravagance, often suffered the want of absolute necessaries. Macrinus, indeed, durst not withdraw the subsidies and various favors which Caracalla had lavished on the army; he however declared that only the old soldiers should enjoy them, while the new recruits should have nothing beyond the ordinary rate of pay: thence arose discontents and jealousies.

Caracalla's maternal aunt Mæsa had been exiled by Macrinus into Syria, and lived with her two daughters, Mammæa and Soæmis, and their sons, in the enjoyment of great wealth at Emesa. Their riches were deposited in a splendid temple of the sun, the Syrian deity, where the brilliant part of a Syrian priest of the sun was performed by Bassianus, the son of Soæmis. Bassianus was young and beautiful; the dress and paraphernalia of a Syrian priest were splendid; a division of the Roman army lay in a fortified camp near Emesa; the soldiers admired the young man's appearance on festal and solemn occasions; he was given out for the son of Caracalla, and the two women, shame-

less enough to countenance the rumor, spared no expense to gain over the soldiery to their interests. When all was prepared, Mæsa appeared in the fortified camp with her nephew Bassianus, afterwards called by the name of his god Heliogabalus, who was saluted by the soldiers as emperor. Macrinus, not being himself capable of heading an army, preferred sending the prefect of the guards, Ulpius Julian, against Heliogabalus and his adherents. These troops were, however, tempted to mutiny, and Julian himself lost his life.

The plainest proofs of indecision and cowardice had in the mean time been exhibited by Macrinus. He had written to the senate; had promised to the Roman people festivities, to the soldiery the full payment of all Caracalla had granted them; had gone at first to Apamea with a division of the army, but then forsook his followers, and hastened back to Antioch. The natural effect of this indecision was the desertion of his troops; even those he had left behind in Apamea went over to the enemy. Heliogabalus, at the head of the Syrian troops, who had already sworn to him, and of those Romans who had deserted at Apamea, advanced to meet the enemy, whom he found nine or ten leagues from Antioch, at the head of his guards. The action seemed at first turning in favor of Macrinus; the Syrian troops gave way before the firmness of the imperial guards, till Mæsa and Soæmis appeared, and succeeded by their urgent instances in bringing back the fugitives into the action. Heliogabalus appeared on horseback, sword in hand, in the thick of the action, and manifested a degree of resolution and courage from which better hopes might have been drawn than were in the sequel realised. Macrinus, on the other hand, did not even await the result of this action, but fled while his Prætorians were still fighting. It was not till after waiting a whole day for his re-appearance, that these brave troops accepted the terms proposed by Heliogabalus, who offered them all the advantages they had enjoyed under Macrinus. The latter, in the mean time, was detained by contrary winds in Chalcedon, where he was apprehended by the people sent after him by Heliogabalus, transported to Cappadocia, and, in attempting to escape, despatched. Diadumenianus his son, of but ten years of age, shared his fate.

A. D. 218. The foregoing government had lasted only fourteen months. Of the three women who overthrew it, conjointly with their confidants, Mæsa was the only one who had any views of personal ambition. Accordingly the effective powers of government fell principally into her hands. Heliogabalus himself, a youth of fifteen, accustomed from his childhood to the effeminacy, festivity, glitter, and revelling of Syrian towns and temples, and finding himself at once in possession of limitless power and wealth as unbounded, rushed headlong into every folly, and steeped himself in every vice which could be prompted by a vitiated fancy, excited senses, and youthful caprice. Even in Nicomedia, where he made some stay, he gave himself up to all sorts of excesses, in which he was encouraged by his mother; while his grandmother Mæsa tried every means of keeping him at least within the bounds of external decency. When he arrived in Rome, every day was signalised by some fresh display of vice or extravagance.

Even his very apparel and head-dress were strange and unmanly in Roman eyes; his familiar circles profligate; those whom he had raised, or allowed to be raised, to public offices, unfit in all respects. Mæsa soon perceived that he was too childish and reckless to be maintained on the throne for any long period. She therefore determined to thrust him aside, and substitute one better fitted to secure the powers of government in her family. She waited, however, for four years, before she resolved on extreme measures; and accordingly gave him time to push his tyranny to the utmost. The business of the government was wholly transacted by these women; Mæsa and Soæmis even appearing in the senate,—an exhibition which had been made neither by Livia nor Agrippina. The youth himself was engrossed with the most frivolous amusements, or with the mummeries of the mystical and symbolical service of Syrian deities, which were linked with the most scandalous practices. In his lewd and lavish sacrificial feasts and processions, he was fond of grotesquely combining the observances of the most different nations, countries, and times. At once voluptuous and cruel, he committed the most outrageous acts in every sense, without shame or reserve; propitiated his deities with human victims; as Baalim and Moloch, whom he held in especial honor, had been propitiated by them of old time, and caused presages of futurity to be drawn from the entrails of slaughtered children. Withal he spared neither the most deserving nor the most honored heads, when, in any access of caprice, he had chanced to conceive suspicion against them.

Mæsa, as we have above hinted, so soon as she was clearly aware of the madness of one grandson, turned her preference towards the other. This other was Alexianus, afterwards known as Alexander Severus, whom his mother Mammæa had educated admirably. While Soæmis had allowed her son, from childhood upwards, entirely to follow his own humors, Mammæa, on the contrary, watched the conduct of hers with the utmost vigilance. She contrived with great art to get him adopted in the place of a son by Heliogabalus himself, and presented by him as his colleague in the empire to the soldiery, although he was then only twelve years old. Mæsa and Mammæa next endeavored to gain over to him the senate and the soldiery; and in this they succeeded the more easily, the more despicable Heliogabalus had made himself. The latter, on the other hand, sought means to rid himself of his cousin. First, he tried to make use of the senate, to annul all he had previously done for his advancement; but every thing he proposed against Alexander was received with such profound silence, that he found himself compelled to resort to other means to effect his object. After more than one secret attempt at assassination, he openly sent the instruments of his cruelties with a commission to despatch him. This proceeding not only failed, but gave the tyrant occasion to hear, that not he, but the army, in effect ruled the empire. The soldiery took Alexander under their protection; and the emperor's life was only saved by the prayers of his adherents, and by his own promises to amend his manner of life and government.

From thenceforwards Mammæa devoted her efforts to make a party

for her son in the camp; while, on the other hand, Heliogabalus did his utmost to rid himself of his too popular rival. The first open attempt having been frustrated, he set about a second more cautiously. First he attempted gradually to withdraw his cousin from the eyes of the people and the soldiers; and accordingly kept him sometime secluded in the palace. Again, however, Heliogabalus had the conviction forced on him, that he could only avoid destruction for himself by giving up his designs against his cousin. The soldiers had already shut the gates of their camp, refused the usual guard to the emperor, and renounced their allegiance, in case Alexander should not be produced before them; when, at length, Heliogabalus appeared with all humility in company with his cousin in the camp. The emperor was received with loud demonstrations of displeasure; his cousin with loud shouts of applause. Exasperated by this reception, Heliogabalus gave orders to seize and punish the ringleaders: Mammæa, on the other hand, stirred up her friends among the troops to resistance; and a regular engagement took place, in which the partisans of Heliogabalus were routed; and the emperor himself was dragged from a filthy place of refuge, and slain in the arms of his mother Soæmis, who also shared his fate. Alexander remained sole emperor, under the guardianship of his grandmother; but the powers of government shortly afterwards fell into the hands of Mammæa, as Mæsa died in the course of the following year.

There has been no female reign, with perhaps the exception of our queen Elizabeth's more beneficent to the human race than that of the mother of Alexander Severus. Whether or no she was actually a Christian, as affirmed by Orosius, her life was in accordance with a system of philosophy which had much in common at least with Christianity. Not only the young emperor's education, but the government of the emperor, was conducted on those principles. Laws did not as hitherto proceed from the imperial cabinet, but deliberation took place on every law in the senate, or in a committee of fifty-two of its members; and this committee was always summoned to decide upon the projects of government. The whole administration was conducted by a council of sixteen experienced statesmen; in the midst of whom the young prince was placed for instruction in state policy. The supreme administration of justice in the capital was committed, not to the prefect of the city, and whatever two assessors he might chance to select, but to fourteen men who had filled the consular office, and were renowned as jurists. Ulpian, the friend of Papinian, the most rigidly upright man of his times, a man more skilled in jurisprudence than any of his contemporaries, was the friend of Alexander, and the only person with whom he was used to converse in strict confidence. This alone may be regarded as the young emperor's highest praise.

How laudable soever were all the measures of this government, it is nevertheless clear, from the whole history of these times, that no rule could be durable under military mastery, unless when an emperor was at the head of affairs who inspired the soldiery with respect for his martial qualifications and experience. This was out of the

power as well of Ulpian as of Alexander; and when the former was made prefect by the emperor, the choice was disapproved by Mammæa, perhaps on account of the danger to which it exposed Ulpian. Probably she foresaw that the soldiery would not endure his sternness and rigor and when at length she yielded, it soon appeared her forebodings had been justified. The discontent of the soldiers at Ulpian's regulations broke repeatedly into open insurrection; and more than once the emperor was compelled to save the life of his prefect, by covering his person with his own purple robes. The citizens and soldiers also sometimes fell into quarrels, which assumed the aspect of regular civil warfare; and on one occasion the emperor was reduced to look on while a conflict of this kind continued three days in the streets of Rome; and the enraged soldiery, finding themselves at length defeated, set the citizens' houses on fire. Ulpian who had long defended the people from the fury of the troops, was slain in the palace, at the feet of his emperor, who vainly endeavored to protect him; and the government was powerless to punish the known authors of the revolt.

It would be tedious to enumerate the military revolts and mutinies, which became the sole object of the cares of government; and which Alexander recompensed with ample donatives. Even the father-in-law of the youthful emperor, to whom he had yielded great influence, sought his destruction. Alexander and his mother were compelled to consign the empress to banishment, and her father to the hand of the executioner. The empress-mother is accused by Gibbon (after Herodian) of having fabricated the plot, to raise her influence on the ruin of the emperor's beloved wife, and her ambitious father. However, whether Herodian's or Dexippus's account be adopted, the lamentable character of this reign betrayed itself daily farther. The armies became more and more unmanageable, as they gradually came to consist almost wholly of barbarians; and being gathered on the frontiers in masses, could have no relations of civil life with the capital or the provinces. The greatest forces were stationed on the Danube, where the emperor himself spent some time; and on the eastern frontier, for defence against the Parthians. In Britain, also, more troops were stationed than there had been formerly. On the Rhine the danger and number of troops were smaller.

The inroads of the German nations in Gaul called the emperor of the Rhine, after an expedition against the Persians, at first prosperous, but abortive in its issue, from the influence of his mother's counsels, and excessive care of his life and health. In the above-mentioned province, a Thracian (Maximin,) who had raised himself from a wrestler and common soldier to the highest military rank, commanded in chief. This man's gigantic stature strength of body, and athletic accomplishments, had attracted the attention of Septimius Severus, who enlisted him in his guards, and promoted him to the rank of an officer. After the death of Caracalla, and even under Heliogabalus, Maximin had refused to serve, and therefore was the more distinguished under Alexander's government. When the emperor reached Mentz, he stood at the head of the new levies, which, for the most part, had been made in Pannonia. This rude Thracian,

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who possessed in an eminent degree the reverence and attachment of the soldiery from the banks of the Danube, regularly exercised the troops; while the emperor, on the other hand, who was always accompanied by his mother, carelessly viewed their various evolutions, shared none of the hardships of the campaigns, but continually issued commands respecting order and discipline, which excited great discontent among the Gallic troops in particular. The young emperor, often beset with the demands and grievances of the soldiery, attempted to control them by severity, as he had done in Asia; but now only succeeded in exciting a complete mutiny. The Gauls, who were encamped in the immediate neighborhood of Mentz, took to arms and forced Maximin to place himself at their head. In this emergency, according to Herodian's account, the emperor behaved almost childishly; fled for refuge at last to his mother, and was slaughtered, with her, near Mentz, at Bretzenheim. A general concern was awakened in the army by the emperor's murder; which was atoned for with the lives of the perpetrators. Maximin, however, knew how to keep his place; and, in March, A. D. 235, was saluted as emperor by the ruder and more energetic part of the army.

With the beginning of the reign of so rude a barbarian, whose best qualities, such as his zeal against effeminacy and luxury, were incompatible with the habits and constitution of a refined people, begins a period, one of the most melancholy of Roman history, from the disorders and divisions of the armies, and a series of barbarian inroads which seemed harbingers of nothing less than total dissolution, and ended in the separation of the eastern from the western half of the empire, and the founding of a new capital.

The election made by the German army, with whom were a large part of the guards, was confirmed, through fear, by the senate and the people. However, the new emperor remained with the army, made great preparations for campaigns in the interior of Germany, and excluded all from public employment who had been Alexander's friends or councillors, or had stood in relations of confidence with the senate. Two Romans of good family, Magnus and T. Quartinus, successively made the attempt to take advantage of the discontent of a part of the troops, for the overthrow of Maximin. These attempts, however, were frustrated, and formed pretexts for the most sanguinary executions. Maximin had no idea of clemency; he viewed with contempt the weakness and effeminacy of the Romans; their dread of dangers and rage for public spectacles were hateful to him. The conspiracy of Magnus cost about four thousand men their lives; and the partners in Quartinus's revolt, which had arisen amongst the Syrian troops, and especially the picked bands of archers whom Alexander had led from Osrhoene to the Rhine, were visited with no less cruelties.

The merciless proceedings of Maximin, the unheard-of treatment inflicted by him on all persons of fortune or family, the neglect of the metropolis, which the emperor, who had adopted his son as colleague, never deigned even to visit, the retrenchment of the whole expenditure made in public games and spectacles, the profuse bounties lavish-

ed on the rudest part of the army, the decay of every civil establishment, had long in the highest degree embittered the citizens; till, at length, an order to appropriate the funds set apart in the towns for the purchase of corn, as well as legacies, or other property of private individuals, to the use of the state, or, in other words, the soldiery, drove at length the most peaceful to despair.

Chance gave the first impulse to revolt in Africa. Two young men of good family, condemned to pay an enormous fine, roused up their clients and tenants against the officer of the imperial treasury, who attempted to enforce the payment, and slew him. On their incitement, one of their friends assembled the people of the neighboring country at Thysdrum, not far from Adrumetum, and proposed to them to raise to the throne the proconsul of the province, Gordian, who was eighty years old, together with his son and lieutenant, a man who had already been consul. The proposition was adopted: and the whole province concurred to set up the mild and pacific old man, and his son, who had in like manner grown up in peaceful and easy occupations, against the ruthless and warlike barbarian. No one spent a thought how the new rulers would be able to maintain their ground. The elder Gordian had long refused to take upon him the purple, and only acquiesced on constraint. The cruel slaughter of all the servants, officers, and friends of the tyrant, was the first consequence of his election. The Roman senate had scarce received the letter, in which the choice of the Gordians was announced to it, when it declared Maximin, as it once had Nero, the enemy of his country. While it made preparations against his vengeance his presence with an army being every day expected in Italy, and, as in the time of Pompey, despatched twenty consulars, with unlimited powers, to the several towns and districts, to carry on the levies of troops, and defend the lines of route, the populace in Rome committed shocking atrocities. The capital was for some time in a complete state of revolution.

In Africa, meanwhile, matters had taken a turn highly unfavorable. The Gordians were conquered; the land was again ruled in the name of Maximin; extermination followed resistance. Capellianus, who had been engaged in litigious contention with Gordian, was at this time governor of Mauritania, and in command of a considerable number of troops: the title of Gordian, therefore, was no sooner recognised by the senate, than he endeavored to deprive Capellianus of his governorship. But the latter, when called on to lay down his office, declared in favor of Maximin, and marched, with a mixed force of Moors and Romans, against Carthage. The undisciplined multitude who armed themselves in Carthage and its neighborhood, and took the field under the younger Gordian, proved a wretched defence against regular troops: Capellianus; conquered; and a numberless host of people were slaughtered. The younger Gordian fell in battle; the elder by his own hand. Capellianus wreaked his vengeance on the rebel district as furiously as Maximin himself could have done; and looked forward to partake, or to inherit, the empire.

Meanwhile Maximin, with his army, was marching towards Italy. The tidings of the death of the two Gordians, and the approach of the

emperor, alarmed the senate, and hastened their choice of two new emperors—Clodius Papienus Maximus, a man of military experience, and Decimus Cælius Balbinus, who was thoroughly versed in public affairs. But the aristocratical system, which seemed introduced by this choice of the senate, was distasteful both to the populace and the soldiery; the multitude, therefore, with furious outcries, demanded a new emperor, who should not be the mere tool of the senate. All attempts to still the tumult failed; and as it was feared that the Prætorians, who had been alienated from Maximin by the murder of their perfect Vitalianus, might join the populace on account of their disaffection from the senate, a third emperor was nominated, a grandson of the elder Gordian, and who bore the name of his grandfather. From the scanty and incoherent accounts, which are all that have been preserved of these times, it cannot be discovered why Maximin, who commanded an over-whelming force, delayed marching on Italy, till all the provinces had declared against him, and the senate had not only levied an army, but had made every preparation to defend the towns through which Maximin must necessarily pass, and to sweep all the provisions and forage from the open country into the towns. Maximin's descent fell in the spring, when all the streams in the Istrian territory are swollen, and the march of an army is difficult. His troops were pinched with privations and hunger; the towns made an obstinate defence; and Maximus conducted with skill the preparations for the general defence of Italy; while Crispinus and Menophilus, two senators who had been delegated to Aquileia, incited the citizens of that town to a stout resistance. Men and woman vied in passive fortitude and active exertions. Maximin was embittered by the stand made against him; his harshness became intolerable, even to those around him; and, as intelligence poured in on every side of the revolt of the provinces, the soldiers, who were suffering severe hardships, and who knew that Aquileia was abundantly stored with provisions, made a sacrifice of their emperor, whom they slew, with his son, and recognised the new prince as named by the senate.

While these events were taking place, Maximus, with his newly levied troops, was at Ravenna. On the first tidings of Maximin's death, he hastened to Aquileia, made a donative to his army, which he ordered back to the frontiers; but unfortunately took back the guards with him to Rome, exasperated as they were with their recent humiliation. His splendid triumph appeared an affront to the honor of these troops, as no one but themselves had been vanquished; besides which, they associated themselves with the Prætorians, who had remained with Balbinus in the city, and had engaged during the absence of Maximus in sanguinary conflicts with the people and the senate. These conflicts, on the one hand, ended in murder and conflagration; on the other, in the blockade of the Prætorians in their fortified camp, and in cutting off the duct by which the Prætorian camp was supplied with water. Scarce two months elapsed betwixt the death of Maximin and the outbreaking of discontents amongst the soldiery. One day, while all the citizens were engrossed with the Capitoline games, and the emperors Maximus and Balbinus were left almost alone in the palace,

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the mutinous troops attacked, slew them, and led Gordian in triumph back to their camp. Gordian was their favorite commander; and when raised to the empire, chance placed an upright and instructed man, Misiheus, at the head of the guards. After the appointment of Misiheus as prefect, he married his daughter to the emperor, and carried on the government with honor and success in his name. The progress of the Persians in the East was in the mean time so considerable, that the emperor's presence in person appeared necessary. While transports were constructing on the Tigris, and preparations were making for a march through the deserts, the father-in-law of the emperor, Misiheus, died, leaving his property, which was considerable, to the city of Rome. His successor to the prefecture and the guardianship of the young emperor, was Julius Philippus, a man of Latin extraction, born in Asia, and commonly surnamed the Arab.

Philip was a man of boundless ambition, who could not content himself with the subordinate situation which had been held by Misiheus, but even aspired himself to be emperor. He purposely excited discontents in the army, caused the young emperor to be put to death, and assumed the purple. A hasty peace was patched up with the Persian king; and Philip returned to the capital to celebrate the millennial anniversary of the empire, at the moment that its utter dissolution seemed impending. The banks of the Rhine were inundated with various German tribes; the Danube, and the provinces on its southern bank, by the Goths, and the nations in alliance with them, or following in their train; the East would have fallen to the share of the Persians, had they possessed regular armies and a well-organised system of warfare. At the same moment several of the legions saluted their leaders as emperors; and Philip himself, who had previously adopted his son as his colleague, despaired of his own fortunes when the news arrived of the double defection of the legions on the Danube and in Syria. Decius encouraged the emperor by predicting the overthrow of the rebels; but he had scarce taken his departure to Mœsia to restore order, when he himself was raised to the throne, and appeared against his emperor in the field. It was said, indeed, that he acted on compulsion, and had promised Philip, on reaching Rome, to restore the government to his hands. Philip, however, trusted not his promises, took the field against him, and was defeated and slain.

The reign of Decius was no more stable or fortunate than his predecessor's. The Goths, Burgundians, Gepidæ, and other tribes, whose names to this day are preserved in those of the countries which they afterwards took possession of, were constantly engaged in warfare, partly with each other, and partly with the Romans on both sides of the Danube. Under Philip, the Goths had rendered tributary the whole of Dacia; under Decius, their king Cniva led a force numerically great into the Roman provinces, and laid siege to the town of Eusterium, afterwards called Novi, and afterwards to Philippopolis, which they took, having surprised and defeated a Roman army in its neighborhood, under Decius himself or his son. It appears that Decius afterwards recovered the advantage over this enemy, but followed them too closely in their retreat; so that, driving

them to desperation, they turned upon him and his army, and cut them
A. D. to pieces. The Christian writers triumph on this overthrow
251. of Decius; declaring it a judgment of God, a foretaste of the
pains of hell, which awaited him for persecuting the Christians, without apparently reflecting that the numberless persons of that persuasion, who had lost life or property by the Gothic invasion, had paid dearly for the supposed punishment of their persecutor.

This rout of a Roman army, and the yearly tribute to the Goths, by which peace was purchased, disgusted the soldiery and the capital; and encouraged the Goths and their allies to new inroads upon the empire, whose chief and army were fallen; whose weakness stood confessed openly. Gallus, the general who was chosen to succeed to the empire by the scattered troops, so soon as they contrived to unite again, had imputed to him, of course, after the fashion of writers in those times, a wilful participation in the overthrow and death of his emperor; and this possibly groundless charge increased the odium which attended him for having agreed to pay tribute, and for having suffered the enemy to carry off all their booty, and all their prisoners. The incursions of the tribes on the Danube soon afterwards compelled Æmilianus, the general commanding in Pannonia, to march against them. He was fortunate enough to surprise and vanquish the force of the same nation to whom his emperor actually was tributary. He routed the Goths, recovered their plunder, and shared it amongst his own soldiers, who hailed him, out of gratitude, emperor. Gallus met the insurgent legions in Umbria, and fell on the field, with his son Volusianus.

Æmilian, indeed, assumed the vacated throne, but did not fill it a moment in security. A force had been assembled in the Grisons and the Tyrol by Valerian, to support Gallus, which appearing in the field too late for that purpose, no sooner, however, approached the army of Æmilian, than the latter slew their emperor, in the neighborhood of Spoleto, and Valerian was enthroned in his stead. It may easily be imagined what confusion must reign in a vast empire, in which, since the death of Alexander Severus, the government so swiftly changed hands; and the soldiery, for the most part rude barbarians, installed and deposed rulers at their pleasure. Add, that famine, pestilence, inroads of barbarians, and, especially under Decius, fierce and merciless struggles with a religion powerful and spreading itself more and more widely, distracted every province, and diffused discontent and misery everywhere; and some conception may be formed of the wretched state of the Roman empire. Even Valerian, distinguished as he was as a general, and worthy, as the senate under Decius had proclaimed him, for his virtues as an incorrupt citizen, to exercise the functions of censor, which had sunk into oblivion since the time of Claudius, could not restore the blessings of peace, order, and tranquility. While the barbarians of the north extended their ravages on every side, and a swarm of pretenders and rival Cæsars appeared, one after the other, the East was incessantly threatened by the Persians. Valerian at length marched to meet them, to relieve Edessa, which alone withstood their attacks, or to recover from them Nisibis: he suffered himself,

however, to be drawn into an ambuscade; and to fall into the hands of the Persian monarch, under pretence of a conference, and never was released from captivity.

Of the pretenders to the imperial dignity, who now hastened to contest it in the several divisions of the empire with Valerian's son Gallienus, who assumed the purple of his father's capture, in the East the most prominent and long-sustained part was played by Odenathus, who may be counted, with his consort Zenobia, among the most remarkable historical personages. The military services of this chief in Asia Minor, against former pretenders to the throne, had obtained for him, from Gallienus, the government of those provinces which he had thus saved to the unity of the empire. In the midst of the desert, since the times of Solomon, Palmyra bloomed, a city and a state in itself; visited by all the caravans in their progress from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, as a place of trade, an *entrepot* for goods, and a point of rendezvous for traders and tribes of Arabs, who hired out their camels to transport merchandise across the desert. So soon as the Syrian dynasty of the Seleucidæ had established its sway, Palmyra adopted Grecian arts and manners, was adorned by Grecian architects with splendid public buildings and temples, preserved its prosperity even during the wars that had laid waste Syria and Palestine; and, afterwards, ranked with those Asiatic towns which, under successive emperors, were declared Roman colonies.

Odenathus would appear to have been originally a sort of leader of a clan, or ruler of a little domain, in the neighborhood of the city of Palmyra; and, at the same time, one of the most respected of its citizens. When the Persian king advanced on the Euphrates, Odenathus at first sought, by force of presents, to win his favor; but, as the Persians disdained his overtures, he took up arms, in revenge, for Gallienus. His services in repulsing the Persian enemy, and in stripping of his adherents and destroying Callistus, or Balista, a somewhat formidable pretender to the empire, was rewarded by Gallienus with the title of generalissimo in the East (*dux Orientis*;) and, afterwards, with the prouder titles of Cæsar and Augustus, which were shared by his consort and his children. Thenceforward Odenathus, during four years at least, issued coin with his insignia as emperor. During these years Odenathus's administration was glorious; Palmyra, under his sway, and that of his consort, became one of the most magnificent cities of the East; till Odenathus himself, and his son Herodes, were assassinated at Emesa, at the treacherous instigation of a near relative, in vengeance for some real or imaginary offence. On this event, however, the government was carried on by Zenobia, with no less vigor than before.

In the western part of the empire, about this time, innumerable anti-Cæsars sprung up; of whom, however, most maintained their footing but for a short time. Tetricus alone, who had been governor of Aquitania, was recognised as ruler in Spain and in Gaul. Gallienus at length abandoned all idea of maintaining any substantial authority in the provinces beyond the Alps, as well as in the East; and, like the Persian monarchs of old times, the Great Mogul, or the Turkish em-

perors, contented himself with a semblance of supremacy. He appeared, however, resolved to defend Italy from all attacks; and even in the last years of his government, when he seemed entirely sunk in slothful repose, he took the field the moment that Italy was threatened by a new invader. This was Aureolus, who had fought with success against the Goths in the service of Gallienus, and was now compelled by his troops to assume the imperial title, and march upon Italy. On this occasion Gallienus evinced a degree of fortitude and activity strongly contrasted with the effeminate sloth generally ascribed to his character. He not only defeated Aureolus in a pitched battle, but shut him up in Milan, and laid siege to him during the whole winter. However, notwithstanding these unwonted exertions, Gallienus's principal officers, and amongst them Claudius, the bravest of his generals, who had vanquished the Goths, and commanded the legions in Illyria, Thrace, Mæsia, and Dacia, felt that the emperor was not equal to the emergencies of his post, and accordingly conspired his death. In order to obtain the opportunity of effecting their purpose, the execution of which was afterwards loudly censured by the soldiery, the emperor was suddenly told that Aureolus had made a sally, and had penetrated into the camp. A Moorish officer of the Dalmatian horse executed the deed of murder, as Gallienus was springing to horse in the darkness, to place himself at the head of his troops. The generals
A. D. 268. who had formed and carried through the conspiracy continued, after the death of Gallienus, the blockade of Aureolus; and offered the empire, not to him, but to Claudius, a better known and older general, who had already, as above mentioned, distinguished himself under Decius.

CHAPTER III.

LIFE AND MANNERS UNDER THE PRECEDING REIGNS.

THE history of this period shows us, better than any other, that to states, as to men, destiny assigns a certain duration of life, beyond which their lot is feebleness and infirmity. Rules of living and prescriptions of art may prolong, indeed, for years, the feeble existence of age, but never renew the juices, or restore the energies of youth. How many capable rulers, how many men of acute insight and excellent intentions, successively administered the Roman empire at this period! The first jurists that ever lived, the most distinguished officers, the ablest men of buisness, the most formidable bodies of troops, incomparable in organisation and discipline, were at the prince's command. Even the worst emperors did more harm to the capital and its immediate vicinity than to the provinces; yet how visibly all sank and declined! how perished, one after the other, all relics of their old greatness! Civilisation gained in extent; arts and trades flourished; industry, commerce, every thing that can add to the ease of material life, progressed; and a new religion taught a new morality. But the old spirit was gone: servile and egoist dispositions had come in place of patriotic feeling and civic virtue. Every where bodies without souls! As, by degrees, all the relations of life had become changed, and from day to day underwent farther and farther changes, the laws which had been made for the republic no longer suited the condition of the empire.

In default of the existence of a legislative body, possessed of the authority which the senate had lost, and capable of adapting the old laws to the new state of things, the emperors, by degrees, began the practice of replying by rescripts to the questions brought before them on debateable points of law; or, where there was no law to refer to, announcing their will on each special occasion. These rescripts by degrees acquired the force of positive law, and possessed superior validity to the ancient legislation. The confusion, contradiction, and injustice, which arose from thence in life, and all its relations, were infinite. It was visible even to Trajan, that two wholly different legislatures, one founded systematically in history and the course of events, and the other wholly accidental and arbitrary, had acquired concurrent authority throughout the Roman empire. Accordingly, he answered appeals in matters of administration, government, or judicial procedure, only in private epistles; not in the form employed by his predecessors in similar cases (*libellis*.) However, Trajan's successors recurred to the old practice; and in giving their decisions in particular cases, ex-

pected these decisions to be considered as having the force of law. In this manner the mad fancies of a Domitian, Caracalla, or Commodus, or the decrees of the female council around Heliogabalus, held co-ordinate authority with the best regulations of old times.

While, on the one hand, we find introduced in Rome Asiatic court-ceremonial, grovelling vanity, slavish splendor, and unbounded profusion; on the other hand, the general decay of the empire, the exhaustion of its finances, the extinction of its laws, are manifest in the state of the guards and the army, their composition, and the part played by them. In the period of which we are engaged in the history, Greece, through the strife and jealousy of her towns towards each other,—Italy, through the decay of all energy of character, and all martial spirit in her people,—had lost the pre-eminence of station which formerly had belonged to them; and the inhabitants of the frontier provinces, soon, indeed, even barbarians, obtained the leading part in all, especially military affairs.

Under Augustus, according to Dio Cassius,* only three or five-and-twenty legions were left of all the immense bodies of troops which he and Antony, Lepidus, Brutus, and Cassius, had brought into the field in the civil wars. Under Nero, however, Galba, Vespasian, Domitian, Trajan, and Marcus Antoninus, new legions had been formed. Under Septimius Severus, their number already had reached two-and-thirty. But it must here be observed, that a number of soldiers cannot be reckoned from these data. A considerable number must be added for the guards; and a number still greater for the bands of foreign mercenaries who occupied the place of the old auxiliaries. These we meet with frequently under the name of *vexilla* or *cohortes*.

The legions were kept together in fixed and stationary encampments; thus forming a sort of military state, or *imperium in imperio*, which was only kept in any subordination by the frequent change of leaders, and transposition of the legions from one end of the empire to the other. Under Septimius Severus a particularly large proportion of military force was assigned to Britain and to Syria. At that period, we learn, three legions were stationed in Britain, one on the Upper Rhine (Germania Superior), two on the Lower Rhine (Germania Inferior,) one in Italy, one in Spain, one in Numidia, one in Arabia, two in Palestine, one in Phœnicia, two in Syria, two in Mesopotamia, two in Cappadocia, two in Lower Mœsia, one in upper Mœsia, two in Dacia, four in Pannonia, one in Noricum, one in Rhætia. Two had no permanent station, but were used, as their services were required, in different parts of the empire. From a passage of Ælius Lampridius,† the numerical strength of a legion at this period appears to have been 5000 men. This, compared with the total force of modern European armies, would appear quite insignificant, if it were not borne in mind, that the legions, in these days of degeneracy, only formed, as it were, the kernel or skeleton of the army, and still retained the discipline and arms of old Rome. In these times the bulk of armies

* Lib. lv. c. 23—25.

† Alex. Sever. c. l.

was often drawn from various nations, equally various in their weapons and order, and perhaps, contained only one or two legions in its ranks. The guards, who formed a description of force most burthensome to the empire, which they sold over and over again, and exhausted by the donatives made them, were from time to time augmented in number. Septimius Severus not only added to their force fourfold, but opened their ranks, for the first time, to barbarians. It is true that military service had long been avoided by the Italians. The rule, however, had always been, to recruit the guards with born citizens, whether Italians, Spaniards, Macedonians, Latin inhabitants of Noricum, &c. Septimius, however, recruited his guards from the ranks of the whole army, and decreed the continuance of the practice in future. It was thought that the effeminate inhabitants of the interior provinces could no longer be made serviceable in warfare. They were, therefore, allowed to buy themselves off; and the conquerors of the world, who had formerly been free from all imposts, were now subject to an arbitrary, onerous, and disgraceful one. From this time a distinction was established betwixt the duties of the recruiting officer, who levied troops in the frontier provinces, or wherever a vigorous race of men were to be found; and the *termarius*, who raised arbitrary fines for exemption from active service in Italy, and the other regions whose inhabitants were despised as soldiers.

The expenditure required for the Roman army is not easy to calculate; as the donatives on the accession of each emperor, and extraordinary rewards and gratifications, amounted to far more than the regular pay. As the warfare on the frontiers was incessant, from the Antonines downwards, the extraordinary rewards, which were only distributed in war time, became a standing branch of expenditure. Moreover, the needy provincials and barbarians, who in those times rose to the head of armies, required to be furnished with the means of enriching themselves at the public cost. Happy, indeed, was the empire under these reigns when the regular and ordinary modes of extortion only were practised; and the soldiers and their officers forbore from open pillage and violence, and from treating Roman ground as an enemy's country.

Since the times of Augustus, and, even more, since those of Trajan, high roads throughout the empire had been amazingly improved and extended, and practicable routes were made, as for example, that of the Splugen, which have never since been rivalled till our days. Even in Britain, Roman roads were made through the island in the times of Septimius Severus; but the making of new roads was always attended with the imposition of new and overwhelming burthens. We do not speak of the forced labors levied on the roads; since, however hard these might be, they fell alike on all property; but of other burthens and oppressions connected with the public roads. Of these, the imperial posts were, without doubt, the greatest. The continual transmission of edicts, rescripts, orders, and missions of all sorts, and all requiring instant despatch; the imperial journeys; the missions of civil and military functionaries; the march of legions from one end of the empire to the other, multiplied as these movements necessarily were by

the incessant inroads of the barbarians, disturbances and revolts in the provinces, demanded a prodigious posting establishment, which was maintained at the charge of the several localities.

Where all depends on the will of a master, and every burthen falls on the industrious classes, to the sole advantage of those descriptions of men who cluster around a court, no footing is left for the class of independent citizens. An individual prince, perhaps, encourages plans of public improvement, builds towns, promotes particular branches of industry; his successor lets all his schemes drop, and the land is covered with relics of abandoned and abortive enterprize. Italy suffered most in this way; as all imperial works, down to funerals or burial places, were there on an enormous scale, and employed the hands of innumerable laborers. Proportionately to the increase of immense private domains and palaces, the class of peasants and free citizens dwindled; and the towns became inhabited by a miserable populace. Yet all without seemed still splendid and prosperous; while all within was hollow, unsound, and tottering. The mechanism of social life appeared to have reached its highest perfection; but the spirit of old citizenship sunk forever.

CHAPTER IV.

PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE, FROM TRAJAN DOWNWARDS.

THE whole literature of these times bears evident traces of the prevalence of a sort of bastard enthusiasm, not of original growth, but of Græco-oriental extraction, and fed on the high imaginations imported by the Greeks from the East of some superior species of wisdom, derived to us through unknown channels, and attainable only by virtue of mysterious means and initiations. The Stoic philosophy itself, as transformed by *EPICETUS*, appeared under a new character. Before his times, the doctrines of Zeno had degenerated, as those of Antisthenes: and had become a mere play of dialectical and rhetorical subtleties. Epictetus first re-called it to life, from which it had been kept at a remote distance by Seneca. A sort of philosophical opposition had been constituted hitherto by the Stoics and Cynics, which had often given umbrage even to the tolerance of the better emperors. From Epictetus, however, downwards, the doctrine of passive endurance and fortitude was exalted to the first place in the moral system of Stoicism; and Christians have therefore claimed Epictetus as their own. He was one of those philosophers who were driven from Rome by Domitian's orders; he took up his abode at Nicopolis in Epirus, and supported, in necessitous circumstances, the consistency of his doctrine by the course of his life. He fashioned himself a world and well-being of his own, and soon collected crowds of disciples, eager for instruction. Men of all ranks and classes sought his conversation, as admirers of his wisdom and eloquence, and were won to a doctrine which offered more than mere speculation, and seemed framed for the actual conduct of life, and the true estimation of human happiness. It was thus that Arrian, the best disciple of Epictetus, embraced his doctrine, and was probably the author of that brief manual (*Enchiridion*) in which his principles are outlined from oral expositions. The whole life of the scholar was well calculated to attract consideration to the master's doctrine; for Arrian attained such distinction as a statesman and warrior, geographer, tactician, and philosopher, that Hadrian promoted him from one important post to another; and finally to the rank of a Roman senator and consul.

PLUTARCH was indifferent to both the contending schools of the day—to Stoics as to Epicureans,—and patched up himself a species of philosophy, suited to the spirit and mystical tendencies of the times. He did not lose sight of actual life, like thoroughgoing enthusiasts; nor had he, like the mass of men in his own times, lost all feeling for the greatness of the earlier days of Greece and Rome. His aim was to idealise those times by poetry and rhetorical ornament; and, versed

as he was in the Greek poets and philosophers of the Platonic school, to mingle the images of fancy with the realities of past history. He created in his biographies a wholly new description of historical literature, and employed in the philosophical part of his writings, according to circumstances, any philosophy, or any doctrines filched from any philosophy, which served his purpose in the subject he happened to be treating of. He therefore eschews equally the systems of Zeno and Epicurus, with the ordinary aversion of a man of the world to all extremes; but frequently shows a leaning to the doctrines of the later academy, which favored philosophical scepticism; always however expressing himself in the manner of Bayle, who took good care to avoid standing forward openly and avowedly in opposition to currently received opinions.

The influence of Plutarch's biographies on his own times, in which poetry and enthusiasm for antiquity were in a manner extinct, would seem to have been very slight, so far as we can judge from appearances. His writings, however rose into the highest importance, at the moment when the study of antiquity revived from its long slumber in Europe. All Plutarch's characters were so conceived as to excite, to the utmost, the juvenile enthusiasm for antiquity which prevailed at that era. His anecdotes seemed to bring before the eyes of the reader the characters and occurrences which for the most part, they exhibit under illusive and theatrical aspects: they seldom fail, however, to surprise or amuse; it is therefore no wonder that they have become incorporated with history, and that his most apocryphal narratives have obtained wider currency in modern times than the most authentic records of antiquity.

The branches of intellectual culture which flourished most in these times, were such as required no vigor of fancy, nor independence of thought—no native and original development of the mental powers; but which either were of immediate utility to the state, or stood at least no way opposed to that disposition of mind which, in states under military government, is expected of subjects. Such departments are those of mathematical, medical, legal, and geographical science. To these may be added that sort of literature which confines its aims to mere entertainment, and escapes proscription and censorship, even under despotic sway, as a necessary of civilised existence.

In the department of medicine, GALEN, from whose writings the Arabs and the middle ages in general exclusively drew such knowledge as they had of that science. lived in the reign of M. Antoninus and his successors. He was not solely a physician and natural philosopher, but an orator and profound student of general philosophy; and from passages in his writings, in which he mentions the course of his own training, we are acquainted with a whole list of flourishing establishments for instruction in Asia Minor and the neighboring regions.

CLAUDIUS PTOLEMÆUS, almost contemporaneously with Galen, rendered similar services to astronomy and chronology as the former had done to the science and the branches of knowledge connected with medicine. Both leaned upon the labors of their predecessors; and can-

not therefore be ranked as the original and earliest pioneers in their respective sciences. Both, however, collected and consolidated into a system all that had been done before them; filled up what had been left in outline, and completed what had been merely commenced; and both were for the Arabs, as for Europe during the middle ages, the sole source and authority for the sciences treated of in their works.

Ptolemy as well as Galen shared the superstitions and reigning absurdities of his age. He found it requisite to give himself out as a teacher of astrology, and to put together a manual of the notions then current on the influence of the heavenly constellations. It was his astrology that recommended Ptolemy to the Byzantine Greeks and to the Arabs; by both of whom astronomy was cultivated mainly for the sake of astrology. It was not till Kepler had struck out a new route, and discovered the true principles of the science, that Newton, and those who trod in his footsteps, transformed the whole system of Ptolemy. The merits of the latter were laborious research, accuracy, and order in arrangement. His great astronomical work, to which he himself gave the modest name of a mathematical *Syntaxis*, is in modern times better known by a title strangely compounded of the Arab article with a Greek adjective—*Almagest* (*η μεγιστη*). The Arabs found in Ptolemy what they found so perfectly nowhere else, complete instruction, namely, in plane and spherical trigonometry, descriptions and directions for the use of astronomical instruments, and all the tables they required for common use. So great was the respect which was still entertained for the name of Ptolemy, even in times when his errors had become known, and in part corrected, that Kepler himself prefers to ascribe the discrepancies of the observations stated by Ptolemy from the previous ones of Hipparchus, and from those of the moderns, to disturbance in the motions of the celestial bodies than to gross errors in the great astronomical teacher of the Greeks and Arabs.

As the astronomy of later times took rise from Ptolemy, so modern geography was founded on his eight books of geographical treatises. His third great work, which he entitled "The Canon of Kings," is not less important in chronology than the former in astronomy and geography. In this work chronology was not his main object; his "Canon" was intended to facilitate to astronomers the calculation of the period of time which had elapsed betwixt the several observations set down in his astronomical treatise. It is singular that the Ptolemaic chronology, which, with its *four universal monarchies*, supplied till within the last century, the chronological order followed in works of ancient history, created an historical era, that of king Nabonassar of Babylon, wholly without a proper historical basis: as we neither are acquainted with any great deeds of that Nabonassar, nor was his reign ever acknowledged in his own country as a starting point for a new chronological era.

Equal merit to that of Galen and Ptolemy in their respective sciences, is that of PAUSANIAS in the history of ancient Grecian art. He combined in his work historical notices, legends, and matters of pure fiction, with the history of art, in the form of a narrative of trav-

els in Greece. His work, which is confined wholly to Greece Proper, and neither includes Thessaly nor Macedon, is divided into ten books, coincidently with the divisions of the ten regions described in it. As Pausanias was a lover of art, and has specially addicted himself to the description of ancient masterpieces, his work, in that department, is of great value: for through him we are brought acquainted with some hundred artists and their works. In relation also to legendary histories, especially of the elder times, hints are to be found in his writings which vainly would be sought for elsewhere. It cannot however, be concealed that he was somewhat too much the child of his age—too much of the sophist, and the chosen companion of that Roman society which gave a marked preference to the marvellous and preternatural over the natural and intelligible—not to incur merited distrust in his narrations where the scene lies in remote antiquity, especially when we catch him in most palpable falsehoods on points where he might and must have known better. To show that he lies purposely, and against his own knowledge, we shall only cull two of his tales from innumerable others. In the first, he says he saw done by a dolphin what neither he nor any one else could have seen; in the second, he tells wonderful stories of silkworms, or rather of the nature and production of silk, of which he must have known the absurdity from Aristotle, and the numerous natural histories derived from his works, which were, in these times, in the hands of all. How can he be trusted implicitly on points where we have no other witnesses, when he fables thus audaciously where the means of exposure were close at hand? This is not the place to review critically the work of Pausanias. On the whole, it must be regarded as a most fortunate arrangement of destiny, that so shortly before the overthrow of the ancient religion, and the poetry and art which were linked with it, a learned writer such as Pausanias should have treated so fully of Grecian art, which in no other work of antiquity had been thought deserving of special attention.

Next to the above mentioned writers, who were more or less children of their age and sharers in its spirit, we would name another, whose mind seized the perverseness of that age, and possessed the art of holding up a mirror to it. LUCIAN, like Voltaire, held the conviction that every thing old must first of all be annihilated by satire and mockery, before any thing better could be built up in its place. Lucian lived in the second century of the Christian era, and probably died at the commencement of the third. He confronted an enervated age with a kind of reckless audacity, and dared to raise the veil of hypocrisy in which his generation had wrapped itself. In these times there was no more easy or lucrative trade than that of the sophists. In order to come out in that character, science was required less than boldness and readiness in discourse, and practice in style. These had been acquired by Lucian, and nature had afforded him a rich store of wit. Accordingly, after appearing for a while in the ordinary guise of sophist, and exciting some notice in that character, he sat himself up as the organ of that hitherto mute party, which was secretly discontented with all the doings of the race of enthusiasts, superstitious, mystics, and rhetorical and fabling writers.

To judge from the reception of Lucian, and the number of his readers and hearers, the multitude of those who prefer laughing to weeping had hitherto lacked only a spokesman. However, Lucian was not a mere scoffer for scoffing's sake, but because he deemed service might be done by his satire to the cause of true wisdom and of true morality. This is evident not only in his "Sale of Philosophers" [*Vitarum auctio*,] from the slight or no value set on an Aristippus or Epicurus, or the comparatively high prices described as being paid for Socrates, Aristotle, and others; but also from the distinct, express, and serious declarations which Lucian gives of the purpose of his writings in "The Fisher." That purpose was, in times in which, as indeed in our own, sophists and smatterers abounded, in religion, science, philosophy, and literature, to tranquillise and solace sound understanding and unhacknied feelings, when beset with idle displays and idler controversies. He exposes all the vanity and emptiness of these learned exertions, and shows that disputes about forms, systems, and paradoxes engage the the world more than zeal for genuine wisdom and virtue. This he shows with especial relation to religion and morals, in Peregrinus Proteus, and Demonax. In both, true and false religious feeling, true and false morality, are made respectively the objects of ludicrous and of serious treatment. Lucian's contempt for Christianity and Christians may be explained, if not excused, by the disfigurements which, in his times, the evangelical doctrine had undergone from the rash aspirants to saintship and martyrdom. The established creed and received morality fared no better in Lucian's dialogues.

APULEIUS may be singled out as the chief orator, philosopher, and writer of the African schools, to show the sort of influence which the taste of his province necessarily exerted in these times on European culture. Apuleius was a most voluminous writer, but of his writings a few only have been preserved. From his other writings, particularly discourses, some one has made extracts, which are commonly annexed, under the title of "Flowers" (*libri quatuor floridorum*,) to such of his entire writings as are extant. However, his greatest and most elaborate work, and that which was most read in the Latin world of these times (whether his pious readers might or might not confess it,) was his "Milesian Histories," or "Golden Ass," also known by the title of "Metamorphoses." He was not, indeed, the inventor of this species of writing; he is not original in this, or in any other of his remaining writings: where, indeed, was an original writer in these times to be found? His extant works, however, may be regarded as an epitome of the whole literature of that degenerate period. The romance or tale, or, if you will, series of tales, of the "Golden Ass," guides us into the inmost life of these times, and clearly reveals to us the deep degradation of a race who had nothing left them but indulgence in enthusiastic visions, or unbridled debauchery; since they were shut out from every field of liberal exertion, and all participation in the management of public affairs.

The more entertaining and amusing are Apuleius's stories, the more pains he takes to proceed only by the gentlest gradations in ex-

citing the fancy, and calling up images of sensual pleasure; the more he studies to present the scenes which he delineates as merely the manners of the times, as something of every day occurrence, the more pernicious the influence of his writings. We know for certain, that Apuleius's story is no invention of his; but whether he derived it from Lucian, or from a certain Lucius of Patræ, in Achaia, is matter of dispute with the learned. Annotators have found in Apuleius problems to solve, and enigmas to interpret; what Roman readers sought in his writings was, the excitement of the fancy by his slippery and equivocal meanings, leaving to others the critical examination of language and idiom. Apuleius himself acknowledged that his style was barbarous, and excused himself by pleading his African birth mended by Greek breeding.

It may be said, in general terms, of the philosophical portion of his writings, that their aim was to familiarise the Latin world, and especially the public of degenerate and depraved times, with the ideas of Plato, and here and there with the doctrines of Aristotle; and that accordingly they severed from their natural connection and order, and moulded into a scheme of superstitious and visionary illusion, thoughts and expressions which produce quite a different effect in the connection, in the garb and place which they hold in the originals.

In the philosophy of the times from Antoninus Pius to Julian the New Platonists took the most conspicuous place, extended their schools from the eastern to the western extremity of the empire, and looked down on all other sects with great contempt. In the East, and soon afterwards also in the schools of Athens, the philosophy of Plato in the times of the Roman emperors had assumed quite a peculiar shape. Especial pains were taken in the elucidation of those parts of philosophy which Plato had either derived from the East, or borrowed from Pythagoras, or converted from myths and poems to his use. Platonic doctrines, in this shape, were available to Philo and others, for bringing the religions of the East into philosophical form; and the Christians also, as well Gnostics as orthodox, had used what was called Platonism in Alexandria, long before Origen, in the construction of their fanciful systems on the relation of divine to human nature. In Hadrian's times, and those immediately subsequent, there took place a new modification of doctrine. Already before that period Plato and Pythagoras had always been associated together; the anniversaries of their birth had been celebrated in one and the same manner in the schools of the Platonists; both had been objects of veneration, as a sort of saints, or good dæmons; the sentences of both regarded as oracles. Immediately after the time of Hadrian, commenced the undertaking of reconciling Aristotle, and the other philosophers of the dogmatical sects, by subtle interpretations, with the Platonic system as understood previously. Thus arose New Platonism; which afterwards was also known by the title of Pythagoreism. Many causes conspired to make this so-called New Platonism the fashionable philosophy of the times. Amongst these may be reckoned the shallowness of the sophists and rhetoricians; the unsatisfactory nature of the sceptical philosophy, the disfigurements of the

Stoic and Cynic doctrine, and the dryness of the Aristotelians, strictly so called. The original talents of Ammonius Sakkas and Plotinus, and the well known inclination of mankind to take for wisdom what they do not in the least understand, may also have promoted the rapid diffusion of the new system.

The honor of founding the new sect is attributed to Ammonius Sakkas of Alexandria; it is difficult to say on what positive grounds. It is, however, undeniable that his scholar Plotinus became the principal writer, a new Pythagoras, of this sect. On addicting himself to the Aristotelian philosophy, Ammonius found the Aristotelians and Platonists at daggers drawn. He thought he could unite both systems, and appears, from the life of the philosopher Isidorus by Damascius, to have been at least a good expounder of Aristotle.

PLOTINUS, for eleven years a zealous disciple of Ammonius, was plunged in such profound inquisition of the inward essence of divine and human nature, that, unsatisfied with Egyptian, he sought after Persian and Indian wisdom. He accompanied the younger Gordian in his expedition against the Persians; but his Indian and Persian researches do not seem to have gone to any great extent. Either he confided not enough in his oratory to make the East his field for exertion, or he knew the disposition of the higher orders in Rome, and the prevailing passion for oriental mysticism;—he therefore turned his course to Rome, where he soon got the renown of a prophet. Amongst his devotees were the emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina. It is even said they had meant to make the experiment of founding, in some town of Italy, a philosophical state according to his doctrines. This, perhaps, would have been the best way of demonstrating clearly to all generations the impracticable nature of the theories which he passed current for wisdom more than earthly.

The means employed by the propagators of this new doctrine, were much the same as those employed by Mesmer and Cagliostro to beguile the modish world in France towards the close of the eighteenth century, and by the traffickers in similar mystic juggleries at all times. Plotinus, we are informed by his scholar Porphyry, was a powerful magician, who could summon before him not only devils, but also spirits of higher rank.* He is recorded to have said to his friends, who invited him to attend at a sacrifice, that it did not suit him to go to the gods, as the gods came to him. The writings of Plotinus were composed also prophetically; for, according to the account of Porphyry, he wrote down his inspirations without vouchsafing afterwards to look at them, or even to correct slips of the pen. Not thus, truly, were the Greek masterpieces produced!

Three scholars of Plotinus became the apostles of his doctrine,—Herennius, Ammonius, and Porphyry; all men of distinguished talent. Fragments only of Herennius have come down to our times; Æmilius and Porphyry diffused widely the doctrines of their master in the West and the East: Porphyry taught in Rome, and even the Christians themselves did not disdain to draw from the troubled fount-

* Vita Plotini, p. 7.

ain of his metaphysics. The influence of the Latin translations and versions of the new Platonist writers on the doctrines of the most illustrious fathers of the Christian church, is one of the most important points in the subsequent intellectual history. The confessions of Augustine present to us himself, and many of the most noted of his brethren, as first having derived from these writers their ideas of the Christian doctrine.

The complete investigation of the philosophy of these times must be left to writers on that special subject: history is only concerned about eminent individuals, as they influenced the prevailing habits of mind in their own and in later ages. Longinus, in the prefatory discourse which has been introduced by Porphyry in his life of Plotinus, enumerates, as the sects then prevalent, only the Platonists, Stoics, and Peripatetics; and probably directed his attention to those only. The Cynics ought to be added to the list, were it merely because Demonax, exclusively of all his contemporary philosophers, has found a panegyrist in Lucian. Some men of high powers, amongst whom were Hermogenes and Longinus, abandoned the pursuit of philosophy, when there was no getting on but by dint of exaggeration and obscure phraseology, for the theory of taste and of rhetoric, and wrote manuals comprising, in a moderate space, all that had been done in that department since Aristotle.

LONGINUS possessed more than one title to a place among philosophers; though his writings, if we may judge from their remains, and, in particular, from the work on the Sublime which goes by his name, appear to have been exclusively of a critical and æsthetic description. He may therefore, said Plotinus, in the usual style of system-mongers, be a grammarian, a rhetorician, a critic—but he can be no philosopher. It is true, that he does not appear to have sworn allegiance to any of the sects of his day; or to have read Plato to any other purpose than to tranquillise his mind, and to instruct his reason.* We know little of his particular philosophical opinions; thus much only is certain: that he played a leading part in the affairs of the East; and in his career and writings manifested not only knowledge of antiquity, but an antique force and freedom of character. In a double sense, therefore he was well named by Porphyry a friend of the old time (*φιλαρχαῖος*). Almost alone, in the period we are treating of, he seems to have devoted his studies not to the cause of a sect or system, but to the business and conduct of life.† Even Marcus Aurelius, though the ruler of an empire, was not free from the littlenesses and pedantries of the schools. His stoic self-contemplations almost justify the ridicule with which Lucian persecutes that sect, as well as the

* "Longinum ignoret oportet, qui tali ingenio placuisse credat duram et contortam philosophorum, qui conciliari nollent, conciliationem, insanum allegorici sive secretioris sensus quærendi studium, mysticas disputationes de deo divinisque emanationibus et dæmonibus quibus omnes illorum libri sunt referti, alia denique multa, hic non attingenda, quibus tum vera et sincera Platonis philosophia fœdum in modum adulterabatur."—*Ruhnkenius Dissertatio de Longino*.

† "Sed quod corrupta jam per recentiores Platonicos philosophia serum erat, homines ad veteres doctrinarum fontes atque adeo ad sanam mentem revocare."—*Ibid*.

Cynics. The emperor amuses himself with common place phrases and trite maxims, at moments when the most urgent duties claimed his attention; and when war might have acquainted him with other ideas of danger and death than those of a schoolman, philosophising in Rome or Athens about them, while sedulously keeping out of their way. Petrarch, in his panegyric of Marcus Aurelius, has rightly named him a wise man of the schools on the throne; and said of him, that he preferred the name of philosopher to that of emperor. In a whole volume of scattered maxims, comparatively few passages appear to have flowed directly from the writer's excellent heart and feelings. Amongst these are his reflections on gratitude:—"What would you have more," he says, "when you have done good to a human being? You have done something accordant with your nature: do you want a reward for it? That were as though the eye should seek requital for seeing—the foot for stepping. As those members, when they have performed what they were given for, have sufficiently fulfilled their purpose, so has man himself, who was destined by nature to do good to others, fulfilled his destination when he had done any thing good, or contributed to the common welfare: and can ask nothing more."*

Having traced the effects of the systems and the schools of the times, up to a ruler of the Roman world we conclude with the mention of those men who opposed themselves, as *Sceptics*, to the spirit which prevailed in their times. If these philosophers found few adherents, it was partly from the mystical and enthusiastic temper abroad, and partly because the Sceptics sought to undermine every ground of certainty and inward conviction. Scepticism, a systematic doubt of all conclusions and reasonings, first became the doctrine of a sect in the later times of Athenian glory; and one of the most eminent champions of that sect made his appearance in this last period of Roman dominion. Sextus, a physician of the third century (the date at which he flourished is not known with precision), systematised all that the earlier Sceptics had put forth, in his works;† and aimed to show that every affirmation of the understanding admitted of being attacked with the same weapons which were employed to defend it. A system of philosophical doubt, like that put forth by Sextus, is a fresh characteristic of times when the human mind disdains what is natural, to hunt after extremes and excitements. In all such times the books of Sextus are put in requisition. The renowned sceptic of modern times, Bayle, has made no inconsiderable use of them.

The *poetry* of these times is wholly beneath criticism. The choice of such subjects as *fishing, hunting, and bird catching*, which exercised the muse of Oppian, Dionysius, Characenus, and others, is evidence enough that their respective performances could claim no eminence as works of poetry. A new species of literature, however, rose

* Marc. Anton. Εἰς ἑαυτὸν, lib. ix. § 42.

† The works of Sextus are three books *Hypothyposeon Pyrrhonicarum*, and his books *contra Mathematicos*.

on the ruins of poetry ; and has received further development from modern nations. This was the *Romance*, which had been previously unknown to antiquity, unless the *Cyropædia* should be called a political romance, though lacking the main character of romance, namely, that a love-story should form the *nodus*, the anticipated solution of which keeps the reader's mind in suspense. A certain sort of tales, it may indeed be conjectured, under the designation of Milesian fables were at an early period diffused among the Greek people ; with which, it is probable, the narrators entertained the assembled multitude much in the same way as the lazy auditory of eastern coffee-houses are at the present day amused by the recital of tales. It was, however, in the times we are treating of that *historiettes* of this description were first numbered amongst works of literature.

The romance, strictly so called, which turns on the progress of a love-story, appears to have had a contemporaneous origin with the slipper and comic description of narrative introduced, as we have seen, in the East and West, by Lucian and Apuleius. The history of Rhodane and Sinonis, one of the earliest Greek romances of which fragments have been handed down to us, dates from the middle of the second century. A deluge of romances has come down from the third and fourth centuries ; which are partly preserved in libraries of this day in MSS. Of these, amongst the best known, are, the Loves of Clitophon and Leucippe, of Achilles Tatius ; the Bishop Heliodorus's *Æthiopica* ; a love-story of Theagenes and Chariclea ; the Pastorals, and Chloe and Daphnis, of Longus ; and finally, the romance of Chariton.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF CLAUDIUS TO THE FOUNDING OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

A NEW and better era for the Roman empire began with Claudius; the revolted were one by one crushed, and the generals formed in his school, who successively held the government after him, followed up the work he had begun. The barbarians subjugated, the unity of the governing power, which had wholly disappeared, was restored. That Gallienus, before his death, had named Claudius for his successor, though it was generally given out, is in the highest degree improbable. The first achievement of Claudius, as emperor, was to save Italy itself from the inroads of the Alemanni, whose leagued tribes had penetrated farther and farther southwards, till numerous bands of them made their appearance in the very neighborhood of Verona, where Claudius advanced to their encounter, and routed them. After the conquest of the Alemanni, the new emperor proceeded to Rome, where, however, he spent only one winter; as the fresh and dangerous inroads of the Goths, and other tribes in league with them, soon called him away to Thrace. The Goths and their related tribes of Peucini, Gruthungi, Ostrogoths, Juthungi, Heruli, had annually repeated the incursions by land and by water, after sacking Athens and Ephesus. The whole mass of nations, whose settlements extended from the Don to the Dnieper and Pruth, set themselves in motion. One division of them put to sea in a large fleet of war canoes, and rowed past Byzantium, through the Dardanelles, into the *Ægean* sea; another invaded from the side of the Danube the Roman provinces of Pannonia, *Mœsia*, and *Illyria*. All the sea-coasts from the *embouchures* of the Danube to Crete and Cyprus were devastated; the towns and fortified places alone resisted the barbarians, who, at many places of which they had formerly made themselves masters with great ease, as, for example, *Cyzicus* and Athens, suffered great lossess. The provinces which were most exposed to their inroads, were indebted to the emperor's regulations and to the activity of his generals, especially

A. D. 268.

Aurelian, not only for a momentary rescue from the Gothic power, but for a lasting and material check to it. These advantages were, unfortunately, all but outweighed by the distribution of the great mass of the vanquished throughout the Roman provinces, and the incorporation into the Roman armies of whole herds of barbarians, with their leaders.

In the meanwhile, however, the barbarians were not only worsted in the field, but suffered from famine, and lost heart, being repulsed almost everywhere from the towns. At last, they made the effort, with their whole land and sea force, to reduce Cassandrea and Thessalonica. On this intelligence, the emperor took the field against them in person, and gave them battle in Upper Mæsia near Naissus. The issue of the engagement was long doubtful; but at length was decided in favor of Rome. In this engagement very great numbers of the Goths and other barbarians were slain; still greater numbers were made prisoners after the action; the rest shut up in the fastnesses of the Hæmus. These latter defended themselves desperately, and inflicted great losses on the Roman forces, till they were swept off by famine and diseases. The losses of the Goths and their allies would, however, appear to be very much exaggerated by the histories and official reports extant; since, immediately after Claudius's death, they reappear in such imposing force, that Aurelian, after, according to the Roman historians, having obtained over them new and important successes, thought it the wisest course to grant them the whole farther province of Dacia, and other advantageous conditions. For the next fifty years we hear little of the Goths; and, when they do invade the Roman provinces, they are almost always repulsed with loss. The same A. D. infectious disease which had thinned their ranks, also carried off 270. Claudius; the army chose Aurelian to succeed him, whom Claudius himself is said to have destined for his successor. When intelligence of the death of Claudius first reached Rome, that emperor's brother assumed the imperial title; but, on hearing of Aurelian's appointment, slew himself. The newly-elected emperor hastened from Mæsia to the capital; but had scarcely reached it, when the inroads of the Marcomanni called him to Aquileia. He repulsed the barbarians, pursued them into their own territory, and had penetrated far into Pannonia, when he learned, that the Alemanni, whom Claudius had brought to terms, had made a fresh irruption through Rhætia into Italy.

This new war of Aurelian with the Marcomanni, Alemanni, and the nations who were leagued, or made their inroads simultaneously, with them (amongst which the Vandals made their appearance,) was of a nature no less formidable than his struggle with the Goths. His arms were for the moment, successful; but, in the treaty which he closed with the Vandals, as in almost every peace which was made with the barbarians, large numbers of them (in this instance two thousand horse) were taken into the Roman Service. An army, such as that of Rome had now become, composed of barbarians of all nations, habituated to rapine and massacre, could be kept in discipline only by infictions of corresponding barbarity. Terror alone could re-estab-

lish the authority of the government, which had sunk lower and lower through a long series of years, and, in the end, had disappeared altogether. The fortification of the city itself was wisely undertaken; for, since the passes of the Alps had failed to keep out the barbarian torrent, the barrier of the Appennines could no longer be deemed sufficient. The enormous size of the city required an immense circuit of walls, the building of which occupied the whole reign of Aurelian, and was not finished till under that of Probus.

Though the barbarians were about this time for the most part driven out of the empire, the undivided authority of the government was not yet restored; as Zenobia held independent sway in the East, and Tetricus assumed the title of emperor in Gaul. Since the death of her husband and eldest son Zenobia had assumed, and administered with masculine firmness, the government of that part of the Roman empire which had owned the authority of the former, in the name of her remaining sons, Herennianus and Timolaus. Her beauty, her cultivation of mind, but, especially, that quality so rare, (in females in eastern reigns, almost miraculous,) her purity of soul and of life; her insight into affairs of state, and proficiency in Grecian accomplishments, distinguished her no less than the masculine bent of her occupations, her military exercises, love of the chase, and male eloquence. Wearing the diadem of eastern kings, she begirt her throne with eastern state and splendor. Her dress was half Greek, half oriental; and in public she always wore a helmet. Her banquets were ordered after the Roman manner. While she won the Romans, and all of Roman habits, by her frank and affable converse, on the other hand, she did not scruple to make herself agreeable to the Armenians and Persians, who were more intemperate in the use of wine than other orientals, by participating in their carouses. She was well versed in the languages of the East, Greece, and Egypt; in Latin, which her sons commonly spoke, she was less fluent. She knew admirably how to combine despotic rigor with mildness and serenity, liberality with prudent economy. During the reign of Gallienus, Zenobia had more and more extended her sway, which not only included the whole of Syria, but the greater part of Asia Minor. Under Claudius she further sought to obtain possession of Egypt, and succeeded so far as to garrison Alexandria with Palmyrene troops.

Such was the posture of affairs immediately after the death of Claudius, and the termination of Aurelian's wars with the Goths and Alemanni. Zenobia was in possession of Alexandria, and on the point of reducing under her dominion Bithynia, and the rest of Asia Minor. Aurelian anticipated her projects. His march eastwards led him through Mæsia, and brought him in collision with the Goths, who reappeared on the right bank of the Danube, and whom he defeated in his passage, and deterred from farther incursions by the fall of one of their most distinguished leaders. In Bithynia, which had not yet submitted to Zenobia, the Romans were received as saviours; in Galatia, on the other hand, they met with resistance; the inhabitants of Anugra, however, opened its gates to them; and Thyatira was betrayed to their forces by one of its richest and most powerful citi-

zens. Zenobia had collected her whole force in Antioch; but could the less confide in the Syrians, as Aurelian offered pardon to all who would desert from her; and a part of her army was already routed. Aurelian gained possession of Antioch after one action; and Zenobia rallied her main army, which consisted for the most part in cavalry, in the neighborhood of Emesa. Here a decisive battle took place, the issue of which was long doubtful; and in which Zenobia's cavalry already were in a manner victors, when, only by a sudden intervention of Divine power, as Aurelian's panegyrist acknowledges, the Roman horse were rallied again by the steadiness of the infantry. After the loss of this battle, Zenobia fell back on her capital, whither she was instantly pursued by Aurelian. Smaller and less strongly fortified towns than Palmyra had set at defiance the arm of Trajan, and the whole power of the empire, because they were surrounded by the desert; and Zenobia had reason to hope for assistance from the Persians, and other nations bordering on her territory. The Persians, however, seem to have given her no solid assistance; and the famine which was soon felt in the city extinguished all hope of defending it. Zenobia attempted to fly to Persia, and had reached the Euphrates, when she was caught by the pursuing enemy, and brought back to the Roman camp. Their queen having been thus taken prisoner, the citizens of Palmyra accepted the emperor's terms of grace for themselves, opened their gates, and delivered up to his vengeance Zenobia's councillors, ministers, and generals. Aurelian found in the city, and in its temples, immense treasures, which he carried off with him to Rome. In other respects he acted with forbearance towards Palmyra, as he had previously done towards Antioch and Emesa. Zenobia was brought to Rome to grace his triumph; her confidential servants, amongst them the celebrated Longinus, her prime minister, felt Aurelian's utmost rigor. Porphyry, Zosimus, and others, extol Longinus's firmness in death. On Zenobia's ultimate fate rests a certain degree of obscurity. The commonly received account is, that she lived many years in Italy, in honored privacy. The account of Zosimus alone differs from the other authorities. According to his narrative, Zenobia died on her passage to Rome.

Aurelian's presence was next required by the state of the European provinces; especially of Gaul, where Tetricus still kept possession. He therefore hastened his return to Europe, leaving only a small garrison in Palmyra; but soon received intelligence of a new revolt of the Palmyrenes, and the slaughter of the troops he had left there. These tidings exasperated Aurelian to the uttermost: he instantly returned to Palmyra; retook the town at the first attack, and wreaked his rage on the people and the buildings with unheard-of barbarity. A general massacre took place, without distinction of age or sex; and even the vast Temple of the Sun, which ranked among sacred edifices second alone to those of Egypt, was destroyed by the soldiers of Aurelian. The emperor gave orders, indeed, afterwards, to restore the building; but the times were more propitious to destruction than re-edification.

The Egyptians had also revolted, and had placed at their head a

certain M. Firmius; had made use of his boundless wealth, partly acquired by commerce, for the promotion of their independence; and had taken under protection, and enrolled in their armies, all the refugees from Palmyra. They imagined Aurelian in the heart of Mesopotamia; when, all at once, to their amazement, he appeared in Egypt. The subjection of that land was of the more importance, as the new usurper had intercepted the usual export of grain to Rome. On quelling the insurrection, Aurelian wrote to the Roman people, in a manner almost comic, to announce his victory. He addressed his discourse to the common people, of whom he professed himself the friend, as he always aimed to attach to himself the populace and the soldiery. First, he promised bread; then introduced several other topics; and concluded by exhorting them to amuse themselves with the public games, especially those of the circus. Thus the prince of the world-ruling people makes it a theme of congratulation, that two wretched wants, *panis et circenses*, engrossed their entire thoughts. After Aurelian's return to the West, the Gallic revolt appears to have caused so little farther trouble, that the period or the manner of the fall of Tetricus has been handed down by no distinct record. A revolt in the capital itself, which was occasioned by the debasement of the currency, and the frauds of certain principal superintendents of the mint, makes a more conspicuous figure in the events of the latter part of his reign, and was not suppressed without great bloodshed. Thus much may be gathered from the obscure accounts given by the miserable writers of these times; but how 7000 of Aurelian's troops could have been sacrificed, as they state, in an affair like this, they leave altogether unexplained. Adored by the army and the populace, Aurelian was hated and feared, for his merciless severities, by the higher orders and functionaries. It may serve, however, for his excuse, that the condition of the empire was such, that, without the most extreme measures, it could not have been held together. Aurelian was greatest at the head of his army. He had scarcely solemnised his triumph over the enemies already conquered, when he mediated a new expedition into the East, to make war on the Persians. The emperor had arrived at Byzantium, and was on the point of crossing over with his army to Asia, when he discovered certain frauds to have been committed by his private secretary, and threatened to chastise him with his usual rigor. Forewarned of his doom, that functionary felt that he had nothing to risk, and, by forging the emperor's hand writing, succeeded in making some of his most confidential servants believe that they were threatened, like him, with a cruel punishment, which they could only escape by the murder of the emperor. The conspirators, who were mostly men immediately round his person, had no difficulty ^{A. D.} in finding an opportunity, when the emperor was in the midst of 275. them, and apart from the rest of his troops, to despatch him. The officers of high rank implicated in this deed, sought to escape, in some degree, the odium which followed it, by leaving the appointment of a new emperor to the senate; and, when that body declined the election, strenuously insisting that the new prince should be named by the senate and people, not by the army. After the lapse of several months,

the generals and the senate, who had by turns referred to each other the election of a new emperor, came to an understanding, and the senate gave a head to the empire.

Tacitus, an old and respectable senator, was unanimously elected emperor; and it was made known, by congratulatory missions from the senate to the inhabitants of the municipalities throughout the empire, that the senate had recovered its rights,—the administration of the empire, and the choice of the emperor. Their triumph was of brief duration. Tacitus offended the troops he had collected together in the East; and, six months after his accession, was despatched, in all probability much in the same way as Aurelian in Asia Minor, while intent upon repelling the incursions of the Goths and Alani. His brother, and prefect of the guards, Florianus, was acknowledged as emperor by the senate and by all the European provinces; but as the army was better acquainted with Probus, who was proclaimed in A. D. Syria, Egypt, and Palestine, Florianus was forced in two 276. months to desist from his pretensions, and Probus remained sole emperor.

A military chief was needed more than ever; for Asia Minor had not yet been wholly cleared of the Goths and Alani; and in Gaul the Franks, Burgundians, Vandals, and Lygians, had sacked sixty or seventy towns, and overrun the whole province. The great object of Probus was to restore an efficient discipline, and for this he held all means justifiable. The difficulty of the task may be estimated from the revolts of Saturninus, Bonosus, Proculus, with whom he had to engage in new struggles, after brilliant victories over the barbarians in every part of the empire. To enumerate the campaigns of Probus, and follow his martial career in detail, would require a more extended space, and more ample materials; it may suffice to trace the leading aims and results of his undertakings, and the general condition of the empire shortly before his death.

Among the tribes of Germany, properly so called, which were united by ties of common origin and primitive modes of government, and were designated therefore by historians by a common name, the most remarkable were the Burgundians, Alemanni, Vandals, and Franks. The last named of these tribes had made their way, by degrees, into the swamps and forests of the Netherlands; while the Alemanni and Burgundians had obtained possession of Switzerland, and, from that point, of many towns of Gaul.

It is certain that Probus cleared the latter province of the barbarians, and that, to check the farther inroads of the Alemanni, he built a fleet of small vessels on the Rhine, and harrassed the Vandals and Burgundians. He thereby, however, exasperated rather than subdued those tribes. According to Vopiscus, he himself declared that, without penetrating deep into the interior of Germany, and reducing the whole country to a province, all the triumphs he had won were barren.

From Gaul Probus marched to Asia Minor, through the territories bordering on the Danube; checked the predatory exploits of the Isaurians and their neighboring tribes; showed himself in the East, and

closed a treaty of peace with the Persians; while his generals were waging war successfully with the semi-barbarous African tribes on the shores of the Red Sea.

After his return from the East, and the solemnities of a splendid triumph, Probus turned his attention to the wounds which the empire had undergone from the long reign of confusion and constant recurrence of barbarian inroads. He sought, by all means, to encourage cultivation and commerce, and to plant a new population in the provinces which had been laid desolate. Unfortunately, with these views, and doubtless with the best intentions, he introduced into the heart of the empire thousands of barbarians. To re-people the wasted regions of Gaul, the prisoners made in war, or any other barbarians who desired a quiet settlement, were partly made use of in Gaul, as serfs to cultivate the soil, partly settled on allotments of land; and the cattle, which had been taken from the Germans on the other side of the Rhine, was bestowed amongst the occupiers in the Roman province. Thus attacks upon that province were rendered easy to the malcontents amongst the new settlers, and the tribes robbed of their cattle were provoked to reprisals.

The discontent of the armies, which proved fatal to the emperor, manifested itself on the most opposite points of the empire. In the East, Saturninus had been forced by his troops to assume the purple; in Gaul and on the Rhine, revolts were excited by Bonosus and Proculus. Disturbances also arose in Britain and Spain, of which we have but faint traces, no circumstantial accounts of them being extant. These intestine feuds having been quelled, Probus turned, with redoubled zeal, to his project of reducing the armies; or employing them, at least, so long as their numbers should be kept up, in times of peace, on works of public utility. He was, however, resolved to carry through in a moment what was only to be done by slow degrees. At the very time when a war had broken out with the Persians, Probus imposed laborious public works upon the troops, whom he had brought together on the Danube, in order to lead them against the enemy. The neighborhood of Sirmium, the birth place of Probus, had at a former period been enriched by the labors of the legionaries with vineyards, which, up to the sixteenth century, were considered to afford the best wine in all the Hungarian territories. Probus ordered canals to be dug, marshes drained, and other works executed, to render the spot healthier and fitter for cultivation; and caused a tower to be erected, from which he could overlook the whole surrounding country and the progress of the laborers. The army was in the highest degree discontented with their forced labors; the more so, as they had recently vanquished the Quadi and the Sarmatians, and now had to look forward to a new service against the Persians. The soldiers complained of being kept, like criminals, with inexorable severity, to public works; and, when Probus himself appeared amongst the laborers, and urged them to diligence, their ill-will broke out into open insurrection. They showered stones on him, pursued him to his tower, and there slew him, and immediately afterwards elected as his successor the prefect of the guards, Carus.

A. D.
282.

The recently vanquished Quadi and Sarmatians, so soon as the emperor's death was known, fell anew upon the territories of the empire; Illyria, Thrace, and Italy itself were threatened; and the German tribes made fresh inroads on Gaul. Carus sent his eldest son Carinus against them, and himself pursued the Persian expedition.

The new emperor had grown grey in service; he was one of those officers who had risen to distinction under Aurelian and Probus, and several of whom rose in succession to the sovereignty of the empire, which required their protection. His rigor and harshness were, however, an object of terror; and the vices of Carinus, of abhorrence. The latter became his father's colleague (Augustus) with unlimited powers; and upon him devolved the rule of the whole West, while his father remained in the East. The younger brother, Numerian, received the title of Cæsar, and accompanied his father on the Persian campaign.

A. D. 283. Carus followed the route which had been taken before him, by the example of so many of his predecessors since Trajan, as far as Ctesiphon; but, marching from thence, perished in his tent during a storm of great violence—killed, as the prefect of his guard, Aper, affirmed, by lightning,—but more likely by less natural means. Aper, whose daughter was married to the young Cæsar, Numerian, assumed the sovereignty of the East, on the sudden death of the emperor. It appears, however, that he was not of the number of those generals who possessed any considerable influence in the army, and consequently could not keep possession of the empire after the death of his son-in-law Numerian, which was laid to his charge, and which he concealed for a suspicious length of time. The army would not transfer to him their allegiance; and chose for emperor Diocletian, the military comrade, and most distinguished officer, of Carus.

The first imperial acts of Diocletian were to condemn the prefect Aper to death, as the murderer of Numerian, without investigation or evidence; and to execute the sentence with his own hand in the face of the army. However, Carinus, who marched to confront Diocletian from the West, was found a more formidable enemy. The struggle betwixt these two competitors for empire lasted more than seven months; and the last and decisive action, near Minegus, on the Danube, is affirmed by Aurelius Victor to have turned in Carinus's favor,

A. D. 284. who was slain by one of his own men. Upon the death of his rival, both armies recognised Diocletian as emperor

CHAPTER II.

DIOCLETIAN, TO THE FOUNDING OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE narrative of the particular events of Diocletian's government has come very imperfectly down to us; and the resentment of the Christians on account of his persecutions, has not a little contributed to cast odium on his memory. From the dates of his laws, however, from occasional regulations which he issued at particular places, from chance-notice of his place of abode in this or in that year, it appears that he showed himself sometimes in one place, sometimes in another; sometimes in the West, sometimes in the East; sometimes on the frontier, sometimes in the interior; as his presence in one or the other place appeared more or less necessary. Maximian, whom Diocletian adopted, first as a deputy in the West, under the title of Cæsar, and then, as a colleague in the empire, under that of Augustus, was like Diocletian himself, a good general and stout soldier, but otherwise destitute of all cultivation. He felt Diocletian's superiority, and allowed himself entirely to be guided by him; the effects of divided government, therefore, were not at first felt.

The state of the empire was critical enough, without that aggravation. The incursions of the Saxons and Franks into Belgium; the advances of the Marcomanni on Suabia; the disturbances in the East, where a part of Egypt, joined with the neighboring regions of the former Cyrenaic territory, was in open insurrection; all these demonstrations appeared of so dangerous a nature, that Diocletian, who exclusively followed the promptings of his own genius, and held the feeble senate worthy of no consideration, resolved to remodel the whole internal arrangement of the Roman empire. He aimed at simplifying every branch of administration, promoting despatch in the execution of all requisite measures, and stopping a fertile source of insurrection and disturbance, by rendering divisible the imperial power and dignity. But, as all his new arrangements were at variance with the laws of the empire, no less than with the prejudices of all classes, and rested altogether on the personal relations of the men whom he chose for Cæsars with himself, they could not by possibility be permanent.

The immediate occasion of the partition of the empire amongst several rulers seems to have been accidental. It was partly, indeed, owing to the attacks, more and more formidable, of the various German tribes on the Rhine and the Danube; who, however often they were repulsed, always reappeared. The Franks, the Saxons, perhaps, also, the Frisians, had about this time learned of the Romans to build larger vessels, made their appearance on the seas, ravaged the Gallic and British coasts, and made an inroad on Belgium by land. To

check their devastations, Maximian equipped a fleet, the command of which he gave to an experienced seaman of low origin, Carnusius, a native of the Netherlands, with the charge to keep a guard on the coast, and intercept the vessels of the barbarians in the channel. It seems Carnusius protected, indeed, the regions which were entrusted to his immediate superintendence, but generally looked on while the barbarians were plundering other districts in the neighborhood, in order to deprive them of their booty on their return, wherewith to enrich himself and his troops, and make himself friends in Britain.

This policy was so far successful, that when Maximian attempted to bring him to account, he found a friendly reception in Britain, and was proclaimed independent emperor by the Roman legion stationed there. The whole fleet, which was collected in the port of Boulogne, followed him, and he found it easy to gather round him hordes of barbarians. Maximian fitted out a fleet, with which he made demonstrations of crossing into Britain, and depriving Carnusius of that island. This undertaking, however, utterly failed; Maximian himself confessed that at sea he was no match for his antagonist, and came to pacific terms with him. Carnusius promised to guard the coasts as before: retaining, on the other hand, the title he had assumed, and the dominion of Britain, with a port on the continent. The Britons rejoiced in this administration. Their island was then in a flourishing condition, stocked with cattle, studded with towns; Carnusius kept off the barbarians who threatened the coast, and drove the Highland Scots back to their fastnesses. Carnusius remained in undisturbed possession of Britain, till he misplaced his confidence in a traitor Alectus, or Allectus, whom he entrusted with the command of the army, and the powers of civil administration, and gave him thereby an opportunity, through the murder of his benefactor, to usurp the government and the title of Augustus.

While in Britain, Alectus carried on the plundering government of Carnusius: Egypt, too, was in a state of revolt; and even the wretched Nomads of the Nubian deserts not only made inroads on the Roman province of Nubia, but penetrated frequently as far as Central Egypt. In Lower Egypt Achilleus, who had started as a pretender there, maintained his footing more than six years. The insurrections and incursions of the African tribes called Maximian into Mauritania, while Constantius Chlorus was conquering Alectus in Britain; and the war was hardly finished in the latter country when a new and very perilous conflict with the barbarians awaited Constantius, in the regions of Troyes and Langres; a conflict in which he carried off the victory only by extraordinary efforts, and after a defeat.

It was no wonder that the barbarians penetrated so easily and so rapidly across the Rhine, and even to the heart of France, since Maximian, like several of his predecessors, had peopled the fertile regions on the Sambre, Maes, and Moselle, with barbarians, to fill the vacant place of the old inhabitants. Constantius Chlorus, also, knew no better method of repopling the desolated land, after his victories there, than by introducing fresh barbarian colonists.

These few traits from the history of the times show us sufficiently

why Diocletian, however little he might be inclined to sacrifice his supreme dominion, found it necessary, however, to appoint Cæsars, who should exercise independent powers on the frontiers. In the choice of the men with whom he shared out the empire he seems to have been particularly careful to select such on whose reverence and obedience he could reckon securely; and, in fact, neither his colleague Maximian, nor the two newly-elected Cæsars, Galerius and Constantius, opposed his will in any particular.

The union of this quadruple administration lasted twelve years. A. D. 292.
The choice of the two Cæsars had been made by Diocletian solely: Galerius was destined to protect from the barbarians the Danubian provinces in the East, Illyria, and Greece; Constantius was associated in the West to Maximian. Galerius was solemnly invested with the robes of his new dignity in the plain of Nicomedia, in the sight of the people, and amidst the loud applauses of the assemblage, on an eminence, where afterwards a column was raised, surmounted by a statue of Jupiter. Distinct provinces were assigned to each of the four rulers, and definite portions marked out to them for defence. This did not, however, prevent the one from exercising the attributes of sovereignty in the provinces of the other, or assuming the command of the armies. The ordinances of all four emperors were valid alike through all the provinces.—all the four emperors were viewed as one, till Diocletian abdicated the government. Four courts, four imperial armies, must have oppressed the empire; the expeditions and marches of the emperors were increased fourfold: besides which, Diocletian introduced the pompous ceremonial of the East; and Italy suffered more from the tax of furnishing recruits than any other part of the empire.

Amongst these rulers three were equally brave, but harsh and merciless men. Constantius alone was distinguished by birth, education, and mental culture. The latter had special charge to reunite Britain with the empire. Allectus, who ruled that island after the murder of Carnusius, confiding in the Roman troops who served under him as little as in the natives of the country, advanced with his picked troops of barbarians to meet the prefect Asclepiodotus, who had seized an opportunity to cross the channel from Boulogne, with one division of the fleet of Constantius, while the emperor himself lay with the other at the mouth of the Seine. Allectus was defeated, and fell. Constantius, on his landing, found the enemy already conquered, and a squadron of his fleet, which had been separated from the rest by accident, and sailed up the Thames, reached London exactly at the moment when the dispersed rabble, of which Allectus's army had been formed, were about to sack that opulent city. It was, however, saved from the hands of the barbarians, and numbers of the Frisians, Franks, and Saxons, who had constituted the main strength of the army of Carnusius, and after him of Allectus, on this occasion met their fate. The clemency of Constantius, after the victory, has been highly eulogised. However, many British artists and artisans of eminent skill must have been carried off, as special mention is made of such in rebuilding of the edifices destroyed by the ravage of war in and about Autun.

About the time that Britain was reunited to the empire, Diocletian commenced hostilities with Egypt; and, not long afterwards, Maximian crossed over to Africa, where he waged war with the rebels and the African populations. Of the latter undertaking we know little; and we must also gather the history of Diocletian's expedition to Egypt from the scanty notices of Eutropius, and the incidental hints of Procopius. From these accounts we find, that Achilleus held out in Alexandria for eight months; that that city, and several other densely populous places in Egypt, suffered much from the military rigours of the emperor, who knew no other course of subduing the obstinacy and restless disposition of the Egyptians. For the rest, he made the wisest regulations, which afterwards were kept up even by the Christian emperors, to whom Diocletian always was an object of abhorrence. For this purpose he traversed the whole country, and sacrificed Nubia, in order to be able the better to protect Egypt against the inroads of the miserable hordes of the Blemmyes, from whom it had suffered during more than a century. He fortified the valley of the Nile where it is narrowest, and protected, by walls and garrisons, the island there formed by the Nile; but neither the fortifications nor the garrison, nor the friendships formed with the Nubian tribes, and sealed with solemn sacrifices, could permanently keep off the predatory nomads.

The war commenced with the Persians, for the possession of the throne of Armenia, was terminated in a manner the most honorable to the Roman empire. Armenia was regarded, both by Romans and Persians, as a dependency of their own, to the sovereignty of which they were wont to raise their friends or vassals. The possession of the Armenian throne, and the contests which arose among the pretenders to it, betwixt each other, and with their subjects, had given occasion, since Nero's time, to all the wars of the Romans and Persians. In the times which we are treating of, the Persians had made good their pretensions; and had driven Tiridates, who put forth claims to the throne of Armenia, and was favored by the Romans, out of the country. Tiridates, however, backed by Diocletian, was established on the throne of Armenia, while Persia was distracted with intestine warfare. He now took Turkish and other auxiliary bands into his service, and maintained his footing so long as the Persian empire was divided between several pretenders to the throne; but was again expelled so soon as Narseus, in the year 294, united the whole Persian empire under his dominion. Diocletian held it dishonorable to give up the dependant of Rome, and summoned Galerius from the Danube to the Euphrates, whither he himself resolved to lead the army of Egypt. Galerius, however, did not wait for him; but, before Diocletian had put his army in motion from Egypt to join him, attacked the Persians with his army, which was particularly weak in cavalry, precisely on the side where they were strongest. Instead of pushing across the mountains, through Armenia, Galerius advanced against the Persians, who had entered Mesopotamia with their whole national force, by the rout which Crassus in former times had followed to his destruction, was completely hemmed in by them betwixt Callinicum

and Carrha, and narrowly escaped the fate which Crassus and his army had experienced on nearly the same spot. The sacrifice and dispersion of his army by this precipitate haste is said to have procured Galerius a very unfavorable reception from Diocletian, who had advanced with his whole force to check the progress of the Persians, while Galerius assembled a new army in the Danube-provinces, in which in particular he enrolled strong bands of Goths. With this new army he marched across the Armenian mountains into Persia, while Diocletian stationed himself with a large force on the Euphrates. The Persians marched with a picked army to meet Galerius; but the ground favored the Roman infantry rather than the Persian cavalry; and Galerius, to revenge the disgraceful reverse which he had recently suffered, went in person as a spy into the Persian camp. Here he watched so well his opportunities, that immediately afterwards he surprised the enemy in their camp, dispersed their forces, plundered their treasures, possessed himself of the whole of the king's harem, and dangerously wounded his person.

The Persians now seemed disposed to accept any terms of peace; and by the treaty which was closed immediately afterwards, they ceded the provinces which they had possessed on the other side of the Tigris, and gave up all claim on Mesopotamia, which they never had consented to previously. Diocletian secured the newly acquired provinces, including Mesopotamia, with new fortifications, walls and trenches, mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus with high panegyric.

In the very year (the nineteenth of the reign of Diocletian) in which the most judicious system of government was established in Syria, was also commenced that fearful persecution of the Christians, the severities of which might seem inconceivable on the part of so clear-sighted and so cautious a ruler, if it were not easy of explanation from that vigilant jealousy with which Diocletian guarded his supreme authority in the empire. Every symptom of disobedience, every attempt at revolt, he visited with inexorable rigor; so that often, in a momentary excess of rage, he issued edicts calculated to produce the most pernicious effects. The persecution of the Christians at first extended no farther than the soldiers of that persuasion who refused their attendance at heathen festivals, and exasperated the emperor by disturbing his sacrificial rites. It seems that, for the purpose of preventing what they looked upon as invocations and questionings of the devil, in the inspection of the entrails of the victims at the altar, they appeared on such occasions with the cross on their helmets, thereby irritating the priests, who awakened the emperor's anger against them. This appears from a passage of Eusebius, in which he complains bitterly of the hollowness and hypocrisy of the Christians of his own times; of their incredible corruptions, of their evil-doing and evil-speaking, of their feuds among themselves, of the contentions of their bishops, their struggles for pre-eminence and stiffness in opinions. He adds, that the persecution began with the soldiery, and that it was only through the forward zeal exhibited by the Christians themselves that it came to extend to their whole communion.

Diocletian went no farther at first than the exclusion of the Chris-

tians from the army, from his court, and his immediate presence; and persevering cabals were required to obtain his assent to harsher measures. These cabals took rise from Galerius, whose mother was a zealous believer in the juggleries and mysteries of the Phrygian priests. Incited by his mother, Galerius urged his colleague to measures of indiscriminate rigor against the Christian community. Diocletian long evaded compliance, and at length convoked a great council; and, after its voice had been given for measures of rigor, farther took the opinions of heathen priests and sooth sayers, who gave judgment, as may easily be believed, against the Christians. It was now first that he issued an edict, less, however, against the persons of the Christians, than against the exercise of their worship, and the recognition of their body as a lawful association. It was then ordained that the churches should be closed or pulled down; that the crosses and images of Christ should no longer be tolerated: and that Christians should not only be incapacitated from holding an office, but even from pursuing or defending their rights before the tribunals. This edict having, as usual, been fixed up in public in Nicomedia, where Diocletian and Galerius were sojourning, a man of high consideration among the Christians tore it down in broad daylight, threw the fragments on the ground, and called out to the bystanders that the emperors would do better to announce victories over the Goths and Sarmatians, than persecutions of the innocent Christians. This provoked Diocletian, who, as we have mentioned above, was inexorably strict in all that concerned the vindication of his imperial authority. Here then commenced a cruel persecution of the *persons* of the Christians; their churches were everywhere razed to the ground; and as a dreadful fire in the palace of the emperor, and a second were, not without plausible color, ascribed to the revenge of the Christians, this increased the rage against them, not in the East only, but also in Africa and Italy. In the countries beyond the Alps, only the churches were destroyed or closed. The execution of the imperial commands was intrusted to the soldiers, to the functionaries who were hostile to Christianity, and to the populace. Galerius exclusively enjoyed these cruelties, while Diocletian partook their blame.

In the second year after the commencement of this persecution of the Christians, Diocletian and Maximian met in the capital of the empire, to celebrate, by a splendid triumph, the many victories each had won. They selected that pratical year, in order that they might solemnise at the same time the second decennial period of Diocletian's reign. That emperor, so far as we know, had never been in Rome since his accession, not even when he came to Milan to hold a conference with Maximian. His colleague, also, had only been twice or thrice in the metropolis. Accordingly the Romans looked for something extraordinary, in the shape of public sports and donatives. They were, however, very much disappointed. Diocletian's frugality withheld him from incurring any needless expense; and he regarded with scorn those of his predecessors who had lavished gold to captivate the favor of the people. Accustomed to the reverential silence and the mute obedience of oriental courts, he found the freedoms taken with

his person, and the censures indulged on his administration in Rome so intolerable, that he left that capital for Ravenna in the most inclement weather. In this way he contracted an illness, which increased during the long and toilsome land-passage through Illyria to Nicomedia: he lay ill for a whole year so seriously, that intelligence of his death was repeatedly circulated. Even after his recovery, traces of mental infirmity from time to time showed themselves, which rendered it impossible for him longer to administer the public affairs. Even during his illness Diocletian had extorted a promise from Maximian that he would also resign the imperial power; and both emperors abdicated the government at the same time (May, 305.) The two Cæsars, Constantius and Galerius, were proclaimed supreme rulers, the one in Nicomedia, the other in Milan; and Galerius alone decided, without taking council either of Constantius or Diocletian, the choice of the new Cæsars, Severus and Maximin, who were now intruded upon the empire. Diocletian and Maximian, in abdicating imperial power, retained for themselves large estates and revenues: the former took up his abode in his native province, Dalmatia, and reared enormous piles of building at Salona, near the modern Spalatro, the remains of which indicate the taste in art to have greatly decayed, no less than in literature. Maximian chose to reside in Lower Italy, but could not console himself for the loss of empire so easily as Diocletian.

The new Cæsars were only known to the soldiers, especially to the numerous barbarian hordes which Diocletian had enrolled in the Roman army, and whom they resembled in their faults and passions. Constantine alone, the son of Constantius,—whom Galerius had passed over on account of his leaning towards the Christians, notwithstanding that he possessed Diocletian's favor, and held a high command in the army,—was deserving of the throne by education, habits, and character. On the occasion of an expedition planned by Constantius to protect the peaceful Britons from the inroads of the highland marauders, Constantine begged and obtained leave to attend his father. July, Constantius fell sick in Britain, where he died; and he was 306. no sooner dead, than Constantine was saluted by his army with the name of Augustus. This intelligence gave Galerius great annoyance, having intended, in the event of the death of Constantius, to have conferred that title on his old friend and brother in arms, Lucinius, whom, for that reason only, he had not nominated as Cæsar. He had intended to pass over Constantine entirely, with whom, however, he now wished to avoid a rupture; and the latter was prudently content with the title of Cæsar, leaving Severus, as being of older standing, the first rank.

Shortly after this epoch, the situation of the whole empire was changed by a popular government in its ancient capital; and Constantine, without any agency of his own, and through the vices of his colleagues, became master of the empire.

In his new function of Cæsar and general, Severus was the mere tool of Galerius, who made use of him to execute his oppressive commands. Galerius was desirous to extend the capitation and taxation

on property to those towns which had hitherto been free from these burthens, and to Rome in particular, to whose citizens, like Diocletian, he was never friendly. With this view he took a population-census, and made strict investigation of property; proceedings which in the highest degree incensed the Romans. At the same time he ordered that the small number of troops which had hitherto been always kept up in the neighborhood of the city, under the once important name of Prætorians, should be removed; and thus appeared to grudge the Romans even the shadow of their former supremacy. The soldiers were enraged by the breaking up of their camp and loss of their privileges; the people by their apprehension of new and oppressive imposts; and Maxentius, the son of Maximian, an imbecile creature in mind and body, who had hitherto lived wholly retired from affairs on his estates near Rome, appeared alike to soldiers and citizens, as the son of a Cæsar, the fit man for their leader. He was accordingly proclaimed emperor, first by the troops, and then by the people.

A. D. 306. As all this happened in October, and before the end of

the year Maximian had reassumed the purple in Rome, it may be surmised, with some probability, that the old man had got tired of retirement, and had more part than was known in the insurrection. The army had served under Maximian, and was thoroughly devoted to him; Severus, on the other hand, had never been much distinguished in arms. Accordingly his whole army deserted to Maximian; and after abdicating the title of Cæsar, in hopes of retaining at least his life, he was, nevertheless, put to death by his successor. Maximian then courted the alliance of Constantine; gave him in marriage his daughter Fausta, and conferred on him the title of Augustus, which Galerius had withheld from him. Maximian, however, wasted his pains on his new son-in-law, in endeavoring to rouse him up against Galerius, who was at times threatening the capital; and returning to Rome, he quarrelled with his own son, and was driven from Italy. He found, however, Constantine as little disposed to take his part against Maxentius as against Galerius, and formed the singular resolution of betaking himself next to the latter, who made use of his presence merely to assist (with the old Diocletian, who was coaxed and almost dragged from seclusion for that purpose) at the recognition and proclamation of Licinius as Augustus, it having been the long cherished project of Galerius to elevate his old friend with all possible pomp to be his colleague.

A. D. 306. Nov. of Licinius as Augustus, it having been the long cherished project of Galerius to elevate his old friend with all possible pomp

to be his colleague. Galerius did not long survive the attainment of this object; and Maximian, after failing in his vain efforts to divert his son-in-law Constantine from the careful government of his province, to the furtherance of his schemes of superannuated ambition, equally failed in more senseless and criminal attempts to debauch his troops, and next to murder him. The dotard, after repeated forbearance, was at length put quietly out of the way.

The number of Christians in all parts of the empire had by this time become very considerable: they were united among themselves in the closest manner; they maintained their hierarchy and synods, while the senate disappeared, with every relic of popular administration.

The adherents of the old religion, although they were united enough in their hatred of Christianity and contempt of Christians, were separated by infinite varieties in their views and sentiments, and kept together by no internal or external hierarchical bond. Whoever, therefore, had in his favor the Christians in all parts of the empire, could not fail to acquire, sooner or later, as a ruler, the supremacy over his fellow rulers. Maxentius seems to have felt this; for he had no sooner become master of Rome than he promised toleration to the Christians; but his despicable character, the arbitrary acts which in all things he permitted himself, his rigors towards the senate, his superstitious awe of the heathen oracles, and, indeed, his whole deportment towards the Christians, belied his milder edicts. Even Galerius, shortly before his death, repented him of the cruelties, which he had long practised against the Christians; and issued an edict, in his own name, and in the names of his fellow sovereigns, in which he put a stop to the persecution of their communion. This edict was never acted upon in the eastern part of the empire.

Constantine alone seemed sincerely well disposed towards the Christians. He did not, indeed, discontinue the services of the heathen gods (even after he had become sovereign in Rome, and had made the cross the banner of the empire). Constantine alone, from the very commencement of his reign, showed regard for law and government while all his colleagues rioted in the exercise of military power and despotic caprice. He, too, alone appeared content with his portion in the empire: all the others sought to extend their dominion at the expense of their colleagues. Galerius was scarce dead, when a contest arose betwixt Licinius and Maximin about the division of the provinces; and the latter took possession of Nicomedia as his capital, and of the Asiatic provinces, as far as the Propontis. A treaty was, with difficulty, at length concluded between them; by virtue of which the Bosphorus was fixed as the boundary line of their states.

Maxentius is described by friends and enemies, Christians and heathens, as a cowardly tyrant, to whom none were attached but his guards and a select band of troops, chiefly barbarians, whom he enriched with the plunder of citizens of all orders, even the senatorial. In reliance on the soldiery and several able officers, he resolved to act on the offensive, even against Constantine. That his strength or resources could not for a moment stand compared with those of his antagonist, and that to seek as he did a quarrel was madness, is apparent on a single glance at the life of both leaders. Maxentius had never even stood at the head of an army; he had ever lived for the gratification of his lusts in lazy tranquillity. The life of Constantine had been spent in incessant effort and self-discipline. He had served with honor under Diocletian; he had accompanied his father on an expedition to Britain; he had long commanded on the Rhine; and had struck terror into the Frankish population and their leaders. The petty chiefs of these tribes were despatched by his orders, whenever taken; and the banks of the Rhine and the Moselle had rest. He afterwards crossed the Rhine, marched far into Westphalia, and, as his panegyrist exultingly announces, carried off or killed all the cattle

that he met with, burned down all the houses and villages, and gave up to the wild beasts every grown person who fell into his hands, and who was not fit to use as a soldier.

Maxentius had assembled an immense army around the capital, where he quietly awaited the approach of Constantine, making no attempt even to prevent his passage over the Po, or to guard the passes of the Appennines. Even after thus giving up to him the keys of Italy, he had only to keep the Tiber betwixt himself and his antagonist, to throw the latter into the utmost embarrassment. Constantine, in the course of his march to Rome, had been unsuccessful in several engagements; to have remained longer before the city must therefore have been his destruction. Maxentius consequently gave up the whole advantage of his position by marching out to meet him at the distance of some leagues from Rome, and placing his army betwixt that of the enemy and the Tiber. In the decisive moment Constantine availed himself of the enthusiasm of the Christians in his own army, and that of the enemy, by elevating the sign of the cross on the standard of the empire. It was spread abroad that the God of the Christians had promised him, in a wondrous apparition, to bestow the victory on his army under the sign of the cross. Accordingly, the day before the decisive action, that sign appeared, with the name of the divine founder of Christianity, on the imperial standard, afterwards known by the name of Labarum; and Constantine publicly gave out that he had seen the cross in the heavens, and that his victory was due to a miracle. Maxentius's new legions took flight at the very commencement of the action; the veterans on the other hand fought stoutly and obstinately, till the cavalry was broken, and Maxentius himself took flight. In the hurry and pressure of the flight, he fell into the Tiber, where his corpse was found the next day, and his head cut off as an ornament to the triumphal entrance of Constantine; who also caused to be put to death the sons and some of the other relations of his vanquished antagonist. The Prætorians and legions of Maxentius were incorporated with Constantine's other forces; and the remaining veteran troops disarmed, and not taken again into service till afterwards, and sent to the Rhine.

Since his victory over Maxentius, Constantine's character seems to have altered; and his conduct often stands in contradiction with the principles which he publicly professed. He became a Christian; all things were permitted or pardoned him by the clergy; and the despicable flattery of the Roman senate could not but lead him to notions of exclusive supremacy. The senate, which, after Trajan's example, Constantine re-inforced with an accession of provincial members; which, however, had long ceased to be a governing body, and was never even consulted in affairs of government, conferred on Constantine, without his right to the honor being very apparent, precedence over Licinius and Maximin. Constantine remained only two months in Rome, withdrew from the city all the troops, even to the municipal guard; but contrived to flatter the vanity of the Romans, who built a triumphal arch to his honor in haste, the remains of which would other wise give us a very deplorable idea of the condition of the arts

in these times. He showed toleration to the Christians, and favor to their clergy; made the sign of the cross the imperial standard, without, however, abandoning the title and the office of high priest of the old religion, which had previously been conferred upon him, or absenting himself from its sacrificial rites. Even after he had openly made profession of Christianity, and, in his zeal for the new faith, erected churches and destroyed temples, he deferred receiving the sacrament of baptism till his death-bed; that he might thus, according to the doctrine taught him by his court clergy, pass into another life cleansed of all sin.

Immediately after the capture of Rome, where Constantine was as little as Diocletian had been in the habit of residing any long time from choice, the German nations renewed their inroads on Gaul; and Constantine was obliged to take the field against them. However before he crossed the Alps, he solemnised the marriage of his sister with Licinius. The latter was at this moment threatened with an attack, between Heraclea and Adrianople, from Maximin. Licinius endeavored to avoid the arbitrement of war, and offered advantageous conditions; but Maximin declined all his overtures, in the firm belief that the forces of his antagonist would desert to his side. The Christian writers represent a miracle to have happened in favor of Licinius on this occasion, almost greater than had taken place before for Constantine; for the latter was at least a believer; the former quite the reverse. An angel, they relate, appeared to Licinius in a dream, and taught him a prayer, which, on his awaking, he caused immediately to be copied, and distributed for the use of his troops. This prayer was offered up on the field; and, though no distinguished merit is perceptible to ordinary eyes in its form, its virtue is alleged to have secured the victory.

Maximin had counted so securely on victory, that he was neither in condition to defend the Bosphorus nor the Hellespont, and designed to fly to Egypt, and threw the Nile betwixt himself and his enemy. But even on his route he despaired of the possibility of making any further stand, and took poison in Tarsus, which however did not work immediately, but caused a painful illness, of which he died, after protracted agonies. The Christian writers make an ignoble use of these circumstances. They describe with undisguised malignity the tortures of Maximin's disease, which may possibly be of their own invention; and they dwell with hypocritically-veiled, but evident, exultation on the zealous rigors exercised on the enemies of their faith by Licinius, in causing Maximin's wife to be thrown into the Orontes, and persecuting all his friends and relations.

Immediately after the conquest of the eastern provinces, Constantine fell out with his brother-in-law, who seemed to him to have grown too powerful. Constantine had raised Bassianus, whom he had married to another of his sisters, to the rank of Cæsar, with the view of giving Italy up to him. Licinius, however, made it clear to the latter that he was merely a tool in Constantine's hands, and persuaded him to resist his intentions. Bassianus's brother, Senecio, was the go between in these cabals, and took flight to Licinius, when the project was discov-

ered, and Bassianus brought to criminal justice. The refusal of Licinius to deliver up the fugitive, and other matters, served as a pretext for war, which it appeared had not been looked for so suddenly on either side, from the small amount of force which both brought into the field. Constantine came twice off victor; but with such serious losses that he found it expedient to accept terms which he had previously rejected with the utmost contempt.

In the interval between the first and last war with Licinius, we find Constantine now at one, now at the other frontier, everywhere keeping the barbarians within bounds; appearing also from time to time in Rome, and holding games and solemnities, but never remaining long in that city; while Licinius, in his eastern dominions, which he retained by the late treaty, oppressed his subjects, persecuted the Christians, and amassed treasures by every possible method of extortion. Constantine, on his part, was incessantly active as legislator, as general, as promoter of the Christian religion, and, in a quiet way, as persecutor of the old state-religion and Judaism. In the years immediately preceding the new war with Licinius, Constantine mostly resided in the eastern part of his dominions. In these years, according to Eutropius, actual hostilities had broken out several times between the two generals,—*varia deinde inter eos bella; et pax reconciliata ruptaque est.*

The outbreaking of the last war with Licinius was connected in its causes with the wars of Constantine on the Danube. He had conquered the Sarmatians; he had routed the Goths; and had followed up the chase of their plundering hordes, whom he finally forced to capitulate, without caring whether he was leading his army over his own territory or over that of Licinius. This violation of his independence had exasperated Licinius: and the long disputes of the rival princes broke out afresh into open hostilities. This time it was evident that both parties had long looked forward to the contest, from the imposing force with which each took the field, as well as from the enormous treasures, collected by Licinius for the purpose of this war, and when Constantine got possession of them, lavished upon the clergy. Licinius had thought himself secure near Adrianople, covered by the Hebrus; but Constantine discovered a ford, deceived his antagonist by a skilful movement, and attacked him with advantage on the other side of the river. Licinius was defeated; but, having a greater naval force than Constantine, could he have kept the sea, might have held out for a long while in Byzantium, and disputed his antagonist's passage to Asia; but a violent south wind, which drove his ships aground, and aided the attack of the enemy's fleet, conducted by Crispus, the eldest son of Constantine, annihilated all his hopes. The fleet was in part driven by the wind on shore and against the rocks; in part destroyed by the enemy. He was consequently compelled to abandon Byzantium; and the only course which now remained open to him was to prevent the enemy landing on the Asiatic coast. Even this attempt was fruitless. Constantine landed some ten leagues from Chrysopolis; and Licinius was once more compelled to try the chances of action. These (by miracle, as Eusebius will have it) went once more against him. Licinius, after the loss of the battle, fled to Nicomedia: his

wife, however, received from her brother Constantine the promise that her husband should be left unharmed, on condition of renouncing the government Licinius, trusting to this promise, gave himself up to the hands of the victor; and, together with Martianus, his principal officer, whom he had made Cæsar, was at first received ostensibly in a very friendly manner. However, they were both shortly afterwards transported to remote places, and put to death.

From henceforth it became too evident that Constantine was led widely astray in his views of his own character and duties towards others, by the hypocrite crew of flatterers about him. He pleased himself with the fancy of being the holiest and purest of men; his own will became a law to him, as he made his own family feel. He resolved to be the patron of a new state religion; to be lawgiver in the secular and spiritual polity; founder of a new metropolis, not inferior to the old; and author of a new division and order of the empire. He regarded every resistance to his will, as his theologians taught him, as nothing short of a revolt against God and his anointed; and, in chase of greatness and glory, neglected the necessary and useful. His conduct to his relations and connections resembles that of an oriental despot, and does his Christianity little honor. The eldest son of Constantine, Crispus, the stepson of his second wife Fausta, at an early age showed military talents of a high order; fought with advantage against the barbarians on the Rhine; and won the decisive naval victory over the admiral of Licinius. His father's jealousy took from him the government of Gaul, which he had previously committed to him, retained him near his own person, and, in the midst of the festivities which celebrated the completion of the twentieth year of his reign, he caused the unfortunate youth to be imprisoned, and soon afterwards executed. Great obscurity hangs about the immediate cause of these rigors; but it is not very honorable to Constantine's share in the transaction, that the good bishop Eusebius, who wrote so much in praise of his patron's eminent services in the cause of Christianity, should have passed over this history in total silence. Whether Crispus played with his step-mother Fausta the part of Joseph with Potiphar's wife, and the latter enacted that of Phædra, as later writers, especially Zonaras, delight to affirm; or whether, as Zosimus relates, Constantine discovered an illicit connection betwixt his son and his wife, and first murdered his son, regarding him as the seducer, and then his wife, on discovering that she had in fact been, so, it is now vain to endeavor to decide. The fact of the two executions is however unquestionable. It is also certain that Constantine's mother, Helena, was deeply grieved by the death, of her grand-son; and contributed accordingly to open her son's eyes to his wife's abandoned conduct; which could hardly be a difficult task. Fausta was suffocated in her bath, by the order of her husband, and a number of her friends and followers executed.

The most momentous public measures which Constantine undertook, and carried into effect in a very arbitrary, not to say violent manner, was the total partition of the empire by the foundation of a new capital. From thenceforward the West was abandoned to its des-

tiny. Byzantium was new-christened by Constantine's name, and in eight years converted to a populous city by a population-forced together from all quarters in the true style of oriental despotism. The new city was designed to be exclusively Christian; and immense sums were spent, altogether uselessly to its trade and prosperity, in building churches and palaces, which was done in part so hastily, that few years had elapsed before the fall of many magnificent buildings. Works of art, however, it was resolved, should not be wanting: and, as art itself had gone to decay, the monuments of antiquity were brought from all parts to set them up in streets and public places, as it was thought they ought not to be suffered within roofed buildings. Often, too, such works, to remove their heathenish appearance, were subjected to extraordinary mutilations and disfigurements. With similar despotic caprice, the senate and authorities of the new capital were placed on an equality of rank and importance with the senate and authorities of Rome; in other words, the last relics of the old constitution were swept away.

CHAPTER III.

ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY.

THE history of old Rome terminates with the triumph of a new creed, the foundation of a new capital, and the total revolution in religion and manners thus outwardly consummated under the long reign of Constantine.* The removal of the seat of government is a mere type of the decentralisation and division of empire, which again took place under Constantine's sons and successors. The Eternal City sunk into shade beneath an exotic growth of oriental despotism; and the old religion fled from sites doomed to Gothic invasion and pillage, to linger by the hearths of the peasantry—whence the name of *Pagans*.†

A fresh page of history begins from this period, on which the limits of our work forbid us to enter, and which has besides been preoccupied by an eminent writer.‡

“In this period of the world,” says F. Schlegel,§ “in this decisive crisis between ancient and modern times, in this great central point of history, stood two powers opposed to each other;—on one hand we behold the Roman emperors, the earthly gods and absolute masters of the world, in all the pomp and splendor of ancient paganism—standing, as it were, on the very summit and verge of the old world, now tottering to its ruin;—and, on the other hand, we trace the obscure rise of an almost imperceptible point of light, from which the whole

* “Constantine survived that solemn festival (the thirtieth anniversary of his reign) about ten months; and at the mature age of sixtyfour, after a short illness, he ended his memorable life at the palace of Agurion, in the suburbs of Nicomedia, whither he had retired for the benefit of the air, and with the hope of recruiting his exhausted strength by the use of the warm baths. The excessive demonstrations of grief, or at least of mourning, surpassed whatever had been practised on any former occasion. Notwithstanding the claims of the senate and people of ancient Rome, the corpse of the deceased emperor, according to his request, was transported to the city which was destined to preserve the name and memory of its founder. The body of Constantine, adorned with the vain symbols of greatness, the purple and diadem, was deposited on a golden bed, in one of the apartments of the palace, which for that purpose had been splendidly furnished and illuminated. The forms of the court were strictly maintained. Every day, at the appointed hours, the principal officers of the state, the army, and the household, approaching the person of their sovereign, with bended knees and a composed countenance, offered their respectful homage as seriously as if he had been still alive. From motives of policy, this theatrical representation was for some time continued; nor could flattery neglect the opportunity of remarking, that Constantine alone, by the peculiar indulgence of heaven, had reigned after his death.”—*Gibbon*, c. xviii.

† From the Latin *pagus*, a rural district.

‡ Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire* (CAB. Cyc.)

§ Lectures on the Philosophy of History: Robertson's translation.

modern world was to spring, and whose further progress and full development, through all succeeding ages, constitutes the true purport of *modern history*."

"Christianity," says the same writer, "in its primitive influence, was like an electric stroke, which traversed the world with the rapidity of lightning;—like a magnetic fluid of life, which united even the most distant members of humanity in one animating pulsation. Public prayer, and the sacred mysteries, formed a stronger and closer bond of love among men than the still sacred ties of kindred and earthly affection. The Christians saw and felt the presence of their invisible King and eternal Lord; and when their souls overflowed with the plenitude of spiritual and heavenly life, how could they value earthly existence, and how must they not have been willing to sacrifice it in the struggle against the powers of darkness; for that struggle formed the whole and proper business of their lives?—Hence we can understand the reason of the otherwise incredibly rapid diffusion of Christianity through all the provinces, and even sometimes beyond the limits, of the vast empire of Rome; like a heavenly flame, it ran through all life, kindling, where it found congenial sympathy, all that it touched into a kindred fervor. Hence, along with that mighty spirit of love which produced so rapid a spread of the Christian religion, and which united in the closest bonds the first Christian communities, that energy of faith which inspired such heroic fortitude under the dreadful and oft renewed persecutions of the Romans."

It would have been flagrantly presumptuous, in a work like the present, to have attempted any view of the system and doctrines of Christianity, considered in their divine nature and origin. It is solely in their point of collision with Roman affairs and manners, that we have taken note of the progress and establishment of those doctrines; and in order to complete our scanty notices of that mighty change,—which, if it did not operate, signalised at least, the utter decrepitude and ruin of the ancient polity,—it may be necessary to glance back to the series of struggles sustained by the Christians with the secular authorities in the period preceding the reign of Constantine.

Even before the destruction of Jerusalem, the knowledge of Christianity had been spread by the apostles, and their earliest inspired followers, as far as Gaul and Spain, and even to the borders of India. The dispersion of the Jews by that event either occasioned its farther diffusion to the remotest regions, or rendered them accessible to it. Paul and his followers had, indeed, freed the Christian communion and doctrine entirely from the fetters of Judaism: but the knowledge of the Jewish Scriptures continued indispensable to the perfect comprehension of the Christian scheme; and the general diffusion of that knowledge by the above event was, therefore, the best preparative for the reception of the new Gospel.

What were termed the persecutions before the time of Vespasian, proceeded in general either from the rage of the Jews, from the ill-will of particular provincial rulers, or, like the persecutions of Nero, were passing freaks of capricious tyranny. The regular persecution of the Christians did not begin till they had become a compact body in the

empire; which seemed so much the more dangerous, the more closely its members were knit together, and the more the hope of heavenly beatitude outweighed the dread of earthly inflictions. Amongst the Greeks and Romans, speculative opinions on religious subjects, except in particular instances, were not made objects of persecution; since neither priests or system-mongers, nor mercenary traders in learning (in general the only implacable persecutors of opinions), ever obtained so undue an ascendancy over the government as they have sometimes done in later times. By the Jews the Christians were persecuted as renegades and domestic enemies; by the government as a secret league of desperate enthusiasts, hostile to the system of the state and its order of public worship; by the people as godless aliens, deemed to be capable of the most frightful atrocities; and concerning whose meetings the most revolting rumors were current.* Among these were the orgies ascribed to them by their enemies as *the repasts of Thyestes*, and greedily believed by the populace. These rumors are supposed by some writers to have originated in a vulgar misunderstanding of the Christian sacrament.

The first regular edict which was passed against the Christians was that of Domitian (A. D. 87), which assimilated the offence of dissent from the national religion to the crime of high treason. This atrocious law was relaxed by Nerva, who proclaimed that the denunciations of slaves were not to be taken against their masters in such cases; but, on the contrary, the informers were to be punished. Trajan, who had made a law against all associations which tended to the formation of a state within the state,† decided, on the report of the younger Pliny (A. D. 120), that the Christians—whose numbers in Asia Minor were so considerable even in those times, that their extirpation seemed impossible—were not to be sought after; but that when denounced, they should be punished, according to the purport of the general law of association. In the above-mentioned official report of Pliny, made while he was governor of Pontus and Bithynia, he wholly acquits the Christians of the monstrous practices laid to their charge; and writes that, according to the confessions wrung from them by torture, after the Roman manner, they were found indeed to entertain a strange, perverse, and excessive superstition,‡ but that in other respects they were irreproachable; and that their custom was to assemble together, in the morning of a certain day of the week (Sunday), to sing the praises of their God, Christ, and to engage themselves to the fulfilment of the most important precepts of virtue; and that they meet again in the evening to enjoy a simple and blameless repast. Every attempt to destroy them but increased their numbers, and added to the internal strength of their league. Under Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius, however, persecution began afresh, probably because both these learned emperors only saw in the Christians illiterate enthusiasts; and only

* Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. v. c. 1.

† The emperor Trajan pushed so far his dislike of associations, as to refuse to incorporate a company of 150 *firemen* for the use of the city of Nicomedia.

‡ “*Neque enim dubitabam*,” says Pliny, “*quodcunque esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri.*”

found in the new doctrine a superstition alien to their philosophy. The more actively however they persecuted, the more disadvantageously they and their school-philosophers, who took part in promoting these persecutions, stood contrasted with the simple Christian teachers and converts; and the more adhesion was gained to a doctrine, which rulers themselves conspired in this way to raise to more engrossing importance.

The simplicity and sincerity of the earlier converts to Christianity, which procured them the contempt of the learned, unfortunately were followed, in the lapse of years, by qualities more fitted to excite their attention, and to captivate the favor of the refined assemblies of these times. Even philosophers and rhetoricians at length found their account in coming forward as defenders of the new doctrine, so soon as they could hope to adapt it to their Platonic dreams or Aristotelian subtleties, or to turn it to the purposes of declamation. In the East, special establishments arose in those places where celebrated academies already existed, for the training of aspirants to the Christian ministry. In Alexandria especially flourished a succession of distinguished teachers, who clothed the Christian doctrine in the garb of philosophy, or rather sought Christian images and expressions as a drapery for their philosophic reveries. Clemens and Origen devised and subtilised, till they had struck out a symbolical and mystical system; and discovered a threefold mode of interpreting Christian doctrine and history. The empress Mammæa, and those about Alexander Severus, as well as himself, did homage to the mystagogue of the Alexandrian school, even if they did not make a formal profession of Christianity.

As the higher ranks of society felt the attraction of the new form of doctrine and of worship; so the lower class of people, and even slaves, to whom heathenism denied the common rights of humanity, were captivated by the announcement of brotherly love and Christian liberty. It is true, that in the increase of the numbers of Christians, their congregational arrangements assumed by degrees an aristocratical form; and the bishops aimed already at a species of absolute dominion; yet the primitive democratical regulations still were in part retained, which naturally assigned to the congregations of the faithful the choice of their spiritual overseers, and the exercise of jurisdiction over all offences of the members of their own body; and the equality of men before God, was still the established principle according to which ecclesiastical offices were distributed, and spiritual influence gained. Slavery was repugnant to the scheme of Christianity; slaves and freedmen accordingly recovered in the spiritual the consideration refused them in the secular state. Add to these, the advantages provided for travellers, widows, orphans, the sick, the poor, by the arrangements of the Christian communities, each of which not only set apart a fund for its own poor, but appointed deacons and deaconesses specially to administer the offices of charity and benevolence. Each community kept up correspondence with the others; and episcopal recommendations carried the traveller free from Britain to Persia.

For more than a hundred years after the death of the apostles, each

Christian community seems to have formed an independent republic, acknowledging no superior or central authority. It was only towards the end of the second century that provincial synods were instituted by the churches of Greece and Asia, "which may justly," says Gibbon, "be supposed to have borrowed the model of a representative council from the celebrated examples of their own country, the Amphictyons, the Achæan League, or the assemblies of the Ionian cities." It soon became the established rule that the bishops of the several churches in each province met twice a year in its capital city, at the stated periods of spring and of autumn. A few of the distinguished elders or presbyters of each church, whose office seems at first to have been co-ordinate with that of the bishops, attended the periodical deliberations of these assemblies; at which were also present, as hearers, the general body of members of the church.*

The ecclesiastical administration and hierarchy thus gradually came to resemble a vast civic confederation. In this league the highest station was taken by the so called apostolical churches in certain of the cities of first rank in the empire. These federal assemblies, in which deliberation was held on the general affairs of the church, on doubtful points of faith, on regulations of discipline, and which soon, alas! employed much of their zeal in commending variations of doctrine, and proscribing heretics and apostates, assumed a new aspect and character, when a *quasi* Jewish distinction became established between the priesthood and laity. This distinction had been unknown to the Greeks and Romans. The terms *clerus* and *laicus*, with the corresponding ideas, had already found reception in the time of Tertullian; who asks, however, *Nonne et laici sacerdotes sumus?* †

Every member of the primitive Christian community must have felt himself, in some sense, invested with the character of a priest and teacher. In the third century, however, the congregation at large retained no part in the appointment to spiritual offices, unless that of confirming the choice of their spiritual superiors. The bishops and their councillors had by that time assumed to themselves the right of nomination of all clerical functionaries, as well as of expulsion from the Christian community. Amongst the bishops of the capital and provincial towns there existed, as we have stated above, a certain subordination of ranks. Some of the chief cities of the ancient world, one of which was Corinth, had obtained a primacy or precedence, which was expressed by the designation of *apostolical churches*. Amongst these apostolical churches, in the East, Jerusalem and Antioch held the first rank, and next Alexandria; in the West, Rome, asserting her claim to number amongst her preachers and martyrs the *two* most eminent apostles, Peter and Paul, early assumed a priority of rank and importance, though not without a protracted dispute for supremacy with the eastern churches, and the bishop of her old rival, Carthage. Cy-

* Acta Concil. Carthag. apud Cyprian. edit. Fell. p. 158. This council was composed of eighty-seven bishops from the provinces of Mauritania, Numidia, and Africa; some presbyters and deacons assisted at the assembly; *præsente pel-bis maxima parte*.

† Exhort. ad Castitat. c. 7.

prian opposed, with resolution and success, the pretensions of the Roman pontiff, skilfully connected his own cause with that of the eastern bishops, "and, like Hannibal, sought out new allies in the heart of Asia."†

In the persecutions previous to the reign of Decius, it had already become a practice to commemorate martyrs, to pay honors to confessors of the faith, to visit their tombs, celebrate their birthdays, sing hymns in their praise, and seek their intercession with the Deity. The Christian republic of these times may be compared to that of Greece in the Persian war: both had for enemies an absolute prince, and a military empire. The Christian constancy and zeal for the faith, corresponded with the enthusiasm of the old Greeks for political freedom: heroes were replaced by martyrs; myths by legends. In the third century, when, after a long interval of tranquillity, the persecutions recommenced, one of the most eminent bishops declared that he regarded the external pressure as wholesome, and even necessary for the preservation of purity of manners among Christians.

In like measure, as the moral part of Christianity was postponed to external forms and hierarchical arrangements, it was endeavored more and more to suit its doctrines and worship to the cravings of sense, and the habits of that increasing number of converts, who were accustomed to mysteries, heathen rites of expiation, and pomps of worship. By these accommodations in forms of worship and ceremonial usages, as well as by the application of philosophic subtleties to points of doctrine, many were brought to interest themselves in Christianity. Another class was attracted by the splendor which surrounded the hierarchy: the hopes of celebrity as teachers and orators, or of more substantial power as bishops. It is thence obvious that the last persecution, under Diocletian, was extremely impolitic; and that Constantius and Constantine, if their object was to supplant their rivals, could not take a wiser course than that of putting themselves forward as the champions of the rising creed. They arrayed thus on their side the only organised body which still possessed a principle of life throughout their vast empire.

The doctrines of Christianity, even before it became the state religion, had become more and more fitted, by the establishment of the hierarchy, the introduction of an orthodox standard of doctrine, and the adoption of a splendid outward form of divine service, to the exigencies of popular taste and political expediency. The government was assuming more and more of an oriental character, which also belonged in its origin to Christianity; while, on the other hand, the ancient state religion of Rome had stood connected, and disappeared together, with the ancient form of government—with the arts, with the poetry, and philosophy of elder times.

The first immediate consequence of Constantine's conversion to Christianity, was a total revolution in the system of education and public instruction; the superintendence of mental cultivation being transferred to the clergy, though the rhetoricians and sophists, to whom the principal institutions of this kind in Athens, Antioch, and Ephesus, owed their celebrity, remained yet a while faithful to the ancient doc-

† Gibbon.

trine. Constantine caused theologians to instruct his sons in their science; and even the amusements of their youth were directed in a manner to render certain mechanical practices of devotion a matter to them of habit and necessity.

With the new mode of instruction was connected the diffusion of belief in the merit of celibacy, and a life of inactive contemplation; a belief which had been formerly very prevalent in the East, but had hitherto been greatly restricted in its range by the establishment of the Roman laws and customs. Love of country, fulfilment of civic duties, active use of property and personal endowments in the public service, had been extolled and recommended as the highest virtue. All regulations made since the time of Constantine were, however, framed in quite another spirit. In order to appreciate the bias of these times in relation to civil affairs and public-spirited actions, it is only necessary to cast a glance upon the writings of the friends and panegyrists of Constantine, whose voices were regarded by himself in some manner as divine oracles. Eusebius, a profoundly learned theologian, and at the same time a consummate courtier, says, "One description of Christians live a higher life than that of the founders of Greek and Roman freedom. This spiritual life and converse rise above human nature. He who has devoted himself to this manner of life knows nothing of marriage and procreation of children; nothing of acquisition and possession of exclusive property. In one word, he entirely departs from the ordinary manner of life; and, out of all-conquering love of God, devotes himself wholly to his service. He who has chosen out this life to himself; who is dead to the lower life of mankind; who lingers on earth with his body only, and dwells in thought and with his soul in the heavens, looks down on this world as though it were contemptuously, like a deity."

How humiliating a station was assigned to the laity in this comparative estimate of spiritual character, may be judged from the following passage of the same work. "*The lower class,*" it is there said, "lives in a manner more human (*ὁ ἑσποῖος ἀνθρώπωνωτερος*), contracts marriages, procreates children, cares for household concerns, engages in judicial business; and though even at the same time mindful of piety, carries on trade, agriculture, and other concerns of civil life; and for learning and hearing the word of God, has appointed certain fixed days only."

These dangerous maxims respecting the relative value of useful activity in affairs public and private, and of contemplative abstraction from both, might be harmless enough as an individual sentiment or doctrine; might even indeed be salutary, if applied in the proper place and manner; but they could not fail to produce effects the most mischievous, so soon as they were formally recognised by Constantine and laid down as a basis of political regulations. Constantine himself might have learned how pernicious in effect may be doctrines, which could not at that time be contested in theory, from the results of the experiment which he made in exempting the Christian clergy from the obligation of discharging onerous civil duties and public functions. The effect soon was, that people of property and influence, exactly

those, in short, who were alone able to execute offices requiring superintendence or outlay, took advantage of this law to avoid the honors and burthens of office, by entering the sacred profession. This abuse he endeavored to prevent by means of another law, which, if it had been carried into effect, would have been no less prejudicial to religion than to industry. He ordered that, in Italy, the poorer class only should be received into the Christian clergy; and all families capable of civil functions or wealthy enough to fill offices involving expense, should be excluded from the clerical order. However, notwithstanding the experience acquired in Italy, Constantine conceded in the province of Africa exemption from all public burthens, not only to the higher clergy, but even to readers and subdeacons, without limiting admission to the clerical order by any restriction; and, according to his own words in this very decree, he had already previously made the same regulation for the East. The consequence of such regulations were soon very perceptible. There every where arose a superabundance of monks, and all sorts of ecclesiastical functionaries; the deficiency which took place was in able and active public officers, in civil servants, and military defenders of their country. We find barbarians in all employments where energy was necessary.

The advance of the clergy in wealth attended their liberation from public burthens. It was presupposed, indeed, that the enriched clergy would provide for objects hitherto neglected by the state; by alms, by the establishment of charitable institutions, by hospitals, houses of reception for strangers and travellers, and Christian schools: It evinced, however, great short-sightedness to expect much good from sacerdotal administration in this department. The active or laborious citizen was impoverished to provide for the inert and slothful; the state devolved cares which appertained to itself on the clergy, which abused its powers only too soon; and monks and priests obtained just such an influence as in modern Spain over a mass of loiterers and beggars, women, and men resembling women. It is true, that almshouses and asylums for the aged and infirm poor, hospitals, and houses for the reception of strangers and orphans, were erected under priestly superintendence. The urgent need of such institutions is, however, a sure evidence of priestly rule and administration, which loves better to relieve the misery it helps to create, than to obviate its occurrence by means of strenuous and active exertion. We may conceive the influence gained by the body of clergy generally; the ease with which they contrived to turn their controversies and quarrels into a matter of supreme public importance; to direct against heretics and holders of erroneous tenets those energies which ought to have been employed against the foreign enemy: and to proscribe and persecute every free thought and independent spirit, when we view the number and extent of the charitable foundations which stood under their superintendence. Gregory of Nazianzen boasted, for example, of the famous preacher and rhetorician Basilus of Cæsarea, that he had set up an establishment of this description of such magnitude as might be likened to a town, and which was called Basilias after its founder.

As charitable gifts and foundations were encouraged by the popular

doctrine, which enjoined the sacrifice of outward goods for the good of the soul, and the renunciation of temporal in order to ensure eternal joys, so monastic habits also may be traced to the like origin. Whoever with the most rigor secluded himself from human society, satisfied none of the social duties, tortured himself with most ingenuity, was regarded as a saint; and the Christian penitents were sought out from all sides in the lonely regions whither they fled; their words were regarded as oracular, their acts as miraculous. These solitaries were spread over the whole East; and held in the higher honor, the more sternly they opposed themselves to every thing in the order of civil society that did not seem to correspond with their singular notions of Christian holiness. These pattern heroes of monkery were, by preference, selected for preferment to bishoprics, of which they were often in a manner constrained to the acceptance. The influence of the maxims of these men on the concerns of life was greatly increased, when Constantine withdrew them from the secular jurisdiction, and conceded to them one of their own.

The clergy would very gladly have introduced into the West the eastern fashion of freedom from all worldly sway and subordination. This, however, was too repugnant to the Roman laws and usages; they were forced to be content with certain favors and immunities. The ecclesiastical jurisdiction in affairs of this world took rise in the times previous to Constantine, and belonged to the first family arrangements of the Christian community. It was originally nothing more than a mode of arbitration. Both parties agreed to call in the teacher of their little community, the head of their assemblies, as the arbiter of their differences, without prejudicing the rights of the regular tribunals. After the time of Constantine the bishop's court became a kind of equity court, of which the jurisdiction, according to Sozomen, Constantine decreed should be recognised by the regular tribunals, and the judgments of which were without appeal. These innovations occasioned great abuses and grievous complaints. The more pious and upright of the bishops themselves complained of being burthened with a mass of worldly and legal business; the laity complained that the teachers of piety and humility set up claims to co-ordinate authority with the secular powers. The abuses which arose from these decrees of Constantine induced his successors to restrict the judicial competence of the bishops. The same pernicious effect which was produced by the reliance of Constantine on episcopal administration of justice, was enhanced by the outward marks of consideration which he paid to that order, and the precedence he assigned to them at court and in his private intercourse. Eusebius clearly indicates the rapid change effected by the transformation of bishops into dignitaries of state, when, in the passage where he states that Constantine invited the bishops to his table, and commonly took some of them about with him in travelling, he adds that these attentions were paid, *although* the bishops at that period were still extremely simple in their outward array. The apparel, the attendance, the whole exterior, in short of the order underwent no less change under Constantine than their tone of discourse, which became, instead of mild, humble, and apostolic, quarrelsome, disputatious, and

damnatory. The emperors were easily drawn into these theological controversies, by the assurance that they would merit divine favor by securing the ascendancy of the true faith by what means soever. From these imperial interferences in spiritual matters there resulted two evils, alike perilous to the church and the state;—the increase of the power and the authority of the bishops of Rome, and the incessant convocation of ecclesiastical assemblies under the denominations of special or general synods and councils.

The spirit of obscure and monkish speculation, indigenous to the East from time immemorial, was at this time ascendant in the Greek church. The same schools which, shortly before, had been fighting about letters and syllables, were now engaged on the delicate distinctions of the Arian controversy, and the mysterious *Homoousion* of the Nicene synod. There would be nothing strange in debates of this kind, even in our own times; but controversies of the sort did not stop within the walls of the schools: the laity took such vehement part in disputes on the barrenest points of doctrine, that the pagans delighted to turn their altercation into farce on the theatre. Arius and Alexander both made adherents to their opinions, and despatched incessant epistles and embassies to all united in their communion. Egypt also, the father-land of fanaticism, was torn to pieces by another contest—that of the Meletians. In the East, the proper time for the festival of Easter, and the doctrine of repentance and remission of sins, were made matter of endless altercation. From thenceforwards, especially after the death of Constantine, and under the government of his sons, the dispute whether the subtleties of Arius, or those of Athanasius, should prevail in the churches, was viewed as an affair of the highest importance to the empire. There was no end of councils, conferences, and assemblies: and the public treasury was exhausted to bear the expenses of these meetings, which, according to high ecclesiastical testimony in those times (that of the good bishop Gregory of Nazianzen), were rather hurtful than useful to Christianity.

The scandalous details of these ecclesiastical assemblies are, however, relieved by occasional traits, which show that independence of spirit, strength of soul and character, are never wholly lost among men, however wretched be the state of the times. The court which, since the days of Tiberius, had been accustomed to meet only adulation and meanness, now and then experienced opposition, at least from the Christian clergy; and the cause of humanity sometimes found intrepid defenders in monks and bishops.

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
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


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